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xForeword
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development sees poverty reduction in all its dimensions and inclusive growth as one of the world’s greatest challenge. The 17 Sustainable Development Goals for transforming our 
world include the universal agenda of implementing nationally appropriate 
social protection systems with substantial coverage for the poor and vulnerable, 
in recognition of the value of unpaid care and domestic work. This will be 
achieved through provision of public services and through the adoption of 
equitable policies within, and among, countries.
In the World Employment and Social Employment Outlook Trends 2016, the 
International Labour Organization suggested that a lack of decent jobs has 
resulted in more than 50.0% of workers turning to informal employment that 
results in low productivity and a volatile income. This problem is exacerbated 
in many developing countries in Asia by a gender divide in the availability and 
quality of jobs available to men and women. The new agenda calls for greater 
compliance with labor standards for those engaged in informal employment. 
Strategy 2020 of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) recognizes the 
demographic changes in the region’s population and the effect on the existing 
labor force, such as the need for adequate pension systems, health insurance, 
and flexible labor policies for populations in developing member countries. 
ADB’s Social Protection Operational Plan 2014–2020 also supports policy 
reforms that improve social insurance and pension schemes for both formal 
and informal sectors.
Social Protection for Informal Workers in Asia addresses social protection gaps 
ranging from issues of financing, design, governance, and political economy 
of social protection for informal workers in Asia. It presents various case 
studies from countries with distinct social protection systems and analyzes 
the institutional aspects and design challenges of each system. It also makes 
recommendations for improving program implementation and for expanding 
social protection systems for informal workers in Asia.
Foreword xi
It is our hope that this publication will identify practical solutions and guide 
policy responses that better address the needs of a growing informal economy 
in the region.
Ma. Carmela Locsin
Director General
Sustainable Development and Climate Change Department
Asian Development Bank
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1Overview
Sri Wening Handayani
Social Protection for Informal Workers in Asia
On the international stage, social protection has been increasingly recognized 
beyond the Millennium Development Goals and is now part of the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development, which brings it to the forefront of the 
development agenda.1 Specifically, these goals recognize that the needs of the 
poor and vulnerable groups must be addressed. 
Social protection—that is, policies and programs designed to reduce poverty 
and vulnerability by promoting efficient labor markets, diminishing people’s 
exposure to risks, and enhancing their capacity to protect themselves against 
hazards and interruption or loss of income—can improve the capacity of 
individuals, thereby contributing to the goal of inclusive, equitable, and 
sustainable economic growth (ADB 2001). Labor market programs are 
considered key elements of a social protection strategy, since only through 
work—not assistance—can people gain the capacity to provide for themselves 
and their families, exercise the right to make their own choices, and eventually 
become active members of the society in which they live. Enabling people to 
provide for themselves is the best formula for social protection, as well as for 
strengthening human capabilities and allocating social and economic resources 
more efficiently and equitably. 
However, few labor market programs play major roles in social protection in 
Asia, when a flexible definition of social protection incorporates both active 
and passive labor market programs. Traditional passive labor market programs, 
such as unemployment benefits and severance payments that mostly cover 
employees in the formal sector, are virtually nonexistent or ineffective in most 
Asian countries. 
1 Implementing nationally appropriate social protection systems through achieving substantial coverage 
of the poor and vulnerable is reflected in Goal 1, eradicating extreme poverty by 2030. Goal 5, on 
gender equality, recognizes the value of unpaid care and domestic work through social protection 
policy provision, while Goal 10, reducing inequality, includes adopting social protection policies for 
greater equality as one of its targets.
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In many countries in Asia, social protection benefits accrues mostly to well-
off households that can afford to make contributions to social insurance, and 
poor households that have some access to social assistance. A large number 
of households (missing middle) are neither covered by social insurance nor 
social assistance (ADB 2013). This missing middle usually works in the informal 
economy, placing themselves in a vulnerable group.
The informal sector comprises economic activity that functions outside of 
official institutional frameworks: a heterogeneous set of workers in income, 
employment status, and sector of activities.2 Migrants, women, and youth 
comprise much of Asia’s growing informal economy workforce; these persons 
do not have contracts, worker benefits, or adequate representation. Without 
proper documentation, the invisible status of these activities is not covered in 
the formal social protection system or in conventional labor force surveys. 
Informal employment is widespread in most developing countries; although 
associated with low productivity in low-income countries, it also contributes 
to nonagriculture gross domestic product (WIEGO).3 While some of the very 
poor are engaged in subsistence activities, some informal workers also have 
profitable business ventures. Informal employment includes an estimated 
60.0% of the workforce in the Asia and Pacific region (ILO)4 and as much as 
90.0% in South Asia and Southeast Asia (ILO 2014a). 
Yet today, informal workers in Asia are increasingly vulnerable, occupying 
hazardous, low-income jobs with poor working conditions. Despite this 
increased risk and susceptibility, only 27.0% of the global population has access 
to comprehensive social protection systems (ILO 2014b). Less than 25.0% of 
the working population in Asia and the Pacific is covered by social insurance, 
such as pensions or health care benefits (PEP 2013). Social insurance is mostly 
geared toward formal sector employees and remains difficult to attain for 
countries with a huge informal sector (ADB 2013). 
Increasing social protection access and coverage to the informal sector can lead 
to a number of benefits. First, social protection can increase workers’ access to 
credit, education, new technologies, and markets, raising the sector’s productive 
potential. Second, protective instruments can provide vulnerable workers with 
increased security and dignity, help them invest in future generations, and 
2 For example, they function outside of existing labor regulations or fiscal obligations of enterprises that 
require registration or licensing.
3 Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO). Links with Growth. http://
wiego.org/informal-economy/links-growth
4 International Labour Organization (ILO). Informal Economy in Asia and the Pacific. http://www.ilo.org/
asia/areas/informal-economy/lang--en/index.htm
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improve their chances to escape poverty. Third, spending and consumption 
among members of the informal economy can stimulate economic growth 
and promote social cohesion. Fourth, economic activity of the informal sector 
can generate greater demand and support entrepreneurship. Fifth, inclusion 
of untaxed workers’ wages in the formal institutional framework can ease the 
burden of social protection financing.
This publication reflects 2 years of research and consultation to build strategies 
for expanding coverage of social protection to informal workers in Asia. The 
first four chapters present the conceptual framework of expanding social 
protection for informal workers by discussing four different themes (design 
and delivery, financing, political economy, and governance), assess social 
protection coverage, identify practical programs, and recommend policy 
solutions to expand social protection schemes for informal workers in Asia. 
These chapters also offer suggestions to close social protection gaps and to 
explain the challenges and constraints of setting up a social protection system 
for informal workers within the larger economic and institutional context of 
countries in Asia. 
Chapter 1 examines general challenges in the design and delivery of social 
protection systems for informal workers. The authors raise two important 
challenges in designing and implementing social protection programs for 
informal workers at the program level: long-term fiscal sustainability and 
heterogeneity of the informal sector. There are also administrative and fiscal 
constraints when implementing social protection programs for informal 
workers in Asia, including limited human and technical resources. To address 
these constraints, program monitoring and evaluation should inform design, 
implementation, or expansion of new programs. The authors also recommend 
a single-registry management information system to coordinate targeting and 
to benefit delivery, monitoring, and evaluation of social protection systems that 
cover informal workers. 
Social protection coverage can also be extended by having complementary 
programs that are implemented within the context of an overall social protection 
framework. Designing complementary frameworks—the life cycle approach to 
provide coverage across all age groups alongside the development planning 
approach to deepen and maximize overall development impact—provides 
continuous coverage and fewer coverage gaps. Innovative solutions, such as 
partnerships with microfinance institutions and community organizations, can 
also increase access to social protection in the region. 
Chapter 2 estimates current social protection expenditure in the informal 
sector by analyzing 20 developing countries in Asia and identifies financing 
options for closing coverage gaps. The study reveals that in the majority of the 
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20 Asian countries that were sampled, at least a basic level of social protection 
for all appears affordable without causing high levels of taxation. In fact, the 
authors find that the major gaps in the protection of the informal sector can 
be closed with only about 2.0%–3.0% of GDP. Financing social protection for 
all requires possible reallocation of existing expenditure within the government 
or national budget, improving tax collection and savings, or increasing taxation.
Chapter 3 explores the link between political economy and low social protection 
coverage. The authors argue that social insurance and poverty-targeted 
schemes are ineffective in reaching the majority of the informal sector and 
cite reasons of political economy, such as the widespread belief in the family’s 
role as the main provider of social protection or the use of social protection 
for patronage or political settlement by elites, to explain the lack of social 
protection coverage. The authors argue that as democracy strengthens in the 
region and political parties become more resolute in using social protection to 
win a majority of the electorate, there will be a movement toward more inclusive 
life cycle social protection schemes. 
Chapter 4 examines the effect of governance at the system and program levels, 
on the service delivery outcomes of social protection systems, particularly 
social assistance programs, which are the primary means of support for informal 
workers in Asia. The author argues that extending social protection coverage 
to the informal sector, or closing social protection gaps, requires a long-term 
effort to address broad governance issues at the national level, including setting 
service quality standards for programs, developing a well-coordinated system 
for effective service delivery, and improving institutional arrangements in 
program design. 
The author recommends that program design for social protection should be 
accompanied by a feasibility assessment of government agency resources and 
capacities that include availability of financial resources, staff, and equipment. 
Equitable social protection provision needs streamlined financial arrangements 
with a transparent mechanism for fiscal transfers from the central government. 
At the same time, central government involvement in eligibility criteria and 
benefit calculation should be accompanied by local adjustments in service 
provision to promote program inclusiveness and equity. The author further 
suggests horizontal accountability, or effective oversight and enforcement 
of the rule of law at the program level, to improve governance and feedback. 
Political commitment and adequate administrative and implementation 
capacity also strengthen national agencies’ ability to establish effective 
government mechanisms for social protection programs.
The succeeding chapters are case studies of various Asian countries—
Bangladesh, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Indonesia, Pakistan, and 
the Philippines. These case studies explore the variety of policies and initiatives 
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relating to social protection in the informal sector in the region. Specifically, 
a large number of micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) are 
informal (ADB 2014), and an estimated 80.0% of all enterprises in developing 
countries are informal firms, with South Asia, East Asia, and Pacific island 
countries having the highest number of informal MSMEs (IFC 2013). The last 
case study also presents lessons learned in overcoming barriers and addressing 
gender dimensions in universal health care for informal workers in India and 
Thailand.
Surveys, covering specific policy areas where most MSME workers lack social 
protection coverage, were conducted in these countries. Further analyses 
consisted of desk reviews, focus group discussions, and key informant interviews 
with respondents from various sectors—construction, services, manufacturing, 
and wholesale and retail trade (including self-employed and industrial 
home-based workers, employers, and government agencies) across the 
countries. These case studies present the challenges of informal workers and 
suggest interventions to inform design and implementation and to improve 
coverage of social protection for informal workers. 
Chapter 5 presents a case study of Pakistan as a country that lacks adequate 
social protection coverage, with most informal workers unrecognized by official 
policies and in need of better labor protection and social welfare. Informal 
workers in Pakistan often earn around, or even below, the legal minimum wage. 
Women are particularly vulnerable because they are largely concentrated in 
the informal sector in home-based work and have lower overall average wages 
than their male counterparts. The author argues that beyond short-term safety 
nets or targeted social assistance, government support is needed to provide 
some basic level of economic security in terms of wages or regularity of work. 
She recommends including budgetary expansions into the government’s 
medium-term framework to allow social protection provision for informal 
workers, creating training programs to reach informal workers with little 
education, hiring from registered contractors to provide incentives to register, 
and linking registration with computerized identity cards to gather information 
on informal workers and to extend social protection coverage. The author 
further encourages the increased participation of informal workers and civil 
society organizations in collective bargaining to improve representation—and 
thus benefits—of informal workers.
The PRC is another case study presented in Chapter 6, because it has a wide 
social protection system, and the government functions as the main provider 
of social protection. The authors find that despite this system, benefit levels 
are low. Informal workers, the majority of whom are migrants, have difficulty 
accessing social protection programs due to the hukou registration system (the 
official registry of residents at their place of birth). Social insurance for residents 
is also limited and disadvantages migrant workers who can only participate in 
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their place of hukou, not where they have migrated. Further, the initial design 
of the social insurance system for formal workers, which was later extended 
to informal workers, can be too expensive for informal workers receiving lower 
wages. The high rates of social insurance contributions required of employers 
also make it difficult for MSMEs to comply with social insurance laws and labor 
contracts. The authors thus recommend policy adjustments in social insurance 
programs for MSMEs, such as reforming the PRC’s laws requiring participation in 
all five social insurance programs simultaneously, allowing employees to opt out 
of individual programs, and requiring lower contributions of MSME employees. 
They also suggest that benefit levels should be recalculated, thus allowing 
informal workers to participate in social protection programs for residents.
Chapter 7 presents the need for a well-designed social protection system in 
Bangladesh to facilitate information sharing and implementation among 
various government agencies responsible for social protection, and to avoid 
current program duplication and patchwork solutions. The informal sector, too, 
faces structural challenges, such as the informal status of employees and their 
corresponding lack of social protection coverage, the absence of employment 
contracts acting as disincentives for employers to offer social protection 
programs, and the weak administration of labor law and regulations. The author 
urges the establishment of a comprehensive social protection framework along 
with a national social protection strategy to ensure the economic viability of 
MSMEs, the heart of the country’s economy. Coordination of social protection 
programs among government agencies must also be improved through better 
monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to determine program impact. Active 
political support would also help ensure better enforcement of labor law, as 
would a redesign of existing policies to upgrade systems of labor inspection.
Chapter 8 turns to the low participation rates of MSME workers for social 
protection programs (e.g., pension and health insurance) in Indonesia, finding 
various constraints that limit informal worker participation. These include 
low awareness of social protection programs and registration procedures, 
regulations that limit the obligation of firms to provide employment insurance 
for workers, lack of coordination in regulatory enforcement, and strict 
requirements for claiming benefits. The irregular income of informal workers 
and the financial incapacity of MSMEs contribute to employer and employee 
unwillingness to pay insurance premiums. Almost half of informal workers are 
not covered by health insurance; the extent of employment insurance coverage 
among informal sector workers is even lower. The Jaminan Sosial Tenaga Kerja 
(Jamsostek) microinsurance scheme, for instance, covers only 0.6% of all 
workers. The authors state that expanding the participation of social insurance 
programs in Indonesia requires more simplified registration and collection 
methods. Improved coordination among government line ministries would 
also help ensure employer compliance with existing labor regulations. MSME 
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empowerment, through better access to financial services and skills training, 
can further help facilitate workers’ participation in social protection programs. 
Chapter 9 shows that nearly half of MSME workers in the Philippines are 
nonmembers of the mandatory health insurance scheme, and rates of social 
security coverage among industrial home-based workers and self-employed 
respondents are extremely low. While low social security coverage is due to 
a lack of awareness of program benefits and unaffordable premiums, low 
coverage for MSME workers results from dependence on employers to register 
them for social protection programs and weak enforcement of labor laws. 
Informal employment is also found in formal enterprises, particularly where 
legal enforcement of employee protection is weak or absent. The author thus 
recommends intensifying information campaigns on participation benefits, 
partially subsidizing insurance premiums for informal workers, providing 
unemployment benefits for a defined period, and improving coordination 
among government agencies to support a movement toward universal social 
protection coverage.
The last case study, in Chapter 10, focuses on gender dimensions and health 
care, comparing the different models of health care systems in India and 
Thailand. The authors note that increasing access to information on preventive 
measures, and addressing systemic problems in the health system, such as 
creating more efficient public health services, can improve the health care 
access of informal workers, especially women. The authors conclude that 
universal health care is an achievable goal for countries at any income level, but 
this requires strong political commitment and a collaborative effort among civil 
society, informal worker representatives, and technocrats. 
The growing informal sector in Asia lacks social protection coverage and needs 
innovative solutions that can reduce risks, mitigate impacts of crises, and ensure 
income security to the majority of the working population, particularly those 
involved with MSMEs. While each country is unique in terms of its institutional, 
political, and social context, the same policy guidelines apply whether it is a 
call to improve fiscal sustainability, streamline administrative procedures, or 
design simpler delivery systems. This publication posits that extending social 
protection coverage to informal workers is financially feasible and, with good 
governance, coordinated systems, and political will, better social protection 
programs can be created that are equitable and inclusive for both employers 
and informal workers in the region.
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9CHAPTER 1
Designing and Delivering  
Social Protection Programs  
for Informal Sector Workers  
in Asia
Michael Samson and Kaleigh Kenny
Abstract
Challenges in designing and delivering social protection systems that extend to informal sector workers arise not only from informal sector workers’ lack of access to traditional forms of social protection, but more 
generally from the heterogeneity of the sector itself. As a result, social protection 
programs that target informal sector workers must employ more creative and 
active forms of outreach than those used by formal sector programs.
The success of social protection initiatives depends not only on their ability to 
protect beneficiaries from the negative impacts of the risks and vulnerabilities 
that they face, but also on their ability to facilitate achievement of broader 
development objectives such as equity, social inclusion, and fiscal sustainability. 
This requires coordinated effort at numerous levels of social protection policy 
formulation and implementation. Providing guidance on how social protection 
systems—regardless of whether these target formal or informal sector 
workers—should be conceptualized, formulated, and implemented requires 
a comprehensive approach that addresses requisite actions at the policy, 
program, and administrative levels. 
At the policy level, coordination is required among social protection policy and 
social protection programs, their sources of financing, and their institutional 
arrangements. At the program level, coordination is also needed between 
social protection programs that fulfill the surveys, covering specific policy areas 
where most micro, small, and medium-sized enterprise (MSME) workers lack 
social protection coverage, as well as programs that are complementary. Such 
coordination is required if coverage gaps are to be reduced and the impact of all 
social protection interventions deepened. The administrative level is the basic 
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level of provision of social protection. It encompasses the day-to-day tasks of 
ensuring adherence to program design and implementing efficient, effective, 
and accessible delivery systems. The formulation and implementation of 
social protection programs for informal sector workers is often hampered by 
administrative and fiscal capacity constraints, as well as by the limitations 
of human and technical resources. However, despite limited capacity for 
administration and evaluation, it is very encouraging that several countries in 
Asia are able to design and implement effective social protection programs that 
target informal sector workers. 
Introduction
Ensuring the availability of social protection to Asia’s large and growing informal 
sector labor force is one of the region’s major social policy challenges. As the 
informal sector comprises all economic activity that remains outside of the 
official institutional framework, it spans a broad spectrum of employment 
that includes street vendors, home-based workers, self-employed workers, 
and workers who are paid wages. For the most part, formal social protection 
programs, such as contributory pensions, health insurance, unemployment 
insurance, or disability benefits, do not cover these individuals. 
The informal sector comprises an estimated 40.0%–50.0% of Asia’s total labor 
force, with estimates reaching as high as 90.0% in some countries (Unni and 
Rani 2003). While informal sector workers account for a significant share of the 
region’s overall workforce, most are not covered by social protection programs, 
as these are more easily extended to the formally employed. Innovative design, 
targeting, and implementation of social protection programs adapted to the 
conditions of the informal sector are thus necessary to address the current 
exclusion of this large—yet nearly invisible—labor force from the formal social 
protection system.
Challenges in designing and delivering social protection systems that extend 
to informal sector workers arise not only from their lack of access to traditional 
forms of social protection, but more generally from the heterogeneity of the 
sector itself. In short, the difficulties faced by governments in providing social 
protection to workers who lack requisite registration and documentation are 
compounded by the fact that the informal sector varies widely across industry 
lines, types of organizations, geographic locations, and salary ranges. The 
design of social protection programs that meet the requirements implicit in 
such heterogeneity must cover the informal sector’s entire range of activities 
and individuals. Further, social protection programs and systems that target this 
significant segment of the overall labor force must also employ more creative 
and active forms of outreach than those used by formal sector programs.
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The nature of informal sector employment differs substantially from that in the 
formal sector. Lacking contracts and documentation, workers in the informal 
economy face high levels of income and job insecurity, and are often subject to 
dangerous or unhealthy work environments. Further, if an individual becomes 
sick or injured working under these conditions, he or she has no access to 
income replacement through guaranteed unemployment or employment 
injury benefits. Comprehensive approaches to mitigating such risks and to 
promoting inclusive growth are required if social protection systems are to 
adequately respond to the specific conditions of informal sector workers and 
the vulnerabilities that they face. 
This chapter addresses considerations that must be taken into account 
when designing and implementing social protection programs and systems 
for informal sector workers in Asia. However, as the chapter addresses social 
protection systems that respond to contingencies that are likely to occur at the 
various stages of life regardless of the employment status of an individual, it 
does not exclude references to programs that benefit the formal sector labor 
force. This chapter perceives social protection as a requisite component of the 
overall development effort and social protection for informal sector workers as 
a subset of that component. 
Providing guidance on how social protection systems—regardless of whether 
these target formal or informal sector workers—should be conceptualized, 
formulated, and implemented requires a comprehensive approach that 
addresses requisite actions at the policy, program, and administrative levels. 
In addition to policy and program considerations as these relate to social 
protection, the quality of day-to-day administration of social protection 
programs greatly affects the degree to which these programs result in their 
intended beneficial impacts. 
This chapter details best practices at each level of design and implementation 
of social protection programs as a means of offering guidance on how these 
programs can best serve the requirements of informal sector workers. It thus 
incorporates examples of social protection programs and systems that address 
the vulnerabilities faced by informal sector workers in Asia. 
The Informal Sector in Asia
The degree to which social protection is provided to informal sector workers 
varies widely across Asia. The factors that account for this variation include 
(i) share of the informal sector in the total labor force, (ii) amount of resources 
devoted to social protection, (iii) nature and design of social protection policy, 
and (iv) level of effort devoted to providing social protection to the most 
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excluded members of society (Kabeer et al. 2010). There is similarly wide 
variation in the social protection programs and benefit delivery methods used 
to address the specific needs of informal sector workers. 
Broadly speaking, the informal sector comprises all economic activity that 
remains outside of the official institutional framework. Given this definition, 
informalization of the workforce can occur through self-employment, wage 
work in enterprises in both the formal and informal sectors, or home-based 
work. In 2003, the 17th International Conference of Labour Statisticians 
broadly defined the informal sector to include (i) own-account workers 
who work in their own informal sector enterprises; (ii) employers who work 
in their own informal sector enterprises, and contributing family members; 
(iii)  members of informal producers’ cooperatives; (iv) employees holding 
informal sector jobs as defined by the employment relationship; and 
(v) own-account workers engaged in the production of food for final use by 
their own household (Rys 2013). Such a definition encompasses all workers 
outside of the formal regulatory environment, and therefore outside of the 
typical coverage of social services, rather than workers who are simply employed 
by informal sector enterprises or who work without employment contracts. 
This definition has broad implications for the design and coverage of social 
protection systems.
There is wide variation in the level of informality in labor markets across 
Asia’s subregions and countries. East Asian countries have benefited from 
substantial economic growth in recent years, and have thus seen increasing 
levels of formalization of their labor markets. In contrast, while Southeast Asian 
countries are projected to experience substantial employment growth over the 
coming years, this growth has been coupled with a continued high incidence 
of vulnerable employment (i.e., 59.0% of all employment in 2013). Vulnerable 
employment comprises informal sector employment that lacks an income or 
employment guarantee, home-based work, and uncompensated household 
work, the latter disproportionately characterizing employment of women in 
the region (i.e., 63.1% for women as compared with 56.0% for men in 2013) 
(ILO 2014). 
In South Asia, the informal sector accounts for a relatively large share of the 
total labor market. For example, during 2009–2010, informal employment 
comprised 83.6% of all nonagriculture employment in India, and 78.4% in 
Pakistan, with similar corresponding figures for other South Asian countries.5 
Such heavy reliance on the informal sector suggests a high level of income and 
employment insecurity in South Asia, a situation further exacerbated by low 
5 ILO. Women and Men in the Informal Economy—Statistical Picture. http:// laborsta.ilo.org/informal 
_economy_E.html
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labor force participation rates, in large part due to differences in rates between 
genders. For example, while the region’s total labor force participation rate was 
56.1% in 2012, it was 80.6% for men but only 30.4% for women (ILO 2014). 
Such statistics demonstrate that women are more likely than men to engage in 
uncompensated work at home, which is a form of vulnerable employment since 
women’s autonomy within a household or community is lessened by their lack 
of an independent income source. 
Thus, in tandem with expansion of the informal sector in many parts of 
developing Asia, the share of women and youth employed in the informal sector 
has increased. One component of the informal sector driving this trend is growth 
in subcontracted home-based work in manufacturing and services (Mehrotra 
and Biggeri 2002). While an increase in home-based work simultaneously 
encourages development of microenterprises by women, contractors looking 
to cut costs by outsourcing product manufacturing or service delivery also tend 
to exploit home-based workers. This outcome has caused the relative income 
and living standards of informal sector workers to deteriorate, as it diminishes 
their bargaining power with respect to wage offers (Kudva and Benería 2005). 
Youth are also disproportionately represented in the informal economy 
(Rys 2013). As individuals are increasingly able to work into their later years, 
fewer opportunities are left for youth who lack the requisite experience and 
skills for procuring formal sector employment. Their only alternative is work 
in the informal sector. However, engaging in low-skills activities may limit 
the opportunities available to youth for finding more productive forms of 
employment later in life. 
The 90th Session of the International Labour Conference identified the lack of 
representation and rights in the workplace and lack of social protection as key 
decent work deficits in the informal economy (Shrestha 1991). These deficits 
are due to the informal sector operating outside of legislation, such as factory 
or commercial acts and tax or social security laws (Chen, Jhabvala, and Lund 
2001). This causes informal sector workers to be more vulnerable to shocks 
arising from job and income insecurity and unsafe working conditions. It makes 
them more vulnerable to contingencies such as illness, injury, or death. From 
a fiscal perspective, ultimate inclusion of untaxed workers’ wages in the social 
protection system would greatly ease the financing of social protection, as 
an insufficient tax base can diminish both the number and coverage of social 
protection initiatives. 
Although there are vast differences between most formal and informal sector 
enterprises, the two are often inextricably linked, as most segments of the 
informal economy have connections to production, trade, and services in the 
formal economy (Chen, Jhabvala, and Lund 2001). This notwithstanding, 
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informal sector workers do not benefit from the rights afforded to those who 
work in the formal sector. 
Designing and Delivering Social Protection 
Programs for Informal Sector Workers:  
The Policy Level
The primary goal of providing social protection to informal sector workers is to 
ensure that all individuals are able to access decent forms of work that sustain 
their livelihoods throughout their life cycles. Further, social protection can 
guarantee a minimum level of income and dignity that allows informal sector 
workers better protection against income shocks and other vulnerabilities. 
The success of social protection initiatives depends not only on their ability to 
protect beneficiaries from the negative impacts of the risks and vulnerabilities 
that they face, but on their ability to achieve broader development objectives as 
well, such as equity, social inclusion, and fiscal sustainability. As a result, social 
protection initiatives should focus on outcomes and establish incentives for 
beneficiaries that help ensure that these outcomes are achieved rather than 
narrowly perceiving social protection as a purely humanitarian initiative. 
Achieving the above objectives requires coordinated effort at various levels 
of social protection policy formulation and implementation. Figure 1.1 depicts 
these levels of operation of social protection policy. At the policy level, 
coordination is required between social protection policy on one hand and the 
social protection programs implemented, their sources of financing, and their 
institutional arrangements on the other. 
At the level of the individual social protection program, coordination is 
required among social protection programs that fulfill the same function, as 
well as programs that are complementary. Such coordination at the program 
level is required if coverage gaps are to be reduced and the impact of all such 
interventions deepened. The administrative level—which is the basic level of 
provision of social protection—encompasses the day-to-day tasks of ensuring 
adherence to program design and implementing effective and accessible 
delivery systems. 
At the policy level, the primary task of formulating and operating social 
protection programs is embedding social protection into a system of coordinated 
financing and institutional arrangements. This requires the cooperation of many 
government ministries and numerous sources of financing. 
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Unfortunately, this contrasts sharply with the current state of affairs at the policy 
level, in which provision of social protection is often hampered by fragmentation 
and inefficiency. This could be mitigated if the national government employs a 
framework for coordinating social protection initiatives and clearly defines the 
objectives of each program within a wider set of development objectives. Two 
frameworks are described below that can be used by national governments to 
establish coordinated, efficient social protection systems. 
Life Cycle Approach 
The life cycle approach to formulating social protection systems assumes that 
individuals face different risks and vulnerabilities at different stages of life, and 
that social protection can be designed in a way that addresses the risks that 
dominate each stage. This approach defines a life cycle as a period in which an 
individual’s level of vulnerability is constant, and the composition of the risks 
that the individual faces remains unchanged. An individual thus enters a new life 
cycle “when the set of risks and certainties that define the level of vulnerability 
changes in a positive or negative way” (Bonilla-García and Gruat 2003). Thus, 
life cycle changes that result from negative shocks in social or economic status 
cause an individual to enter a new life cycle marked by an increased level of risk. 
Social protection instruments can protect individuals from negative life cycle 
changes. They can also adjust an individual’s livelihood in a way that makes 
Figure 1.1: Three Levels of Formulation and Operation  
of Social Protection Systems
Policy Level
Program Level
Administrative Level
Source: L. Rawlings and S. Murthy. 2013. Common Ground: UNICEF and World Bank Approaches to 
Building Social Protection Systems. http://www.unicef.org/socialpolicy/files/UNICEF-WB_systems_
note_formatted.pdf
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the current phase of the life cycle less prone to vulnerability. Provision of 
social protection throughout the life cycle even has positive impacts on 
nonbeneficiaries within households. For example, available evidence suggests 
that providing social pensions increases expenditure on children within 
pensioner households (Willmore and Kidd 2008). 
Figure 1.2 depicts contingencies and risks that emerge during an individual’s 
life cycle. To a significant extent, social protection can mitigate the shocks that 
result from such contingencies.
Figure 1.2: Contingencies and Risks at Various Stages  
of a Life Cycle
Source: S. Kidd and C. de Paz. 2014. Report on Visit to Viet Nam to Support the Development of the 
Master Plan for Social Assistance Reform. New York: United Nations Development Programme.
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•	Malnutrition
•	Loss of parent
•	 Inadequate skills
•	Unemployment
•	Training inaccessible
•	Alienation
•	Early motherhood
•	 Increasing frailty
•	 Inability to work
•	No care from family
•	Discrimination in 
labor force •	Unemployment and 
underemployment
•	 Inadequate wages, 
excessive debt
•	Need to care for children 
and/or parents
•	Gender discrimination
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Many countries have integrated the life cycle approach into national social 
protection planning. For example, Bangladesh’s National Social Protection 
Strategy addresses contingencies during childhood, school age, working age, 
and old age, and also provides social protection for persons with disabilities 
(Planning Commission, Government of Bangladesh 2014). 
The life cycle approach to social protection is particularly effective in 
addressing the needs of informal sector workers who often face vulnerabilities 
and risks greater than their formal sector counterparts. This is because the 
life cycle approach allows the forms of social protection to be tailored to the 
vulnerabilities of particular demographic groups. Further, because the life cycle 
approach ensures that individuals are provided continuous coverage during all 
stages of life, it improves the level of social protection provided to the overall 
population.
Development Planning Approach 
The development planning approach helps governments maximize the linkages 
between social protection and other components of the overall development 
effort such as education, health care, and provision of infrastructure. The 
assumption underlying the development planning approach is that the 
beneficial impact of social protection interventions at the household and 
community levels are maximized when they are integrated into the overall 
development planning framework. Embedding social protection into overall 
social and economic planning requires policy coordination at all levels of 
government, as well as between government and nongovernment entities such 
as service providers. 
The development planning matrix (Figure 1.3) depicts the impacts of social 
protection and related development objectives, as well as how these impacts 
can be maximized by integrating social protection into the overall development 
planning agenda. The three types of social protection initiatives (social 
assistance, social insurance, and labor market programs) form a subset of the 
policy instruments that comprise inputs into the development planning matrix. 
These three types of social protection initiatives directly address the needs 
of informal sector workers. However, they also contribute to beneficial social 
and economic development outcomes, which form the overall policy outputs 
presented in the right-hand column of the matrix. 
Integrated development planning through incorporating social protection 
for informal sector workers into overall development objectives allows these 
instruments to contribute to the achievement of overall development goals 
such as poverty alleviation, management of social risk, social inclusion, and 
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human capital development. Thus, integrating social protection into the 
overall development effort links it with other development objectives, as it 
facilitates human capital development, livelihood development, and inclusive 
economic growth. 
The development planning matrix defines inputs as government policies, 
programs, and instruments that further national policy objectives (i.e., outputs). 
It thus emphasizes the linkages within and between sectors. The box shaded 
in the first quadrant shows how intrasector linkages (i.e., linkages between 
social protection initiatives) mutually strengthen the impact of all other social 
protection initiatives taken together in a way that facilitates achievement 
of social protection objectives. For example, when social transfers finance 
contributions to social health insurance for destitute households, household 
members are protected against catastrophic health shocks, for which simple 
cash transfers would be inadequate. 
Social protection initiatives also facilitate achievement of policy objectives in 
other sectors, such as promoting inclusive economic growth. Thus, a national 
coordinating mechanism that plans, prioritizes, and integrates social protection 
policies and initiatives in a coordinated fashion also deepens the impact of 
all social protection initiatives taken together. It does this by maximizing the 
Figure 1.3: Development Planning Matrix
Source: Authors.
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likelihood of achieving social protection policy objectives, while at the same 
time minimizing associated risks and costs. 
The development planning framework also recognizes the potential for intersector 
impacts. For example, social protection programs that operate at the individual 
and household levels can complement one other, thus producing synergies 
that produce broader beneficial macroeconomic impacts. The Government of 
Indonesia recognizes the benefits of such synergies. As a result, it has delegated 
all aspects of development planning including social protection to the Ministry 
of National Development Planning (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional 
[BAPPENAS]). BAPPENAS is responsible for ensuring coherence between 
institutional arrangements and financing that relate to social protection, as 
well as ensuring coherence among all development initiatives in Indonesia. It 
is also responsible for coordinating development partner and donor funding 
of all development initiatives, including those that relate to social protection 
(BAPPENAS, Government of Indonesia 2016).
Benefit Portability
One of the most pressing policy objectives for social protection coverage for 
informal workers in Asia is benefit portability or “the ability to preserve, maintain, 
and transfer vested social security rights or rights in the process of being 
vested, independent of nationality and country of residence” (Avato, Koettl, 
and Sabates-Wheeler 2009). Portability of social protection benefits provides 
coverage to migrants, either by allowing them to access social protection 
benefits from their home country while abroad, or by obtaining access to social 
protection measures in their country of residence. Benefit portability minimizes 
the vulnerabilities that migrant workers face, thus protecting their basic human 
and social rights. 
The importance of establishing portable social protection benefits has become 
clear in recent years. Adopted at the 12th Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations Summit, the 2007 Declaration of the Promotion and Protection of 
the Rights of Migrant Workers includes provisions for promoting the welfare 
and upholding the dignity of migrant workers (Avato, Koettl, and Sabates-
Wheeler 2009). This declaration recognizes that migrant workers have limited 
access to formal social protection benefits, thus ratifying the need for portable 
social protection benefits. Moreover, the declaration serves as a framework 
for designing portable social protection programs for all workers in the region, 
including those who work in the informal sector (Pasadilla 2011). 
Ultimately, labor migration benefits both the country of origin and the receiving 
country. The country of origin benefits from foreign exchange remittances, 
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while the receiving country benefits from access to affordable labor. Yet little 
has been done to provide social protection for migrant populations, particularly 
those working in the informal sector. 
Agreements do exist for protecting formal sector workers in some countries in 
Asia. For example, Thailand extends social protection rights to legal migrants 
from Cambodia. Similarly, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic gives work 
permits to legal migrants from Cambodia for 2 years, extendable to 4 years 
(Samydorai 2012). Canada, Caribbean Community countries and areas, 
and New Zealand provide further examples of portable social protection 
benefits. Table 1.1 summarizes examples of social protection benefit portability 
worldwide. Although these examples primarily refer to formal sector workers, 
they can guide extension of such coverage to informal sector workers, including 
undocumented (and possibly illegal) informal sector migrant workers (Hall, 
Manajit, and Nga Na 2011).
Ensuring Coherence at the Policy Level
Coherence of social protection initiatives at the national policy level requires 
all social protection programs to be integrated, both with regard to their 
institutional arrangements and their financing. However, many of the region’s 
national social protection systems are fragmented, which in turn causes gaps in 
coverage and system inefficiencies. 
A number of government agencies—typically at different levels of government—
implement social protection initiatives. As a result, these agencies often derive 
their funding from different sources. Without adequate communication 
between these agencies, parallel social protection programs often provide 
similar benefits to different geographic areas. This typically deprives some areas 
of the country of social protection coverage altogether; alternatively, it results 
in minimal coverage. 
Thailand’s social protection system provides an example of such fragmentation. 
Numerous government agencies are involved in programming and funding 
social initiatives in Thailand. These initiatives include the government 
officials’ pension system, Government Pension Fund, Civil Servant Medical 
Benefit Scheme, Workmen’s Compensation Fund, Social Security Fund, 
Private School Teacher Welfare Fund, Universal Coverage Scheme (UCS), 
Universal Non-Contributory Allowance for People with Disabilities, Universal 
Non-Contributory Allowance for Older People, Compulsory Migrant Health 
Insurance Scheme, and Education for All Policy (UN/RTG 2013). Similarly, 
Bangladesh implements more than 95 social protection programs, funded and 
administered by 30 different government ministries; however, no mechanism 
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Table 1.1: Portable Social Protection Programs  
for Formal Sector Workers
Program Description
Mahatma Gandhi 
Pravasi Suraksha Yojana, 
India (Pension and 
Life Insurance Fund 
Scheme)
The scheme allows citizens employed overseas under 
formal contracts to access social protection benefits 
upon repatriation. These benefits include (i) savings for 
return and resettlement, (ii) contributions to an old-age 
pension, and (iii) life insurance coverage against natural 
death. 
Overseas Workers 
Welfare Administration, 
Philippines 
This agency provides a broad range of services including 
(i) regulation of recruitment, (ii) predeparture training 
and information, (iii) repatriation and financing 
assistance, and (iv) support for family members left 
behind. The program is fully funded by a mandatory 
membership fee of $25.00 per contract for temporary 
migrant workers. This membership fee is mostly paid by 
the migrant, but can also be paid by his or her employer.
Seasonal Agricultural 
Worker Program, 
Canada 
The program offers migrants the same social protection 
rights as national workers. Employers participate in 
designing and implementing the program. 
Recognized Seasonal 
Employers Scheme, 
New Zealand
This program is mutually beneficial to New Zealand's 
horticulture and viticulture sectors, as well as to Pacific 
island workers. It ensures a secure labor supply to  
these sectors, while allowing workers from Pacific island 
countries to repatriate with both work experience and 
remittances. The program's monitoring and evaluation 
component has helped improve the design and operation 
of departure training, as well as the below-expectation 
savings rates of migrants.
Caribbean Community 
Reciprocal Agreement
This agreement qualifies legal migrant workers for the 
maximum pension benefits. It also allows them to claim 
workers’ compensation and unemployment benefits. 
Sixteen Caribbean Community states have ratified the 
agreement.
Sources: R. Holzmann and Y. Pouget. 2010. Social Protection for Temporary Migrant Workers: Conceptual 
Framework, Country Inventory, Assessment and Guidance. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTECA/
Resources/tmporaryMigrantWorkers.pdf; Ministry of Overseas India Affairs, Government of India. 
Mahatma Gandhi Pravasi Suraksha Yojana (MGPSY). http://www.moia.gov.in/services.aspx?id1=409&id= 
m12&idp=409&mainid=73
exists for coordinating between these programs or ministries (Planning 
Commission, Government of Bangladesh 2014). 
In many of the region’s developing countries, consolidating the social protection 
function by involving fewer ministries or finding ways to improve coordination 
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between ministries would progress both the coverage and efficiency of social 
protection, without adding to the fiscal burden of the country. Another solution 
is to make a single government agency responsible for overall coordination and 
efficiency of the social protection system, as in Indonesia with BAPPENAS. Thus, 
although Indonesia’s social protection programs are implemented by a number 
of government ministries, making BAPPENAS responsible for coordinating 
these efforts mitigates the adverse effects of program fragmentation (Satriana 
and Schmitt 2012). 
Designing and Delivering Social Protection 
Programs for Informal Sector Workers:  
The Program Level
As with the policy level discussed previously, efficient implementation of 
national social protection policy requires coherence at the program level. This 
means providing individuals with continuous coverage across all ages and 
income groups. Operationally, this denotes designing national social protection 
systems that respond to the particular risks and vulnerabilities faced by the 
populations that these systems serve, and putting into place fiscally sustainable 
programs that address these risks and vulnerabilities over time. The two best 
mechanisms for achieving this objective are the life cycle and development 
planning frameworks for designing social protection programs described earlier. 
As for informal sector workers, addressing the particular risks and vulnerabilities 
that they face requires that social protection programs are designed and 
financed in a way that enables them to reach marginalized populations. That 
said, designing and implementing social protection programs for informal sector 
workers is more complicated than for formal sector workers, due to financing 
and appropriateness. 
Regarding financing, the fact that work in the informal sector is not taxed raises 
the issue of how such programs can be financed in a way that makes them 
sustainable over the long term. With regard to appropriateness, the inherent 
heterogeneity of the informal sector makes designing social protection programs 
that target this sector particularly complex, as few programs adequately respond 
to all risks of all individuals and households in the sector. 
Some design considerations that address the issues of financing and 
appropriateness are described. 
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Social Protection Initiatives
Social protection initiatives are generally of three types: (i) noncontributory 
social assistance, (ii) contributory insurance programs, and (iii) labor market 
programs. Each of these types of initiatives comprises a broad array of 
instruments that can be used to mitigate risk and reduce the impact of negative 
shocks faced by informal sector workers (Figure 1.4). 
Figure 1.4: Instruments Comprising the Three Types  
of Social Protection Initiatives
Source: T. McKinley and S. W. Handayani. 2013. The Social Protection Index: Assessing Results for Asia 
and the Pacific. Manila: Asian Development Bank, p. 5.
Social Assistance Insurance Mechanisms
Labor Market 
Programs
•	Social transfers
•	Cash
•	In-kind
•	Child grants
•	Social pensions
•	Disaster relief
•	Social services
•	Pensions
•	Health
•	Unemployment
•	Disability
•	Microinsurance
•	Public works 
programs
•	Loan-based 
employment 
generation
•	Unemployment 
benefits
•	Skills development 
training
Social Assistance
Because few countries operate social protection programs that directly target 
informal sector workers, coverage is mostly extended through social assistance 
(Cook and Pincus 2014). Social assistance is generally delivered to informal 
sector workers through social transfers and social services. 
Social assistance helps manage risk by (i) reducing poverty that results from 
shocks; (ii) directly reducing vulnerabilities; and (iii) strengthening the coping 
mechanisms used by individuals, communities, and countries to address such 
shocks. Social assistance can also promote productive risk taking, such as 
enterprise development or investment in human capital. Both stimulate the 
economy at the local and national levels. Because of this, several countries in Asia 
have incorporated social assistance programs into their overall social protection 
systems (Table 1.2). This helps ensure that resources and infrastructure that 
decrease poverty and increase resilience to shocks are available to all members 
of the population, including informal sector workers.
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Poverty-targeted transfers. Many social transfers are poverty targeted. 
Such transfers provide cash or productive assets to individuals or households 
whose income falls below a certain threshold. However, rather than outright 
“gifts,” social transfers should, in fact, be used as a poverty alleviation tool. By 
ensuring at least a minimum standard of living for beneficiaries, they are able 
to take on productive risks and to mitigate the negative effects of shocks to the 
livelihood of a beneficiary household. Because informal sector workers living in 
poverty are exposed to greater risks and vulnerabilities than their formal sector 
counterparts, the risk management function of social assistance is of particular 
importance to this population. Further, the incidence of relative poverty is 
greater in the informal sector than in the formal sector. This is particularly true of 
informal sector agriculture workers, who face the highest risk of poverty (Heintz 
and Vanek 2007). Table 1.3 lists examples of conditional and unconditional 
poverty-targeted transfer mechanisms that meet the needs of informal 
sector workers.
Grants for children and families. These grants are provided to both individuals 
and households with children to reduce poverty and vulnerability and to improve 
children’s access to basic services. Such transfers take the form of unconditional 
family allowances and child grants, or cash transfers dependent on fulfilling 
stated conditions that deepen the development impact of social transfers. For 
informal sector workers, parents are afforded a minimum level of income to 
provide for their children, even when the household faces income instability. By 
focusing on children, these grants encourage expansion of the stock of human 
capital and allow recipient children to be more productive workers later in life. 
Table 1.2: Examples of National Social Protection Systems  
Incorporating Comprehensive Social Assistance Programs
Country Strategy Social Assistance Component Instrument
India National Social 
Assistance 
Program
•	 Indira Gandhi National Old Age Pension Scheme
•	 Indira Gandhi National Widow Pension Scheme
•	 Indira Gandhi National Disability Pension 
Scheme
•	 National Family Benefit Scheme
Bangladesh National Social 
Protection 
Strategy
•	 Old Age Allowance Programme
•	 Vulnerable Group Feeding
•	 Allowance for Financially Insolvent Persons with 
Disabilities
•	 Widow and Distressed Women Allowance 
Programme
Sources: Planning Commission, Government of Bangladesh. 2014. National Social Protection Strategy 
(NSPS) of Bangladesh. http://www.plancomm.gov.bd//upload/2014/NSPS.pdf; Indian National Social 
Assistance Programme. http://nsap.nic.in/
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These grants thus produce a positive economic impact at the national level. 
Investing in early childhood development through these grants is particularly 
beneficial for countries with populations of young average age, as they stand to 
benefit when the cohort that has received such grants enters the labor force. 
Such grants would thus be particularly beneficial to South Asian countries in 
which the average age of the population has not yet begun to rise at a significant 
rate (ADB 2011). Table 1.4 lists examples of grants for children and families that 
are either already in operation, or are proposed.
Table 1.3: Examples of Poverty-Targeted Transfer Schemes 
Country Program Description
People’s 
Republic  
of China
Minimum 
Living Standard 
Guarantee 
Program
This program is the centerpiece of the country’s 
social welfare system. It provides income transfers 
to households with incomes below a stated 
threshold. Both the thresholds and the amount of 
the transfers are determined locally to ensure that 
the program remains context sensitive. In 2014, 
the program provided income transfers to more 
than 76 million people. 
Indonesia Program 
Keluarga 
Harapan
(Family Hope 
Program)
Under this scheme, cash is provided to 
households that include pregnant women or 
children on the condition that the household 
access specific health and education services. As 
of 2016, the program benefited about 3.5 million 
families. Impact evaluations of the program have 
found that it increased the level of educational 
achievement of poor families, encouraged 
self-investment, improved the health status of 
household members, and reduced the incidence 
of nutritional deficiencies.
Philippines Conditional 
Cash Transfer 
Program (4Ps)
Under this cash transfer scheme, cash is given to 
poor families on the condition that they invest in 
the health and education of their children, as well 
as in maternal health services. The 2012 impact 
evaluation of this program demonstrated that 
the scheme helped increase both the uptake of 
health services and school enrollment.
4Ps = Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program.
Sources: N. Chaudhury, J. Friedman, and J. Onishi. 2013. Philippines Conditional Cash Transfer Program: 
Impact Evaluation 2012. http://pantawid.dswd.gov.ph/images/philippines_conditional_cash_transfer_
program_impact_evaluation_2012.pdf; S. Nazara and S. K. Rahayu. 2013. Program Keluarga Harapan 
(PKH): Indonesian Conditional Cash Transfer Programme. International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth 
Research Briefs. No. 42. http://www.ipc-undp.org/pub/IPCPolicyResearchBrief42.pdf; J. Golan, T. Sicular, and 
N. Umapathi. 2014. Any Guarantees? China’s Rural Minimum Living Standard Guarantee Program. Social 
Protection and Labor Discussion Paper Series. No. 1423. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/han
dle/10986/19976/900300NWP0P132085299B00PUBLIC001423.pdf?sequence=1
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Social pensions. Social pensions are noncontributory transfers provided to 
individuals of old age that guarantee a minimum income. Social pensions are 
particularly important for informal sector workers, as they are typically denied 
access to contributory pensions, and often continue to be employed in old age. 
In many developing countries in Asia, older workers are typically employed 
in the informal sector in less-attractive jobs that pay wages less than those 
received by individuals still of working age (Kidd and Whitehouse 2009). 
Social pension programs bridge the gap in old age between those with access 
to contributory pension schemes and the means to participate in them, and 
those that lack both. Such schemes restore dignity to older persons by ensuring 
that they are not left in deep poverty and regarded as a burden by their families 
(Kidd and Whitehouse 2009). Social pensions have also been shown to offer 
benefits within the household itself. Older persons often share their pension 
with the rest of the household, thus reducing the financial burden associated 
Table 1.4: Examples of Grants for Children and Families
Country Program Description
Mongolia Child Money 
Program
A conditional cash transfer program for families 
with children, eligibility for the program was 
originally determined by the official poverty 
threshold and the number of children in the 
household. Since July 2006, benefits have been 
provided universally to all families with children 
under 18 years of age who live with their families 
and attend school or nonformal education. 
Nepal Child Grant Introduced in 2009–2010 with the objective of 
improving childhood nutrition, the program is 
designed to reach all children under 5 years of 
age, but is currently limited to children in five 
Karnali districts and poor Dalit children.
Thailand Child Support 
Grant
The government intends to introduce a child 
grant of B400.00 (over $11.00) per month to 
parents and caregivers of children under 6 years 
of age to support the education and development 
of children.
Sources: T. Okubo. 2014. Nutritional Impact of the Child Grant: An Evidence from Karnali Zone, Nepal. 
UNICEF Nepal Working Paper Series. No. 3. http://www.un.org.np/sites/default/files/Nutritional_Impact_
paper.pdf; A. Hodges et al. 2007. Child Benefits and Poverty Reduction: Evidence from Mongolia’s Child 
Money Programme. Maastricht University Graduate School of Governance Working Papers. No. 002. http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1095717; United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). 2014. 
UNICEF Welcomes Child Support Grant as Four Million Children under Six in Thailand Still Lack Adequate 
Social Protection. http://www.unicef.org/thailand/media_23401.html
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Table 1.5: Examples of Noncontributory Social Pensions
Country Program Description
Nepal Senior Citizens’ 
Allowance
Both universal and noncontributory, this program 
has proven to be affordable for beneficiaries, 
as it cost only about 0.3% of national income in 
2007–2008. It is provided to all individuals over 
the age of 70 years. In the case of Dalits and 
residents of the Karnali Zone, eligibility begins 
at 60 years of age, a feature of the program that 
recognizes the heightened vulnerability of older 
individuals in these groups. 
Thailand Old-Age 
Allowance
This offers a universal, noncontributory social 
pension to individuals aged 60 years or over who 
are not covered by a contributory government 
pension. As of 2013, the program covered 5.69 
million beneficiaries.
Viet Nam Social pension 
scheme
In addition to Viet Nam’s social pension, two 
contributory pension schemes are also offered. 
The social pension scheme is tiered, allowing it 
to provide benefits commensurate with need. 
The scheme is also targeted with respect to age, 
health status, and income.
Sources: W. Suwandra and D. Wesumperuma. 2012. Development of the Old-Age Allowance System in 
Thailand: Challenges and Poverty Implications. In S. W. Handayani and B. Babajanian, eds. Social Protection 
for Older Persons: Social Pensions in Asia. Manila: ADB; M. Samson. 2012. Nepal’s Senior Citizens’ Allowance: 
A Model of Universalism in a Low-Income Country Context. In S. W. Handayani and B. Babajanian, eds. 
Social Protection for Older Persons: Social Pensions in Asia. Manila: ADB; G. T. Long and D. Wesumperuma. 
2013. Some Notes on Social Pensions in Viet Nam. International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth One Pager. 
No. 210. http://www.ipc-undp.org/pub/IPCOnePager210.pdf
with their care. The security of a minimum income later in life is also likely to 
lead to more productive spending of income during working age (Willmore 
and Kidd 2008). Such implications are particularly important for informal 
sector workers. By reducing the need to provide for elderly relatives or to save 
intensively for their own future, social pensions allow working-age individuals 
to invest in productive assets or skills.
Many higher-income countries in Asia are experiencing rapid aging of their 
populations due to falling fertility rates and increased longevity (ADB 2011). 
Under such conditions, social protection should increasingly focus on providing 
for individuals in old age. This is already occurring in these countries where 
pensions are an increasingly important component of the national social 
protection system. Table 1.5 lists a number of examples of noncontributory 
social pensions currently operating in developing countries in Asia.
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Noncontributory health care. Access to health care is often the first security 
that poor and vulnerable people seek. Further, universal health care is recognized 
as a human right, and a key factor in stimulating labor productivity and overall 
economic growth. Such findings make universal health care a cost-effective 
endeavor (Rys 2013). 
Extending access to basic health care to informal sector workers in a way 
that guarantees their security and livelihood is an important feature of social 
protection for the informal sector, given that work environments in the 
informal sector often pose a threat to workers’ health. However, the scale of 
the assistance provided must be sufficient to ensure that informal sector 
workers can afford basic health care services, and that the resulting improved 
level of general health of the informal sector workforce is sufficient to achieve a 
development impact commensurate with the cost of such a program.
Thailand’s provision of noncontributory health care is an example of a program 
that specifically targets informal sector workers. The UCS provides health 
care to every citizen not covered under any other publicly funded scheme—
approximately 80.0% of the country’s population. This scheme, which provides 
basic preventive services as well as emergency medical care, is estimated to 
have prevented 88,000 households from falling below the poverty line in 2008 
(Sakunphanit and Suwandra 2012). 
While the scope of services provided must cover the basic needs of informal 
sector workers, unnecessary health care measures should be excluded from the 
program. The coverage of Thailand’s UCS includes both preventive services 
and emergency services but excludes certain services such as treatment for 
infertility or cosmetic surgery (Sakunphanit and Suwandra 2012). By providing 
protection against adverse health shocks but excluding elective treatments, 
the UCS ensures health care coverage while at the same time containing 
program costs.
Public services. Informal sector workers and their households are often 
excluded from accessing public services for two reasons. First, they fall outside 
of the formal institutional framework of the country concerned. Second, the 
government lacks the capacity to serve the needs of vulnerable populations. 
Public services may include universal education through publicly funded 
schools, public housing, food aid, access to clean water, and adequate sanitation 
facilities. Of these, universal education is particularly important, as it produces 
a broad array of economic benefits. Examples include higher wages, greater 
agriculture productivity, and more rapid economic growth than would otherwise 
be possible. It likewise confers large-scale health benefits to the countries that 
provide it and it also empowers women (Sperling 2005). 
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Table 1.6: Examples of Public Services Currently Extended  
to Informal Sector Workers
Country Program Description
India Total sanitation 
services
In 1999, the government implemented a 
sanitation services program to address poor 
sanitation and public health. The government 
provides financial support, as well as policy 
and institutional guidance, to the program, but 
delegates its design and administrative aspects  
to state and local governments, thus allowing it  
to respond to the specific needs of each 
geographic area. 
Thailand Universal 
education
Thailand provides universal education as a 
constitutional right, stating that it is the duty of 
every person to receive free, quality education. 
This free education policy applies to all children, 
including children of refugees, migrants, and 
ethnic minorities. This program covers the cost 
of tuition and associated fees, textbooks, learning 
materials, and school uniforms. 
Viet Nam Compulsory 
education
Viet Nam provides free, compulsory education 
to children from the age of 3 years and upward. 
The government also provides free child care for 
children under 3 years of age.
Sources: United Nations and Government of Thailand Joint Team on Social Protection. 2013. Social 
Protection Assessment Based National Dialogue: Towards a Nationally Defined Social Protection Floor in 
Thailand. Bangkok: ILO Regional Office Asia Pacific; F. Lund and J. Nicholson. 2006. Tools for Advocacy: 
Social Protection for Informal Workers. http://wiego.org/sites/wiego.org/files/resources/files/Tools-For-
Advocacy-Social-Protection-for-Informal-Workers.pdf; B. Briceno and J. Eisenbraun. 2014. A Randomized, 
Controlled Study of a Rural Sanitation Behavior Change Program in Madhya Pradesh, India. 
Ultimately, informal sector workers often live or work on vacant public or private 
land, although this is illegal (GDRC). Providing public housing or land for work 
could remove the risk of eviction and provide workers with more secure means 
of maintaining their livelihoods. Ensuring access to clean water and sanitation 
improves public health and reduces the burden on the health care system of 
the country concerned. Table 1.6 lists a number of examples of public services 
currently extended to informal sector workers in developing countries in Asia.
Fee waivers and subsidies. In situations in which social services cannot be 
100.0% subsidized, fee waivers and subsidies are used to allow poor individuals 
to access basic services. Examples include education vouchers, scholarship 
programs, and financial support for basic foodstuffs. Table 1.7 lists examples of 
fee waivers and subsidies currently in operation in developing countries in Asia.
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Table 1.7: Examples of Fee-Waiver and Subsidy Programs
Country Program Description
Bangladesh Secondary 
school stipend, 
primary school 
stipend
Bangladesh offers stipends for payment of school 
fees at both the primary and secondary levels. 
Indonesia Subsidy for poor 
students
Subsidies are offered directly to poor children 
and students from primary school through high 
school. The number of beneficiaries assisted each 
year depends on the extent of program funding 
offered through the provincial authorities of the 
Ministry of Education and Culture.
Sources: S. Satriana and V. Schmitt. 2012. Social Protection Assessment Based National Dialogue: Towards a 
Nationally Defined Social Protection Floor in Indonesia. http://ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-
bangkok/---ilo-jakarta/documents/publication/wcms_195572.pdf; Planning Commission, Government of 
Bangladesh. 2014. National Social Protection Strategy (NSPS) of Bangladesh. http://www.plancomm.gov.
bd//upload/2014/NSPS.pdf
Social Insurance Schemes
Insurance manages risk by protecting insured individuals against the negative 
impacts of economic shocks. This is achieved by pooling the risk of all insured 
individuals (i.e., all of the insured individuals pay into a single fund). This fund 
is then used to financially compensate any member of the pool who is affected 
by a shock. 
For insurance schemes to be sustainable, two conditions must be fulfilled. 
First, the pooled fund must be large enough to compensate all members who 
experience an economic shock in any given time period. Second, the risks faced 
by the members of the pool must be uncorrelated. That is, all members of 
the pool should not experience economic shocks at the same time. Thus, for 
insurance schemes to be sustainable, the risks faced by the members of the 
pool must be uncorrelated. 
The conditions on which insurance schemes depend are violated in the case 
of natural disasters, since these events negatively impact all members of the 
pool at the same time. This makes such risks difficult to insure against, unless 
the pool is very large and its members live in geographic areas remote from one 
another. However, in the case of contingencies that affect individuals across the 
life cycle, the risks that members of the pool face are highly uncorrelated. This 
allows pooling of such risks, even at the community level. 
This uncorrelated nature of life cycle risks allows relatively small pools of 
individuals to use insurance schemes to finance their own protection against 
shocks. This has beneficial economic impacts over the long term, as it allows 
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individuals to engage in productive risk taking, such as using a portion of current 
income to establish a business rather than saving it to provide individual—
rather than pooled—protection against an economic shock. However, in the 
short term, insurance schemes do not produce the same immediate beneficial 
impacts on poverty that other social protection instruments do. 
Because social insurance schemes are financed through a combination of 
contributions and tax financing, they can be offered to target groups with 
contribution requirements that are subsidized through tax financing. Four 
types of social insurance are currently in use in developing countries in Asia: 
(i) health insurance, (ii) unemployment insurance, (iii) disability insurance, 
and (iv) pensions. However, for the most part, these social insurance programs 
serve the formal sector. Thus, insuring small enterprises, farmers, and the 
informal sector in general requires programs funded by voluntary contributions 
(Cook and Pincus 2014). Table 1.8 lists examples of social insurance programs 
Table 1.8: Examples of Social Insurance Schemes  
Targeting the Informal Sector
Country Program Description
India Rashtriya 
Swasthya Bima 
Yojana (Health 
Insurance for 
the Poor)
This health insurance scheme links universal 
health care to voluntary health insurance that 
requires only small contributions. It insures 
beneficiaries with incomes that fall below the 
poverty line for hospitalization-related expenses. 
It likewise improves access to quality health care 
by allowing beneficiaries to visit any public or 
private health care provider. 
Indonesia Employment 
insurance for 
workers in the 
private sector
This scheme offers informal sector workers 
health insurance, as well as coverage against 
occupational injury and death. Currently 
implemented on a voluntary basis, the coverage 
that it provides is relatively limited.
Thailand Voluntary 
social insurance 
scheme 
Expanded in 2011, this voluntary insurance 
scheme provides insurance against sickness, 
disability, and death for B100.00 ($3.20) monthly. 
For B150.00 ($4.80) monthly, a contributory 
pension is also included. 
Note: Exchange rates are derived from ADB. 2012. Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2012. Manila.  
$1.00 = B31.08, on average, in 2012.
Sources: Social Security Office, Ministry of Labour, Government of Thailand. 2012. The Extension of Social 
Security Coverage to Informal Sector: Thailand’s Experience. http://hrd.apec.org/images/7/7c/2B_Premsuriya.
pdf; A. Swarup, and N. Jain. 2012. Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana. In United Nations Office for South–
South Cooperation. Successful Social Protection Floor Experiences. http://tcdc2.undp.org/GSSDAcademy/
SIE/Docs/Vol18/SIE_v18_ch11.pdf; S. Satriana and V. Schmitt. 2012. Social Protection Assessment Based 
National Dialogue: Towards a Nationally Defined Social Protection Floor in Indonesia. http://ilo.org/wcmsp5/
groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/---ilo-jakarta/documents/publication/wcms_195572.pdf
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currently operating in developing countries in Asia that target the informal 
sector.
Microinsurance is defined as “protection of low-income people against specific 
perils, in exchange for regular premium payments proportionate to the likelihood 
and cost of the risk involved” (ADA Microinsurance 2003). Microinsurance 
functions in the same way as traditional insurance, except microinsurance 
serves populations that face levels of risk higher than beneficiaries protected 
by traditional insurance. Reaching marginalized populations also necessitates 
other differences between microinsurance and traditional insurance. For 
example, insurance premiums tend to be smaller than for traditional insurance. 
Similarly, to accommodate the relatively erratic cash flows of its beneficiaries, 
microinsurance premium payments may be collected more frequently or even 
on an irregular basis (Lloyd’s of London 2009). 
Microinsurance allows informal sector workers to insure themselves 
against risk in the absence of coverage provided by other means, or in 
cases in which they require insurance that neither the public nor the 
private sector can provide. That said, relatively small, stand-alone, and 
self-financed microinsurance schemes that attempt to reach large segments 
of target populations face sustainability and efficiency issues that must be 
addressed if they are to fulfill this objective. 
One of the best ways to address such issues is to establish linkages between 
microinsurance schemes and the formal social insurance system (Rys 2013). 
However, some features of microinsurance schemes mitigate such linkages. 
For example, microinsurance schemes often lack quality data regarding the 
risk profile of their clients. Similarly, the low-income or otherwise marginalized 
populations that they serve may lack awareness of how traditional insurance 
schemes function or their service delivery systems may be weak (Tan 2012). 
Table 1.9 lists examples of microinsurance schemes currently operational in 
developing countries in Asia that have successfully addressed these issues.
Microinsurance schemes are ideally suited to informal sector workers for a 
number of reasons. First, microinsurance schemes can be voluntary, which 
allows them to extend coverage to individuals unable to access traditional forms 
of insurance. In contrast, mandatory formal sector insurance schemes typically 
depend on formal sector registration mechanisms such as employers registering 
workers with tax authorities. Second, because microinsurance schemes 
are financed by beneficiary contributions, they do not face the substantial 
financing constraints of social assistance mechanisms. Third, microinsurance 
schemes can be adapted to the wide variation in exposure to risk of informal 
sector clients, as well as their widely varying levels of income.
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Table 1.9: Examples of Microinsurance Schemes
Country Program Description
India Unit Trust 
of India 
Micropension 
Scheme
This micropension scheme requires only small 
contributions and offers a flexible payment 
schedule. Its partnership with multilateral 
financial institutions and nongovernment 
organizations facilitates the expansion of its client 
base, reduces costs to providers and beneficiaries 
alike, and streamlines service delivery. 
Viet Nam Tao Teu 
May Mutual 
Assistance Fund
Tao Teu May provides both financial and social 
support to women. Marketed as a solidarity 
mechanism for members, the scheme partly 
supports the expenses incurred by member 
households that have experienced an economic 
shock. The scheme’s solidarity aspect is intended 
to positively impact the communities that it 
serves and to attract additional members.
Sources: J. A. B. Alip, E. L. Navarro, and M. M. Caribog. 2010. Status of Microinsurance in Southeast Asia. http://
www.microfinancegateway.org/sites/default/files/mfg-en-paper-status-of-microinsurance-in-southeast-
asia-the-cases-of-cambodia-the-philippines-and-vietnam-2010.pdf; S. Shankar, and M. G. Asher. 2011. 
Micro-Pensions in India: Issues and Challenges. International Social Security Review. 64: 1–21.
Designing either social insurance or microinsurance schemes for informal 
sector workers means taking account of the perverse incentives that operate at 
the individual level in the informal sector, as well as the systemic risk endemic 
to that sector. Similarly, the risks posed by asymmetric information and moral 
hazard must be taken into account when designing such schemes. 
Asymmetric information refers to the fact that one individual entering into an 
agreement may have more information relevant to the agreement than the 
other. In the case of insurance schemes, clients have far more information 
about their own risk profiles and the likelihood of the insurance having to pay 
out than does the insurer. Moral hazard refers to insured individuals being 
incentivized to take on more risk than they would in the absence of insurance 
coverage, since they know that the insurer will incur the bulk of the cost of any 
negative consequences to their taking on that additional risk. This has important 
implications in the case of the informal sector. In particular, if informal sector 
workers have access to health, employment injury, or even life insurance, they 
may take on more dangerous occupations than they would if they lacked such 
insurance, since they know that in the event of an accident or even death, they 
would be compensated for such losses. The ability of an insurance scheme to 
address these two forms of perverse incentives greatly impacts that scheme’s 
sustainability. 
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When designing insurance schemes, one must also take account of correlated 
or systemic risk. This refers to large numbers of members of a risk pool being 
vulnerable to the same large-scale risk. For example, informal sector members 
of an insurance pool living in a single geographic area that is prone to natural 
disasters would negatively impact the sustainability of a property insurance 
scheme. The same is true of informal sector workers being employed in the same 
industry. In such a case, an industry-wide downturn could cause widespread 
unemployment, which could, in turn, drain the unemployment insurance pool. 
In short, for insurance mechanisms to be sustainable, their client base must be 
sufficiently wide and diverse to ensure that the risks faced by their members are 
uncorrelated. 
Labor Market Programs
Labor market programs are interventions that increase access to decent work. 
These programs can help informal sector workers in two ways. First, they may 
directly improve access to decent work through employment development 
opportunities. Second, they may help informal sector workers acquire 
employable skills. This section describes four types of labor market programs: 
unemployment benefits, public works programs, loan-based employment 
generation schemes, and skills development training. 
Unemployment benefits. Considered a form of social protection, 
unemployment benefits have two major objectives. First, they at least partially 
replace income from work when a beneficiary becomes unemployed. Second, 
they support unemployed workers in seeking new employment and increasing 
their employability (Carter, Bédard, and Bista 2013). The Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations has formally recognized the importance of 
unemployment benefits (Carter, Bédard, and Bista 2013), but the number 
and kinds of benefits extended to the informal sector is limited. Both Thailand 
and Indonesia have found innovative ways to extend unemployment benefits 
(Table 1.10).
Public works programs. Public works programs involve the regular payment of 
money (or in some cases, in-kind benefits) by government or nongovernment 
organizations to individuals in exchange for work, with the objective of 
decreasing chronic or shock-induced poverty. Public works programs are thus 
essentially cash transfers paid on the condition that beneficiaries perform 
work provided under the program. These programs provide social protection, 
address social risk, and reduce economic vulnerability (Samson, Niekerk, and 
MacQuene 2010). 
Public works programs function most efficiently when they address poverty 
that is linked to unemployment. They are thus particularly appropriate for 
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Table 1.10: Informal Sector Unemployment Benefit Programs
Country Program Description
Indonesia Health 
Insurance 
Program 
This program provides a modest one-off cash 
benefit in case of sickness, work injury, or death. 
While limited in scale, the program targets 
informal sector entrepreneurs such as street 
vendors and microenterprise owners. 
Thailand  Social Security 
Act
The unemployment benefits provided under 
this act are part of the country’s comprehensive 
social protection floor, the purpose of which is 
to provide all members of society—including the 
unemployed—with sufficient income to ensure 
access to basic goods.
Sources: United Nations and Government of Thailand Joint Team on Social Protection. 2013. Social 
Protection Assessment Based National Dialogue: Towards a Nationally Defined Social Protection Floor 
in Thailand. Bangkok: ILO Regional Office Asia Pacific; S. Satriana and V. Schmitt. 2012. Social Protection 
Assessment Based National Dialogue: Towards a Nationally Defined Social Protection Floor in Indonesia. http://
ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/---ilo-jakarta/documents/publication/wcms_195572 
.pdf
addressing transient poverty such as poverty due to seasonal unemployment, 
a climate change-related or economic shock, or an economic downturn. Public 
works programs can either supplement seasonal work or replace informal sector 
work (World Bank 1995). Table 1.11 lists examples of public works programs.
Loan-based employment generation. Loan-based employment generation 
programs provide financing for microenterprises and small businesses. Due 
to their heterogeneity, small businesses are established in both the formal and 
informal sectors (Western Cape Provincial Government 2007). As a result, 
loan-based employment generation programs are suitable for stimulating 
commercial activity in the informal sector. 
By linking employment with social protection, these programs both expand 
the human capital stock and increase labor productivity (ADB 2013a). As 
individuals working in the informal sector are often wary of formal sector 
financial institutions, including those offering microfinance, these programs 
may be useful for expanding access to finance by informal sector entrepreneurs. 
Table 1.12 briefly describes the loan-based employment generation schemes 
currently active in India and Indonesia.
Skills development training. Skills development training helps informal sector 
workers acquire the skills necessary for decent work. This ultimately improves 
their quality of life, prospects for work, and geographic mobility. Expanding the 
level of commercial activity in both the formal and informal sectors ultimately 
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depends on semi-skilled and unskilled workers acquiring requisite skills 
(Martinez-Fernandez and Choi 2012). Many countries in Asia invest in skills 
development as a matter of policy, as it is key in accelerating the overall pace 
of economic advance (ADB 2013a). In 2011, India, Pakistan, and Timor-Leste 
Table 1.12: Loan-Based Employment Generation Schemes
Country Program Description
India Prime Minister’s 
Employment 
Generation 
Programme
Administered by the Ministry of Micro, 
Small and Medium Scale Enterprises, this 
program facilitates the establishment of 
microenterprises in both rural and urban areas.
Indonesia Kredit Usaha Rakyat 
(Credit Program for 
Microenterprises)
This scheme finances the establishment of 
microenterprises and subsidizes 70.0% of the 
total loan amount.
Sources: Ministry of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises, Government of India. n.d. Guidelines on Prime 
Minister’s Employment Generation Programme (PMEGP). http://msme.gov.in/WriteReadData/KMS/KVI_
Policy_and_Establishment_Section_57.pdf; S. Satriana and V. Schmitt. 2012. Social Protection Assessment 
Based National Dialogue: Towards a Nationally Defined Social Protection Floor in Indonesia. http://ilo.org/
wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/---ilo-jakarta/documents/publication/wcms_195572.pdf
Table 1.11: Examples of Public Works Programs
Country Program Description
Bangladesh Cash-for-Work, 
Food-for-Work
These programs provide cash and food to rural 
households in exchange for work. The cash-
for-work program has significantly improved 
anthropomorphic and nutritional outcomes for 
women and children.
India Mahatma 
Gandhi 
National Rural 
Employment 
Guarantee Act
The act provides seasonal agriculture 
employment in rural areas. The program pays 
piece-rate wages sufficient to ensure a minimum 
income level for households, but not high enough 
to distort local labor markets or disincentivize 
job searching or building of human capital. The 
program provides employment for both skilled 
and unskilled labor. In addition to the direct 
employment the program provides, it likewise 
stimulates additional commercial activity in the 
areas that it serves.
Sources: Planning Commission, Government of Bangladesh. 2014. National Social Protection Strategy 
of Bangladesh. http://www.plancomm.gov.bd//upload/2014/NSPS.pdf; C. G. N. Mascie-Taylor, M.  K. 
Marks, R. Goto, and R. Islam. 2010. Impact of a Cash-for-Work Programme on Food Consumption and 
Nutrition among Women and Children Facing Food Insecurity in Rural Bangladesh. Bulletin of the World 
Health Organization. 88: 797–876. Available at: http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/88/11/10-080994/
en/#. doi:10.2471/BLT.10.080994; Overseas Development Institute. 2006. The Maharashtra Employment 
Guarantee Scheme. Inter-Regional Inequality Facility Policy Briefs 6. London.
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Table 1.13: Skills Development Training Programs
Country Program Description
Indonesia Apprenticeship 
Program
This program provides vocational training and job 
placement services, at no cost, for informal sector 
workers.
Thailand Skill 
Development 
Promotion Act
This act encourages employers to provide skills 
training to employees. It also encourages private 
providers to establish vocational and skills training 
centers under the authority of the Ministry of 
Labour’s Department of Skills Development.
Sources: S. Satriana and V. Schmitt. 2012. Social Protection Assessment Based National Dialogue: Towards 
a Nationally Defined Social Protection Floor in Indonesia. http://ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/--- 
ro-bangkok/---ilo-jakarta/documents/publication/wcms_195572.pdf; United Nations and Government 
of Thailand Joint Team on Social Protection. 2013. Social Protection Assessment Based National 
Dialogue: Towards a Nationally Defined Social Protection Floor in Thailand. Bangkok: ILO Regional Office 
Asia Pacific.
adopted national technical and vocational education and training policies, 
while formulation of such policies was under way in Bangladesh, Mongolia, 
and Tajikistan (ADB 2013a, ILO 2011). A report on skills development in the 
Asia and Pacific region urged countries to develop policies that expand access 
to market-related skills by disadvantaged populations (ADB 2013a). Table 1.13 
describes initiatives of this type in Indonesia and Thailand.
Some types of social protection instruments can benefit both formal and 
informal sector workers. However, instruments that depend on existence of an 
explicit employer–employee relationship are generally only provided to formal 
sector workers, since such relationships by definition do not exist in the informal 
sector. The key to enabling the latter types of instruments that benefit informal 
sector workers is disentangling benefit eligibility from employment status. This 
is done by changing the format of the particular social protection instrument 
to allow it to fulfill the same function as its formal sector counterpart, but 
without being dependent on formal sector employment status. Table 1.14 
compares formal and informal sector variants of three types of social insurance 
instruments: pensions, health insurance, and insurance against unemployment, 
injury, and accidental death.
An alternative approach to enabling benefits to be extended to informal sector 
workers is to employ forms of social protection unrelated to employment, while 
maintaining traditional contributory forms of social protection for formal sector 
workers. 
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Ensuring Coherence at the Program Level
Coherence at the policy level means ensuring that social protection is 
complemented by other development initiatives. In contrast, coherence at 
the program level ensures that social protection instruments complement one 
another by minimizing gaps in the populations served, and by ensuring that 
the forms of social protection that they provide complement one another in a 
way that deepens the impact of all programs that comprise the national social 
protection system.
The coverage of all social protection schemes taken together can be expanded 
if these schemes are implemented within the context of an overall social 
protection framework, as this ensures that such schemes neither overlap nor 
exclude particular populations. Indonesia’s social insurance schemes illustrate 
the benefits of such a framework. Social insurance in Indonesia is provided 
through five distinct schemes that serve the formal private and public sectors, 
as well as a noncontributory health insurance scheme that covers the poor and 
near poor. 
The government recognizes that both overlaps and coverage gaps occur under 
this arrangement, particularly with regard to nonpoor informal sector workers. 
While the pilot scheme Jamsostek Luar Hubungan Kerja (Employment 
Insurance for Workers in the Informal Sector) offers insurance to informal 
sector workers, its scope is limited, and client turnover is high (Satriana and 
Schmitt 2012). The lesson to be learned from Indonesia is that implementing 
social protection programs in the context of an overall framework with coverage 
being determined on the basis of income, employment status, and need allows 
program coverage to be continuous and coverage gaps to be avoided.
Coherence at the program level also allows social protection programs to 
complement one another, and thus to deepen the impact of each program. 
Table 1.14: Comparison of Social Protection Instruments  
in the Formal and Informal Sectors
Formal Sector Instrument Informal Sector Instrument
Contributory pensions Voluntary contributory pensions, 
noncontributory old-age allowances
Contributory health insurance Social health insurance, microinsurance, 
noncontributory health care
Contributory unemployment, 
employment injury, or life insurance
Subsidized, noncontributory social 
insurance, microinsurance
Source: Authors.
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For example, the success of cash transfers provided on the condition that 
children attend school or receive health care requires access to schools and 
health care services. In the absence of schools and health clinics, the impact of 
such a program would be negligible. This may have, in fact, been the outcome 
of the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps), a conditional cash transfer 
program in the Philippines. The program’s 2012 impact evaluation found that 
wide variation in access to, and provision of, health care services may have 
contributed to regional variation in its impact (Chaudhury, Friedman, and 
Onishi 2013). Similarly, health insurance interventions are fruitless if health 
care services are unavailable. 
The lesson to be learned is that social protection systems must ensure that the 
preconditions to the success of the interventions that comprise that system 
have been met. More generally, the degree to which the interventions that 
comprise a social protection system are coherent and integrated ultimately 
determines the overall impact of any given social protection system. Thus, 
coherence at the program level is a precondition to maximizing the impact of a 
social protection system. 
Designing and Delivering Social Protection 
Programs for Informal Sector Workers:  
The Administrative Level
Another precondition to maximizing the overall impact of a social protection 
system is the cost-efficiency with which a particular social protection program 
is administered. In this regard, three considerations must be taken into account: 
(i) targeting (i.e., determining the population eligible for the benefit); (ii) benefit 
determination (i.e., the size and nature of the benefit); and (iii) conditionality 
(i.e., whether benefit receipt should be conditional on a particular type of 
beneficiary behavior). 
Targeting
Targeting is the most contentious design issue, as it relates to both financing 
and coverage. A major benefit of targeting social transfers is that by reducing 
the number of beneficiaries, money is saved. However, it is important to allocate 
targeted program benefits to those who need assistance the most. In contrast, 
to targeted benefits, universal social transfers extend benefits to all individuals 
who meet eligibility criteria other than need. 
In cases in which the administrative and financial costs of targeting are 
considerable, a universal transfer scheme may be cheaper than a targeted 
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scheme. For example, due to the informal sector’s inherent lack of 
documentation, heterogeneity, and fluidity of employment, programs that 
attempt to target informal sector workers may face administrative and financial 
costs so high that a universal scheme sensitive to the needs of informal sector 
workers may cost less than the targeted alternative. 
Whether a program is targeted also affects the poverty reduction impact of the 
program, as numerous political, social, administrative, and economic factors 
can alter the magnitude of this impact. First, exclusion and inclusion errors 
can greatly alter the poverty alleviation impact of targeted social transfers. 
An exclusion error occurs when eligible individuals or households are denied 
access to program benefits, an outcome that undermines the poverty reduction 
impact of the program concerned. In contrast, an inclusion error occurs when a 
benefit is provided to individuals outside of the target group. Reducing inclusion 
errors is a potential benefit of targeting, as reducing the number of ineligible 
individuals or households able to access program benefits reduces the cost of 
the program concerned. 
The results of a cost–benefit analysis that takes account of administrative, 
private, social, and incentive costs should be used to determine whether a 
particular program should be targeted. In this regard, administrative costs 
generally tend to increase as accuracy increases. However, they tend to be higher 
when individual assessment methods are used, but lower when categories of 
individuals are lumped together in performing the assessment. 
Private costs are the costs of program participation borne by beneficiaries. Such 
costs include the costs associated with transport, documentation, and queuing 
time, and the opportunity cost of applying for social transfers. In some cases, 
private costs can be prohibitive, which causes inadvertent exclusion of eligible 
individuals. In some cases, private costs are deliberately set at relatively high 
levels to cause potential beneficiaries to self-target. 
Social costs include division of communities into beneficiary and nonbeneficiary 
groups, which can undermine social capital and community cohesion. In this 
regard, targeted transfers may stigmatize beneficiaries employed in the informal 
sector, thus exposing them to further vulnerability. Incentive costs result 
from changes in applicant behavior. For example, providing program benefits 
to informal sector workers may encourage individuals to seek employment 
in the informal sector instead of the formal sector as a way of accessing 
program benefits. There is some empirical evidence that this in fact occurred 
in Thailand, where extending access to health care to informal sector workers 
under the UCS may have provided an incentive for workers to shift from formal 
to informal sector work (Wagstaff and Manachotphong 2012). Monitoring of 
such outcomes allows adjustments to be made to the targeting methodology 
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used under particular programs with a view to minimizing incentive costs 
(Devereux et al. 2015).
Three different targeting methodologies are available for channeling program 
benefits to particular target groups: 
(i) Individual (or household) assessments. These evaluate income, 
expenditure, assets, or other personal characteristics. Individual 
assessments may employ means testing, which assesses the income, 
assets, wealth, or employment status of an applicant. Further, means 
testing may be verified or unverified. Proxy means testing uses a 
statistical estimate of the probability that a person (or household) 
is eligible for program benefits. In performing proxy means testing, 
particular characteristics expected to be highly correlated with 
eligibility are analyzed. Proxy means testing thus estimates the 
probability that an individual or household meets program eligibility 
requirements. In the case of informal sector workers, criteria that 
particularly relate to informal sector employment could be substituted 
for those used in assessments of applicants who work in the formal 
sector. In this regard, Indonesia’s survey—which uses proxy means 
testing for a number of its social protection programs—may be used as 
a starting point (Satriana and Schmitt 2012).
(ii) Categorical targeting. This identifies easily distinguishable attributes 
that characterize the households to be targeted. Categorical 
targeting includes geographic targeting, which identifies the location 
or residence of applicants. Categorical targeting of informal sector 
workers is inherently difficult. As a result, either geographic targeting 
or targeting benefits on the basis of the life cycle can be used to target 
program benefits to informal sector workers. The pilot stage of Nepal’s 
Child Grant program used categorical targeting to identify eligible 
families in the five districts of Karnali, as well as poor Dalit families with 
children (Okubo 2014).
(iii) Self-targeting. This uses the principle of self-election to allocate 
social protection benefits. While participation is therefore voluntary, 
self-targeting often makes accessing noncontributory benefits so 
unattractive that it disincentivizes anyone but the neediest from 
applying for them. Due to the informal sector’s inherent lack of 
employment documentation and heterogeneity, self-targeting can be 
used to target informal sector beneficiaries. However, the personal costs 
of beneficiaries’ demonstrating need could be prohibitive, thus causing 
exclusion of the poorest informal sector beneficiaries. Voluntary forms 
of social insurance are, in fact, self-targeted social protection programs. 
Further, because they can be financed by worker contributions, the 
benefits of voluntary insurance can be both sustainable and inclusive. 
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Because the voluntary social insurance programs currently operating 
in Indonesia and Thailand include informal sector participation, these 
may form useful starting points for formulating similar schemes for 
implementation elsewhere (ILO 2008; Social Security Office, Ministry 
of Labour, and Government of Thailand 2012). 
(iv) While community-based targeting can use any of the targeting 
methodologies described above, determinations are made at the 
community level. Community-based targeting allows social protection 
to be adapted to a wide variety of socioeconomic contexts. This 
targeting methodology could thus be used to identify informal sector 
beneficiaries with diverse backgrounds. However, community-
based targeting has a number of drawbacks. First, it is vulnerable 
to both corruption and social, political, or ethnic fragmentation of 
communities (Conning and Kevane 2001). Corrupt officials often are 
able to allocate program benefits to relatives or friends in exchange 
for political favors. Similarly, fragmented communities are susceptible 
to discrimination in allocating program benefits, making it difficult to 
reach target groups. Community-based targeting is also difficult to 
scale up. To fulfill its intended objective, the individuals to be targeted 
must be personally acquainted with other members of the community. 
Further, the community in question may be too small for community-
based targeting to be cost-effective (Conning and Kevane 2001). 
Its potential inefficiencies and pitfalls notwithstanding, there is some 
evidence that community-based targeting can improve beneficiary 
perceptions of social protection programs. An evaluation in Indonesia, 
performed by the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab, concluded 
that although proxy means testing provided more efficient targeting 
than community-based targeting, program satisfaction on the part 
of beneficiaries was greater when community-based targeting was 
used (Alatas et al. 2013). Similarly, the evaluation of Bangladesh’s 
Gratuitous Relief disaster response program and Vulnerable Group 
Feeding Program, performed by the International Food Policy 
Research Institute, found that community-based targeting succeeded 
in reaching the target populations of these two programs (Gilligan and 
Hoddinott 2004). 
Methodologies for targeting beneficiaries increasingly use a combination of 
the approaches described above. For example, the 4Ps in the Philippines uses 
both geographic and community-based targeting together with proxy means 
testing. The Philippine Statistics Authority uses a survey to target the poorest 
municipalities, and then uses proxy means testing to identify the poorest 
households in these municipalities. The resulting list of selected households is 
then submitted for community approval before eligibility is finalized (Fernandez 
and Rosechin 2011). Using multiple targeting methodologies facilitates efficient 
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disbursement of program benefits for national-level programs, while at the same 
time allowing eligibility to remain context-specific. A similar approach can be 
used to target beneficiaries under programs that focus on the informal sector.
Determining the Level of Benefits 
For social transfer programs to fulfill their intended objectives, the benefits 
that they provide must be both adequate and context specific (Siddiki et al. 
2014). As a result, the first benefit determination issue to be decided is whether 
benefits should be provided in cash or in kind. Cash transfers allow beneficiaries 
to decide how best to meet their individual needs (Hanlon 2010). However, 
in-kind transfers may be best suited for individuals living in extreme poverty. 
A study performed by the International Food Policy Research Institute in 2009 
found that the poorest households tend to prefer in-kind transfers provided in 
the form of food over cash transfers, and that preference for cash transfers grows 
as beneficiary income increases (Ahmed et al. 2009). If in-kind transfers are 
chosen, the assets provided must be appropriate to the intended beneficiaries. 
Asset transfers suitable for informal sector workers include food, livestock, 
manufacturing inputs, or land for a workspace. Cost is likewise a consideration 
when deciding between cash or in-kind transfers. The administrative cost of 
cash transfers is significantly lower than it is for in-kind transfers, a factor that, in 
turn, facilitates implementation of cash transfer schemes (Hanlon 2010). 
Trade-offs among adequacy, acceptability, and affordability inevitably come 
into play in determining the actual size of the transfer to be provided. Adequacy 
refers to ensuring that the value of the transfer is sufficient to meet program 
objectives. In this regard, a benefit level set too low inadequately mitigates 
income insecurity and poverty reduction, whereas a benefit value set too high 
constrains coverage, as it limits the number of potential beneficiaries. As a 
result of such trade-offs, decisions regarding benefit levels are largely normative 
and political in nature. Regardless of the level set, adjustments for inflation are 
necessary if the purchasing power of the transfer is to be maintained.
Program funding issues often make determining an appropriate benefit level for 
informal sector workers particularly difficult. While social transfer pilot programs 
are often funded by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) or development 
partners, the expanded forms of government-provided social transfer programs 
tend to be tax-funded, although informal sector activity makes no contribution 
to the tax base. Given that the informal economy comprises a substantial share 
of total economic activity in many developing countries, noncontributory 
social transfer programs may seem either impossible or unsustainable. Creating 
adequate fiscal space in a government budget to fund such programs therefore 
requires some innovation. Alternatives for achieving this objective include 
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reallocating public expenditure, increasing the operational efficiency of other 
government programs or reducing their administrative costs, and seeking 
assistance from development agencies. 
In cases in which fiscal capacity varies widely, funding from the central 
government may be an option, particularly if the latter sets national guidelines. 
For example, both the transfer amount and eligibility threshold for the 
People’s Republic of China’s Minimum Living Standard Guarantee (MLSG) 
are determined at the local level, although both must fall within broad national 
guidelines. The benefit amounts provided depend on the financial capacity of 
the local government concerned; the level of benefits provided is thus often 
lower in poor, rural areas than it is in wealthier, urban centers, an outcome that 
impacts interregional poverty incidence (Golan, Sicular, and Umapathi 2014). 
Programs of this type may thus benefit from national oversight in ensuring that 
social protection initiatives reach their intended objectives.
Conditionality
Conditional cash transfers offer benefits on the condition that beneficiaries 
comply with certain requirements such as school attendance, nutritional 
outcomes, or visits to a health care provider. The expectation is that these 
requirements will induce broader development impacts than a cash or asset 
transfer in isolation. While conditional cash transfers have been proven to 
be effective, whether conditionality is responsible for this outcome remains 
unclear (Fiszbein and Schady 2009). In fact, any of the components of 
conditional cash transfers may be responsible for this positive outcome—the 
cash benefit itself, increased investment in human capital or social services, 
improved awareness of the prospects for economic advance, denying benefits 
in the face of noncompliance, or even effective program monitoring.6 
Conditional cash transfers have been widely used in Southeast Asia, primarily 
for childhood development. For example, investment in children’s education 
and health and maternal health services are conditions of receiving benefits 
under the 4Ps of the Philippines. A 2012 impact assessment of the program 
found measurable increases in the use of health services by mothers and their 
children as well as school enrollment, perhaps indicating the benefit of linking 
conditions to cash benefit receipt (Chaudhury, Friedman, and Onishi 2013).
If programs that target informal sector workers incorporate conditionality 
into their design, the conditions stipulated should facilitate achievement of 
outcomes beneficial to this group. Examples include school attendance by 
6 When individuals know that their compliance is being monitored, they often change their behavior 
(Levitt and List 2011). 
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beneficiary children, participating in skills development courses, or maintaining 
a safe workspace, since all of these mitigate the risks and vulnerabilities faced 
daily by informal sector workers. Investment in the education of children and 
adults builds skills and expands employment opportunities, thus ensuring better 
livelihoods for the beneficiaries and their children. Making social transfers 
conditional on workplace safety could be equally beneficial for self-employed 
and home-based workers who operate unsafe work environments as a means 
of cutting costs. However, regardless of their beneficial impact, the monitoring 
and enforcement costs of administering such restrictions on benefits may 
be prohibitive, particularly in the informal sector. Nevertheless, targeting the 
specific vulnerabilities and risks faced by informal workers with conditionalities 
may result in investment in more productive and less harmful employment and 
business endeavors. 
Benefit Delivery
Delivering social protection to informal sector workers is complicated, as they 
comprise a marginalized population. In particular, the unregistered nature of 
informal sector activity makes it difficult to determine which individuals and 
households comprise this sector. Ultimately, delivery of program benefits to 
informal sector workers requires appropriate administrative systems, minimizing 
inclusion and exclusion errors, efficient payment and delivery mechanisms, and 
monitoring and evaluation of program performance. 
Developing Administrative Capacity
Implementation of any social protection program requires administrative 
capacity in identifying and registering beneficiaries and their dependents, 
delivering program benefits, and monitoring and evaluating program success. 
Social protection programs that target informal sector workers require 
substantial outreach capacity. Due to difficulties associated with registration 
and documentation as well as the heterogeneous nature of informal sector 
activity, social protection measures currently operating in developing countries 
are often voluntary, as in Indonesia and Thailand (Social Security Office, 
Ministry of Labour, Government of Thailand; Satriana and Schmitt 2012). 
In fact, identifying informal sector workers requires extensive marketing 
campaigns that encourage potential beneficiaries to participate. Knowledge 
building is likewise required if program design is appropriate. 
Further, if the program is to be efficient, it must minimize inclusion and 
exclusion errors. This requires identifying the factors that could cause inclusion 
of ineligible beneficiaries or exclusion of those eligible. For example, means tests 
will likely need to be reformatted to the informal sector context, discrimination 
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or corruption that would negatively impact the outcome of community-based 
targeting will need to be exposed, and whether self-targeting mechanisms 
will attract the most marginalized segments of the informal economy must be 
determined. 
The People’s Republic of China provides an example of policy formulation in 
a country with large variation in local administrative capacity. As mentioned 
earlier, eligibility requirements for the MLSG program are primarily determined 
at the local level. Due to the variation in administrative and funding capacity 
that exists between the country’s urban and rural areas, numerous methods 
have been used to determine beneficiary eligibility. In provinces or cities 
with substantial administrative capacity, consumption indexes are used in 
determining eligibility, while areas with weaker administrative capacity use 
income levels alone for this purpose (Umapathi, Wang, and Keefe 2013). 
Although this system of determining beneficiary eligibility causes coverage 
and benefit levels to vary widely across regions, it is sensitive to administrative 
capacity at the local level.
Benefit Payment and Delivery Systems
Payment and delivery systems are important elements of service delivery, as 
they greatly influence both the cost and impact of a social protection program. 
Regardless of whether they relate to transfers of cash or assets, inefficient 
delivery mechanisms can make the cost of a program borne by beneficiaries 
prohibitively expensive or can greatly diminish the development impact of 
the program concerned. The appropriateness of a particular delivery system 
depends on both the type of program implemented and the sociopolitical 
context of the beneficiary community. 
In light of the above, the accessibility of the benefits provided is key to 
successful program outcomes. One study that assessed access to microfinance 
by poor and vulnerable populations found that the physical distance to the 
nearest financial institution most strongly impacted whether beneficiaries 
used financial institutions (Annim, Arun, and Kostov 2012). This suggests 
that facilities necessary for accessing program benefits—such as insurance 
providers, health clinics, and schools—must be available locally if the positive 
impact of a program is to be maximized. In many cases, partnering with local 
organizations improves access to program services. 
While authorized pay points have traditionally been used to deliver benefits paid 
in cash, more innovative delivery methods—such as direct deposit, “smart cards,” 
or even mobile phones—have increasingly been employed. Such mechanisms 
both increase beneficiary convenience and reduce delivery costs. Allowing 
beneficiaries the option of using either physical or digital forms of collecting 
benefits may encourage additional beneficiaries to participate. This was the logic 
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underlying the direct deposit and physical collection of benefits under India’s 
National Social Assistance Programme, which was expanded to include informal 
sector beneficiaries as a result of the Unorganised Workers Social Security Act 
2008 (Fasih 2011). This program allows beneficiaries to access benefits through 
accounts at commercial banks, the Post Office Savings Bank, postal money 
orders, at local government meetings in rural areas, or at neighborhood meetings 
in urban areas (Indian National Social Assistance Programme).
Monitoring and Evaluation
The primary objective of evaluation is to assess the degree to which a particular 
program achieves its objectives. Effective monitoring and evaluation also allows 
program design and implementation to be improved, political will for expansion 
or sustainability to be strengthened, and the global evidence base concerning 
social protection initiatives to be expanded. Monitoring—which occurs 
over the entire lifetime of a program—refers to identification and tracking of 
performance indicators and reviewing program implementation. Evaluation 
links outcomes to causes through objective and systematic assessment of a 
program’s impact. Because monitoring and evaluation serve multiple functions, 
the design of a program should lend itself to frequent review of the entire social 
protection system, of which the program concerned forms just one part. 
When used as part of a credible monitoring and evaluation framework, a 
management information system (MIS) can protect program success, reduce 
program costs, and allow a program to be scaled up in an affordable and 
appropriate manner. A well-functioning MIS contains all data, information, 
and processes required for evaluating program success. This includes data 
and information for identifying and addressing all factors that could threaten 
that success, maximizing the development impact of a particular intervention, 
and reporting all information relevant to the program in question. A 
well-functioning MIS also provides a means by which program risk can be 
managed and connections to complementary interventions established. 
Indonesia’s BAPPENAS oversees monitoring, evaluation, and annual 
assessment of all social protection initiatives. Its online administrative system 
(e-Monev) assists line ministries in collecting and integrating data relating to 
social protection initiatives, and reporting these to BAPPENAS. e-Monev has 
substantially improved reporting to BAPPENAS. In 2010, only 30.0% of all line 
ministries submitted reports, but following implementation of e-Monev, 65.0% 
of line ministries submitted reports to BAPPENAS (Haryana 2013). Further, 
because it makes information regarding program performance and budgeting 
available online, e-Monev also improves accountability.7
7 e-Monev. http://e-monev.bappenas.go.id/
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Ultimately, comprehensive program evaluations are necessary for mobilizing 
political support for expanding the scope or coverage of existing social 
protection programs. Finally, by identifying problems and proposing solutions, 
program monitoring and evaluation serves not only the program itself but also 
the global community that designs and implements social protection programs.
Ensuring Coherence at the Administrative Level
Coherence across social protection programs is best safeguarded by maintaining 
beneficiary enrollment and operational processes in a single registry MIS. This 
streamlines administration of social protection systems by making distribution 
of resources more equitable, facilitating oversight of multiple programs, 
and establishing links between programs and instruments that increase the 
efficiency of design and delivery. 
A single registry also allows a universal targeting procedure to be adopted, 
which, in turn, minimizes inclusion and exclusion errors and increases the 
cost-effectiveness of social protection programs. For single registries to work 
properly, they must be implemented within an appropriate context, which at 
the minimum requires a system approach to social protection. Ideally, this 
includes a sound national identification system, high-quality data at the level of 
the individual, sufficient administrative capacity, and enabling governance and 
institutions (Barca and Chirchir 2014). 
Single registries could also benefit informal sector workers who are potential 
program beneficiaries. Once entered into the system, these individuals would be 
able to receive all benefits for which they are eligible without applying for each 
program individually. However, exclusion from national household datasets (as 
in the case of migrant workers) may complicate such registration. Thus, other 
forms of enrollment and outreach may be necessary if informal sector workers 
are to be included in a single registry.
Indonesia’s Unified Database illustrates the benefits of a single registry with 
regard to administration of social protection. This database includes 96 million 
individuals in 24 million households. It also manages the administration of 
five national social protection programs: Jaminan Kesehatan Masyarakat 
(the national health insurance program), Bantuan Siswa Miskin (educational 
stipend for poor students), Program Keluarga Harapan (Family Hope Program), 
Beras untuk Rumah Tangga Miskin (rice for poor households), and Bantuan 
Langsung Sementara Masyarakat (a temporary unconditional and direct cash 
transfer provided to offset an increase in fuel prices) (Hatt et al. 2009). 
Proper maintenance of the database requires coordinated institutional 
arrangements. While system data is collected by Statistics Indonesia through 
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the census and other national surveys, data processing and maintenance is 
managed by Unit Penetapan Sasaran Penanggulangan Kemiskinan (Unit for 
Targeting Program of Poverty Alleviation), which reports to The Indonesian 
National Team for the Acceleration of Poverty Reduction. TNP2K’s national 
targeting unit is responsible for processing data and running proxy means tests 
that determine eligibility for social protection initiatives, maintaining data, 
providing operational advice to government entities hoping to use the unified 
database, and conducting research relevant to monitoring and evaluation 
of social protection programs. Figure 1.5 depicts coordination of Indonesia’s 
Unified Database graphically.
Other countries have likewise recognized the value of a single registry MIS. 
Bangladesh formally recognizes the value of a single registry system in its 
Figure 1.5: Indonesia’s Unified Database
IMIS = Integrated Management Information System, MIS = management information system, 
NIK = Nomor Induk Kependudukan (citizen identication number), PMT = proxy means text, PODES 
= village potential statistics, PPLS = Pendataan Program Perlindungan Sosial (database of social safety 
net program).
Source: L. Hatt, R. Thornton, B. Magnoni, and I. Mursaleena. 2009. Extending Social Insurance 
to Informal Sector Workers in Nicaragua via Microfinance Institutions: Results from a Randomized 
Evaluation. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACP309.pdf
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National Social Protection Strategy. As a result, the country will establish a single 
registry MIS for all citizens. While the Ministry of Social Welfare is to develop 
this MIS, each ministry will be responsible for overseeing the part of the MIS 
that relates to each scheme for which it is responsible (Planning Commission, 
Government of Bangladesh 2014). 
Accommodating Administrative Capacity Constraints
Those formulating and implementing social protection programs for informal 
sector workers in developing countries often face administrative and fiscal 
capacity constraints, as well as human and technical resources limitations. 
For example, an assessment by the International Labour Organization found 
Indonesia’s social protection system ill-equipped to provide for informal sector 
workers. Much of this related to difficulties with the registration, compliance, 
and payment processes that resulted from the undocumented nature of 
informal sector employment. In addition, the fact that informal sector workers 
were unaware that they may be eligible for the program or its compliance 
requirements further constrained program participation rates (Satriana and 
Schmitt 2012).
Despite limited capacity for administration and evaluation, it is still possible 
to design and implement effective social protection programs that target 
informal sector workers. However, this depends on three conditions being 
fulfilled: (i) monitoring and evaluating processes must be appropriate; (ii) the 
design and implementation of social protection programs must take account of 
existing administrative, fiscal, and resource constraints; and (iii) assistance from 
outside sources must be sought. 
First, program monitoring and evaluation procedures must allow feedback from 
ongoing programs to inform the design and implementation of new programs 
or expansion of existing initiatives. In short, the monitoring and evaluation 
procedures employed must, over time, allow delivery mechanisms to be 
improved, the results of ongoing programs to be documented, the efficacy of 
alternative approaches to program processes to inform both ongoing and future 
programs, and the capacity and financing requirements of social protection 
interventions to be identified.
In addition to improving program outcomes, effective monitoring and 
evaluation also provides policy makers with the information necessary to secure 
the requisite resources for sustaining and expanding social protection programs 
and for civil society organizations to demand transparency in social protection 
policy and the initiatives funded (OECD 2009). In short, effective monitoring 
and evaluation systems are essential for ensuring long-term sustainability of 
social protection programs.
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Second, program design and implementation must acknowledge existing 
capacity constraints. In fact, it is possible to design and implement effective 
social protection programs that place few demands on existing administrative 
and fiscal capacity and recognize limitations on the availability of human and 
technical resources. Building an effective social protection system should 
initially focus on implementing such programs. Then, as administrative capacity 
strengthens and initial program successes and weaknesses inform the design 
and implementation of new programs and expansion of existing initiatives, 
more comprehensive programs that require additional resources and more 
sophisticated administrative capacity can be undertaken.
Basic social protection programs with limited administrative requirements 
can be easily implemented, even under decentralized systems. Examples 
include basic targeted or universal social transfer programs, provision of basic 
services that uses preexisting delivery channels, and simply defined insurance 
mechanisms. 
Similarly, monitoring and evaluation systems—including their component 
MISs—can be simple as program implementation begins, and then expand 
progressively with evolving program requirements. Ideally, a single registry MIS 
would coordinate key administrative functions (i.e., targeting, registration, and 
enrollment), payments, and monitoring and evaluation of one or more social 
protection programs. As program implementation progresses and political will 
for social protection measures grows, a larger-scale social protection system 
can evolve. 
Viet Nam’s social pension program illustrates how a social protection 
initiative implemented under significant financial constraints can grow in 
sophistication and complexity over time. Upon its inception in 2000, the 
pension was only offered to individuals aged 90 years or over who were unable 
to access contributory pensions or other social allowances. Over time, eligibility 
requirements were progressively relaxed, and the size of the benefit expanded, 
thus increasing the program’s scope and coverage. As a result, two forms of 
social pension are now offered: a pension for older persons who live in poor 
households, either alone or with an ill, older spouse and who have no other 
form of financial support, and a pension provided to persons aged 80 years or 
over who receive no other retirement or social allowance benefits (Table 1.15). 
The multitiered nature of this program curtails the cost to the government of 
noncontributory pensions, while providing benefits commensurate with the 
level of vulnerability of the individuals it serves (Long and Wesumperuma 2013).
Third, support from development agencies and NGOs can often accelerate 
development of social protection systems when the capacity for establishing, 
monitoring, and evaluating social protection programs is limited. This is 
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particularly true with regard to building administrative capacity or scaling up 
more limited initiatives. In fact, designing and implementing national-level social 
protection programs and systems is an area in which numerous development 
agencies have significant comparative advantage. 
In seeking such assistance, a shift away from donor-specific financing and 
delivery mechanisms toward funding national programs through joint financing 
instruments should be emphasized (OECD 2009). Such support allows 
leveraging of international experience in formulating social protection systems 
as well as funding that can catalyze program development. However, care should 
be taken in managing donor support in a way that prevents implementation of 
programs not tailored to the receiving country’s particular social, political, and 
economic context, as such an outcome could potentially diminish the positive 
impact of the social protection program concerned. 
Opportunities for Development Partner Support
While development partners can help catalyze development of social 
protection systems when the receiving country’s administrative capacity is 
constrained, the role of development partners in designing and delivery of 
social protection systems transcends this relatively limited function. In fact, 
development partners can play an important role at the level of formulation 
and administration of social protection systems. 
Table 1.15: Viet Nam’s Tiered-Benefit Social Pension Program
Category Beneficiary
Benefit 
Level
(D’000)
Older persons living in poor households, 
and living (i) alone, or (ii) living with an 
ill older spouse and without children, 
grandchildren, or relatives who provide 
support
Aged 60–79 years 180.00
Aged 60–79 years, 
severely disabled
270.00
Aged 80+ years 270.00
Aged 80+ years, severely 
disabled
360.00
Individuals aged 80 years or more who 
do not receive retirement or other social 
allowance benefits
Aged 80+ years 180.00
Note: $1.00 = D20,935.00, on average, in 2013.
Source: G. T. Long and D. Wesumperuma. 2013. Some Notes on Social Pensions in Viet Nam. International 
Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth One Pagers. No. 210. http://www.ipc-undp.org/pub/IPCOnePager210.pdf
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At the policy level, development agencies and NGOs can help evaluate the 
efficiency and existing coverage of national social protection systems, and 
suggest how coverage can best be expanded. Further, they can develop a 
framework that assists the design and implementation of the receiving country’s 
social protection system over time. Such a framework can then be used to 
assess the adequacy of the receiving country’s social protection system, and to 
identify how best to improve this system. 
The Social Protection Floor Initiative of the International Labour Organization 
provides one example of such a framework. In particular, it guides formulation 
of nationally defined basic social protection guarantees that prevent or alleviate 
poverty, vulnerability, and social exclusion throughout a life cycle (ILO 2012). 
Further, it has also formulated a set of analytical instruments that facilitate 
formulation of national social protection floors. These two types of assistance 
are now packaged together as the Assessment-Based National Dialogue. 
Similarly, the Asian Development Bank’s Social Protection Index quantifies a 
country’s scope and depth of social protection coverage, as well as its impact 
within and between population groups. It measures currently available data 
and quantifies the degree of social protection offered by developing member 
countries in terms of social assistance, insurance, and labor market programs 
(ADB 2013b). 
Evaluation frameworks such as the Social Protection Floor Initiative and the 
Social Protection Index facilitate evaluation of the extent of social protection 
coverage currently offered, including that extended to informal sector workers. 
In sum, development agencies and NGOs can make a substantial contribution 
to national social protection systems by providing consultation and evaluation 
services relating to social protection systems and programs, as well as assisting 
in the application of the analytical frameworks that they have formulated.
It is at the program level that development agencies can provide the most 
tangible assistance to the social protection systems of receiving countries. 
In particular, they can assist by implementing and financing the pilot stage of 
national social protection programs. Such pilot programs can then be used 
to provide the evidence base necessary for procuring the requisite political 
and financial support for taking these pilot programs to scale. However, once 
at scale, national authorities must assume full overall responsibility for such 
programs if longevity and coherence with other development initiatives are to 
be ensured. 
At the administrative level, development partners can offer guidance and 
funding for formulating, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating national 
social protection systems, particularly in the case of establishing a single registry 
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MIS (Barca and Chirchir 2014). In this regard, training programs that build 
national and local capacity for administering social protection programs is an 
area in which numerous development partners have significant expertise. The 
same is true of conducting external evaluations of program implementation 
that highlight areas in which program operations can be strengthened. 
Policy Lessons and Recommendations
Current economic, social, political, and demographic conditions in developing 
countries in Asia suggest that social protection programs that respond to the 
vulnerabilities of informal sector workers are required if the region is to fulfill 
the productive potential of its vast labor force. This suggests that the design of 
social protection programs must be sensitive to the specific vulnerabilities of 
informal sector workers and their households. At the very least, these programs 
should avoid exposing them to further vulnerability. Safeguarding adequate 
social protection coverage for informal sector workers requires that, as with all 
other social protection initiatives, such programs must be coordinated at the 
policy, program, and administrative levels. 
At the policy level, social protection systems must be sensitive to the needs 
of informal sector workers by providing coverage for all citizens, rather than 
just the poor and vulnerable. In particular, due to the informal sector’s inherent 
heterogeneity, nonpoor informal sector workers may be excluded from social 
protection schemes. Thus, an entire range of contributory and noncontributory 
services must be provided in addition to those that respond to the needs of the 
poor and vulnerable. Both the life cycle and development planning approaches 
to provision of social protection should be employed at the policy level to 
ensure adequate scope and depth of impact of such programs. 
Social protection systems can provide for informal sector workers by encouraging 
establishment of, or taking advantage of, existing national identification 
registration systems. This would ensure that informal sector workers are not 
excluded from social protection coverage for lack of identification. Further, 
benefit portability should be adopted to extend coverage to migrant workers 
employed outside of their home countries. Countries should likewise enter 
into bilateral and multilateral agreements that make social protection system 
continuous across the region.
At the program level, an entire range of contributory and noncontributory 
forms of social protection should be made available to individuals regardless of 
employment status. This may require disentangling access to social protection 
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from employment, or allowing individuals access to social protection through 
avenues other than formal employment. Further, all social protection 
instruments must be coordinated to ensure that the coverage gaps of any 
particular instrument are minimized. For example, one scheme could offer 
benefits and corresponding contribution requirements that vary with need 
or ability to pay. Alternatively, an agency that manages program coordination 
could be instituted. Access between different social protection instruments 
should also be coordinated to ensure greater development impact of the entire 
social protection system.
At the administrative level, all social protection systems including those that 
cover informal sector workers would benefit from a single registry MIS that 
coordinates targeting, benefit delivery, monitoring, and evaluation. Innovative 
forms of outreach may also be required if access to social protection programs 
is to be available in all regions of a country. Partnerships with microfinance 
institutions and community-level organizations would be of significant 
assistance in this regard. The same is true of establishing a network of agents 
for facilitating enrollment and benefit delivery. 
Formulation of policy relating to social protection, as well as implementation and 
administration of particular social protection programs, must be coordinated 
at all levels if continuity of coverage is to be ensured across the entire range 
of social protection initiatives. This is necessary to ensure that national social 
protection systems respond to the needs of all inhabitants of a country at every 
stage of life, particularly with respect to informal sector workers who are easily 
excluded from the traditional forms of social protection currently in place. As 
informal sector workers account for a significant share of the total labor force in 
most developing countries in Asia, their access to social protection is critical to 
ensure social protection for Asia’s population at large.
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CHAPTER 2
Financing of Social Protection 
for Informal Sector Workers  
in Asia: Challenges  
and Opportunities
Michael Cichon and David Cichon
Abstract
This chapter identifies options for financing the closure of social protection gaps for the informal workforce in Asia, including prospects for concrete government action. Gaps are analyzed in four dimensions 
of social protection: health security during all ages; and income security during 
childhood, adulthood, and old age. 
The share of people in the informal sector is estimated to be 40.0%–90.0% 
of the total population in the 20 sample countries in Asia. Total public social 
expenditure in the sample ranges from 1.0% of gross domestic product (GDP) 
in Myanmar to 18.6% of GDP in the Kyrgyz Republic.8 The weighted average 
public social expenditure in the sample is 4.4% of GDP. Social expenditure as 
a share of GDP in all of Asia is slightly higher than 50.0% of the overall global 
average expenditure on social protection. The weighted average of the cost of 
closing social protection gaps across all sample countries is 3.0% of GDP. 
Social protection gaps, at least in the majority of countries in Asia, can be 
closed by a limited set of social protection benefits and mobilized within a 
period ranging from 5 to 10 years. Some increase in population coverage may be 
possible through extension of contribution-financed social protection systems, 
but most of the coverage extension should be financed from general revenues. 
In exceptional cases, this may be accommodated within current budget 
surpluses, but in most cases, additional revenue is needed. 
8 Private expenditure is ignored in the analysis due to the excessive level of uncertainty of expenditure 
estimates. 
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Investments are required in responsible social and fiscal governance to reduce 
severe poverty. Political will is key in addressing major social protection financing 
challenges.
Introduction
This chapter seeks to identify options for financing the closure of social 
protection gaps for the informal workforce in Asia. The main objective is to 
identify prospects for concrete government action. Twenty Asian countries 
were selected to provide an overview of the heterogeneous social and economic 
situations and social protection systems in Asia: Armenia, Bangladesh, 
Cambodia, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Fiji, India, Indonesia, the 
Republic of Korea, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
(Lao PDR), Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the 
Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Uzbekistan, and Viet Nam. Throughout this 
chapter, these countries are referred to as the sample countries. Nineteen 
are developing member countries of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), 
while the Republic of Korea is a developed member country.9 Economic and 
fiscal analyses were undertaken for all 20 countries, but in some cases, fewer 
countries were analyzed, as not all country-specific databases are complete.10 
The main organizations that produce internationally available data are ADB, 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International 
Labour Organization (ILO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), International 
Social Security Association, United Nations, and World Health Organization. 
These data were complemented with data from national sources if needed. 
To cross-check the quality of aggregated international data and information, six 
countries were selected for detailed analysis of their existing social protection 
systems: Bangladesh, the PRC, India, Indonesia, the Lao PDR, and Pakistan. 
This selection ensures that the majority of Asia’s population is included in 
the analysis, and that the full range of the magnitude of national challenges in 
extending coverage to the informal sector is included. This range of challenges 
extends from “easy” (PRC), to “manageable” (Indonesia), to “formidable but 
possible” (India and the Lao PDR), to “almost impossible” (Bangladesh). 
9 The Republic of Korea’s largely mature social protection system serves as a benchmark for comparison 
and interpretation of data for the other countries.
10 Metastudies, like this one, must rely on international data, which may not be compatible and are often 
incomplete. For this chapter, data of different sources were linked together, and data gaps were closed 
by estimates or assumptions. This may affect the accuracy of some parts of the analysis.
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The analysis proceeds in five steps. First, the socioeconomic environments in 
which national social protection systems in Asia currently operate are analyzed. 
Second, the development and present state of social protection in the region are 
described. Third, on the basis of analysis of the existing systems, the principal 
options for closure of social protection coverage gaps in Asia are examined. 
This is followed by a presentation of a new way of estimating the cost of closing 
such gaps, as well as broad identification of financing strategies for this purpose. 
Finally, the chapter concludes with recommendations for the future extension 
of, and financing strategies for, social protection in Asia.
Social and Economic Context  
and the Informality Challenge
Ultimately, the performance of, and expenditure on, social protection systems 
depends on decisions of policy makers as well as the quality of governance. The 
social and economic environment in which social protection systems operate 
determines the challenges for governance and policy. The key determinants 
of these challenges are (i) the demographic structure and dependency ratio 
of the country concerned, (ii) the structure of pretax and pretransfer income 
distribution, (iii) the functioning of the national economy, and (iv) the structure 
of the labor market. 
Demographic Context 
Demographic development and ongoing demographic transition set the 
economic and social development of countries. While old-age dependency rates 
will increase in most countries in the region, Asia’s projected total dependency 
ratios until 2050 (i.e., youth under 15 years of age plus older people over 60 or 
65 years of age as a proportion of people in active age) will stagnate, slightly 
decline, or only slightly increase (UNDESA 2015). The overall dependency rate 
for all of Asia will increase from 2010 to 2050 from 47.6% to 54.5%. Armenia, the 
PRC, the Republic of Korea, and Thailand are the exceptions, as they will face 
a more than 50.0% increase in their overall dependency ratios, a development 
similar to rapidly aging countries elsewhere. 
Within the stagnating overall dependency rate in Asia, a substantial structural 
shift will occur between old-age dependency and child dependency rates. The 
overall old-age dependency rate in Asia is expected to increase from 10.1% in 
2010 to 27.0% in 2050, and the child dependency rate is expected to decline 
from 37.6% to 27.7%. However, on the whole, the level and development of 
the overall dependency ratios in developing Asia for the next 4 decades do not 
signal any unmanageable risks for present or future social protection. 
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Economic Context 
Most of the sample countries showed solid long-term economic growth during 
the past few decades. Despite the global financial crisis, real average per capita 
growth exceeded 3.0% per year in most countries, with the PRC experiencing 
the highest average long-term real growth rate of over 9.0%, and the two Pacific 
island countries (i.e., Fiji and Papua New Guinea) realizing the lowest growth 
rates. Figures for GDP per capita (measured in 2013 US dollar purchasing power 
parity [PPP] terms) range between $2,200.00 and $33,000.00. 
The resilience of economies in Asia was demonstrated during two financial 
crises, which Asia experienced within 1 decade. In both cases, recovery was 
relatively quick in most countries. The Asian financial crisis in 1997–1998 
and the global financial crisis in 2008–2009 provided serious stress tests for 
Asia’s labor markets and social protection systems, showing that countries with 
established social protection systems could contain the social repercussions 
from the crises better than those that lacked such systems. 
Poverty and Inequality
Overall, national poverty and inequality levels remain high in the sample 
countries, albeit not as extreme as in other developing regions. Nonetheless, 
due to its large population, Asia is still home to the majority of the world’s poor, 
including most of its working poor. According to ILO (2011), “around 868 million 
workers in Asia and the Pacific—around 46.0%—still live on less than $2.00 
per day, of whom nearly 422 million survive on less than $1.25 per day. Asia still 
accounts for nearly 73 per cent of the world’s working poor.” 
The under $2.00-per-day poverty ratio in developing countries (i.e., the 
arithmetic average of 25 countries) currently stands at 32.0%. The average in 
the sample of countries (i.e., an 18-country average) stands at 34.0%. Figure 
2.1 shows that the under-$2.00-per-day poverty rate in developing Asia 
declines sharply as GDP per capita rises.11 This is no surprise, as this poverty 
line represents a lower percentage of GDP per capita in countries with relatively 
high GDP per capita than in countries with low GDP per capita. 
Figure 2.1 also shows that GDPs per capita of $1,000.00 PPP–$5,000.00 PPP 
are compatible with a wide range of poverty rates. In other words, national 
poverty rates are influenced not only by the per capita GDP level of the country 
concerned but also by other factors, including governance decisions for or 
11 Regression analysis of 25 developing countries in Asia for which complete data are available (ILO 
2014b). 
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against income redistribution through taxes and transfers. India ($3,600.00 
PPP) and Viet Nam ($3,400.00 PPP) have similar levels of GDP per capita, 
but India’s under $2.00-per-day poverty rate is 60.0% higher than that of Viet 
Nam, which in part is due to the fact that India spends about 1.7% of GDP on 
social protection while Viet Nam allocates 5.7% to it. 
The level of income inequality in developing Asia tends to rise with increasing 
per capita GDP levels. The arithmetic average of the Gini coefficient stands 
at 0.35 in developing Asia, but countries with relatively high levels of GDP per 
capita (e.g., the PRC, Georgia, Indonesia, and Malaysia) have Gini coefficients 
above 0.4. 
The national values around the regression line shows that a wide range of Gini 
coefficients, hence various levels of inequality, can be realized at similar levels 
of GDP per capita (Figure 2.2). Again, the level of inequality is a matter of 
governance and policy choice. 
Figure 2.1: Approximate under $2.00-per-Day Poverty Rates  
versus Gross Domestic Product per Capita in Purchasing Power 
Parity Terms in Developing Countries in Asia, 2010–2011 
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default/files/wdi-2014-book.pdf and authors’ calculations. 
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Labor Markets and the Challenge of Informality  
for Social and Economic Development
In line with the pace of economic growth, employment in Asia has grown 
substantially over the past few decades. However, between 1990 and 2010, 
Asia’s overall labor force participation rate dropped from 73.0% to 69.1%, 
with the rate for women dropping faster than that for men (from 58.4% 
to 53.7%, and 85.5% to 83.8%, respectively). These falling rates partially 
compensated for the growing population of active age, and, together with 
increasing employment, led to overall stagnating levels of unemployment. 
The impact of the global financial crisis on Asia was thus relatively small and 
short-lived. 
National labor markets in Asia are still marked by significant vulnerability and 
informality, however. Nearly 60.0% of workers in Asia and the Pacific—around 
1.1 billion—worked in vulnerable employment in 2009. The proportion was 
highest in South Asia at 77.0%, followed by Southeast Asia at 62.0%, and East 
Asia at 51.0%. The persistence of this kind of low-productivity and low-wage 
Figure 2.2: Gini Coefficients versus Gross Domestic Product  
per Capita in Purchasing Power Parity Terms in Several  
Developing Countries in Asia, 2010 
(approximate) 
GDP = gross domestic product, PPP = purchasing power parity.
Sources: World Bank. 2014. World Development Indicators 2014. http://data.worldbank.org/sites/
default/files/wdi-2014-book.pdf and authors’ calculations. 
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employment has also limited the growth of the domestic market—inhibiting a 
virtuous cycle of increasing labor demand, wages, and production (ILO 2011). 
The terms “informal employment” or “employment in the informal sector” 
are difficult to define. In fact, the 17th International Conference of Labour 
Statisticians struggled to find definitions for these terms (ILO 2004). Due to 
the complexity of these concepts, it is almost impossible to provide statistical 
estimates of the size of informal employment or employment in the informal 
sector that are internationally compatible. As a result, in this chapter, the term 
“vulnerable employment” is used as a proxy for “informal employment.” 
Vulnerable employment is defined as the sum of own-account workers and 
contributing family workers. In the 20-country sample, the share of vulnerable 
employment in total employment ranges from 20.0% to 25.0% in the Republic 
of Korea and Malaysia, to over 80.0% of total employment in Bangladesh, 
the Lao  PDR, Myanmar, Nepal, and Viet Nam, with the PRC, Fiji, Indonesia, 
the Kyrgyz Republic, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Thailand in the middle with 
vulnerability shares of 40.0%–60.0% in total employment. 
People who are in vulnerable employment are usually not covered by any form 
of social insurance or universal tax-financed social protection scheme that 
requires registration as an employee, citizen, or legal resident.12 However, the 
number of people who are vulnerable and socially insecure is greater than the 
estimate of people in vulnerable employment, because workers exist in formal 
sector enterprises for which employers do not comply with their obligations to 
pay contributions; hence, these workers are left unprotected. 
Figure 2.3 presents indicators of informal employment in sample countries.13 It is 
clear that the share of noncovered workers in total employment is greater than 
the share of vulnerable workers and legally noncovered workers. Legal, effective 
coverage of social protection schemes is approximated by the coverage of 
pension schemes. The extent of vulnerability and effective noncoverage is 
nothing less than dramatic in all countries, except the Republic of Korea. 
Figure 2.3 also shows the development of vulnerability between 2000 and 2013. 
In this period, vulnerability dropped by a sizable proportion only in Viet Nam, 
where it fell by about 20 percentage points. In all other countries, the reduction 
of vulnerability is either substantially less (not even reaching 1 percentage point 
12 Even universal pension schemes may require proof of residence during years when a worker is actively 
working. Alternatively, eligible residents may have to be identified and be registered. Such processes 
may not reach all de jure eligible workers in a developing country context (e.g., such processes would 
generally exclude undocumented migrant workers). 
13 The two estimates are based on different statistical sources, and thus may not be 100.0% compatible.
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per year) or stagnant. These figures demonstrate that the trickle-down strategy 
of extending social protection coverage by waiting for formalization of the labor 
force to take place will most likely leave many workers and their dependents 
uncovered for several decades. 
State and Financing of Social Protection  
for the Formal and Informal Sectors in Asia
Table 2.1, which refers to the same data used for Figure 2.3, provides an overview 
of the state of current social protection coverage in the sample countries. It 
indicates that the share of workers not protected by social protection schemes 
(approximated by the share of workers who are not actively contributing 
Figure 2.3: Indicators of Informal Employment in Sample 
Countries, 2000 and 2013 
Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic, PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Notes:
a Estimated on the basis of 2012 employment data for Malaysia, Nepal, and Thailand.
b Estimated on the basis of 2011 employment data for the Republic of Korea.
Sources: International Labour Organization (ILO). 2014. Key Indicators of the Labour Market 2014. 
8th edition. Geneva; ILO. 2014. World Social Protection Report 2014–15: Building Economic Recovery, 
Inclusive Development and Social Justice. Geneva.
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to national social insurance pension schemes or who are not covered by 
tax-financed schemes) is substantially greater than the estimated level of 
vulnerable employment in all of the sample countries, other than in the PRC 
and the Republic of Korea.14 
The wide discrepancy between legal coverage and effective coverage—in 
the Philippines and Sri Lanka, the difference is more than 50.0% of total 
employment—shows that the potential for increasing coverage through full 
enforcement of existing social protection legislation is substantial. This fact 
should play a major role when designing national strategies for achieving 
universal protection. However, a high proportion of the workforce, ranging from 
20.0% in fairly developed economies (e.g., the Republic of Korea and Malaysia) 
to 80.0% in others (e.g., Bangladesh and Myanmar) will not easily be reached by 
the usual social protection schemes designed for the formal sector.
Analytical Framework
The next step is to analyze the nature of the social protection gaps in more detail. 
This requires a structural framework. The concept of the social protection floor 
adopted by the United Nations and put into an international instrument by the 
ILO in 2012 provides a globally accepted framework for the extension of social 
protection to uncovered groups, notably in the informal economy (ILO 2012). 
It is also a useful framework for identifying structural coverage gaps as well 
as estimating the cost of closure of these gaps. Box 2.1 describes the salient 
features of the social protection floor framework and its historical origins in the 
global financial crisis. 
Using the Social Protection Floor to Analyze  
Social Protection Gaps
The four social protection guarantees from R202, the ILO’s Social Protection 
Floor Recommendation, are used to estimate coverage and protection gaps in 
this chapter. They are (i) income security during childhood, (ii) income security 
during adulthood, (iii) income security during old age, and (iv) health security 
during an entire lifetime. The term “guarantees” underscores the fact that the 
focus is on social protection outcomes that can be achieved by different types 
of benefits and schemes, rather than on concrete means or particular types 
of benefits. R202 clearly formulates a protection objective: “these guarantees 
should ensure that all in need have access to essential health care and basic 
14 Increases where legal coverage is less-than-effective coverage due to statistical discrepancies that 
could not be clarified or to short-term frictional unemployment, which leads to temporary interruptions 
of contribution payments. 
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Table 2.1: Changes in Vulnerable Employment, 2000–2013,  
and Level of Social Protection Noncoverage in Sample Countries  
in the Latest Year for Which Data are Available
Country
Vulnerable 
Employment
Legally Not 
Covered by 
Mandatory, 
Voluntary, and 
Noncontributory 
Pension 
Schemes
Effectively 
Not Covered 
by Mandatory, 
Voluntary, and 
Noncontributory 
Pension 
Schemes
% Share in Total Employment
2000 2013
Latest  
Available Year  
(2009–2011)
Latest  
Available Year
(2009–2011)
Armenia 44.7 33.4 26.5 62.5
Bangladesh 83.3 82.9 97.0 100.0
Cambodia 81.3 63.8 … 100.0
PRC 59.1 45.6 71.7 41.9
Fiji 38.4 40.9 0.0 0.0
India 82.0 77.2 96.6 87.3
Indonesia 62.2 60.1 85.1 91.1
Republic of Korea (b) 22.8 22.8 0.0 17.9
Kyrgyz Republic 52.1 45.6 14.4 54.5
Lao PDR 89.2 85.0 91.5 98.5
Malaysia (a) 22.0 20.6 27.5 55.7
Myanmar 94.7 88.7 … 87.5
Nepal (a) 71.4 67.1 97.4 94.7
Pakistan 63.0 61.4 52.8 94.4
Papua New Guinea 75.9 77.2 100.0 95.9
Philippines 40.3 40.3 20.9 73.6
Sri Lanka 40.3 39.9 15.8 88.3
Thailand (a) 55.2 50.7 55.5 71.8
Uzbekistan 46.5 36.5 0.0 …
Viet Nam 80.7 60.7 62.8 72.7
… = no data, Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic, PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Notes: 
a. Estimated on 2012 employment data for Malaysia, Nepal, and Thailand.
b. Estimated on 2011 employment data for the Republic of Korea.
Sources: International Labour Organization (ILO). 2014. Key Indicators of the Labour Market 2014. 8th 
edition. Geneva; ILO. 2014. World Social Protection Report 2014–15: Building Economic Recovery, Inclusive 
Development and Social Justice. Geneva.
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Box 2.1: Using the United Nations and International Labour 
Organization Social Protection Floor as an Analytical 
Framework for Identifying Gaps in Social Protection Coverage
The term “social protection floor” was first used as the title of one of nine crisis initiatives promulgated by the United Nations during a meeting of the 
United Nations System Chief Executives Board in April 2009. The initiative was 
joined by 19 United Nations and international agencies, and a number of major 
bilateral donors and nongovernment organizations. Since then, the concept 
of the social protection floor has been widely endorsed in the development 
community, including the Open Working Group on Sustainable Development 
Goals, which proposed a set of 17 new development goals for the global 
post-2015 development agenda. 
With the support of a coalition of United Nations agencies—notably the World 
Health Organization and United Nations Children’s Fund—the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) obtained a mandate from the 100th Session of the 
International Labour Conference in 2011 to develop a new international social 
protection standard. R202, the Social Protection Floors Recommendation, was 
unanimously adopted by the 101st Session of the International Labour Conference 
in June 2012. As a result, it is an instrument of international law that all 184 ILO 
member states must take into account when drafting national social legislation. 
It aims to (i) establish and maintain, as applicable, social protection floors as a 
fundamental element of national social security systems; and (ii) implement 
social protection floors within strategies for the extension of social security that 
progressively ensure higher levels of social security to as many people as possible, 
guided by ILO social security standards.
National social protection floors should comprise at least the following four social 
security guarantees: (i) access to a nationally defined set of goods and services, 
constituting essential health care, including maternity care, that meets the criteria 
of availability, accessibility, acceptability, and quality; (ii) basic income security 
for children, at least at a nationally defined minimum level, providing access to 
nutrition, education, care, and any other necessary goods and services; (iii) basic 
income security, at least at a nationally defined minimum level, for persons of 
active age who are unable to earn sufficient income, in particular, in cases of 
sickness, unemployment, maternity, and disability; and (iv) basic income security, 
at least at a nationally defined minimum level, for older persons.
Source: International Labour Organization. 2012. Social Security for All. Geneva.
income security, which together secure effective access to goods and services 
defined as necessary at the national level” (ILO 2012, Article 4). 
This formulation also defines the floor as a combination of income security 
provided through cash transfers and transfers in kind, or in the form of access 
to essential social services as listed in Articles 11–13 of the International 
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Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (United Nations 1966) and 
the concept developed by the Bachelet Advisory Report to the United Nations 
Crisis Initiative on Social Protection established in 2009 (Bachelet 2011). R202 
also casts social protection floors into the context of wider social security 
extension strategies that countries are required to adopt. 
Overview of Social Protection Gaps in the Sample Countries
The overall picture of social protection systems in the region is one of extreme 
fragmentation (Cichon and Cichon forthcoming, 17–18). Country profiles 
reveal that many of the social protection systems of the sample countries 
comprise a set of uncoordinated programs, each focusing on specific aspects of 
social insecurity. Thus, in their entirety, these systems have major deficiencies 
in terms of their extent and quality of coverage. 
Health Security
The degree of effective access to essential health services (i.e., health security 
coverage) is the indicator of social protection coverage that is the most difficult 
to estimate. There is no accepted indicator that measures population coverage 
and quality of care. In the literature, coverage, access, and quality of care are 
generally measured by a variety of proxy indicators, such as density of medical 
staff, staff resources per medical act, or total expenditure and out-of-pocket 
payments. Each of these indicators has its merits and demerits; however, none 
effectively combines aspects of physical access (e.g., staffing ratios), financial 
access (i.e., the extent of third-party coverage of health care cost), and quality 
of care. 
Thus, a new health protection indicator is defined in this chapter, combining 
(i) an indicator of physical access to health facilities (i.e., calculated on the basis 
of staffing ratios of health professionals per 1,000 population, which compares 
the national staffing ratios with the World Health Organization benchmark 
of adequate health sector staffing ratio of 41.1 health professionals per 1,000 
population);15 (ii) an indicator of quality of health services (i.e., proportion of 
live births attended by qualified health professionals benchmarked against 
100.0% attendance by qualified health professionals); and (iii) an indicator of 
financial access (i.e., proportion of total expenditure covered by out-of-pocket 
payments benchmarked against the relatively low out-of-pocket co-payment 
rate of Thailand). 
15 The indicator simply calculates the ratio of national health professionals by the benchmark of 41.1 per 
1,000 population. Ratios over 1 are cut to a value of 1 (ILO 2014b, 296). 
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The construction of the health care coverage indicator deliberately confines 
itself to input indicators of the health delivery and health financing systems. 
It does not incorporate health outcome indicators (e.g., life expectancy or 
quality-adjusted life years), since health outcomes are as much a consequence 
of general living conditions as of the health delivery system itself. Likewise, the 
specific nature of third-party financing arrangements (e.g., social insurance, 
private insurance, health insurance, or national health services) does not 
enter into the indicator (Table 2.2). Instead, to what extent health care users 
are required to cofinance services by out-of-pocket payments is key, as this is 
indicative of the extent to which the health financing system may discourage 
utilization. 
The three individual components of the new coverage indicator, as well as 
the combined coverage indicator, are summarized in Table 2.2. The PRC, the 
Republic of Korea, and Thailand are currently achieving a coverage indicator of 
about 75.0% of a theoretical perfect score of 100.0%. Thailand achieves that 
score with an expenditure of 3.9% of GDP, while the Republic of Korea uses 
7.5% of GDP. Aided by successful formalization of its labor force, the Republic 
of Korea rapidly extended health access through its social health insurance 
scheme. In contrast, Thailand complemented a stagnating social health 
insurance scheme in 2001 by the tax-financed Universal Coverage Scheme. 
A score similar to that of the Republic of Korea and Thailand is achieved by 
Sri Lanka, which operates a national health service.
The largest protection gaps in the region are in countries with high levels of 
labor force informality. Bangladesh, Cambodia, the Lao PDR, Nepal, Pakistan, 
and Papua New Guinea show dramatic shortfalls in their overall coverage 
indicators as compared with the benchmark, indicating a need for investment 
in their national health delivery systems. 
Whether the level of protection in these countries can best be improved by a 
social health insurance scheme aimed at universal coverage or another health 
financing system aimed at universal coverage is unclear, as this depends on 
national circumstances and preferences. From a governance point of view, there 
is little difference between a universal health insurance scheme and any other 
universal health financing system where the purchaser and delivery functions 
are separated. However, from international experience, it is obvious that 
private insurance schemes or community-based schemes have not been able 
to demonstrate that they can achieve universal coverage, other than in cases in 
which private insurance is mandated (e.g., the Netherlands, Switzerland, and 
more recently, the United States). 
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Table 2.2: Measures of Health Care Coverage and Quality  
in the Sample Countries 
Country
Health Care 
Staff-Based 
Access Gap
% Share of 
Live Births 
Attended 
by Skilled 
Health Care 
Professionals 
in Total Live 
Births
Out-of-
Pocket 
Payments 
as a Percent 
of Total 
Health Care 
Expenditure
Combined 
Coverage 
Indicatora
Armenia 0.0 99.5 54.6 52.0
Bangladesh 75.7 31.1 63.3 3.2
Cambodia 55.8 71.0 61.7 13.8
PRC 0.0 99.6 34.3 75.3
Fiji 0.0 99.7 22.8 88.6
India 33.1 57.7 57.6 18.8
Indonesia 31.6 79.8 45.3 34.4
Republic of Korea 0.0 100.0 34.8 75.0
Kyrgyz Republic 0.0 98.3 36.1 72.3
Lao PDR 57.3 37.0 38.2 11.2
Malaysia 0.0 98.6 35.6 73.1
Myanmar 41.0 70.6 71.3 13.8
Nepal 72.8 36.0 49.2 5.7
Pakistan 43.0 45.0 61.9 11.2
Papua New Guineab 80.7 42.7 9.5 8.6
Philippines 0.0 62.2 52.0 34.4
Sri Lanka 0.0 98.6 49.9 56.8
Thailand 24.7 99.4 13.1 74.8
Uzbekistan 6.6 91.9 44.1 55.2
Viet Nam 6.6 91.9 48.8 50.6
Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic, PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Notes:
The combined coverage indicator is from the authors’ calculations. 
a  Defined as benchmark coverage indicator = (100 – access gap) / 100 * % of births attended /100 * (100 – 
out-of-pocket payments)/(100 – Thailand out-of-pocket payments) * 100
b  Compensation of two dimensions of coverage gaps by extent of third-party payment is allowed.
Sources: International Labour Organization. 2014. World Social Protection Report 2014–15: Building Economic 
Recovery, Inclusive Development and Social Justice. Geneva; World Bank. 2014. World Development Indicators 
2014. http://data.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/wdi-2014-book.pdf
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Income Security during Childhood
There is little statistical information on the extent of income security programs 
for children. Tax-financed universal cash benefits or benefits in kind for children 
sometimes occur, as can be seen in the country profiles. Yet only 17 out of 
49 countries and areas in Asia have some form of family allowance system built 
into their social protection systems for the formal sector.16 
Child income security is, to some extent, provided for in the survivor benefit 
regulations of public pension schemes. It can thus be assumed that at least the 
same proportion of children’s benefits are available from the income security 
provisions in case of the loss of one or two parents as those that are available to 
workers who are covered by formal sector pension schemes. 
In Asia, only 4.3% of total public social protection expenditure is spent on social 
protection transfers to children. This indicates that in Asia—as in most other 
developing regions of the world—childhood income security is not the top 
priority of governments or societies (ILO 2014b, 306). Thus, most children, and 
in particular most children in need, remain unprotected today. 
Income Security during Active Age
Income security in active age can be provided through many schemes. Formal 
sector workers often benefit from income transfers for specific contingencies 
such as employment injury benefits, unemployment and severance pay 
benefits, maternity benefits, sickness benefits, and disability pensions. These 
benefits may be combined with other allowances such as constant attendance 
or dependents’ allowances. However, people in the formal sector who 
exhaust their employment-related benefits, as well as unprotected people 
in the informal sector, must instead rely on general means-tested social 
assistance benefits. 
Most countries in Asia have some form of provision for employment-related 
social security benefits. Traditionally, the greatest legal coverage is reached by 
employment injury schemes.17 However, much of that coverage is still organized 
in the form of employer liability schemes, in which injured workers often have 
to prove employer fault and claim their benefits through cumbersome legal 
16 Indirect child benefits, in the form of tax credits for parents with children, are not analyzed here. The 
statistical data regarding their financial volumes in a region with generally low income tax revenues are 
nonexistent. However, when revenues for financing national child benefit schemes are explored, it may 
be worthwhile to look at such tax credits and to consider them among the public subsidies that may be 
reduced or abolished to refinance a new, more universal, or better-targeted benefit. 
17 In the sample, ranging from under 10.0% in India to 85.0% in the Republic of Korea.
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proceedings that often are unsuccessful or very slow. Comparable data on 
coverage of maternity, sickness, and invalidity schemes are scarce. However, 
since most of these schemes are organized in the form of social insurance, their 
coverage can be assumed to be similar to the coverage provided under pension 
schemes (Table 2.1). 
Most income security during working age is provided by unemployment 
benefits and general social assistance. Unemployment benefits are paid in 
periodic payments for a number of months by social insurance schemes, 
periodic payments by social assistance schemes, or one-off severance pay that 
is generally an employer liability. 
While 67.0% of countries in Asia have some form of unemployment scheme, 
the actual coverage of these schemes is rather limited. The overwhelming 
majority of the unemployed in Asia receive no benefits. In developing Asia, only 
Thailand and Uzbekistan have a beneficiary coverage rate of 30.0%–40.0% of 
all workers. Workers in the informal sector and their dependents do not benefit 
from any unemployment benefit provision, as this generally pertains exclusively 
to the formal sector. 
Instead, workers in the informal sector depend on general social assistance, 
public employment schemes, or charity. In fact, social assistance schemes that 
attempt to support people in poverty are relatively new. It is important to note 
that in all of Asia, only 0.4% of GDP is spent on general social assistance for 
people in active age. 
Social assistance is defined as comprising all schemes that provide benefits 
in cash or in kind, are income- or means-tested, and are financed by taxation. 
Traditionally, social assistance was a means-tested cash benefit targeting the 
very poor, but recently, new forms of social assistance have become the focus 
in the global social protection debate. For example, the World Bank rebranded 
time-bound social assistance as “social safety nets.”18 The terms “conditional” 
and “nonconditional” social transfers have also sprung up recently, and mean 
that in addition to being poor, recipients have to meet one or more additional 
behavioral conditions. 
The applicability of general means-tested social assistance schemes to 
developing countries with high levels of poverty has been contested on 
the grounds that they may be too expensive, or that efficient, effective, and 
corruption-free means testing is not possible. In 2014, Cook and Pincus 
18 The World Bank (2014b, 1) definition of social safety nets is “non-contributory transfers designed to 
provide regular and predictable support to targeted poor and vulnerable people . . . .[and] regular and 
predictable social protection for the poor and vulnerable.” 
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(2014, 5) described the limited reach of social assistance in Asia, and concluded 
that for Southeast Asia, “social assistance is largely delivered through safety net 
programs that are either means-tested, geographically targeted or both.” The 
World Bank (2014a, 5) estimated that of the poorest quintile of the population 
in South Asia, only about 25.0% is covered by some form of social assistance, 
with corresponding percentage shares for East Asia and the Pacific being less 
than 50.0%.
However, in 2009, Handayani and Burkley (2009, 6) concluded that, based on 
exchange of experiences of social assistance and cash transfers during a regional 
workshop in Manila, “social assistance experience is rich in Asia and the Pacific 
region.” Exchanges during that workshop validated the idea that most countries 
in the region have some form of social assistance, especially during economic 
downturns, and that conditional cash transfers are fast becoming a popular tool. 
Similarly, in its Social Protection Operational Plan, 2014–2020, ADB (2013, 6) 
observed that the “use of direct income transfers is gaining greater attention in 
Asia and the Pacific after the widespread adoption and scaling up of conditional 
cash transfers in Latin America and the Caribbean since the 1990s.” 
While public employment schemes have often been viewed as alternatives 
to social assistance schemes, their coverage, in general, has remained low for 
decades. However, a major innovation in social protection was devised in India 
in 2005 by the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, which combines 
elements of public employment schemes with a social assistance objective. It 
has created a new form of self-targeted social assistance that provides cash 
income in the form of a minimum wage payment in exchange for a guaranteed 
maximum of 100 workdays per year per household. Its self-targeting design 
overcomes some of the traditional implementation problems of social 
assistance schemes in developing country contexts. A number of developing 
countries have shown interest in replicating this scheme. 
Income Security in Old Age 
In all of Asia, only about 47.0% of all people above statutory retirement age 
receive a pension (ILO 2014b). This represents about half of the coverage rate 
of North America and Europe. Table 2.1 already reported the proportion of the 
employed that are not actively contributing to a pension scheme or are not 
covered by a noncontributory pension scheme, identifying huge coverage gaps 
in the active population in developing Asia. Noncoverage in active age logically 
leads to nonreceipt of employment-related pensions in old age. 
Table 2.3 demonstrates that in developing Asia—except for countries with 
planned or formerly planned economies—pension coverage in old age is 
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Table 2.3: Share of Pension Recipients in the Total Population  
above Retirement Age in Sample Countries  
(%)
Country
Pensionable 
Age
Elderly with 
Contributory 
Pensions
Elderly with 
Noncontributory 
Pensions
Total 
Coverage of 
the Elderly
Armenia 63m/62.5f 64.6 15.4 80.0
Bangladesh 65m/62f  4.9 34.6 39.5
Cambodia 55 … …  5.0
PRC 60m/55f 32.2 42.1 74.4
Fiji 55 … … 10.6
India 58  9.9 14.2 24.1
Indonesia 55 … …  8.1
Republic of Korea 60 … … 77.6
Kyrgyz Republic 63m/58f … …  100.0
Lao PDR 60 … …  5.6
Malaysia 55  16.2 3.6 19.8
Mongolia 60  62.6 37.4  100.0
Nepal 58  9.2 53.3 62.5
Pakistan 60m/55f … …  2.3
Papua New 
Guinea 55 … …  0.9
Philippines 60  24.3 4.2 28.5
Sri Lanka 55m/50f … … 17.1
Thailand 60  13.1 68.6 81.7
Uzbekistan 60m/55f  97.8  0.3 98.1
Viet Nam 60m/55f  25.8  8.7 34.5
… = no data, Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic, PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Note: m denotes male pension age; f denotes female pension age.
Source: International Labour Organization. 2014. World Social Protection Report 2014–15: Building Economic 
Recovery, Inclusive Development and Social Justice. Geneva.
substantially below 50.0% (other than in the Republic of Korea, Nepal, 
and Thailand). While the high coverage in the Republic of Korea is largely a 
result of the rapid expansion of the contributory National Pension Service 
after its inception in 1988, which was facilitated by successful formalization 
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of the economy and labor force, the remarkably high coverage rates in Nepal 
and Thailand resulted from introduction of noncontributory social pension 
schemes. 
Old-age income security systems in historically market economies (e.g., the 
Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand), as well as in some former 
planned economies (e.g., the PRC, the Lao PDR, and Viet Nam), have a strong 
social insurance component but generally combine this with social pensions 
for those who do not qualify for contributory social insurance. Interestingly, 
countries that experienced a strong British colonial influence—regardless 
of whether they historically leaned toward planned economies (e.g., India 
and Sri  Lanka) or market-oriented systems (e.g., Malaysia and Singapore)—
still have provident funds at the core of their old-age benefit systems. 
Nepal has a long provident fund tradition but has combined it with a social 
pension scheme that was a pioneer noncontributory pension scheme in 
the region. 
While the provident funds in Malaysia and Singapore are considered to be 
successful in economic terms, regarding rates of return on mandatory savings 
accounts, they do not provide long-term income replacement rates that create 
real income security in old age (OECD 2013, 29). Formerly planned economy 
countries, including the PRC, introduced variants of the provident fund in 
the form of mandatory defined-contribution schemes following economic 
liberalization. 
The major innovation in old-age income security over the past 2 decades in 
Asia is the emergence of new, or now more prominent, noncontributory or 
social pension schemes. Noncontributory pension schemes now operate in 13 
countries, virtually all of these being social pensions that are either means- or 
income-tested (Table 2.4). The benefit levels of these schemes are relatively 
low; as a consequence, their cost in all cases remains below 0.5% of GDP. 
Noncontributory pension schemes are also currently the major old-age benefit 
system for the informal sector in Asia. The many decades of experience in Asia 
with provident funds and social insurance schemes show that with only the rare 
exceptions of countries with strong central governance systems (e.g., the PRC, 
the Republic of Korea, and Singapore), classical social insurance and savings 
schemes do not have the potential to overcome coverage gaps, particularly in 
the informal sector.
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Current Level and Composition of Social Expenditure  
in the Sample Countries
According to ILO data, total public social expenditure in Asia ranges from 1.0% 
of GDP in Myanmar to 18.6% in Mongolia, with an average level of 4.6% of 
GDP (ILO 2014b, 310).19 The weighted average expenditure in the sample of 
developing Asia (including the Republic of Korea) is 4.4% of GDP. This roughly 
tallies with the estimate of ADB’s Social Protection Index for 2012 for all Asia 
(ADB, Social Protection Index). Since ILO data are the most current, allow for 
disaggregation of social expenditure along the four social security guarantees, 
and include more comprehensive health expenditure, they are used for the 
analysis.20
Social expenditure as a share of GDP in all of Asia is about half of the global 
average expenditure on social protection. Roughly three-quarters of total 
social expenditure in the region is devoted to pensions (43.0%) and health 
care (33.0%). The wide range of expenditure levels again reflects the diverse 
social and economic histories of the countries in the region. Uzbekistan has 
social expenditure of over 10.0%; Armenia, the PRC, the Republic of Korea, the 
Kyrgyz Republic, and Thailand show a range of expenditure between 5.0% and 
10.0% of GDP; while the rest of the countries in the sample have total public 
social expenditure below 5.0% of GDP (Table 2.5). 
Allocating Current Social Expenditure in the Sample Countries 
to the Formal and Informal Sectors
Table 2.6 allocates total social expenditure to recipients in the formal and 
informal sectors, but there is no direct statistical information on the percentage 
of some public social expenditure, such as on public health or social assistance 
allocated to recipients in the informal sector. The expenditure allocation is made 
19 Private expenditure had to be ignored, as the level of uncertainty concerning expenditure estimates is 
considered to be too high. Data are from 2011–2012.
20 However, there are serious inconsistencies between expenditure estimates of the different institutions 
that cannot be clarified without an in-depth statistical study, which is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
The ILO data allow for disaggregation of total social protection according to the four guarantees. ADB 
data obtained from the Social Protection Index database do not contain all public health expenditure. 
ADB data also do not allow for the same level of disaggregation as ILO data. There are major 
discrepancies between the overall public social expenditure estimates of international institutions 
(and sometimes even between different departments of the same institution) due to the use of 
different definitions and different national and international statistical sources. Some data sources also 
show inexplicable differences in social expenditure between consecutive years. The ILO data seek to 
establish a consistent time series of social expenditure since 1990. Their expenditure data draw on 
national sources, ILO sources, and the ILO social security inquiry, as well as data from ADB, Eurostat, 
Government Spending Watch, the International Monetary Fund, the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, the United Nations Children’s Fund, the United Nations Economic 
Commission, and the World Bank. 
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Table 2.5: Approximate Alternative Estimates of Public Social 
Expenditure in the Sample Countries, 2010  
(% of gross domestic product)
Country
Total Public 
Social 
Expenditurea
Public Social 
Expenditureb 
Social 
Protection 
Expenditurec
Government 
Social 
Security  
and Welfared
Social 
Protection 
and Health 
Expendituree
Armenia 8.5 4.2 1.9 8.7 8.9
Bangladesh 2.7 2.8 1.6 1.7 1.7
Cambodia 1.8 2.0 0.6 1.8
PRC 6.8 7.0 5.0 3.5 7.5
Fiji 3.4 4.7 1.5 2.1 …
India 2.6 2.7  1.5  
(2009)
1.1 …
Indonesia 2.6 2.0 0.7 … 0
Republic  
of Korea 9.2 9.6 6.3 4.7 5.8
Kyrgyz 
Republic 8.3 15.3 15.0 8.1 8.8
Lao PDR 1.7 2.1 0.7 …
Malaysia 3.0 5.9 3.5 3.7 …
Myanmar 1.0 …
Nepal 2.3 4.5 2.2 2.2 2.0
Pakistan 1.7 2.1 0.4 0.1
Papua New 
Guinea 4.4 3.1 0.1 … …
Philippines 1.6 3.5 2.1 0.8 1.9
Sri Lanka 3.1 4.8 2.8 3.2 3.0
Thailand 7.2 5.5 2.7 3.3 4.1
Uzbekistan 11.2 … 8.4 … 12.4
Viet Nam 6.3 6.5 5.0 … …
… = no data, Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic, PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Note: Data are from the central government, whichever is higher.
Sources:
a  International Labour Organization. 2014. World Social Protection Report 2014–15: Building Economic 
Recovery, Inclusive Development and Social Justice. Geneva.
b  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2014. Society at a Glance: Asia/
Pacific 2014. Paris.
c  Asian Development Bank (ADB). Social Protection Index. https://spi.adb.org/spidmz/ (accessed 10 
February 2015).
d ADB. Statistical Database System Online. http://www.adb.org/data/sdbs (accessed 10 February 2015).
e International Monetary Fund. 2013. Regional Economic Outlook, Update. Washington, DC.
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on the basis of an analysis of the coverage of the different social protection 
programs in the country concerned, as well as by using the degree of overall 
formalization of the population (approximated by the share of vulnerable 
employment in total employment), or the degree of coverage of contributory 
versus noncontributory pension schemes as allocation weights, wherever 
appropriate.21 
The results show an average allocation of total social expenditure of roughly 
64:34 in favor of the formal sector, which means, due to the high level of the 
population in the informal sector, that social protection expenditure per capita 
in the formal sector in the sample is about 2.6 times higher than per capita 
social protection expenditure in the informal sector. This differential is a rough 
indicator of the different degrees of social insecurity in the formal and informal 
sectors of the sample as a whole. The differential also aggravates the level of 
income inequality between the formal and informal sectors. The statistical 
basis does not allow the splitting of the overall expenditure into the proportion 
financed by social insurance contributions and shares financed by taxation. 
Based on the relative distribution of social expenditure of the ADB Social 
Protection Index between the poor and nonpoor, Table 2.6 also estimates how 
much of social expenditure is allocated to the poor.22 The result is that roughly 
38.0% of all social expenditure for the informal sector is allocated to the poor, 
if one assumes that all of the poor are in the informal sector. This also means 
that, on average, the countries in the sample spend about four times as much 
per capita on social protection for the nonpoor as they spend per capita on 
the poor. This imbalance is due to a combination of the low level of benefits 
designated for the poor and inadequate coverage of the poor. 
While these estimates are crude, they provide sufficient reason to conclude 
that social protection expenditure in the sample countries is heavily biased 
toward the formal sector and nonpoor. In other words, existing social protection 
systems fail to focus on the poor and informal sector, where they could make 
the largest difference in reducing absolute poverty and inequality.
21 The general principle followed in the allocation process is as follows. Public health expenditure is 
allocated according to the share of vulnerable with respect to nonvulnerable employment (which 
probably leads to an overestimation of the health care expenditure for the informal sector). Pension 
expenditure is allocated according to the statistical data on expenditure of contributory schemes 
(allocated to the formal sector) versus noncontributory schemes (allocated to the informal sector, 
as virtually all noncontributory pension schemes are means-tested), or based on the information 
on the nature of the schemes (e.g., for countries with provident funds, all pension expenditure was 
interpreted as expenditure on social pensions and allocated to the informal sector), or on the basis of 
the coverage of the contributory versus noncontributory schemes. Expenditure for children, general 
social assistance, and expenditure on labor market programs (i.e., probably mostly public employment 
programs) are allocated to the informal sector. 
22 Applying the Social Protection Index allocation rates to the overall ILO levels of social expenditure. 
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Social Expenditure as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product 
in the Sample Countries
Figure 2.4 indicates that social expenditure as a percentage of GDP in the 
sample tends to increase with the levels of GDP per capita. However, more 
interesting is the wide dispersion of data points around the regression line. This 
indicates that countries at the same level of GDP per capita may have different 
levels of social protection expenditure.
Due to prevailing overall low levels of social protection spending of 4.4% 
of GDP in the sample—which is exactly half of the global average—and the 
wide dispersion of total public expenditure among countries with the same 
level of per capita GDP in PPP terms, there may be additional fiscal space for 
investment in social protection that may have a rapid, positive impact on Asia’s 
level of poverty and inequality. Additional social expenditure could have a 
longer-term positive effect on the level of informality in developing Asia, and 
hence on employability and economic growth. 
Figure 2.4: Total Public Social Expenditure as a Percentage  
of Gross Domestic Product versus Gross Domestic Product  
per Capita in $ Purchasing Power Parity, Selected Countries  
in Asia, around 2010 
GDP = gross domestic product, Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic, PNG = Papua New 
Guinea, PPP = purchasing power parity, PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Sources: International Labour Organization. 2014. World Social Protection Report 2014–15: Building 
Economic Recovery, Inclusive Development and Social Justice. Geneva; World Bank. 2014. World Bank 
Indicators 2014. http://data.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/wdi-2014-book.pdf
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Social Protection for the Informal Economy: 
Principal Options
Only a few principal conceptual options exist for extending social protection 
to workers and their families in the informal sector: subsidized social insurance, 
tax-financed means- or nonmeans-tested transfer schemes, conditional 
or nonconditional transfers, community-based insurance schemes, and 
private sector–executed insurance solutions provided on a voluntary or 
mandatory basis. 
During the 1990s and the early 2000s, governments were slow to extend social 
protection coverage, and civil society and communities tried to take action in 
many countries in the developing world. Supported by a number of donors, 
community-based or group-specific social protection schemes were created. 
It was hoped that these initiatives would lead to a new bottom-up movement 
toward national social protection systems that would successfully cover the 
population in the informal sector. However, only a few of these schemes were 
truly successful, and global coverage of such schemes remained low. 
One of the schemes that defied the general trend was the health care scheme 
operated by the Self Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) in India. In that 
case, social protection was only one aspect of a wide range of activities of a strong 
national organization. With its health coverage probably still around 1 million 
people, the major contribution of SEWA to extension of social protection in 
India is its successful lobbying for national social security schemes, rather than 
its direct operation of cooperative-based insurance schemes. 
Understanding that civil society cannot provide the answer to major social 
protection financing challenges, in 2012, more than 80 global and national 
nongovernment organizations and trade unions formed a coalition for 
promoting national social protection floors worldwide.23 Following the SEWA 
example, global civil society added a new role of advocating for public social 
protection for the uncovered population, as well as creating political will (and 
fiscal space), to its traditional role as providers of charitable social transfers 
and services. 
Donors and some international organizations have moved on from supporting 
microinsurance schemes to supporting conditional or nonconditional social 
transfer schemes often modeled on the Bolsa Família scheme in Brazil or the 
Oportunidades scheme in Mexico. One prominent example is the Benazir 
23 See Global Coalition for Social Protection Floors. http://socialprotectionfloorscoalition.org
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Income Support Programme in Pakistan, which provides cash transfers to poor 
women. Further examples on varying scales can be found in the PRC, Nepal, and 
the Philippines. McKinley and Handayani (2013, 4) observed that the largest 
social transfer scheme in Asia has, in the meantime, surpassed the absolute 
population coverage of the Bolsa Família scheme: 
the People’s Republic of China’s Minimum Living Standard Guarantee 
for the poor in both urban and rural areas is one of the most ambitious 
unconditional social transfer programs in the world.…[I]n 2009, it 
accounted for 47.0% of all social assistance expenditures in the country 
and benefited 79 million people.
Donor roles are usually limited to supporting countries in preparing the 
analytical basis and capacity building for the introduction of these schemes or 
to financing limited pilot projects. Transitional cofinancing of benefits through 
donors does exist,24 but such cofinancing is not sustainable over long periods or 
in more than a few countries. Ultimately, all national social protection systems 
have to be financed by national resources and be organized by the country 
concerned. 
Conceptual Options for Extending Coverage  
to the Informal Sector 
As already mentioned, in a number of the sample countries, overall social 
protection coverage gaps can be partially closed by reducing the discrepancy 
between legal and effective coverage of existing formal sector social protection 
schemes. Some people in the informal sector may be reached by extending these 
formal sector schemes by offering voluntary coverage or special contribution 
and protection arrangements for groups whose informal employment shows a 
sufficient degree of regularity.25 However, the core of the vulnerable workforce 
will remain difficult to reach by schemes that are designed for people who 
have regular and well-documented monthly or weekly incomes from regular 
employment. 
Worldwide, there is ample experience concerning the potential contribution 
of each of the principal options for extending social protection to the informal 
24 For example, the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps) in the Philippines, which is supported by 
the Asian Development Bank, United Nations, and World Bank.
25 For example, the one-contribution system for small-scale earners in Argentina and Uruguay allows 
people on a self-assessment basis to make one payment to cover their tax and social security liabilities. 
This reduces the administrative complexity of compliance with tax and social security regulations, but 
still requires some paperwork that may prove prohibitive for some of the extremely vulnerable in Asia. 
For more information, see Administración Federal de Ingresos Publicos.
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economy. Appendix Table A2.1 lists these options and identifies the problems 
and extension potential associated with each. 
When developing national social protection systems, virtually all countries 
opt for a combination of solutions for several reasons, such as inherited 
and historically expanded organizational structures, fiscal policy principles, 
societal values, group interests (e.g., the interest of the formal sector to enjoy a 
predictable level of income replacement in case of sickness, maternity, disability, 
unemployment, and old age), political economy considerations, and the nature 
and structure of administrative capacity. Essentially, all systems are outcomes 
of implicit or explicit societal negotiations on desired levels of protection for 
different populations and interest groups and the acceptable degree of income 
redistribution. Pluralistic systems offer a balance of interests that accommodate 
a compromise solution with regard to the protection and political preferences 
of most groups. 
Only a few countries adopt explicit universal (and uniform) coverage policies 
for all social protection guarantees. They may do so for one or two guarantees 
(e.g., flat-rate child benefits or universal old-age pensions), but not for other 
income security benefits for the active population, or they may seek differential 
levels of health care or income security for different population groups. In many 
cases, these differential levels stem from the fact that at some point, decades 
ago, social insurance coverage for the formal economy was introduced, and 
later additional subsidiary systems were devised to cater for people, who due to 
volatile incomes, have difficulty in contributing on a regular basis. 
Whether universal or conditional benefits are socially more effective is 
currently widely debated. It is obvious that targeted, conditional transfers are 
administratively more complex than universal schemes, and hence more costly 
to administer. In addition, they may lead to exclusion errors. There is no database 
that allows delineation of a general rule for the relative cost of administering 
universal versus mean-tested, conditional benefits or the differences in social 
effectiveness between these models. Only a proxy consideration can provide 
some guidance in this regard. 
If one were to take the cost difference between an efficiently administered, 
dominantly universal national social protection system (e.g., Sweden), and an 
efficiently administered system that relies on a combination of social insurance 
and social assistance (e.g., Germany) as a guide, then the administrative cost 
of a universal system may be half as high as that of a scheme that relies on 
individually calculated and/or means-tested benefits.26 However, in some 
26 Eurostat. Social Protection Statistics. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics- explained/index.php/
Social_protection_statistics (accessed 10 February 2015).
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low-income countries, public agencies able to administer sophisticated 
individual means- or conditionality testing may simply not exist.27 Ultimately, it 
has to be explored on a case-to-case basis whether targeting benefits through 
means testing or conditionalities is justified, given their potential administrative 
cost or potential exclusion errors. 
However, since R202, all countries have acknowledged that they would honor 
the right to social security for all members of society by aiming to introduce 
universal protection as soon as possible. What is important is that national 
social protection systems in their entirety do not leave anyone in need without 
adequate protection. This leaves individual countries and societies with the 
option to choose whether to introduce targeted benefits for those in need 
only, introduce contract-based social insurance benefits earned through 
contribution payments, or opt for universal and uniform benefits for entire 
categories of people. 
Realistic Options for Extending Coverage to the Informal Sector 
From an analysis of coverage and protection gaps and synopsis of international 
experience, only a limited number of benefit options are rational, efficient, and 
effective ways to extend basic, reliable, and robust levels of social protection 
to the informal economy in Asia (Table 2.7). The options presented do not 
exclude that at a later stage, higher levels of protection can be achieved by 
combining these options with social or private insurance cover for groups that 
wish to organize better protection for themselves. 
Due to perceived or real resource constraints, priority choices of policy 
measures may have to be made in individual countries. One way to prioritize 
these measures is to rank policy options by their closing impact on the average 
or aggregate poverty gap per currency unit spent on their respective benefits. 
However, this approach is academic, and a coherent poverty strategy should 
pursue a mix of policy options. There can, for example, be no income security 
without health security, and no health security without income security (in 
particular, food security). Realistically, determination of protection priorities 
must be a matter of national consensus building. Rational analysis can only 
deliver the evidence for such a consensus-building process. 
27 Slater and Farrington (2008) concluded in their review of means testing on social transfer schemes, 
“the costs and capacity requirements of designing and implementing approaches that rely on the 
formal means-testing of households or individuals, or embodies significant ‘conditionality’ is likely to 
be prohibitively costly for many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Approaches that rely on proxy and/
or informal assessments (including community-based assessment) may offer an alternative. But…
categorical targeting is likely to remain a popular policy option, partly because of the difficulty of means-
testing, and partly for other reasons; for instance, the political and community-level acceptability of 
targeting specific categories such as older people, more than that of simply targeting the poor, where 
‘we are all poor.’”
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Table 2.7: Realistic Options for Extending Social Protection  
to the Informal Economy in Asia
Social 
Security 
Guarantee Options Objective
Examples of 
Schemes in 
Developing 
Countries
Health 
security
Universal health 
service or national 
health insurance 
(with earmarked 
health tax)
Universal social 
insurance, tax-
subsidized for  
low-income workers
Combination of social 
insurance (formal 
sector) and residual 
national health 
service for informal 
economy
100.0% protection of 
the total population
Indonesia, Thailand
Income 
security  
for children
Universal child 
income transfers  
(in cash or in kind)
Means-tested or 
conditional child 
income transfers  
(in cash or in kind)
100.0% of all children 
in need of protection
People’s Republic 
of China, Indonesia, 
Mongolia
Income 
security  
for adults
Self-targeting 
employment 
guarantee schemes 
for unemployed
Social assistance for 
the sick and disabled 
Transfers for pregnant 
women 
100.0% of all people 
who cannot make 
sufficient income in 
the labor market (i.e., 
people under the 
national poverty line) 
People’s Republic of 
China, India, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Mongolia
Income 
security for 
the elderly
Universal tax-
financed pensions
Means-, income-, or 
pension-tested social 
assistance pensions 
100.0% of all, or all in 
need of protection
Nepal, Thailand, 
Viet Nam
Source: Authors.
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Estimating the Cost of Closing Social Protection Gaps
The next step in the analysis is to estimate the cost of closing these coverage 
gaps. According to the ILO rapid assessment methodology, a sound basis for 
national decision-making processes on the reform of national social protection 
systems normally consists of full-fledged social budget analyses, actuarial 
valuations, or abbreviated social budget analyses. To undertake such analyses 
for 20 countries is outside of the scope of this study; as a result, a simplified 
methodology is applied here. The estimates produced serve as an indication of 
the cost of policy options for closing the coverage gap that may be pursued in 
the future. 
Methodology
It is assumed that countries will seek to close coverage gaps by first providing 
social protection floor benefits for the noncovered population in the informal 
sector. A robust two-benchmark methodology, based on stationary-state 
calculations (i.e., for a fictitious year following maturation of the introductory 
phase [roughly 2020]), is formulated.28 These cost estimates provide a lower 
and higher estimate of the cost of closing coverage gaps for the four basic social 
protection guarantees, based on the following methodological concepts. 
Lower Estimate
This approach establishes a crude estimate of the cost of a targeted, efficient, 
means-tested social assistance scheme that provides for basic income security 
for all people during childhood, adulthood, and old age, plus an increase (if 
necessary) in expenditure for health care. The cost of closing health security 
gaps is estimated by an increase in national public health expenditure sufficient 
to make it consistent with that of Thailand (i.e., 3.0% of GDP). Thailand is 
used here as a benchmark country as it has achieved combined coverage of 
75.0% at a reasonable overall cost. The costs of closing the income security 
gap are considered equal to the amount of resources needed to close absolute 
poverty gaps up to the international poverty line of $2.00 per person per day in 
PPP terms.29 
In total, this calculation should be an estimate of the minimum cost of 
completing a national social protection floor that provides universal protection 
28 It is assumed that if preparations for introduction of the social protection benefit schemes were to 
commence in 2015, stationary state operations—after gradual increases in uptake and outreach during 
the transition phase—would be reached in about 5 years. 
29 In 2005 international dollars. Not updated to 2016. 
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on the basis of an income-tested social assistance approach. Such a scheme in 
each of the sample countries closes all of the protection gaps that have been left 
by the present social protection schemes. It is assumed here that the majority of 
beneficiaries under this approach are those in the informal economy, as most in 
the formal sector are either protected through higher-level protection systems 
or do not qualify for social assistance due to incomes or assets beyond social 
assistance thresholds. 
Higher Estimate
The second approach provides rough cost estimates for closing the protection 
gap by using tax-financed universal benefit schemes, notably tax-financed 
child benefits; India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Act–type public 
employment with social assistance benefit schemes for the poor in active 
age; a disability benefit for all persons with disabilities; as well as a flat-rate, 
tax-financed pension scheme. Health costs are estimated by the increase in 
the cost of reducing out-of-pocket payments down to the level of Thailand, 
which has the lowest share of out-of-pocket payments in total health care cost 
in the region. This is a high-cost estimate that is based on largely nonmeans-
tested universal benefits except for the National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Act–type scheme, which constitutes a form of self-targeted income security 
benefits for people in active age. The protection gap for the informal sector is 
actually closed through benefits for the entire population. 
Assumptions in Calculating the Lower Estimate
It is assumed that all countries are to reach the share of public health expenditure 
in the GDP of Thailand. Countries with lower current expenditure will increase 
their expenditure accordingly. Countries that have already higher costs require 
no increase in overall cost.30 Further, the social assistance scheme closes the 
individual poverty gap for poor people of all ages to the level of the international 
poverty line of $2.00 per person per day in PPP terms. 
Assumptions in Calculating the Higher Estimate
It is assumed that the additional costs of health care are calculated as in the 
lower estimate, but in addition, the national co-payment rates (i.e., the share of 
out-of-pocket payment in total health expenditure) are brought down to the 
level of Thailand, which is 13.0% of total national health expenditure. 
30 While these countries may be required to change the allocation of health expenditure to reach 
Thailand’s level of the combined protection indicator, such structural shifts are not relevant for 
estimating additional cost. 
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Further, all children under 15 years of age receive a benefit of 50.0% of the global 
poverty line of $2.00 per day in PPP terms, or 50.0% of the national poverty 
line in PPP terms, whichever is higher.31 All persons with disabilities in active 
age receive a benefit of $2.00 per person per day in PPP terms or the national 
poverty line, whichever is higher. A disability rate of 3.0% of the population in 
active age is used (WHO and World Bank 2011, 30).32 
Fifty percent of the population in vulnerable employment is assumed to receive 
an allocation of 100 days of public employment per year, paid at the national 
minimum wage.33 All people, over age 65 years, receive a pension of $2.00 
per person per day in PPP terms or the national poverty line in PPP terms, 
whichever is higher. Finally, all countries operate some protection schemes 
for the informal sector. The current costs of social protection for the informal 
sector are subtracted from the gross amounts of benefit expenditure calculated 
for the higher estimate.
Assumptions Common to Both Estimates
Administrative costs are added to the cost of benefits. Administrative costs in 
mature social protection schemes are normally well below 5.0% of the total 
benefit cost. However, in countries with less-developed administrative capacities 
that are charged with administering new benefit schemes, it is assumed that the 
administrative overhead will be 20.0% of the total benefit cost for means-tested 
cash benefit schemes, and 10.0% of the total benefit cost for universal benefit 
schemes. The administrative cost of health schemes is assumed to be included 
in the calculation of the increase in the overall cost as described above. 
Results 
The results of the cost estimates are summarized in Tables 2.8 and 2.9. The 
lower estimates range from less than 0.5% of GDP in additional cost in the PRC 
and Thailand to perhaps prohibitively high costs of 12.2% of GDP in Bangladesh. 
For all other countries, except the Lao PDR and Nepal, the additional cost is 
31 The PPP poverty lines in 2005 international dollars are used, as these were the only data available for a 
wide range of countries. 
32 The data from the WHO and World Bank publication indicate a severe disability rate of 2.9% for people 
aged 15–59 years in lower- and middle-income countries in Asia (WHO and World Bank 2011).
33 The calculations actually use the relationship between the national minimum wage per year and 
GDP per capita. In Bangladesh, Nepal, and Pakistan, these rates exceeded 100.0% and are considered 
implausible. Hence, a rate of 33.3% of per capita GDP is used. Unemployment rates could have been 
used to calculate the number of beneficiaries; however, the unemployment rates in developing 
countries tend to hide the degree of underemployment, which is widespread. It is assumed here that 
unemployment is about 50.0% of the underemployed in vulnerable employment, who seek work from 
a 100-day employment scheme.
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estimated to be 5.0% of GDP. The weighted average for all sample countries is 
3.0% of GDP. 
The higher estimate shows an anomaly in the case of Bangladesh, in which 
the higher estimate returns a lower result than the lower estimate, denoting 
that due to the extremely high poverty rate of $2.00 per person per day 
in PPP terms, closing the aggregate national poverty gap is actually more 
expensive than trying to close the gaps through categorical universal or 
self-targeted benefits. For Bangladesh, the assumption that only 50.0% of 
Table 2.8: Cost of Closing the Social Protection Gap  
in the Sample Countries, Stationary State, Lower Estimate  
(in % of gross domestic product)
Country
Closing 
the Health 
Expenditure 
Gap
Closing the 
$2.00 per Day 
Aggregate 
Poverty Gap 
Administrative 
Cost  
(20%)
Total 
Additional 
Cost
Armenia 1.1 0.3 0.1 1.5
Bangladesh 1.8 8.7 1.7 12.2
Cambodia 1.7 2.5 0.5 4.6
PRC 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.4
Fiji 0.4 0.6 0.1 1.1
India 1.7 2.7 0.5 4.9
Indonesia 1.8 1.0 0.2 3.0
Kyrgyz Republic 0.0 1.2 0.2 1.4
Lao PDR 1.5 3.4 0.7 5.6
Malaysia 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.9
Nepal 0.8 6.0 1.2 8.0
Pakistan 2.0 2.1 0.4 4.5
Papua New 
Guinea
0.0 3.8 0.8 4.6
Philippines 1.3 1.6 0.3 3.2
Sri Lanka 1.8 0.4 0.1 2.3
Thailand 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Viet Nam 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.7
Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic, PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Source: Survey of Informal Workers 2015 compiled by the author.
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all people in vulnerable employment resort to the 100-day wage guarantee 
scheme is probably an underestimation.
The additional cost that would have to be financed to close the protection gap 
lies between 1.6% of GDP in Thailand and 10.9% of GDP in Bangladesh and 
Cambodia. The estimated additional cost for all other countries ranges from 
2.0% to 8.0% of GDP. The weighted average across all countries is 5.2% of GDP. 
While this appears high, Table 2.9 also indicates that individual components 
(e.g., universal pensions or employment guarantee schemes) of the set of 
categorical benefits designed for the higher estimate may well be affordable, 
even in the near future. 
Table 2.10 shows that the cost of the lower estimate could be reduced if the 
lower international poverty line of $1.25 per day per capita in PPP terms is 
applied. In fact, the average cost of the lower estimate would drop from 3.0% 
of GDP to 1.5% of GDP, and the average cost of the higher estimate to 4.5% 
of GDP. However, the poverty line of $1.25 per day is extremely low for most 
countries in the region. The ADB estimate for the average poverty line in Asia 
(i.e., $1.51 per person per day in PPP terms) would put the average cost of the 
lower estimate around 2.0% of GDP.34 
34 The costs cannot be calculated more precisely, as poverty gap ratios for the $1.51 estimate are not 
available. 
Table 2.10: Comparison of Cost of Closing the Protection Gap  
in Sample Countries, Stationary State for Alternative Poverty Lines  
(% of gross domestic product)
Poverty 
Line
Average 
Lower 
Estimate  
of Cost
Average 
Higher 
Estimate  
of Cost
Lowest-Cost 
Country
Highest-Cost 
Country
$1.25 PPP 1.3 4.5 PRC
(0.0)
Cambodia 
(10.5)
$2.00 PPP 3.0 5.0 Thailand
(0.1)
Bangladesh 
and 
Cambodia 
(10.9)
PPP = power purchasing parity, PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Source: Survey of Informal Workers 2015 compiled by the author.
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For purposes of comparison, Table 2.11 summarizes the results of recent ILO 
cost estimates for several countries in Asia. The benefit packages are not 
compatible with those developed in this study, as they reflect national priorities 
and benefit packages designed through national consultation processes. 
However, they confirm the order of magnitude of these conservative estimates. 
Table 2.11: Estimated Cost of Closing the Social Protection Floor 
Gap in Selected Sample Countries in a Stationary State, Year of 
Around 2020, Using International Labour Organization Estimates  
(in % of gross domestic product)
Country
Estimated Total Cost 
(Stationary State)  
Low-Cost Variant
Estimated Total Cost 
(Stationary State)  
High-Cost Variant
Cambodia 0.4 2.4
Indonesia 0.7 2.5
Myanmar 2.0 7.0
Thailand 0.5 1.2
Viet Nam 2.0 6.1
Notes: Preliminary results for Myanmar. The primary author, Louise Tessier, shared the results of the 
preliminary version of International Labour Organization and United Nations Country Team in Myanmar. 
2015. Social Protection Assessment-Based National Dialogue: Towards a Nationally Defined Social Protection 
Floor in Myanmar. Yangon: United Nations Liaison Office for Myanmar. 
Source: International Labour Organization (ILO). 2013. Unmet Needs: Assessment-Based National Dialogue 
Exercises and Social Protection Floors in East and Southeast Asia: Methodology and Findings. Bangkok: ILO 
Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific.
With only about 2.0%–3.0% of GDP, major gaps in the protection of the informal 
sector can be closed. Since social protection country profiles show a need to 
overcome the chronic fragmentation of income security schemes for adults, 
possible priority candidates are, for example, employment guarantee schemes, 
as they would benefit entire households (Cichon and Cichon forthcoming). 
Further, their estimated cost seems to indicate affordability.
Closing Coverage and Protection Gaps:  
Financing Options
The potential for including the informal sector in existing self-financing social 
insurance schemes for the formal sector or organizing effective community- or 
charity-based security systems is limited. Thus, financing additional protection 
for the informal sector must focus on finding new fiscal space.
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While reallocation of existing expenditure may be possible, financing substantial 
social protection for all requires an increase in the tax–GDP ratio in a number 
of countries in the region that now have fairly low tax revenues. This, in turn, 
requires major investments in the tax collection system. 
Historically, the tax–GDP ratio has increased in many countries without 
jeopardizing economic growth. While the overall level of taxation is a constant 
debate between neoclassical and Keynesian or neo-Keynesian economists, 
some of the most successful economies in Europe have relatively high 
tax–GDP ratios. The optimal level of taxation for a society will always be elusive, 
and the politically acceptable and economically sustainable level will always 
be algorithmically approached by a complex system of implicit and explicit 
negotiations and compromises that test the limits of societal acceptance of 
taxation rather than by textbook economics. 
Fiscal Situation in the Sample Countries 
Table 2.12 depicts the governments’ financial positions in the sample countries. 
Total revenue ranges between 9.4% of GDP in India and 29.1% of GDP in the 
Kyrgyz Republic. Except for Armenia, the Republic of Korea, and Uzbekistan, 
all countries are in deficit, with deficits in the Lao PDR, Papua New Guinea, 
and Sri Lanka ranging above 5.0% of GDP, and most others 1.0%–5.0% of 
GDP. Countries with the highest level of informality (i.e., Bangladesh, India, 
and Pakistan) have the lowest revenue rates (below or around 10.0% of GDP). 
Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand have revenue 
rates under 20.0% of GDP. 
Since there is no correct level of tax–GDP ratio in an economy, the only pragmatic 
solution in assessing fiscal space in individual countries is by comparison (i.e., 
by benchmarking their tax–GDP ratios against each other). In this regard, the 
first assumption is if the tax–GDP ratio in a given country is much lower than 
that of other countries at a similar level of GDP, then there may be additional 
fiscal space; hence, there may be policy space for providing additional social 
protection benefits. Should this not be the case, then reprioritization of the 
current budget offers an alternative for finding some of the resources necessary 
for funding additional social protection. However, reallocating existing 
expenditure may be as politically difficult as financing new expenditure from 
new revenues.
Tentative Financing Strategies for Closing  
the Basic Social Protection Gap 
The financing strategies considered here for the sample countries are 
(i) increased taxation, (ii) improved tax collection, (iii) savings, (iv) reallocation of 
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Table 2.12: Central Government Total Revenue, Total Expenditure, 
and Fiscal Balance in Sample Countries, 2013 or Latest Year  
for Which Data are Available 
(% of gross domestic product)
Country Total Revenue Total Expenditure Fiscal Balance
Armenia 24.8 24.0 0.8
Bangladesh 11.2 14.5 (3.3)
Cambodia 18.1 19.9 (1.8)
PRC 22.5 24.2 (1.7)
Fiji 28.1 29.2 (1.1)
India 9.4 14.0 (4.6)
Indonesia 15.7 18.0 (2.3)
Republic of Korea 22.1 21.1 1.0
Kyrgyz Republic 29.1 29.8 (0.7)
Lao PDR 24.3 29.9 (5.6)
Malaysia 21.7 25.6 (3.9)
Myanmar 24.3 29.2 (4.9)
Nepal 20.0 21.9 (1.9)
Pakistan 9.5 13.7 (4.2)
Papua New 
Guinea
27.1 34.3 (7.2)
Philippines 14.9 16.3 (1.4)
Sri Lanka 13.2 19.1 (5.9)
Thailand 18.1 20.1 (2.0)
Uzbekistan 22.0 21.7 0.3
Viet Nam 21.3 26.0 (4.7)
( ) = negative, Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic, PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Note: Calculated fiscal balances differed substantially from published ADB figures in some cases 
(e.g., Cambodia, Lao PDR, Nepal, and Papua New Guinea); in these cases, revenue was adjusted to reported 
fiscal balance. 
Sources: Asian Development Bank. 2014. Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2014. Manila; International 
Monetary Fund. 2014. Governance Statistics Finance Manual 2014. Washington, DC; World Bank. 2014. 
World Development Indicators 2014. http://data.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/wdi-2014-book.pdf
expenditure within the government budget, and (v) reallocation of expenditure 
within the national budget for social expenditure. Given the present deficit 
levels of most of the sample countries, the option of increasing deficits is not 
considered. The same applies to external financing. While external financing 
may be an option for financing or cofinancing the startup of national social 
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protection systems, in the long run, most social protection financing will have 
to come from domestic sources. 
Closing the social protection gap in the sample countries—even when the 
cheapest variant is considered—requires about 1.5% of GDP on average. 
However, individual components of the social protection floor are less costly. 
It is not realistic to assume that development partners at the present level of 
global official development assistance can support more than a few countries 
at the same time in this regard. 
The following sections address five groups of countries with similar combinations 
of public expenditure and poverty levels. The first group faces no real financing 
challenge. Identifying possible financing strategies for modifying national social 
protection systems in the other four country groups is a more complex issue. 
Country Group I: The No-Deficit Group 
The first group comprises Armenia, the Republic of Korea, and Uzbekistan—the 
only countries with positive fiscal balances. There are no estimates of the size of 
the protection gaps for Uzbekistan, as its database was incomplete. However, 
the overall access indicator in health signals that there may be need for action. 
Given Uzbekistan’s overall social expenditure, it may be possible to solve the 
problems within the present overall resource envelope through reallocation of 
funds within the social protection system. 
The Republic of Korea’s social protection floor is virtually complete, but may 
need some minor adjustment to close residual gaps through reallocation of 
expenditure. Armenia should not have to resort to mobilizing new revenues 
to complete at least a modest social protection floor. In all three countries, 
national dialogue should begin to analyze the basic protection gaps in detail, 
with strategies then developed for closing these gaps. 
Country Groups II, III, IV, and V: The Deficit Groups 
Figure 2.5 maps the under $2.00-per-day poverty rate—as the main trigger 
for rapid, remedial social protection action—against the level of government 
revenue in percent of GDP. Four quadrants can be distinguished, created by 
a horizontal line depicting a poverty rate of 25.0% of GDP and a vertical line 
depicting government revenue of 25.0% of GDP. Each of these quadrants 
contains a number of countries with similar policy challenges. 
The first quadrant (i.e., country group II) has countries with relatively low 
poverty rates and less than 25.0% of GDP in revenue. The next quadrant (i.e., 
country group III) comprises countries with relatively low poverty rates and 
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more than 25.0% of GDP in revenue. The next quadrant (i.e., country group IV) 
comprises countries with relatively high poverty rates and more than 25.0% 
GDP in revenue. The final quadrant (i.e., country group V) comprises countries 
with relatively high poverty rates and less than 25.0% of GDP in revenue.
In contrast to group I referred to above, all countries in the other four groups 
require additional revenue or reallocation of current expenditure to finance 
closure of the social protection gap. Possible expenditure reallocation is limited 
to reduction of defense spending, subsidies, and public service. 
Principal revenue-generating mechanisms suggested here are an increase in 
income tax, improving the efficiency of tax collection, and an increase in social 
insurance coverage. The use of these mechanisms is justified below. 
Increase in Income Tax
This measure is only suggested for countries with a revenue level of less than 
25.0% of GDP. Income tax levels in the region are extremely low by international 
Figure 2.5: Under $2.00-per-Day Poverty Rates and 
Government Revenue as a Percentage of Gross Domestic 
Product in Selected Sample Countries, 2010–2013  
(approximate)
GDP = gross domestic product, Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic, PNG = Papua New 
Guinea, PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Source: World Bank. 2014. World Development Indicators 2014. http://data.worldbank.org/sites/default/
files/wdi-2014-book.pdf
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standards, and overall tax–GDP ratios are relatively low in a number of countries. 
As a result, there should be space for a modest to substantial increase in the 
income tax depending on the country. 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
considers Asia’s low tax–GDP ratios to be a chronic regional governance 
problem.35 An International Monetary Fund (IMF) study suggested that, 
on average, low-income countries can increase their tax–GDP ratio by 2–4 
percentage points without jeopardizing economic performance (IMF 2011, 4). 
An alternative to increasing the income tax is to impose or increase a 
value-added tax. However, the value-added tax is a regressive tax that would 
reduce the value of additional social assistance benefits, in particular for poorer 
people in the informal sector.
Improve Tax Collection
Findings from OECD and the IMF support the common assumption that there 
are considerable inefficiencies in tax collection mechanisms in all of the region’s 
countries (OECD 2012, IMF 2011).36 IMF data showed that the average tax effort 
(i.e., a measure of the difference between the amount of tax collected and the 
amount that should be collected when all tax rates are perfectly applied to the full 
tax base) in 10 countries in Asia only stands at 53.3%.37 The average tax effort of all 
lower-middle-income countries stands at 63.2% (IMF 2011, 60).38 
If it is assumed that the sample countries can achieve that level of tax effort, 
then overall tax revenues could theoretically be increased by 18.6% without 
increasing tax rates. It is conservatively assumed here that the maximum 
increase in the tax effort achievable in the sample countries is 10.0%. However, 
the potential gains from improved tax collection is used as a residual revenue 
category, which is only used to its full extent (i.e., 10.0%) if other measures are 
insufficient to finance closure of the protection gap. 
35 It states: ”The revenues in emerging Asia average 15.0% of GDP.…The comparatively low tax revenue 
relative to GDP is not a new phenomenon in the region. In addition, in some countries (for instance, 
Indonesia), tax revenues relative to GDP have declined since 1990. Such experience suggests that 
there is room for improved resource mobilisation through tax reform” (OECD 2011, 39–40).
36 See OECD (2012, 40): “Tax revenues can be increased by strengthening tax administration including 
tax audits and enforcement.” 
37 The tax effort is a factor between 0 and 1 (or 0 and 100.0%). All factors smaller than 1 indicate that due 
to tax exemptions, noncompliance, nonenforcement, or other reasons for noncollection of taxes that 
are due, less than the potentially full amount of taxes are collected. Much of the noncollection can 
normally be attributed to bad governance.
38 Countries in the average calculation are Armenia, Bangladesh, the PRC, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, 
Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand.
106 Social Protection for Informal Workers in Asia
Increase Social Insurance Coverage
Most of the sample countries operate some form of social insurance for the 
formal sector. However, these schemes neither de facto cover all of the people 
that should be legally covered, nor do they reach all nonvulnerable (i.e., formal 
sector employees) persons in the workforce. If social insurance coverage is 
extended to all people who are thus far de facto and de jure not covered, but 
could be covered without undertaking painstaking efforts, then tax-financed 
social assistance or universal schemes could save the resources that otherwise 
are needed for this group of people. 
Social insurance schemes are generally financed by employer and worker 
contributions that are not regarded as taxes but as part of the general government 
account. Normally, these schemes should be in financial equilibrium (i.e., 
revenues should cover expenditure in the long run), and no subsidies from 
general tax revenues should be required. It is assumed here that the cost of the 
lower estimate of the social protection floor–costing exercise can be reduced 
by the share of social protection floor expenditure that would be consumed 
by the people who could be covered by an extended social insurance scheme. 
Summary of Possible Financing Strategies for Closing  
the Coverage and Protection Gaps
Appendix Table A2.2 summarizes the potential financing strategies for the 
sample countries arranged according to the five country groups. The model 
calculation demonstrates that a low-cost version of the social protection floor 
seems to be affordable in at least 17 countries. Only in the countries belonging 
to group V would increases in taxation be necessary. In all of the other countries, 
improved tax and contribution collection, combined with some expenditure 
reallocation (notably a reduction in subsidies), are deemed sufficient to finance 
closure of the gap in basic social protection. 
Increased Taxation
Even the suggested increases in taxation do not seem to constitute an undue 
burden by international standards. Appendix Table A2.3 shows the mean and 
standard deviation of tax–GDP ratios in the low- and lower middle-income 
sample countries. It also groups these into brackets of “mean plus one standard 
deviation” and “mean plus two standard deviations.”39 Except for five cases, all 
countries fall in the “mean plus one standard deviation” bracket. If increases in 
39 Some countries actually have lower tax rates than “mean minus one standard deviation.” This is not 
specifically mentioned here.
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taxes (measured in percentage points of GDP) suggested here in six countries 
(i.e., Cambodia, India, the Lao PDR, Nepal, Pakistan, and the Philippines) are 
added to the present tax–GDP ratios of these countries, none of these countries 
would leave the “mean plus one standard deviation” bracket. This may serve as 
an indication that the tax hikes suggested here are by no means excessive.
The volume of revenues that theoretically can be generated by the income tax 
increases listed in Appendix Table A2.3 could also be realized by increases in 
other existing tax categories, or by introducing new taxes, such as 
(i) Excise taxes. An increase in excise taxes, such as “sin taxes” on alcohol, 
tobacco, and luxury goods, or introduction of new excise taxes at the 
same level (as measured in percentage points of GDP) would not lead 
to indirect tax rates outside of the “mean plus one standard deviation” 
bracket for that category of taxes. 
(ii) New form of income taxation earmarked for social protection. This 
could be a social protection tax applied to all personal income, which 
would finance all, or part, of the social protection expenditure for the 
informal sector on the basis of national solidarity.40 Levying a social 
protection tax of 4.0%–4.5% on all incomes would probably solve the 
social protection financing problem in all countries, and would, in some 
cases, even contribute to general consolidation of the government 
budget.41
Exceptional Cases
Only in two countries (i.e., Bangladesh and Papua New Guinea) could realistic 
proposals for financing closure of basic social protection gaps from domestic 
resources not be made. Since these countries have very high poverty rates, there 
may be a case for external financial support. The annual support for closing the 
basic social protection gap in Bangladesh requires $5.40 billion, with support 
for Papua New Guinea requiring $0.70 billion per year. 
The present level of global official development assistance only amounts to 
$125.00  billion. This demonstrates that external funding of social protection 
in the longer term for more than a very few countries would not be possible 
without a major new global funding facility for social protection, such as the 
Global Fund for Social Protection, which the United Nations special rapporteurs 
on the right to food and on extreme poverty and human rights suggested in 
40 Since 1991, France has charged such a general social tax, the contribution sociale generalisée, which 
is levied at a flat rate of 7.5% on all incomes, and by now constitutes a larger share of all income tax 
revenues than the normal progressive personal income tax. 
41 Assuming a share of taxable income in GDP of about 50.0%.
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October 2012. Such a fund could be fueled by part of the proceeds of a global 
financial transaction cost. 
Conclusions 
Except for two of the sample of 20 countries in Asia (i.e., Bangladesh and Papua 
New Guinea), financing at least a basic level of social protection for all people 
appears affordable without triggering undue overall levels of taxation.42 
The above notwithstanding, an important caveat remains: investment in good 
governance is a prerequisite to all new social protection financing and delivery 
strategies. Whenever new benefit systems are designed, or preexisting benefits 
are extended to new groups, investments in human resources who must 
administer these benefits, as well as in the machinery necessary for collecting 
additional taxes or contributions, must be made. This means that countries 
should begin addressing the problem of informality. Without reductions 
in informality, revenues are not likely to increase substantially, and new 
expenditure cannot be financed. Further, if contributions and tax collection 
are not effectively enforced, no sustainable extension of social protection 
to the uncovered population is possible. Even before the first new social 
protection benefits can be paid and the first additional currency unit of taxes or 
contributions can be collected, such upfront investments should be made and 
financed. 
The following recommendations are made for closing the social protection 
gaps in Asia, at least at the level of the social protection floor. 
Governments should undertake investments in tax and contribution collection 
mechanisms, as well as in capacity development of social protection planners, 
managers, and administrators. They should also begin a national dialogue 
with the objective of establishing a consensual national social protection 
development plan, along with national social protection diagnostic exercises. 
This includes taking stock of existing schemes, their expenditure levels, their 
incidence of financing, and their performance. Further, a social protection gap 
analysis should be undertaken to support the national dialogue.
42 The database for Myanmar did not allow full exploration of a financing strategy; thus, the Myanmar 
country case must remain inconclusive in this chapter. However, the United Nations system in 
Myanmar suggested the feasibility of a social protection floor in Myanmar: “This opportunity to 
reduce poverty through the extension of social protection and to finance it at least in part through 
a combination of budgetary reallocations and modest tax increases may warrant a critical public 
expenditure and revenue review” (ILO and United Nations Country Team in Myanmar 2015). This 
indicates that in Myanmar, some closure of social protection floor gaps is also probably fiscally feasible. 
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Governments should also consider extending social insurance coverage 
to workers in the informal sector. Perhaps even introducing tax-financed 
universal—or where necessary—means- and benefit-tested child benefits, 
employment guarantee schemes, and invalidity and old-age pensions in a 
gradual process, but within a set time frame of not more than 1 decade, should 
occur. All schemes would, in principle, be schemes for the entire population, but 
the majority of new beneficiaries would be in the informal sector. Introducing 
new schemes exclusively for the informal sector or even the poor does not 
seem a rational strategy and would just lead to further fragmentation of the 
national social protection system. There would also be the risk that schemes for 
the poor would turn into poor schemes. 
In exceptional cases, governments should begin to consider obtaining external 
financing. However, in the long run, social protection financing should be 
largely domestic. External financing should not be considered without a clear 
exit strategy from exogenous financing. 
Where necessary, the revenue-generating potential and redistributive effects 
of tax increases (notably in notoriously low personal income tax rates) or 
introduction of new taxes (in the form of new or higher excise taxes, or a 
general social protection income tax) should be analyzed. Following this, 
revenue-generating measures should be expeditiously introduced. 
Civil society organizations and trade unions should actively promote the 
right to social protection floors, and thus help create the political will for its 
institutionalization. They can also support national stocktaking exercises and 
the design of national social transfer schemes. Further, civil society organizations 
and trade unions should monitor implementation of national social protection. 
Multilateral and bilateral donors should continue and intensify funding of 
projects that invest in good social and fiscal governance, as well as national 
capacities for designing, implementing, and administering national social 
protection systems efficiently and effectively. They can provide, in exceptional 
cases, transitional financial support for financing benefits. 
Finally, the United Nations and other development partners should develop 
a support facility that helps countries invest in good governance, as well as 
development of an analytical framework for stocktaking exercises and fiscal 
space analyses, and possibly for setting up new, or revamping existing, social 
protection institutions. This may be linked to the new Social Protection 
Inter-Agency Cooperation Board created in 2012 at the behest of the G20 
countries. They can also consider the creation of a new global financing facility, 
such as a special multidonor fund for social protection that provides transitional 
financing for social protection in exceptional cases.
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Table A2.3: Mean and Standard Deviation of Tax–Gross Domestic 
Product Ratios in Low- and Lower Middle-Income Countries,  
around 2010
Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Mean 
plus One 
Standard 
Deviation, 
Upper Limit Countries in Range
Mean plus 
Two Standard 
Deviations, 
Upper Limit
Countries  
in Range
Lower-income countries
Government 
tax revenue
13.0 5.5 18.5 Bangladesh, 
Cambodia, 
Lao PDR, Myanmar, 
Nepal
29.5 Kyrgyz 
Republic
Income tax 3.5 2.5 6.0 Bangladesh, 
Cambodia, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Lao PDR, 
Myanmar
11.0
Corporate 
income tax
2.2 2.2 4.4 8.8
Personal 
income tax
1.6 1.4 3.0 2.8
Tax on goods 
and services
5.0 3.0 8.0 Bangladesh, 
Cambodia, 
Lao PDR, Myanmar, 
Nepal
14.0 Kyrgyz 
Republic
Value-added 
tax revenue
4.9 2.1 7.0 11.2
Lower middle-income countries
Government 
tax revenue
17.7 7.9 25.6 Armenia, PRC, 
India, Indonesia, 
Pakistan, Papua 
New Guinea, 
Sri Lanka, Thailand, 
Uzbekistan, 
Viet Nam
41.4
Income tax 5.0 4.7 9.7 Armenia, PRC, Fiji, 
Republic of Korea, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, 
Papua New 
Guinea, Philippines, 
Sri Lanka, Thailand
19.1 Malaysia
Corporate 
income tax
2.9 2.5 5.4 10.4
Personal 
income tax
1.9 1.4 3.1 2.8
Tax on goods 
and services
6.1 3.1 9.2 India, Indonesia, 
Republic of Korea, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, 
Papua New Guinea, 
Sri Lanka
15.4 Armenia, PRC
Value-added 
tax revenue
5.0 2.4 7.4 12.2
Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic, PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Source: International Monetary Fund. 2011. Revenue Mobilization in Developing Countries. Washington, DC.
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CHAPTER 3
The Political Economy of 
Social Protection for Informal 
Economy Workers in Asia
Stephen Kidd and Verena Damerau
Abstract
Around 60.0% of Asia’s working-age population works in the informal economy. The majority of the informal economy workforce is unable to access social protection. A comprehensive national social protection 
system is an essential component of a successful, sustainable market economy. 
This chapter examines the impact of political economy on the development 
of social protection for workers in the informal economy. It uses an analytical 
approach known as the adopted political settlement that refers to the balance 
of distribution of power between contending social groups and political classes 
on which the state is based. It discusses how political economy and relations 
of power have influenced the nature of social protection for informal economy 
workers across Asia.
As democracy strengthens, some countries are investing in higher-quality 
inclusive life cycle schemes, such as universal old-age pensions and child 
benefits, which include the majority of workers in the informal economy and 
their families. To build political commitment for expansion of social protection 
for informal economy workers, there is a need to present evidence that social 
protection is an essential component of the market economy, and that markets 
will function much more effectively if a comprehensive social protection 
system is in place. Development partners can play a key role in supporting 
this process by generating and offering evidence on the social, economic, 
and political benefits of comprehensive, inclusive national social protection 
systems.
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Introduction
Social protection is a core component of a market economy, contending that 
the state should establish systems that protect citizens from the effects of 
profit maximization in unfettered markets. Without social protection, there 
could be no market economy since it would not be sustainable in the face of 
societal opposition (Polanyi 1944). 
In recent decades, the importance of establishing social protection in 
developing countries as part of a market economy has been increasingly 
recognized. For example, many countries agreed to the ideal of creating national 
social protection floors (ILO 2012). In addition, there is growing international 
understanding in the post-2015 development agenda that, if the Sustainable 
Development Goals are to be reached, countries must establish effective 
national social protection systems. 
As countries in Asia have become more integrated into the global market 
economy, much of their populations work in the informal economy. A range of 
challenges have accompanied their economic growth, which, to be addressed 
effectively, require states to invest in social protection. Countries are becoming 
more urbanized, and growing rural–urban migration is weakening social ties and 
traditional forms of informal social protection. Further, there is a demographic 
transition under way, with many countries rapidly aging. Already, 11.6% of the 
population of the region is aged over 60 years, and by 2030, this demographic 
will reach 17.0%—24.0% by 2050 (UNDESA 2015). Inequality is also increasing 
in many countries, resulting in social tensions and waning social cohesion. 
Despite the growth of market economies, many continue to live in poverty 
facing challenges in providing for their families. 
Only a few countries in Asia offer the informal economy workforce adequate 
access to social protection. A range of factors has influenced the size and 
nature of national social protection systems across Asia, with many shaped by 
the political economy within countries. 
This chapter will examine the impact of political economy on the development 
of social protection for informal economy workers in Asia. It uses an analytical 
approach known as adapted political settlement, based on the framework 
outlined in Lavers and Hickey (2015). As Di John and Putzel (2009) explained, 
a political settlement refers to the balance or distribution of power between 
contending social groups and social classes on which the state is based. While 
this concept has mainly been applied to the politics of economic growth, Lavers 
and Hickey (2015) argued that it can also be applied to social protection, 
since similar factors are at play. Relations of power between elites—that 
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is, those regarded as rich and powerful in any society, as well as their allies 
in government—and other social and economic groups can explain how 
resources are distributed through social protection schemes and can influence 
the quality of their provision. In effect, elites control national resources, and 
the nature of their political settlements with other groups determines how 
resources are shared across society. A market economy, and the social tensions 
that it can generate if left uncontrolled, creates the motivation for elites to 
share resources to maintain their power and wealth, as well as broader social 
stability.
The World Bank (1990), Sen (1995), Mkandawire (2005), Pritchett (2005), 
and Kidd (2015) have implicitly used the political settlement approach when 
explaining the political economy of targeting of social protection.43 They argued 
that, in a well-functioning democracy, alliances across social and economic 
classes influence levels of investment in social protection and the quality of 
social protection schemes. Since the poor have limited political influence, 
programs targeted at those living in poverty are likely to have low budgets and 
low transfers, as well as low quality. Sen (1995) noted that benefits for the poor 
often end up being poor benefits, and Kidd and Hossain (2015) argued that 
the term “the poor” is, in reality, often shorthand for the most socially excluded 
members of society who lack power. 
In contrast, when social protection programs are inclusive in their design—that 
is, incorporating not only the poor but also those with more political power, such 
as those in the middle of the income spectrum, taxpayers, and the wealthy—
levels of investment in social protection schemes increase, as do the value of 
transfers and quality of program delivery. Governments mostly respond to the 
demands of the more powerful.
When examining the influence of political economy on social protection, it is 
important to develop criteria that can be used to assess the level of government 
commitment to particular schemes. This chapter thus assesses commitment 
by the size of a state’s investment in a scheme, most easily measured as a 
percentage of national gross domestic product (GDP), and the quality of a 
program. Quality is more challenging to measure, of course, but it broadly refers 
to the value of transfers offered to beneficiaries and the extent to which the 
right people receive the right amount of money and the ease with which they 
receive it.44 
43 See also Kidd and Hossain (2015).
44 The extent to which people receive the right amount of money at the right time is dependent on the 
level of investment in the administration and management of schemes.
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To understand the impact of political economy on the development of social 
protection for the informal economy, it is necessary to understand the nature of 
the informal economy as well as the shape of national social protection systems 
and how they differ among countries. Thus, the chapter begins by describing 
the characteristics of the informal economy in Asia and then details the shape 
of social protection systems across Asia. The next section examines how 
politics and relations of power have influenced the nature of social protection 
for informal economy workers across the region, and it concludes by outlining 
how political economy can be influenced to extend social protection to the 
informal economy workforce. 
In this chapter, social protection—sometimes known as social security—is 
defined as schemes that provide individuals, families, and households with 
regular, predictable income transfers.45 Generally, there are two main types of 
social protection transfers: those that are financed from general government 
revenues, which can be referred to as social transfers; and those financed by 
contributions from employees and employers, often known as social insurance. 
The Informal Economy in Asia 
There are many definitions of the informal economy, but, in general, the term 
refers to workers not registered with the state who do not pay income taxes 
or receive protection from labor legislation (Evers and Seale 2015).46 The 
International Labour Organization (ILO), which has increasingly referred to 
informal economy employment as vulnerable employment, estimated that it 
encompasses around 60.0% of workers in Asia (ILO 2011).47 The proportion 
is highest in South Asia at 77.0%, encompassing over 80.0% of the workforce 
in Bangladesh (World Bank 2008). In many middle-income countries in 
Southeast Asia, the proportion is 40.0%–65.0%, although in the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), it reaches over 80.0%. East Asia has around 
50.0% of its workforce in the informal economy, while in Central Asia, the size of 
the informal economy has grown dramatically since the fall of the Soviet Union 
and may still be expanding. Only in the wealthier countries of Asia, such as 
Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Malaysia, do those in vulnerable employment 
number less than 30.0% of the overall workforce (Cichon and Cichon 2015). 
45 This chapter does not examine other aspects of social protection such as health financing or access to 
a broader range of social services.
46 OECD (2009, 1) defined informal economy employment as “jobs or activities in the production and 
commercialisation of legal goods and services that are not registered or protected by the state and, 
accordingly, are not covered by the social security system.” 
47 See Cichon and Cichon (2015) for a more comprehensive discussion on the size of the workforce in the 
informal economy in Asia and the Pacific.
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The nature of informal economy employment varies among countries and 
areas in Asia. In most, a high proportion of those in the informal economy are 
in the agriculture sector, either as owners of small plots of land or unskilled 
laborers (or both). In Bangladesh, for example, nearly 50.0% of the labor force 
is in the agriculture sector (World Bank 2008). Informal economy workers 
outside of agriculture engage in a range of employment arrangements and 
activities either as employer-owners of informal firms, own-account workers 
(i.e., self-employment with no employees), informal employees of both formal 
and informal firms, subcontracted workers and wage workers for households 
(i.e., domestic workers), casual day workers, and unpaid family members. 
Common activities include street traders; home-based, piece-rate workers in 
the garment industry; transport workers; rubbish collectors; domestic servants; 
and shoe cleaners. 
Within Asia, women are more likely to be in informal employment than men; 
in South Asia, for example, 84.5% of women are in vulnerable employment, 
compared with 74.8% of men (ADB and ILO 2011).48 As Figure 3.1 indicates, 
nonpaid work in family businesses is dominated by women, while men make up 
the own-account and employer statuses. In fact, only 1.0% of all female workers 
in Asia run their own businesses with paid employees. Gender differentials 
in income in the informal economy surpass those in the formal sector, and, 
among women, there is a stronger correlation between poverty and informal 
economy labor. As the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and ILO (2011, 14) 
noted, “Informal women workers are the ‘working poor,’ struggling in survivalist 
activities, working arduous and long hours but not earning enough to support 
themselves or their families.” 
For many workers in the informal economy, underemployment is endemic, 
meaning that workers are unable to maximize their incomes. In Bangladesh, 
around 25.0% of the labor force is either unemployed or underemployed, with 
9.0% of those employed working less than 20 hours per week. In Indonesia, 
ADB estimated that those who are underemployed work an average of only 
28 hours per week (World Bank 2008, Sugiyarto 2007).49 
The challenges are greater for young people, as they experience much higher 
rates of unemployment or underemployment. In Bangladesh, 2.7 million young 
people enter the labor market each year, but only 0.7 million are able to find 
employment (Islam 2012). In Viet Nam, ILO estimated that around 53.0% of 
those under the age of 25 years have obtained vulnerable employment (Thanh 
Nien News 2013), and, in 2012, around 40.0% of young people remained out 
of education, training, or work, a situation that has hardly improved with most 
48 The main exceptions are the Mongolia and Philippines.
49 In Indonesia, ILO estimated that the underemployed work an average of 21 hours per week.
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of those with limited schooling ending up in low-paid jobs in the informal 
economy (World Bank 2013b). 
Although some workers in the informal economy generate good incomes, in 
general, employment in the informal economy is associated with low, insecure 
wages (Huitfeldt and Jutting 2009). However, the understanding of the 
relationship between informal economy employment and poverty is distorted 
by unrealistically low poverty lines in many countries. The use of the $1.25 
purchasing power parity (PPP) per day poverty line as the international standard 
for poverty has ignored the reality that survival on such a sum is extremely 
challenging and that it should be more accurately regarded as indicating 
extreme poverty.50 
More in-depth analyses of national household surveys have indicated that a 
high proportion of the population in most countries in Asia should be regarded 
as living on low incomes, with a $2.00 PPP per day poverty line a better indicator 
of deep poverty. In some countries, the figures are stark; in Bangladesh in 2008, 
50 ILO (2011) noted that 422 million workers in Asia and the Pacific live on less than $1.25 PPP per day.
Figure 3.1: Distribution of Total Employment in Asia,  
by Status in Employment and Sex
Source: Asian Development Bank (ADB) and International Labour Organization. 2011. Women and 
Labour Markets in Asia: Rebalancing for Gender Equality. Manila: ADB.
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while 43.0% of the population lived on under $1.25 PPP per day, 84.0% had per 
capita consumption of less than $2.00 PPP per day (World Bank 2012a). Other 
low-income countries, such as India, Nepal, and Pakistan, have 50.0%–60.0% 
of their populations living on less than $2.00 PPP per day. In the middle-income 
countries of the Philippines and Indonesia, the rates are 41.7% and 43.3%, 
respectively.51 The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Viet Nam perform 
better, with 18.6% and 12.5% of their populations living on less than $2.00 
PPP per day, respectively. However, overall, it must be emphasized that over 
868 million workers in Asia and the Pacific survive on less than $2.00 PPP per 
day (ILO 2011). 
Even in middle-income countries, few people can be regarded as middle class, 
since the majority survives on relatively low incomes. With no adjustment for PPP, 
only around 20.0% of the population in Viet Nam lives on more than $4.60 per 
day; in Indonesia, only 18.0% live on more than $2.60 per day; and, in Georgia, only 
32.0% live on more than $4.70 per day. Therefore, most families, including most 
of those engaged in the informal economy, do not have sufficient income to invest 
in the well-being of their families or to save for the future. In Indonesia, many in 
this group have been characterized the “scooter class,” which could also apply to 
other middle-income countries in Asia, such as Viet Nam (Schlogl and Sumner 
2014, Kidd et al. 2015).52 Consequently, even in middle-income countries, the 
majority of the population can be regarded as either living in poverty or vulnerable 
to it, obliged to sell their labor in uncertain and informal labor markets. 
The growing availability of panel datasets, which track households over time, 
indicates that the simplistic dichotomy of poor and nonpoor, which is often 
used in social analysis and policy development, is an imaginary construct.53 
Household consumption and incomes are highly volatile, as people respond to 
opportunities and are hit by shocks. For example, in Georgia, around 60.0% of 
households in the poorest quintile of the population in 2013 were not in that 
quintile in 2011; therefore, they can be regarded as having fallen into poverty 
(Baum, Mshvidobadze, and Tsuruoka 2015). In Viet Nam, the proportion 
falling into the poorest quintile between 2010 and 2012 was nearly 40.0% 
(Kidd et al. 2015). Further, among the majority in the second, third, and fourth 
consumption quintiles (where many people in the informal economy can be 
found), the movement between quintiles was significant, indicating a high level 
of insecurity. Indeed, in Georgia, over 50.0% of those in the richest quintile in 
2011 experienced a relative fall in living standards by 2013, with some having 
fallen completely into extreme poverty.
51 World Bank. Poverty Headcount Ratio at $3.10 a Day (2011 PPP). http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
SI.POV.2DAY
52 The term “scooter class” refers to those in the middle of income distribution, with sufficient income to 
purchase cheap scooters but, generally, with low incomes and insecure employment.
53 See Knox-Vydmanov (2014) for further discussion.
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The insecurity faced by most people in the informal economy is linked to 
the risks that they face across their life cycles, which are exacerbated by low 
incomes. Life cycle risks begin in early childhood, with undernutrition particularly 
important.54 While stunting rates are, as expected, high in low-income 
countries,55 they are also high in the middle-income countries of Southeast 
Asia. In 2011, in Viet Nam, 22.0% of children under 5 years of age were stunted 
(General Statistics Office 2011), and, in Indonesia, 35.6% were stunted in 2010 
(UNICEF 2013). Undernutrition impacts negatively on children’s cognitive 
development, subsequently hindering their ability to perform well at school 
and reducing their productivity and earning potential as adults, enhancing 
the likelihood that they will remain in vulnerable employment. Undernutrition 
also increases the likelihood of being overweight or obese in later life, with 
the associated heightened risks of cardiovascular disease, diabetes, and other 
noncommunicable diseases, which, in the long term, will increase the risks 
faced by workers in the informal economy.56 
Children of school age risk not being able to access a good education. Again, 
this threatens their long-term well-being and their chances of gaining formal 
sector employment. For example, in Indonesia, only 25.0% of the labor force has 
completed senior secondary education, and there are concerns that secondary 
schools, including vocational schools, are not providing children with adequate 
skills for the labor market (Alatas and Newhouse 2010). Further, across Asia, 
many children face the risk of being employed in the informal economy at a 
young age, particularly in low-income countries. In South Asia, 13.0% of boys 
and 12.0% of girls are involved in child labor, while in East Asia, the figures are 
10.0% and 7.0% (UNICEF 2015).
People of working age in the informal economy face significant risks. Many 
are in insecure jobs and/or underemployed and, as a result of low educational 
attainment, find it difficult to gain decent work. Women in the informal economy 
face particular risks, since they are often in more vulnerable employment, are 
unable to access adequate child care, and, as a result, cannot return to work 
after giving birth. If they do, they may experience a fall in their productivity. 
Ill health and disability are further risks to workers in the informal economy, 
which can undermine standards of living. In Bangladesh, one study found that 
around 87.0% of working-age people who became disabled left employment 
within 1 year (Chowdhury and Foley 2006).57 In Viet Nam, people aged 25–29, 
54 It can be argued that risks begin when children are still in the womb, since risks faced by their mothers 
(e.g., poor nutrition) will impact their offspring.
55 In Bangladesh, 41.0% of children are stunted (NIPRT, Mitra and Associates, ICF International 2013).
56 The impact of undernutrition can be seen in estimates that its prevalence in Asia reduces overall gross 
national product by 11.0% (IFPRI 2014).
57 The study by Chowdhury and Foley (2006) took place in Chuadanga District.
128 Social Protection for Informal Workers in Asia
living with a disability, have poverty rates that are more than double those of 
people without a disability (Kidd and Abu-el-Haj 2015). 
Migrants are a category of workers in the informal economy at particular risk. 
In some countries, restrictions on internal migration mean that people moving 
to another part of the country may find themselves without protection and 
unable to enter the formal labor market. Viet Nam, for example, provides 
inadequate protection to those considered temporary migrants. A survey 
in 2008 demonstrated that around 94.0% of employed migrants were in 
the informal economy, and only 5.0% of migrants had written job contracts 
(Duong, Linh, and Thao 2011). They are also unable to access social protection 
benefits unless they return to their home areas.58 Overseas migrants also 
face challenges since, while overseas, they are usually unable to pay into their 
home country’s social insurance schemes. This is particularly significant in the 
countries of Central Asia where social insurance schemes are still relatively 
large; in the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan, hundreds of thousands of people 
work overseas and cannot contribute into national social insurance schemes 
(Mikkonen-Jeanneret, Rayapova, and Yefimov 2011).59 
However, the biggest risk faced by workers in Asia’s informal economy is 
associated with old age. The majority of older people are women,60 and older 
people become increasingly susceptible to disability as they age. In many 
countries, more than half of the population over age 70 years is likely to be 
experiencing some form of disability, thereby hindering their ability to continue 
to work. Yet across the region—as a result of factors such as poverty and 
processes such as urbanization and migration—the support provided to older 
people by their families is weakening. 
Many older people continue to work in the informal economy for as long as they 
can. In Viet Nam, between the ages of 60 and 64 years, around 70.0% of older 
people are engaged in some form of employment, falling to around 40.0% at 
70–74 years of age, and 20.0% at 80–84 years of age (Kidd and Abu-el-Haj 
2015). Older women are more likely to engage in unpaid domestic work, including 
child care.
Many working-age families with low incomes experience the strains of caring 
for people with disabilities, including older people, with little or no support 
58 The PRC has had similar problems, but, in recent years, it has taken steps to protect the rights of 
migrants.
59 In the Kyrgyz Republic, up to 13.7% of the labor force may be working overseas (Mikkonen-Jeanneret, 
Rayapova, and Yefimov 2011).
60 Older women are more likely to be single compared with men, which, in many societies, can result 
in greater isolation. Often, widows have limited property rights, with property remaining with their 
spouse’s family.
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from the state. In fact, in the absence of effective pension systems, this can be 
regarded as an ad hoc caring tax that is placed on working-age families, reducing 
their ability to care for their own children. It should also be noted that families 
with children face even more challenges, especially when a family member has 
to give up work to care for children. 
In sum, the majority of Asia’s informal economy workforce survive on low 
incomes with high levels of insecurity. If they experience a shock, such as 
unemployment, ill health, or disability, most have no safety net to offer them 
protection. Investing in social protection for workers in the informal economy 
can offer a wide range of benefits, both for families and the national economy. 
Access to social protection can provide working-age families, people with 
disabilities, and older people with increased security and dignity, helping them 
invest in children and offering them the chance of escaping the intergenerational 
poverty trap. At the national level, investment in social protection can help 
tackle inequality and promote national social cohesion while strengthening 
political stability. It can also provide a significant stimulus to economic growth, 
and through increased spending and consumption among members of the 
informal economy, it can generate greater demand in the economy, thereby 
supporting entrepreneurs. 
Social Protection Provision across Asia
Despite the strong rationale for significant investment in social protection 
across Asia, coverage of workers in the informal economy and their families is 
limited. Governments offer social protection to their citizens either via social 
insurance or social transfers. The general pattern found across the region is that 
many formal sector workers can access social insurance, while social transfer 
schemes are often offered only to those deemed to be living in extreme poverty. 
Thus, most families with breadwinners working in the informal economy are 
unable to access social protection, since they are deemed not to be “poor.” The 
main exception is old-age pensions, which, in a few countries, are accessible to 
everyone once they reach a specific age, and which are largely financed through 
general taxation. Across much of Asia, there is a “missing middle” that cannot 
access social protection, mainly corresponding to workers in the informal 
economy (ADB 2013). 
Social Insurance Schemes
Only around 34.0% of the labor force in Asia contributes to social insurance 
and, in many countries, coverage is below 10.0% (ILO 2014). Those countries 
with higher coverage rates are, in general, either former Soviet Union transition 
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economies (Box 3.1) or high-income countries. Almost all members and 
beneficiaries of social insurance in the region are formal sector employees. 
Box 3.1: Social Insurance Systems in the Former Soviet Union 
or Transition Economies
Several former Soviet Union transition economies (e.g., in Central Asia and Mongolia) have inherited extensive social insurance schemes that provide 
high levels of social protection coverage to specific categories of the population, 
particularly older people. Yet these schemes are for those who have worked in the 
formal sector, and there are signs that the coverage gaps of the informal economy 
workforce may grow over time, unless effective tax-financed mechanisms are put 
in place. For example, although Uzbekistan currently has high old-age pension 
coverage, in coming decades, coverage is likely to fall significantly as the informal 
economy workforce finds it more challenging to enter into the social insurance 
system (Kidd 2014b). While the country has implemented a social pension, it is 
directed toward those living in poverty with no family support and, as a result, 
other former workers from the informal economy are not likely to have access to 
pensions. 
Further, many of the current schemes in former Soviet Union transition economies 
are actually recent. For example, most of Georgia’s social protection system (in 
particular its old-age pension and poor relief scheme) are innovations from 2006 
and are financed from general taxation rather than from social insurance. Another 
example is Uzbekistan’s child benefit, which was introduced as part of a stimulus 
package following the fall of the Soviet Union.
Sources: S. Kidd. 2014. An Overview of Uzbekistan’s National Social Protection System. Unpublished; 
Pension Watch. Country Fact Sheet: Georgia. http://www.pension-watch.net/pensions/country-
fact-file/georgia
In most of the countries that have attempted to extend social insurance to the 
informal economy, coverage is also minimal. In 2010 in Viet Nam, for example, 
only 60,000 people contributed voluntarily to the national social insurance 
scheme (Long and Wesumperuma 2012). Sri Lanka has a range of programs for 
different categories of workers, such as fishers, farmers, and the self-employed 
(Willmore and Kidd 2008). Despite low contributions, only 36.0% of potential 
members of the largest scheme are actual members, and only half of these 
are active (Mackellar 2009).61 Further, the value of the pensions is low (the 
highest is around 5.4% of GDP per capita), and the schemes themselves are not 
61 ILO (2011) provided alternative figures, stating that 57.0% of farmers and 42.0% of fishers in Sri Lanka 
are members of contributory pension schemes.
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actuarially sound and will probably have to be subsidized by the government 
from general taxation (Willmore and Kidd 2008). In fact, only around 7.0% of 
older people currently receive a pension from Sri Lanka’s informal economy 
pension schemes (ADB 2012). 
One exception to the low coverage of informal economy workers by social 
insurance pensions is the PRC, but its system nonetheless faces a range of 
challenges (Box 3.2). 
Box 3.2: The Rural Pension of the People’s Republic of China
The People’s Republic of China has recently experienced a significant expansion of social insurance pensions among informal economy workers, 
mainly through the introduction of the Rural Pension. Coverage increased rapidly 
from around 70 million contributors in 2009 to nearly 250 million by 2011 (Vilela 
2013).
However, despite the rapid increase in coverage, the current design of the scheme 
may not be sustainable. People have been incentivized to contribute to the 
scheme by being offered, in exchange, a social pension for their parents, who can 
receive a pension of CNY55.00 ($8.83 per month). Yet contributors only have 
to pay a minimum of CNY100.00 annually, equivalent to $1.28 per month. As a 
result, people with elderly parents are able to contribute the minimum amount, 
while ensuring that their parents receive almost seven times as much in return. 
As many are choosing to make the minimum contribution, this will undermine the 
scheme’s long-term viability (Cai et al. 2012).
Source: Asian Development Bank (ADB). 2014. Support to Rural Pension Reform and Administration 
in the People’s Republic of China. ADB Briefs. No. 26. Manila.
Social Transfer Schemes
The coverage of the informal economy labor force by social transfers financed 
from general taxation is limited across most of the region. While old-age 
pensions are the most common social transfers in developing countries, few 
countries in Asia offer universal pension coverage (Table A3.1). Countries that 
provide more than half of people over 60 years of age with a social pension 
are Brunei Darussalam, Georgia, the Republic of Korea, the Maldives, Thailand, 
and Timor-Leste. Some countries offer high coverage at an older age, such 
as Nepal, which provides a pension to every person aged over 70 years, and 
Viet Nam, which offers universal access at 80 years of age. In most countries, 
budgets are low; although many developing countries invest more than 1.0% 
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of GDP in social pensions, the only countries to do so in Asia are Georgia and 
the Maldives.
The other main life cycle social transfer program to be offered across Asia is a 
disability benefit. In most countries, the levels of investment and coverage are 
limited (Table A3.2). The highest investment is in Uzbekistan, where coverage 
is universal and the scheme is embedded within the social insurance system. 
However, even there, the program has recently been withdrawn from those 
with less-severe disabilities (Kidd 2014b).
Social transfer schemes directed mainly at informal economy families with 
children are also limited and have low coverage. A number of countries have 
established poor relief schemes, in which benefits are directed at the poorest 
households (Table A3.3). Well-known examples include the PRC’s Minimum 
Living Standard Guarantee Scheme, Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program of 
the Philippines, and Pakistan’s Benazir Income Support Programme. However, 
coverage is low, rarely reaching more than 20.0% of households. 
Budgets for poor relief programs are relatively low. The scheme with the largest 
expenditure is Georgia’s Targeted Social Assistance (TSA) program, with a 
budget of 0.9% of GDP,62 but most have budgets below 0.4% of GDP. India’s 
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme has a budget 
around 0.3% of GDP (Tewari 2015). 
Some countries have taken a different approach to supporting working-age 
families by focusing on children through child benefit schemes (Table A3.4). 
Mongolia provides a child benefit with the highest relative coverage in the 
region, offering a child benefit to all children aged under 18 years (UNICEF 
2012).63 Other countries with child benefits include Uzbekistan, with around 
14.0% of children aged 3–17 years benefiting, while Nepal introduced a child 
grant for Dalit children aged 0–4 years living in extreme poverty in 2009, 
reaching around 13.0% of children in the age group (Hodges et al. 2007, Kidd 
and Wylde 2011, Kidd 2014b, and Fritz 2014). Other countries and areas, such 
as Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Pakistan, offer education stipends to encourage 
children to attend school. While the Pakistan programs offer universal access to 
girls in public secondary schools, in Bangladesh and Indonesia, the schemes are 
directed to all of those living in poverty (Kidd and Khondker 2013, Jellema and 
Noura 2012, Kidd 2014a). 
62 Budget estimated from information in Baum, Mshvidobadze, and Tsuruoka (2015).
63 During the first payment of the allowance in October 2012, 79.6% of children received the benefit.
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In addition, some countries provide a maternity benefit. In Uzbekistan, this 
reaches around 36.0% of children aged 0–2 years, while, in Bangladesh, it is 
very small, benefiting only 100,000 women (Kidd et al. 2014). Some countries 
provide support to widows and/or single women, many of whom are of working 
age and are likely to be engaged in the informal economy. In Nepal, all single 
women over age 18 years can access a transfer, while, in Bangladesh, it is targeted 
at those living in poverty, reaching just over 1 million women (Kidd et al. 2014).64
Some countries offer benefits to those deemed to have performed a valuable 
service to the nation. In Viet Nam, around 1 million people involved in wars of 
liberation receive merit payments. Most beneficiaries are elderly or living with a 
disability, and the budget, in 2014, was around 1.0% of GDP (Kidd and Abu-el-
Haj 2015). Another example is in Timor-Leste, which provides a benefit to war 
veterans, people disabled during the war of independence, and the families of 
martyrs (Rigolini 2008).
Overall Social Protection Provision
Across Asia as whole, social protection coverage for workers in the informal 
economy and their families is limited, although there are significant variations 
among countries. Social insurance schemes provide minimal coverage of 
workers in the informal economy, and few countries invest a significant 
proportion of their GDPs in social transfer schemes that could reach this 
group. Georgia, which invests over 6.0% of GDP in social transfer schemes, 
is an exception, while Uzbekistan, with expenditure of over 12.0% of GDP in 
both social insurance and social transfer schemes, is the other large investor. 
In contrast, a high proportion of countries invest less than 1.0% of GDP in total, 
and some large middle-income countries, such as Indonesia, the Philippines, 
and Viet Nam, spend less than 0.5% of their GDPs in total on core social transfer 
schemes.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the difference that high and low levels of investment 
can make to countries. It shows the impact on poverty rates by different 
tax-financed social transfer schemes across age groups. In Viet Nam, a low 
investor, the impacts on poverty are minimal and mainly restricted to the elderly. 
In contrast, in the high investor country of Georgia, the impacts are much more 
significant. While the largest impacts are, again, among the elderly, there are 
also relatively significant impacts across the population. 
64 In India, Bihar provides an allowance to all widows over age 18 years who have a family income below 
Rs60,000 (Department of Social Welfare 2007).
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Figure 3.2: Impact on the Poverty Rate of Social Assistance 
Transfers across Age Groups in Viet Nam (2012)  
and Georgia (2013)
TSA = targeted social assistance.
Sources: General Statistics Office, Government of Viet Nam. 2012. Data Results of the Viet Nam 
Household Living Standards Measurement Survey 2012. Ha Noi; T. Baum, A. Mshvidobadze, and 
H.  Tsuruoka. 2015. Reducing Child Poverty in Georgia: A Way Forward. New York: United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF).
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Political Economy of Social Protection  
for the Informal Economy
Although there is a range of reasons for the low coverage of social protection 
schemes for informal economy workers in Asia, to a large extent, the pattern 
of social protection provision can be explained by political economy factors 
within each country. Ideologies and deeply held beliefs have interacted with 
the structural changes under way to shape how elites and political leaders have 
made decisions on the nature of social protection. Politicians have also been 
influenced by their political regimes, societies, and economies. Ultimately, the 
main decisions on investment in social protection are made by politicians to 
gain political advantage and to agree on “political settlements” with powerful 
groups and constituencies. The following sections explore how political 
economy has influenced the development of social protection for the informal 
economy workers across Asia. 
Responsibility of Families to Care for the Vulnerable
A key influence on social protection decision making among policy makers in 
Asia derives from widespread beliefs in the family’s role in caring for vulnerable 
members of society.65 Across Asia, families have traditionally been the main 
providers of informal social protection, such as children caring for their parents 
in old age. As in much of the world, this practice is still prevalent, although it 
is weakening as a result of widespread poverty, the expansion of the market 
economy, and processes such as urbanization and migration. Many policy 
makers, however, cling to the belief that families—rather than the state—should 
be the main source of support for vulnerable people, particularly older people.66 
The belief has influenced the design of social protection schemes. In Viet Nam 
and Uzbekistan, many older people can only receive a social pension if they 
do not have children to care for them (Kidd 2014b, Kidd et al. 2015).67 This 
stance has also been supported by many economists, who have argued that the 
provision of social protection will “crowd out” family support. In other words, 
if people receive state benefits, then families will reduce their support to the 
beneficiaries. Yet the belief in crowding out is highly simplistic and not based on 
a robust understanding of kinship and social dynamics (Box 3.3).
65 For further discussion, see Kidd (2013b).
66 The belief that children should be responsible for caring for their parents has, in some countries, been 
converted into legislation. For example, India and the PRC have passed laws obliging children to care for 
their parents (Coonan 2013).
67 In Viet Nam, the restriction only applies to those aged 60–79 years. For those aged above 80 years (and 
younger in some provinces), pension coverage is supposed to be universal.
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However, while this belief has probably hindered the development of effective 
old-age pension systems for the informal economy workforce, there are 
signs that it is beginning to weaken. The National Social Security Strategy in 
Bangladesh used the deterioration in traditional support systems for older 
people to expand the country’s old-age allowance and to transform it into a 
citizens’ pension (General Economics Division, Planning Commission 2015).
Clientelistic Politics
As Lavers and Hickey (2015) argued, elites often use social protection as a form 
of patronage to secure backing from powerful factions. Indeed, Khan (2010) 
characterized political settlements in many countries in Asia as “clientelistic” 
with social policy, that is, used by elites to pay off powerful groups that pressure 
them by providing them with social programs, including social protection. In 
many instances, these groups do not comprise the poor or socially excluded but 
those with greater power and influence.
As an example, several countries have established large fuel subsidies, which 
mainly benefit the most affluent rather than the majority of the population. 
Box 3.3: Crowding Out: Is It a Problem?
The concept of “crowding out,” used by some economists to challenge the introduction of formal systems of social protection in developing countries 
(Calder and Tanhchareun 2015), does not reflect the reality of social and kinship 
relations in much of Asia (Kreager and Schröder-Butterfill 2008, 2010, 2012; 
Kidd 2013b). 
Anthropological studies across the world have highlighted how people build 
kinship relations by offering “gifts” to others. So, by receiving old-age pensions, 
older people are in a position to strengthen their kinship relations, as they have 
resources or “gifts” to share with others. Indeed, evidence from around the 
world indicates that older people who are members of kinship networks living in 
poverty—and who do not receive a pension—may experience a greater likelihood 
of social exclusion (Kidd 2009, Miguel 2005). 
Furthermore, the belief that a reduction in family support to pensioners is bad 
must be challenged. For example, if, as a result of receiving an old-age pension, 
families can reduce their support to their parents, they can invest more in 
their own children, while their relationship with their parents is simultaneously 
strengthened. 
Source: Authors.
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The Kyrgyz Republic spends around 9.0% of GDP on fuel subsidies, while 
Bangladesh’s expenditure is over 3.0% of GDP (World Bank 2015). Indonesia 
has consistently invested over 2.0% of GDP per year in its fuel subsidy, 
also transferring the majority of benefits to the most affluent members of 
society (DFAT, Government of Indonesia, unpublished). In recent years, the 
Government of Indonesia has tried to reduce the subsidy, putting in place 
short-term cash transfer programs for the poorest sectors of society as a form 
of compensation. Yet, until recently, the reductions were only partial, and, it 
could be argued that the target group of the compensation programs was the 
wrong group, which probably explains the failure of the reforms.68 
Despite the evidence that it is difficult to offer adequate social protection 
to the majority of workers in the informal economy (Box 3.4), policy makers 
have continued to promote social insurance to extend social protection to 
68 The group benefiting most from the fuel subsidy, when calculated as a percentage of household 
consumption, has been middle-income households, mainly workers in the informal economy.
Box 3.4: Technical Challenges to Incorporating the Informal 
Economy Workforce into Social Insurance Schemes
Many of the challenges to incorporating the informal economy workforce into social insurance schemes are technical, deriving from the nature of 
informal economy employment, in which low and irregular incomes predominate, 
making it difficult for people to contribute to schemes. Furthermore, the levels 
of contribution required from employers and employees, which average around 
17.0% of salaries across the region, are a strong disincentive to businesses to 
enter the formal economy. If they remain in the informal economy, they can avoid 
these additional costs (SSA 2012). The self-employed workforce in the informal 
economy does not have the option of employers paying the majority of the 
contribution, thereby reducing their incentives to enter social insurance schemes. 
There are further practical difficulties in making contribution payments. Many 
informal economy workers live in areas where social insurance agencies are not 
present or where financial services are limited. As a result, people cannot physically 
make payments. In addition, the limited investment by most governments in Asia 
in labor inspectors means that formal sector firms are able to employ people on 
an informal basis to avoid paying contributions, without facing sanctions. Across 
Viet Nam, there are only 130 labor inspectors, far too few to effectively police the 
system (Kidd and Abu-el-Haj 2015).
Source: Authors.
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the informal economy workforce. In 2004, for example, Indonesia passed Law 
2004/40 on the National Social Security System, with the aim of offering all 
older people and people with disabilities access to pensions (Kidd 2013b). 
However, the law mandated that universal pension coverage must be achieved 
through social insurance, but, since then, little progress has been made.69 
One reason for policy makers prioritizing the incorporation of the informal 
economy workforce in contributory schemes may be to mobilize resources for 
investment in economic development, as happened successfully in some East 
Asian countries (Kwon 2004, Yi and Mkandawire 2014). Although contributory 
pension schemes necessarily exclude the informal economy workforce, they 
may be supported by policy makers as a response to business interests—a 
powerful political constituency—given their potential to provide funds for 
investment. 
During the 1990s and early 2000s, the extension of contributory and privatized 
pension schemes was strongly promoted by the World Bank. It proposed a 
three-pillar pension model, with social insurance as the public pillar and the 
other two pillars comprising funded pensions managed by the private sector 
(World Bank 1994). While recognizing the advantages of universal social 
pensions, which would have benefited the informal economy workforce, it 
argued against their use on the basis that they would be beyond the financial 
capacity of developing countries. Instead, priority was given to the privatization 
of contributory public pensions. One example of the World Bank successfully 
promoting pension privatization was in Kazakhstan, where it worked in 
partnership with ADB and the United States Agency for International 
Development (Hujo and Cook 2012). 
However, an independent internal evaluation by the World Bank suggested 
that it had been quite inflexible in promoting private pensions during the 1990s 
and early 2000s, including in the PRC and the Republic of Korea (IEG 2007). 
Indeed, the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group (2006, xxiii) found 
that “[w]ith the exception of a limited number of countries that offered social 
pensions, particularly in Europe and Central Asia, the Bank provided little 
support to develop social assistance for the aged poor, even though this was 
a stated element of the Bank’s strategy on pension reform.” Furthermore, the 
World Bank’s drive to deliver privatized pension systems meant that, in some 
cases, they were promoted “in countries with high fiscal deficits, weak financial 
systems, and ineffective implementation capacity.” (IEG 2006, xxiii)
69 Indonesia has been more successful in implementing the health insurance components of Law 
2004/40.
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In some cases, governments have offered matching contributions to incentivize 
the inclusion of informal economy laborers into social insurance schemes, such 
as India’s Unorganised Sector Workers Social Security Scheme, and a number 
of schemes across Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and West 
Bengal (Chakraborty 2007, Cai et al. 2012). As expected, there is little evidence 
of these schemes succeeding to attract large numbers of members from the 
informal economy. Nonetheless, the promotion of matching contributions 
indicates a desire by governments to prioritize more influential higher-income 
informal economy workers over those with lower incomes, given that the latter 
cannot afford to enter social insurance schemes even with government support 
and would be better served by social pensions financed from general taxation.
Some development agencies continue to promote social insurance pensions 
for the informal economy workforce. In Viet Nam, both Deutsche Gesellschaft 
für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and ILO have argued for matching 
payments for informal economy workers.70 Other experts, such as MacKellar 
(2009), have argued in favor of voluntary pension schemes for the informal 
economy, run privately by microfinance institutions. While the rationale behind 
these proposals is unclear, their promotion is not evidence-based and will, 
again, only benefit more affluent informal economy workers.
Other examples of governments prioritizing investment in social protection 
for government employees can be seen in the financing of civil service and 
military pensions over pensions for the general population. While Viet Nam 
invests over 1.0% of GDP in pensions for civil servants who retired before 1995, 
its investment in social pensions for the majority of the population is less than 
0.2% of GDP (Khondker unpublished). Furthermore, between 2007 and 2013, 
the real value of Viet Nam’s civil service pensions more than doubled, while the 
value of the social pensions fell by around 25.0% (Kidd et al. 2015). Similarly, 
in Bangladesh, the civil service pension costs 0.5% of GDP, while only 0.1% of 
GDP is invested in the national old-age allowance (Kidd et al. 2014). 
The investment by some countries in schemes for former “freedom fighters” 
and “national heroes” is also evidence of governments responding to powerful 
groups. Viet Nam spends around 1.0% of GDP on its schemes for “meritorious 
people,” with transfer values that are around four times higher than the value 
of the social pension for the general population (Kidd et al. 2015). A similar 
pattern emerges in Timor-Leste, where, in 2008, veterans received transfers of 
$85.00–$550.00 per month, compared with the $20.00 per month provided 
by the social pension (Rigolini 2008).
70 See, for example, ILSSA and GIZ (2013). ILO has, however, also argued for the expansion of social 
pensions (ILO and UNFPA 2014).
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Moreover, many social protection schemes have been initiated by governments 
in response to potential social unrest. The PRC’s establishment of the Minimum 
Living Standard Guarantee Scheme was a response to the high proportion of 
people, often middle-aged men, who were being laid off from state-owned 
enterprises in the late 1990s (Ngok 2010). Social unrest was on the rise and 
only after a number of years was the program extended to the rural population. 
Similarly, during the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis, the Republic of Korea 
established a social transfer to compensate those losing their jobs, largely 
formal sector workers (Kwon, Dong, and Moon 2010). 
In Indonesia, the government has been unwilling to reform problematic aspects 
of the national social protection system due to its desire to avoid confrontation 
with trade unions. Indonesia’s hiring and firing regulations are among the most 
inflexible in the world; severance pay rates are particularly high, rising to around 
30 months salary for employees with more than 20 years of service. However, 
this is a bad situation for both employers and employees, as it deters investment 
in business and employees do not necessarily benefit. In 2008, only 34.0% of 
employees eligible for severance pay received anything, and, of those who did, 
78.0% received less than their legal entitlement (Alatas and Newhouse 2010). 
The government’s inability to address the issue means that a major disincentive 
to formalization of the economy remains in place, while informal economy 
workers are unable to benefit from existing legislation.
In sum, some governments in Asia have frequently used social protection 
schemes as part of a political settlement, building implicit alliances with powerful 
factions or rewarding those who have supported them. In most countries, 
governing elites cannot afford to alienate the rich, the business community, the 
civil service, or formal sector workers. As a result, social protection for these 
groups is often prioritized rather than schemes for the majority of the informal 
economy labor force. Indeed, as Claus, Martinez-Vazquez, and Vulovic (2012, 
2013) have pointed out, social protection spending in Asia is regressive, 
benefiting affluent members of society more than those living in poverty, an 
indication of the extent to which social protection policy has been used for 
patronage of the more powerful sectors of society to the detriment of the 
majority of the population and the informal economy workforce (ADB 2014, 
Bastaglia 2015).
Influence of Neoliberal Ideology on the Shape  
of Social Protection in Asia
The neoliberal ideology, particularly from Europe and North America, has some 
influence on the thinking of policy makers in Asia. The post-war European 
political settlement, which facilitated an expansion of inclusive social protection 
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systems, happened at a time when a social democratic consensus prevailed, 
and higher levels of taxation and investment in social policy were generally seen 
in a positive light and not impediments to winning elections (Lavers and Hickey 
2015). Through a significant redistribution of national wealth via the tax system 
and a concomitant investment in social services, including social protection, 
inequality across Europe was, for the first 30 years of the post-war period, 
relatively low. 
However, from the early 1980s, neoliberal ideology began to dominate 
international thinking on economic and social policy, influencing policy 
development in many countries. In addition to a strong belief in liberalized 
markets, the new neoliberal ideology promoted lower levels of taxation and 
social spending. In many countries influenced by neoliberal thinking, such as 
the United Kingdom, there were rises in inequality.
This neoliberal ideology provided the underpinnings for the Washington 
Consensus, with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank 
pursuing structural adjustments in developing countries during the 1980s and 
1990s, focusing on reducing the size of the state. This included policy proposals 
to remove food subsidies, privatize pension funds, and introduce user fees for 
health, often as a prerequisite for loans (Lavers and Hickey 2015). Alongside 
this structural adjustment, IMF and the World Bank promoted social safety 
nets for those living in extreme poverty, since they recognized that their reforms 
could be a source of political discontent. The 1990 World Development Report 
on Poverty encapsulated these ideas, recommending the targeting of “social 
safety nets” at the “poor,” without recognizing that effective methodologies for 
accurately identifying the “poor” did not exist in developing countries (World 
Bank 1990). The focus on poverty-targeted “safety nets” aligned closely with 
the neoliberal belief in limiting social spending. As the World Bank (2014d, 27) 
itself has argued, a key motivation for poverty targeting was a desire to reduce 
public spending: “The historical….evidence suggests that the forces pushing for 
better targeting are more regularly motivated by cutting entitlement bills and 
ensuring financial sustainability than by helping the poor.”
This dominant neoliberal ideology influenced the design of several social 
protection schemes that started during the 1990s, with a strong focus 
on targeting the “poor.” For example, social pensions that commenced in 
Bangladesh, India, and Thailand in the 1990s were targeted at older people 
living in poverty.71 The limited commitment by governments to these schemes 
is indicated by their very low transfer values and the inadequate level of 
71 Currently, the Bangladesh social pension reaches only around 33.0% of the eligible age group, while 
India’s reaches 25.0%.
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administrative resources allocated to their management. As a result, the old-age 
pensions in Bangladesh and India are ridden with governance issues, with local 
elites manipulating selection processes for political patronage purposes, while 
bribery is widespread.72 Unfortunately, the poor reputation of these schemes, 
which are often denounced in the media, filters back to influence political 
opinion, with policy makers much less likely to invest significant resources in 
schemes that are regarded as engendering corruption.
While the Washington Consensus has now been largely discredited, the 
neoliberal ideology underpinning it continues to have strong supporters both in 
international institutions and national governments in Asia, and among elites. 
Across the region, there is still support for targeting social protection programs 
at those living in extreme poverty. In part, this was strengthened by the 
Millennium Development Goals on tackling extreme poverty and prioritizing 
those living under the $1.25 PPP per day poverty line. While the prioritization 
of those living in extreme poverty was welcome, it distracted policy makers 
from addressing the needs of the majority of informal economy workers and 
their families. Furthermore, many policy makers and social protection experts 
mistakenly conflated tackling extreme poverty with poverty targeting (Box 3.5). 
Yet international evidence strongly indicates that investment in more universal 
schemes is much more effective in tackling extreme poverty than schemes 
targeted at the “poor.”73 
72 See, for example, Pellissery (2005) and Hossain and Zahra (2008).
73 See, for example, Sen (1995), Pritchett (2005), and Mkandawire (2005).
Box 3.5: Misunderstandings about  
the Political Economy of Targeting
Across all types of stakeholders involved in social protection, including policy makers, development partners, government officials, academics, and 
nongovernment organizations, there have been calls in favor of poverty targeting, 
often derived from the erroneous belief that it is beneficial for those living in 
poverty. The crux of the argument is that if there is a fixed pot of funding, it is 
better to distribute funds only to those living in poverty, since they will receive 
higher transfers (Hanlon et al. 2010, Kidd 2015). Yet this does not take into 
account the well-accepted theory of the political economy of targeting that 
higher coverage of schemes can result in higher transfer values. It also ignores the 
argument of Pritchett that, in government social policy, there is no such thing as 
a fixed budget, and governments are able to vary their budgets in line with their 
political decisions (Pritchett 2005).  
Source: Authors.
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The World Bank has continued to influence the direction of social protection 
provision in Asia by promoting poverty targeting and limited investment in social 
protection, essentially continuing a key thrust of the Washington Consensus. By 
targeting the “poor,” these conditional cash transfer schemes in countries such 
as Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Philippines necessarily exclude the majority of 
the informal economy workforce and are similar in design to Latin America’s 
conditional cash transfer schemes, which target the “poor” by using a proxy 
means test to identify beneficiaries and to provide transfers to beneficiaries 
only if they fulfill certain conditions, such as sending their children to school. In 
some countries, however, the condition has been employment in public works 
schemes, such as in Bangladesh’s Employment Generation Program for the 
Poorest program. Many international agencies have strongly promoted Latin 
America’s conditional cash transfer schemes as success stories to policy makers 
in Asia, even creating myths about their efficacy and popularity (Box 3.6). In 
contrast, little is said about the much larger and more successful life cycle 
schemes in Latin America, in particular the continent’s old-age pensions and 
Argentina’s almost universal system of child benefits.74
It can also be argued that the poor relief programs that have arisen recently 
across Asia and Latin America follow the model of social protection that formed 
the cornerstone of social protection in Northern Europe in the 18th and 19th 
centuries (Lindert 2004). These schemes were developed under authoritarian 
regimes, when elites were able to tax the middle class—who could not vote—
and allocate those resources to the “poor.” At the time, investment in some 
poor relief schemes was relatively high, reaching 2.7% of GDP in England’s Poor 
Laws scheme. 
74 For further discussion on Latin America’s transition to life cycle schemes, see Kidd (2013a).
Box 3.6: The Myth of Brazil’s Bolsa Família Program
Across many countries in Asia, a myth has been created around Brazil’s Bolsa Família program, with many policy makers sent to Brazil to study the scheme. 
Bolsa Família has been promoted as a success story and the social protection 
model for other countries to follow (Lavers and Hickey 2015). Yet, in reality, 
within Brazil, Bolsa Família is a small program compared with the country’s much 
more significant investments in life cycle social protection programs, in particular 
the old-age pension, which, as part of the Previdência Social scheme, has annual 
expenditure around 15 times the size of Bolsa Família (Kidd and Huda 2013). 
Indeed, the old-age pension in Brazil has generated much higher impacts on 
poverty and inequality (SSA 2012). 
Source: S. Kidd and K. Huda. 2013. BOLSA unFAMILIAr. Pathways Perspectives. No. 9.
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There was a range of political economy drivers behind these poor relief 
programs. In England, for example, elite landowners used the Poor Laws to 
maintain their agriculture labor force during periods of low employment, so that 
they did not migrate to the cities of northern England. However, elites were also 
concerned about avoiding the type of social conflict that provoked the French 
Revolution and hoped that the redistribution of benefits to the “poor” would 
pacify potential opposition to their rule. 
Yet as predicted by the political economy of targeting, as democracy 
strengthened and the middle class gained the ability to vote, they increasingly 
began to oppose their taxes being spent on programs for the “poor” since they 
themselves were excluded. As a consequence, expenditures on poor relief 
fell—reaching only 0.8% of GDP in England by 1880—and the programs were 
made conditional, so that the benefits could avoid being seen as handouts. This 
resulted in “poor” beneficiaries engaging in public works, known as workhouses. 
Increasingly, and as a result of the middle class gaining political influence, 
Europe moved toward an inclusive life cycle approach to its social protection 
system, which addressed the needs of the middle class and initially prioritized 
old-age pensions. Poor relief eventually came to comprise only a very small 
component of expenditure in most European and other developed countries. 
As in Europe, poor relief schemes in Asia have tended to be introduced in 
countries with either authoritarian regimes or weak democracies, where 
election results do not reflect the aspirations of the majority. Indeed, a similar 
process occurred in Latin America when poor relief schemes were first 
introduced. Democracies were still in their early stages following long periods 
of authoritarian rule, but, as democracy strengthened, inclusive life cycle social 
protection schemes have become more prevalent. The same is likely to happen 
in Asia. The Republic of Korea introduced a social pension in 2007, reaching 
70.0% of people aged over 65 years, while the Philippines commenced a social 
pension in 2011, although, as noted earlier, it is still small and highly targeted. 
The minimal commitment to poor relief programs by Asia is indicated by 
countries’ limited budgets. The one exception is Georgia, which has invested 
around 0.9% of GDP in its TSA scheme, yet this is dwarfed by the country’s 
investment of 4.3% of GDP in its universal pension (Baum, Mshvidobadze, and 
Tsuruoka 2015). In May 2015, the Government of Georgia, responding to policy 
advice from the United Nations Children’s Fund, announced a reduction in 
the TSA scheme, reallocating around 10.0% of the budget into a child benefit, 
which will reach 35.0% of children, compared with the TSA’s coverage of only 
15.0% of households. It is likely that the child benefit will continue to grow at 
the expense of the TSA, given that it is more likely to be popular and provides 
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higher coverage of the informal economy workforce. In Kazakhstan, the total 
annual expenditure on its TSA poor relief program fell from $36.80 million 
to $12.50  million between 2005 and 2012 (Babajanian, Hagen-Zanker, and 
Salomon 2015). Indeed, none of Latin America’s poor relief schemes have 
budgets above 0.4% of GDP, despite some having been in existence for almost 
2 decades, and do not reach the majority of the informal workforce.
In Asia, poor relief schemes tend to be of low quality. They exclude the majority 
of their intended beneficiaries, often using the proxy means test–targeting 
methodology, which has high design errors and produces low accuracy and 
arbitrary results.75 
It is possible for elites to impose the proxy means test on the poorest and 
weakest sections of society, since they are not in a position to effectively 
oppose it, despite it generating significant social conflict within communities. 
For example, a number of studies have documented social unrest in Indonesia 
as a result of the use of the proxy means test (Hannigan 2010, Widjaja 2009, 
Cameron and Shah 2011, Hossain 2012). The proxy means test acts as a 
rationing rather than targeting mechanism, allocating limited resources to a 
small group of the poor who are selected from a much larger group of equally 
deserving families.76 
Alternative Economic Drivers of Social Protection  
for the Informal Economy
A key driver behind neoliberal policies is the belief that low levels of taxation 
are good for economic growth; by reducing taxes on the rich, it is thought that 
they will invest more in business (rather than, as often happens, move their 
wealth overseas). Yet, as Polanyi (1944) stated, social protection is an essential 
component of a market economy, with markets functioning more effectively if 
a comprehensive social protection system is in place. In addition, as evidence 
from many developed countries indicates, higher levels of taxation and social 
spending are not an impediment to economic success. 
In contrast to the belief of neoliberals, investment in well-designed social 
protection can generate economic growth, such as by encouraging people 
to take more risks, enabling families to invest in their children (i.e., the future 
75 For an explanation of the arbitrariness in the proxy means test–targeting methodology, see Kidd and 
Wylde (2011) and Kidd and Hossain (2015). For examples of targeting errors in poor relief schemes in 
Asia, see Kidd et al. (2014); Fernandez and Velarde (2012); and World Bank (2012a).
76 See Kidd and Wylde (2011) and Kidd and Hossain (2015) for a further explanation of how the proxy 
means test functions as a rationing mechanism.
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workforce), and stimulating higher consumption and creating greater demand 
in the economy, thereby enabling entrepreneurs to sell their services and goods 
(Box 3.7). Much of this thinking is derived from basic Keynesian economics, 
which is opposed by neoliberals but has had a significant influence on the growth 
of comprehensive social protection systems in many developed countries.
Some countries in Asia are increasingly beginning to understand how social 
protection can generate economic growth, which has resulted in higher levels 
of investment and more comprehensive national systems. In particular, some 
countries have established social protection schemes as a means of stimulating 
growth in the economy. For example, Uzbekistan introduced a universal child 
benefit costing 4.0% of GDP in 1994 to stimulate demand, which resulted in 
its economy experiencing much less damage than other former Soviet Union 
states. It subsequently decided to means test the child benefit, although during 
the global financial crisis, it was temporarily expanded as part of a stimulus 
package (Kidd 2014b). Thailand’s expansion of its social pension to offer 
universal coverage was undertaken, in part, to generate greater consumption 
during the global recession (Suwanrada and Wesumperuma 2012). In addition, 
the PRC’s significant extension of its pension system in recent years was part 
of a broader stimulus package during the global financial crisis (ADB 2009). 
Khondker (unpublished) undertook simulations that indicate that investments 
in inclusive social transfers will have similar impacts on economic growth in 
Bangladesh and Viet Nam as the same level of investment in infrastructure.
Box 3.7: Social Protection and Reductions in Inequality  
as Drivers of Growth
Investment in social protection is a core policy for reducing high levels of inequality, and, it is increasingly understood that high inequality is not only 
problematic for poverty reduction but can impact negatively on economic 
growth (Cingano 2014, Ostry et al. 2014, Oxfam 2014). One benefit of lower 
levels of inequality is greater social cohesion, which benefits both elites and 
economic growth since more peaceful countries are likely to attract greater 
foreign investment. International evidence indicates that inequality is most 
effectively tackled by social protection schemes offering higher coverage and 
higher-value transfers (and, implicitly, higher levels of investment). For example, 
in Georgia, the universal old-age pension has reduced the national Gini coefficient 
by 8.3%, while the reduction from the Targeted Social Assistance poor relief 
program has been only 2.9% (World Bank 2009b). 
Source: Authors.
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In sum, the expansion of social protection schemes as components of 
stimulus packages is the result of politicians moving beyond narrow neoliberal 
thinking to encompass alternative economic theories. These social protection 
schemes are not targeted at the “poor” since the main aim is to stimulate 
growth, which is best achieved by broadening the number of beneficiaries. 
These increases in investment are not necessarily undertaken to generate 
short-term political gains through boosted popularity. 
Several countries in Asia have introduced inclusive life cycle schemes. As the 
name suggests, these schemes address key life cycle challenges and, while 
many life cycle schemes are targeted at the “poor,” a growing number offer 
high or universal coverage, incorporating the majority of the informal economy 
workforce and their families. An inclusive life cycle social protection system is 
typical of most countries with more developed social protection systems, with 
poor relief comprising only a residual component within national systems. 
In almost all countries with life cycle systems, old-age pensions tend to be 
prioritized initially, especially as societies begin to age. The population and 
policy makers are willing to accept that older people are “deserving,” and, 
in many countries, the elderly are valued. Pensions also fit with a broader 
understanding that people should be able to retire from the labor force as they 
age. In addition, of course, pensions are for everyone, as everyone hopes to 
grow old. Other popular life cycle schemes include disability benefits, survivors’ 
benefits, child benefits, and unemployment schemes.
The Growing Democracy and Inclusive Life Cycle Scheme
A key driver behind some inclusive life cycle schemes in Asia has been growing 
democracy.77 Politicians have proposed inclusive schemes as a means of 
generating popular support, including around elections. As happens in other 
regions, old-age pensions have been at the forefront of the growth of inclusive 
schemes, given the aging of populations across Asia. It is not coincidental that 
in Georgia, the country with the largest old-age pension scheme, older people 
comprise over 20.0% of the population and are present in more than half of 
households (World Bank 2009c, UNDESA 2015). Similarly, other countries that 
have recently decided to offer social pensions to the majority of the population 
also have high proportions of older people, such as the Republic of Korea, 
with 18.5% aged over 60 years, and Thailand with 15.8% (UNDESA 2015). In 
a democratic environment, the imperative for governments to respond to the 
needs of a growing older population will become increasingly important. Even 
in Bangladesh, a country with a relatively low elderly population at present 7.1% 
77 See Kidd (2015) for further discussion.
148 Social Protection for Informal Workers in Asia
aged over 60 years, (UNDESA 2015), once those aged over 50 years are taken 
into account, older people will comprise 32.0% of voters by 2030 and 46.0% by 
2050, a potentially powerful political constituency.78
Social pensions offering universal coverage have grown in a number of Asian 
countries, in response to the desire of politicians to build political support in 
more democratic environments. For example, Nepal’s universal coverage 
pension system and its accompanying Single Women’s Allowance began in the 
mid-1990s as small programs, with the pension directed only at people aged over 
75 years (Samson 2012). Yet, following the end of Nepal’s civil war, the schemes 
expanded significantly as political parties sought to position themselves with 
the electorate.79 Similarly, the decision of the Government of Thailand to 
provide universal pension coverage in 2009 was partly influenced by a populist 
approach, despite the government’s assertion that the “Old Age social pension 
is not a populist policy, but rather a basic human right that everyone deserves” 
(Suwanrada and Wesumperuma 2012, Brustad 2012).
Although child benefits are much less common than pensions in Asia, the history 
of the universal child benefit in Mongolia illustrates the influence of democracy 
and the desire to gain electoral rewards on the design and development of a life 
cycle social transfer scheme (Box 3.8). 
As predicted by the theory on the political economy of targeting, some universal 
schemes offer high benefits, helping both low- and middle-income families, 
including many in the informal economy. The value of Georgia’s pension is 
around 30.0% of GDP per capita, Nepal’s 24.0%, and the Maldives’ 21.0%, which 
are among the highest across developing countries (Kidd 2015). In comparison, 
the targeted schemes in India and Bangladesh offer only 2.0% and 5.0% of GDP 
per capita, respectively. In effect, these universal schemes have built alliances 
across the majority of the population, and governments are responding to 
demands from more powerful sectors of society, not just those living in extreme 
poverty (Box 3.9). A functioning democracy means that governments need 
to agree to a “political settlement” with the majority of the population. There 
are universal or high coverage pensions in Asia with low transfer values. Some, 
however, are in less-democratic regimes where governments do not need 
to respond to political pressures from the population in the same way as in 
democracies. So, the PRC’s pension offers only a transfer value of 1.0% of GDP 
per capita, Viet Nam’s 7.0%, and Brunei Darussalam’s 6.0%. 
78 Calculations based on UNDESA (2015).
79 Hujo and Cook (2012) noted how social pension reform in Nepal is linked to elections.
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Nonetheless, it is likely that, as democracy strengthens across the region and 
political parties increasingly realize how to use social protection policy to win 
favor with the majority (including the informal economy workforce), there will 
be a move toward more inclusive life cycle social protection schemes. This 
trend may be strengthened by some development partners advocating for more 
inclusive life cycle schemes. In Thailand, in early 2015, the government agreed to 
introduce a child benefit for 135,000 children aged 0–1 year, following intensive 
policy dialogue by the United Nations Children’s Fund. The United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) is also becoming increasingly influential. In 
Bangladesh, in collaboration with Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, it provided technical advice to the government for its National Social 
Security Strategy, which proposes a more inclusive life cycle social protection 
system for the country. In Viet Nam, UNDP is currently working closely with 
the Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs, providing evidence on the 
benefits of a life cycle social protection system and a significant increase in 
investment in social transfers. 
Box 3.8: Democratic Drivers behind Mongolia’s  
Universal Child Money Scheme
Mongolia’s Child Money Program was first proposed by the Motherland Democratic Coalition political party in its platform for the 2004 election, 
and was credited with contributing to its electoral success. Following the election, 
a coalition government was formed, and, by 2006, as a result of the significant 
fiscal space afforded by natural resource revenues, the government made the 
Child Money Program universal. This move was supported by the United Nations 
Children’s Fund. 
In 2010, Mongolia introduced a basic income grant—the Human Development 
Fund—offering each citizen a cash grant of $90.00 per year in 2010, which 
was increased to $190.00 in 2011. In January 2012, the government amended 
the Social Welfare Law to introduce targeted benefits and introduced annual 
payments of $900.00 for retirees and people with disabilities, and monthly 
payments of $50.00 for students. Yet, following the July 2012 elections, the new 
coalition government abolished the Human Development Fund and reintroduced 
a universal child benefit, which currently has annual expenditure of around 1.5% 
of gross domestic product. The expenditure in 2012 is an assumption, however, 
based on the program being implemented throughout the year. In reality, it was 
only implemented in 2012 for a few months, and the expenditure for 2013 is likely 
to have been in the range of 1.1% of gross domestic product (Fritz 2014).
Sources: V. Fritz. 2014. Dealing with a Resource Shock: Political Economy Analysis and Its Impacts 
in Mongolia. In V. Fritz, B. Levy, and R. Ort, eds. Problem-Driven Political Economy Analysis: The World 
Bank’s Experience. Washington, DC: World Bank; S. Kidd. 2015. The Political Economy of “Targeting” 
of Social Security Schemes. Pathways Perspectives. No. 19. October. Kent: Development Pathways.
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Box 3.9: The Financial Feasibility of Investing  
in Inclusive Life Cycle Schemes
The evidence from Asia and developing countries indicates that establishing an inclusive life cycle system of social protection, which goes beyond a social 
pension, is fiscally feasible. Given that Nepal can provide an old-age pension to 
the majority of its older population, a benefit for single women aged over 18 years, 
a small disability benefit, and the beginnings of a child benefit, more affluent 
countries should be able to do much more. In Viet Nam, for example, the United 
Nations Development Programme demonstrated that it would cost less than 0.8% 
of gross domestic product for the country to provide universal pension coverage 
for everyone aged over 65 years, a disability benefit for everyone under 65 years 
with a severe disability, and a child benefit for 70.0% of children aged 0–7 years 
(Kidd et al. 2015). The schemes would reach around 58.0% of the population, 
including a high proportion of those in the informal economy, and would reduce 
the national poverty rate by 13.4%.
Source: S. Kidd, T. Abu-el-Haj, B. Khondker, C. Watson, and S. Ramkissoon. 2015. Social Assistance in 
Viet Nam: A Review and Proposals for Reform. Kent, UK: Development Pathways.
In the Maldives, the World Bank was a key actor in the development of its 
universal social pension, indicating that individuals in the institution are 
able to diversify beyond a neoliberal paradigm. ADB has also highlighted the 
importance of social protection in a number of publications.80 In July 2015, 
both the World Bank and ILO signed an agreement to support universal social 
protection (ILO 2015).
Nonstate actors are also likely to have a growing role in promoting inclusive life 
cycle schemes. In Nepal, in 2011, Women for Human Rights Nepal successfully 
appealed to the Supreme Court for the age of eligibility for the Single Women’s 
Allowance to be reduced from 60 to 18 years (WUNRN 2011). In Thailand, the 
National Committee on Elderly was influential in the expansion of the pension 
to offer universal coverage (Hujo and Cook 2012). HelpAge International has 
also undertaken significant advocacy on universal pensions in Asia, including 
collaborating with ADB in the publication of a book on social protection for 
the elderly (Handayani and Babajanian 2012). Nonetheless, the degree of 
influence of nonstate actors is often difficult to attribute. For example, HelpAge 
International undertook advocacy on the social pension in Bangladesh to 
influence Bangladesh’s National Social Security Strategy, but it is difficult to 
80 See, for example, ADB (2006, 2013), and Handayani and Babajanian (2012).
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know whether HelpAge’s advocacy had an influence in the decision to expand 
the pension. 
Conclusion and Recommendations
The coverage of Asia’s workers in the informal economy by social protection 
schemes is limited. In most countries, few workers in the informal economy 
are covered; when schemes do reach some (usually those living in extreme 
poverty), their effectiveness is limited by low transfer values of their overall 
investment in social protection and the relative value of the transfers that they 
provide. 
Decisions on the shape of national social protection systems in countries are 
highly influenced by politics, ideologies, and beliefs. Much of the evolution 
of social protection across Asia can be explained by an adapted political 
settlement approach. In Asia, the dominance of a paradigm reflecting the 
values of the Washington Consensus has hindered the development of social 
protection, with policy making across the region influenced by a commitment 
to a minimal social spending and poverty targeting. As ADB (2014a) noted, 
Asia has focused on using fiscal policy to support economic growth rather than 
income distribution. Further, the weakness of democratic institutions in many 
countries has meant that electoral politics have not yet resulted in significant 
expansion of social protection, although there are signs that this is beginning 
to change. 
However, social protection in Asia is still in the early stages of its evolution. 
Developed countries took decades to establish comprehensive systems of 
social protection, and it could be argued that social protection in Asia is, in 
fact, progressing more rapidly. Nonetheless, it is evident that the only means 
of guaranteeing access to social protection for informal economy workers is 
through social transfers financed from general taxation. Social insurance and 
other forms of contributory social protection are not the solution, except for a 
small proportion of more affluent informal economy workers who may be in a 
position to contribute consistently to well-designed schemes.81 
If politicians and elites are to be convinced that investment in social protection 
should increase so that the majority of informal economy workers are covered, 
they need to understand that expansion is in their interest. Small schemes that 
target the “poor” bring few benefits to politicians and elites, as the “poor” are 
81 Even those countries introducing health insurance to improve access to health systems are dependent 
on general taxation to make health insurance more inclusive.
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politically weak and are much less influential in elections than those in the 
middle of the income spectrum and the affluent. Furthermore, the “poor” are 
much less likely to actively engage in political protests than the majority of the 
informal economy workforce, many of whom still experience high levels of 
income insecurity. Across middle-income countries in recent years, it has been 
those in the middle of the income spectrum who have been protesting in the 
streets. In a democracy, the citizens ultimately determine the shape of social 
protection systems, and they will respond to politicians who offer schemes to 
the majority—building alliances across economic classes—rather than only to 
those living in extreme poverty or the affluent.
To build political commitment for social protection, there needs to be a push 
back against the ideology that values minimal social spending and low taxation. 
Politicians and other politically influential groups, including powerful civil 
servants, need to be presented with the evidence that social protection is an 
essential component of a market economy, and that markets will function 
much more effectively if a comprehensive social protection system is in place. 
An important shift in thinking for policy makers is likely to happen once they 
recognize that social transfers can be entitlements rather than handouts. There 
are a number of national constitutions in Asia that already recognize the right 
to social security for all, such as Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Viet Nam, and the 
shift from a “hand-out” mentality to that of a rights perspective will be visible 
once countries move away from a commitment to poor relief and toward 
inclusive life cycle schemes. 
Ultimately, a significant expansion in effective social protection for the informal 
economy workforce in Asia will only happen as democracy strengthens and the 
majority of workers begin to vote for political parties that promise and deliver 
inclusive schemes. As has happened in developed countries, politicians will 
begin to realize that social protection should be a key area of debate in elections, 
and that progressive commitments can help them win power. Gradually, this 
should lead to growing investment in inclusive social transfer schemes, with 
higher coverage and higher-value transfers.
Development partners can play a key role in this evolution. They should ensure 
that their policy proposals are based on evidence, challenging the myths that 
have been used to promote small-scale, poverty-targeted schemes. They can 
invest in research that demonstrates the benefits of greater investment in social 
protection and can build evidence on the inclusive life cycle schemes in the 
region, such as universal pensions and the child benefit in Mongolia, challenging 
the current tendency to evaluate mainly poor relief schemes. In addition, they 
can ensure that policy makers and other influential stakeholders across Asia are 
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exposed to the evidence and question the neoliberal consensus that has held 
back the development of social protection in the region. 
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Table A3.4: Selected Child Benefits in Asia
Country Scheme Age of Eligibility
Selection 
Method
Value of 
Transfer  
(as % of GDP 
per capita) Coverage
Cost  
(as %  
of GDP)
Bangladesh Child Benefit 0–4 years Means-tested 5.0 100,000 0.0
Primary 
Education 
Stipend Project
Primary 
schoolchildren
Means-tested 1.0 8,430,000 0.1
Female 
Secondary 
Education 
Stipend Project
Girls at school in 
grades 6–10 plus 
some boys
Means-tested 2.0 3,800,000 0.1
Stipend for 
dropouts
School-age 
children
Means-tested 1.0 500,000 0.0
Georgia Targeted Social 
Assistance 
Program
0–17 Means-tested  2.0 260,000 0.1
Indonesia Bantuan 
Siswa Miskin 
(educational 
transfers for poor 
students)
Schoolchildren 
aged 5–18 years
Means-tested 1.0–3.0a 15,500,000 0.1
Program 
Kesejahteraan 
Sosial Anak 
(Child Benefit 
Program)
At-risk children Means-tested 4.0 … 0.0
Mongolia Child Money 
Program
All children up to 
18 years
Universal 4.0 967,900 1.5
Nepal Nepal Child 
Grantb 
0–4 years Dalits and 
means-testedc 
5.0 409,000d 0.0
Education 
stipendse
Female and 
Dalit school-age 
children
Universal 2.0 … …
Pakistan Waseela-e-
Taleem (Child 
Benefit Program) 
Schoolchildren 
aged 5–12 years
Means-tested 2.0 52,000 0.0
Uzbekistan Family allowance 2–14 years Mean-tested 13.0f 13% of 
families
0.6
Viet Nam School stipend 
program
Children at 
school and  
on poor list
Means-tested 1.0g 6,504,000 0.1
… = no data, GDP = gross domestic product.
Notes:
a  Target number of beneficiaries and benefit level based on 2009 data.
b  The child grant is provided to poor Dalit families, with the maximum number of beneficiaries set at two children 
per family, aside from the Karnali Zone (the poorest region in Nepal), where it is given to all families (Ministry of 
Local Development, Government of Nepal 2009).
c In the Karnali Zone, the program is universal.
d About 13.0% of children based on 85,642 children outside of the Karnali Zone.
e  Besides the scholarships for girls and Dalits, there is a much higher scholarship (Rs1,000.00 per year) for children 
of martyrs and a regional stipend for the Karnali Zone, with the same higher amount. There is another scholarship 
for children with disabilities, which is Rs500.00–Rs15,000.00 per year.
f   The value of the transfer reduces slightly for the second and third children (Kidd. 2014. An Overview of Uzbekistan’s 
National Social Protection System. Tashkent: United Nations Development Programme [UNDP]).
g  Paid for 9 months per year (World Bank. 2013. Vietnam Social Assistance System Strengthening Project: P123960. 
http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P123960?lang=en).
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Sources: S. Kidd, B. Khondker, N. Khan, and T. Ahsan. 2014. Building a Social Protection System to Address 
the Demographic Challenges Faced by Bangladesh. Background paper for the National Social Security 
Strategy. Dhaka: Government of Bangladesh; T. Baum, A. Mshvidobadze, and H. Tsuruoka. 2015. Reducing 
Child Poverty in Georgia: A Way Forward. New York: United Nations Children’s Fund; S. Kidd, R. Chirchir, S. Gul, 
and R. Shaikh. 2014. Proposals for Reform of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Secondary Girls Stipend Scheme. Islamabad: 
DFID; S. Kidd and E. Wylde. 2011. Social Protection Evidence Report: Nepal. Kent, UK: Development Pathways; 
G. Koehler. 2011. Social Protection and Socioeconomic Security in Nepal. Institute of Development Studies 
Working Paper Series. No. 370. Brighton, UK: IDS; A. Rabi, G. Koehler, T. Okubo, and T. Dhakal. 2015. Strategies 
and Options for Scaling Up and Enhancing the Child Grant Nationally in Nepal. UNICEF Nepal Working 
Paper Series. No. 2015 (002). Kathmandu: UNICEF Nepal; S. Kidd. 2014. An Overview of Uzbekistan’s National 
Social Protection System. Tashkent: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); World Bank. 2012. 
Bangladesh: Towards Accelerated, Inclusive and Sustainable Growth—Opportunities and Challenges, Volume 1: 
Overview. Washington, DC.
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CHAPTER 4
Governance of Social 
Protection for Informal  
Sector Workers in Asia
Babken Babajanian82
Abstract
This chapter addresses the extent to which governance of social protection in developing countries in Asia translates into effective and equitable support to informal sector workers. The methodology used is 
a desk review of a number of sources, including published program reports and 
papers.
The chapter identifies several weaknesses in the governance of social 
protection programs at a broader, system level as well as at the operational, 
program level. These weaknesses negatively affect efficiency, effectiveness, 
and equity of service delivery. At the system level, bottlenecks pertain to the 
extent of coordination and linkages across social protection programs as well 
as the depth of decentralization of governance functions. At the program 
level, governance challenges exist at all stages of the program cycle, including 
communications and outreach; targeting; benefit delivery; payment methods; 
monitoring, evaluation, and oversight; and grievance redress. These governance 
constraints are largely caused by inadequate design and implementation 
arrangements, along with weak institutional capacity. 
Promoting systemic integration necessitates setting coherent policy goals and 
coordinating programs in terms of their objectives, target groups, benefit levels, 
and administrative systems. Responsive, equitable service delivery requires 
careful delineation of institutional and financing arrangements among different 
levels of government. Governance risks at the program level can be prevented, 
82 The author gratefully acknowledges guidance and feedback from Sri Wening Handayani, Andrew 
Parker, and Warren Turner, Asian Development Bank. The author also appreciates the insights 
of Silvia Masiero, London School of Economics, on India’s information and communication 
technology–enabled monitoring of social protection programs.
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reduced, or mitigated through appropriate analysis, planning, design, and 
implementation of social protection programs. Good governance in social 
protection also requires a long-term effort to address broader institutional and 
political economy constraints at the national level.
Introduction
Governance in social protection is defined as “the set of incentives and 
accountability relationships that influence the way in which providers are held 
accountable for their behaviours and [their] ability to deliver services with 
quality and efficiency” (Bassett et al. 2012). Governance in a social protection 
context thus relates to two separate but related functions: (i) putting into place 
appropriate institutional arrangements (i.e., rules, regulations, and procedures 
for performing core service delivery functions), and (ii) implementation. Given 
the centrality of these two functions to the overall social protection effort, 
governance is critical for effective, accountable, and responsive service delivery.
This chapter examines governance of social protection for informal workers 
in Asia. To date, there has been relatively limited analysis of how governance 
affects service delivery outcomes under social protection schemes. Several 
World Bank–commissioned reports (Bassett et al. 2012, Gianozzi and Kahn 
2011, Rubio 2011, van Stolk 2010) have explicitly explored governance in 
social assistance, initiating a discussion on governance of social protection as 
a distinct policy and operational domain and offering concepts and frameworks 
that can be used as a starting point for further research and analysis.
This chapter is not meant to be comprehensive, given the variety of programs, 
modalities, and governance arrangements in the region. Existing studies on 
governance of social protection acknowledge this challenge (e.g., Bassett 
et  al. 2012). This chapter uses case studies and examples that identify both 
the challenges and opportunities facing improvement of social protection 
programs in developing countries in Asia. It examines governance at a broader 
system level as well as at an operational program level.
Background 
In the last decade, many countries and areas in the region have intensified 
efforts to strengthen social protection for supporting the poor and vulnerable, 
the majority of whom are employed in the informal economy. Informal sector 
workers make up as much as 80.0% of the labor market in some countries in 
the region (UNESCAP 2014a). The share of people working in the informal 
economy varies from 22.0% in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), to over 
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60.0% in India and Indonesia, and over 70.0% in Pakistan and the Philippines 
(UNESCAP 2014b).
The informal economy comprises economic activities outside of the official 
regulatory framework that governs the establishment and functioning of 
enterprises as well as labor, fiscal, and environmental matters (Canagarajah 
and Sethuraman 2001). The term “informal economy” used in this chapter 
is therefore relatively broad. Its coverage extends from agriculture workers—
both in the for-profit and subsistence subsectors—to unpaid workers in the 
home-care economy, most of these being women engaged in productive work. 
The region has undergone an impressive expansion of programs that protect 
the poor and vulnerable over the past decade. However, it is social assistance—
as opposed to social insurance—that has become the region’s major vehicle 
for supporting poor and vulnerable informal sector workers. This chapter is 
therefore mainly concerned with social assistance, i.e., cash and food transfers, 
and public works programs. 
As for social insurance, there are ongoing efforts to extend its coverage. To date, 
however, social insurance programs do not protect informal workers against the 
negative economic impacts of sickness, unemployment, disability, and old age 
(Canagarajah and Sethuraman 2001, ILO 2013, Lund 2009). It is unsurprising 
that little evidence relating to the governance challenges facing social insurance 
schemes for workers in the informal economy is available.
Methodology
The chapter is based on a desk review and draws on a wide range of sources, 
including published program reports (e.g., program assessments, analytical 
reports, and policy briefs) and papers (e.g., working papers and academic 
articles). 
Reviewing existing literature relating to governance of social protection is 
challenging. Other than a few studies, governance of social protection does not 
comprise a research topic of its own. One reason for this is that “governance” 
is a broad term that encompasses institutional arrangements and practices 
at the system, sector, and program levels. Analyzing the available evidence 
relating to the governance of social protection thus requires disaggregating 
this information into its various components such as targeting, benefit delivery, 
monitoring, and grievance redress. These aspects of governance tend to appear 
as components of more general studies of social protection programs. The 
chapter thus reviews a broad range of reports and papers that focus on different 
aspects of social protection as a means of identifying analyses, data, and other 
information relevant to the topic.
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The studies that are available often focus on the operational aspects of social 
protection programs, and contain limited analysis of the contextual social, 
institutional, and political conditions that impact social protection outcomes. 
Where possible, the chapter addresses the context in which social protection 
programs are implemented.
Social Protection for Informal Workers
Workers in the informal economy experience high levels of income insecurity 
and are more vulnerable to various economic and social risks than those in the 
formal economy. The risks that they face include health risks; deterioration in 
the value of, or loss of, productive assets; a wage less than the legal minimum; 
income fluctuations due to market-related risks; and income insecurity in old 
age (Canagarajah and Sethuraman 2001). 
In addition, certain geographic regions or areas may be more prone to economic 
or political shocks, both of which compound the income insecurity of informal 
sector workers. Moreover, a number of gender-related risks impact women 
employed in the informal sector to a greater degree than men. Examples include 
levels of remuneration less than those of men for identical types of work, lack 
of support for enterprises headed by women, and invisibility of female workers 
generally (Lund and Srinivas 2000).
The informal economy comprises income-earning activities that lie outside 
of legally regulated enterprises and employment relations. This includes 
self-employment in informal enterprises (i.e., those that are small and/or 
unregistered) and wage employment in informal jobs. Informal workers do not 
have secure contracts, worker benefits, social protection, and representation. 
They are more vulnerable to various economic and social risks than those in the 
formal economy (ILO 2002).
This chapter considers the informal economy in relation to social protection, 
rather than labor market participation and outcomes. Therefore, it 
conceptualizes the informal economy broadly to include both reproductive 
and agriculture activities, where individuals generally are more vulnerable 
than those in the formal sector and do not have work-related social protection 
entitlements.
Social protection in Asia has undergone remarkable growth over the past decade. 
Many of the region’s low- and middle-income countries have strengthened 
existing programs, and developed new programs for supporting the poor and 
vulnerable. Despite significant progress, social protection programs do not 
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provide adequate support and protection to workers in the informal economy. 
The existing social insurance schemes in the region do not cover the majority 
of informal workers, while social assistance programs tend to provide partial 
coverage and benefits of limited value. This is largely conditioned by policy 
design and fiscal constraints. Furthermore, as discussed in this chapter, the 
effectiveness of the region’s social protection programs is also constrained by 
inadequate governance. 
Social Insurance
Existing social insurance schemes in developing Asia mainly support workers 
in the formal sector. As a result, most informal sector workers have minimal 
protection against income insecurity associated with illness, disability, 
unemployment, and old age. For example, only 47.0% of the population above 
statutory pensionable age is covered by old-age pensions, and only 34.0% of the 
labor force provides contributions toward pensions in Asia and the Pacific (ILO 
2014). When the PRC is excluded from these calculations, the corresponding 
figures drop to 32.0% and 25.0%, respectively. Similarly, although 58.0% of the 
region’s population is covered by some form of health insurance, this statistic 
drops to 37.0% when the PRC is excluded, since 95.0% of the PRC population 
enjoys some form of health insurance (ILO 2014).
The key challenge to expanding social insurance to informal workers in the region 
and beyond is the difficulty of raising social insurance payments. An effective 
social protection system requires broad-based, sustained participation, which, 
in turn, requires workers who can contribute part of their earnings toward 
social insurance schemes in a sustained manner (Yeates 2009). In the case of 
informal sector workers, earnings are either too low or too unstable to allow 
them to make contributions to social insurance schemes (ILO 2013). 
Even if informal sector workers can afford to pay social insurance premiums, 
they are reluctant to do so for a number of reasons, including lack of trust in 
social protection institutions, a perceived mismatch between the types of 
benefits offered and their priority needs, and time-intensive or cumbersome 
application procedures. Finally, entitlement to benefits may require a long 
period of contribution, which discourages many informal workers who often 
have insecure and unstable jobs (ILO 2013).
Inadequate administrative and financial capacity presents yet another 
challenge to expanding social insurance systems beyond the formal sector. 
Limited institutional capacity coupled with high administrative and transaction 
costs prevent pension systems from reaching out to workers in rural areas and 
in the informal economy (Park and Estrada 2012).
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Over the last decade, several countries in Asia have used a range of approaches 
to expand social insurance coverage to informal workers. Some countries in the 
region have established innovative tax-funded old-age and health insurance 
programs. Through its tax-financed Universal Coverage Scheme, Thailand 
has achieved nearly universal health coverage for its population. Further, 
poverty-targeted, tax-financed health insurance schemes exist in India and 
Indonesia (e.g., the Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana [RSBY] national health 
insurance program for below-poverty line cardholders and Jaminan Kesehatan 
Masyarakat health insurance for the poor and near-poor). In the PRC, Medical 
Financial Assistance for urban and rural residents supports health-related 
expenses of poor individuals by subsidizing their insurance contributions or 
providing direct cash assistance.
Some countries established new national voluntary schemes. In 2009, India 
expanded its National Pension Scheme to informal sector workers (Meissner 
2014). The scheme is based on voluntary defined contributions and uses 
a group-based approach. It tops up individual contributions to encourage 
informal sector workers to save for their retirement and to lower the cost of 
operations. Mongolia has recently extended its compulsory social insurance 
scheme to herders, the self-employed, and informal workers on a voluntary 
basis. The 2006 Law on Social Insurance in Viet Nam expanded the coverage 
of the pension system to farmers and the self-employed on a voluntary basis 
(MacKellar 2009). The coverage of the scheme, however, is very low: only 
around 140,000 people contributed, equivalent to 0.3% of the total workforce 
(Meissner 2014). 
There are also various microinsurance models, including health, life, disability, 
agriculture, and livestock insurance. Most microinsurance programs are 
initiated and managed by trade unions, local cooperatives, nongovernment 
organizations (NGOs), and community-based groups. Microinsurance has 
especially proliferated in India; for example, the Self Employed Women’s 
Association (SEWA), registered in Ahmadabad, Gujarat in 1972, provides 
an umbrella for vulnerable self-employed women engaged in home-based 
work and various types of casual work. Its insurance packages cover sickness, 
personal accidents, widowhood, loss of assets, and accidental death. 
Social Assistance
Social assistance is the primary means of supporting informal sector workers 
in Asia. It includes a variety of conditional and unconditional cash transfers, 
in-kind transfers, public works programs, and asset transfer schemes. 
Many programs focus on poverty relief, providing basic subsistence support to 
chronically poor through targeted cash transfers. Eligibility in these programs 
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is determined by income. There are also cash transfer programs that provide 
assistance to address life cycle-related vulnerabilities, such as Nepal’s Child 
Grant, Cambodia’s social welfare for families living with HIV/AIDS, and Viet 
Nam’s social assistance for vulnerable children and ethnic minorities. The 
difficulty in instituting contributory social insurance has prompted governments 
in Bangladesh, India, Nepal, the Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam to develop 
tax-financed, noncontributory old-age pensions (or social pensions).
Social assistance in the region does not provide comprehensive support to 
individuals throughout their life cycles. While there are some universal schemes, 
most social assistance programs are designed to provide partial coverage of the 
poor and vulnerable. Many programs do not have a national coverage and are 
not available to groups residing in areas outside of their operation. 
The region’s poverty-targeted programs support only a limited share of the 
population that falls within their target groups. For example, Pakistan’s flagship 
Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP), covers 4.8 million families 
or approximately 40.0% of Pakistan’s poor (World Bank 2015). Similarly, 
Indonesia’s Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH), the Program of Family Hope, 
conditional cash transfer scheme supports 2.8 million people (Bankable Frontier 
Associates 2015), and Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps) conditional 
cash transfer program supports 4.4 million of the poor in the Philippines.83 Many 
poor and vulnerable individuals remain outside the coverage of these programs.
The limited coverage of social assistance programs in the region is often due 
to financing constraints. For example, increasing the coverage of Indonesia’s 
PKH from 1.5 million to 3.0 million households would require an estimated 
increase in the number of program facilitators from 6,700 to 12,500 (Nazara 
and Rahayu 2013).
Social assistance programs often have a bias toward urban or rural areas. India 
retains a strong rural bias, despite the growing urbanization and increasing share 
of the urban poor (World Bank 2011a). Until recently, the existing schemes in 
the PRC disproportionately favored urban areas in terms of coverage and benefit 
levels (World Bank 2009).84 Finally, due to budget constraints, programs in the 
region provide only limited benefits, which are not adequate to lift beneficiaries 
out of poverty.
83 Government of the Philippines. Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program. http://www.gov.ph/programs/
conditional-cash-transfer/
84 Interim measures on social assistance in 2014 established a basis for unifying the PRC’s urban and rural 
social assistance programs.
Governance of Social Protection for Informal Sector Workers in Asia 179
The effectiveness of social protection, including both social insurance and 
social assistance, often depends on governance at both the system and program 
levels. As this chapter demonstrates, existing institutional arrangements and 
implementation practices affect targeting effectiveness, accountability, and 
responsiveness of service delivery.
Linkages within Social Protection Systems  
and Intragovernment Arrangements
Coordination of Social Protection Programs 
Effective governance requires the development of coordinated systems of 
social protection (Robalino, Rawlings, Walker 2012; World Bank 2012d). 
Fragmentation across programs is a major challenge facing most low- and 
middle-income countries globally. It results in administrative inefficiency, 
as many programs have similar objectives and overlapping target groups. 
Fragmentation also contributes to a coverage gap when uncoordinated 
programs focus on distinct regions and particular groups without 
complementing each other, and leave other disadvantaged groups without 
support (World  Bank 2012d). Finally, fragmentation of basic management, 
information, and administrative tools undermines implementation 
effectiveness of social protection programs. Coordination can be promoted at 
a policy, program, and administration level.
The reality is that governance of social protection in developing Asia is 
fragmented. Existing programs tend to be administered by different agencies, 
including agencies at various levels of government, as well as nonstate actors 
such as NGOs and international development partners. They often have 
different objectives and capacities, and use different institutional arrangements, 
including targeting criteria and procedures, benefit delivery methods, data 
management, outreach and communication, monitoring and evaluation, and 
grievance redress.
For example, there are more than 90 food- and cash-based social assistance 
programs in Bangladesh (Ahmed et al. 2013). Of these, at least 30 are directly 
operated by the government. The 90 programs are administered by multiple 
agencies, including various government ministries, NGOs, international aid 
agencies, and bilateral donors, and coordination among these actors is ineffective 
(Ahmed 2007). In particular, Bangladesh has at least 13 ministries engaged in 
delivering social protection services, and all of them administer their programs 
independently, without much coordination between them (Ahmed 2007). The 
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lack of coordination and linkages constrains the development of a coherent 
approach to the implementation of these programs (Sharif 2009). 
Social protection programs in Pakistan are similarly fragmented and 
uncoordinated in terms of their objectives, target groups, and administrative 
procedures (Malik and Pop 2013). Pakistan’s programs are operated by various 
ministries and departments at both the federal and provincial levels, resulting 
in inconsistent administrative practices, which often lack objective and 
transparent beneficiary targeting, and unreliable and unpredictable benefit 
delivery (Malik and Pop 2013).
The actual measures and avenues for promoting coordination depend on initial 
conditions and country-specific institutional shortcomings. In Pakistan, for 
example, there is a need to harmonize social protection policies and programs 
to ensure complementarity and to clarify the roles and responsibilities of 
federal and provincial governments (Malik and Pop 2013). Greater consistency 
can be promoted by setting minimum standards for program administration 
for all social protection programs in the country. These include procedures 
for beneficiary identification and selection, data management, and grievance 
redress (Malik and Pop 2013). In the PRC, the level of integration is relatively 
advanced, but there is a need to deepen the ongoing efforts to address the 
duality in urban–rural provision (ADB unpublished).
Integrating Data and Information Management
This section discusses coordination at administration level, which involves 
building basic management, information, and administrative tools and 
integrating data and information management. Establishment of a single 
registry and associated management information system (MIS) can enhance 
coordination of social protection programs and result in operational benefits. 
It can unify and improve program oversight and monitoring, facilitate planning 
across programs, consolidate beneficiary targeting, minimize inclusion and 
exclusion errors, and enhance access of beneficiaries to programs and services 
in other sectors (Barca and Chirchir 2014).
There are ongoing initiatives in several countries to integrate data and 
information management. Cambodia’s Ministry of Planning has established 
a national registry that uses a standardized targeting system called IDPoor. 
Government institutions, NGOs, and international aid agencies use this system, 
which is integral to the government’s National Social Protection Strategy, 
2011–2015. Linking IDPoor with a computerized MIS will ultimately facilitate 
use by, and coordination among, Cambodia’s social protection programs.
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Indonesia’s Basis Data Terpadu (Unified Database) national registry unifies 
information used for beneficiary targeting across the country’s largest social 
assistance programs (Barca and Chirchir 2014). The National Team for 
Accelerating Poverty Reduction or Tim Nasional Percepatan Penanggulangan 
Kemiskinan (TNP2K) manages the database, which is used for determining 
eligibility for five national social protection programs: (i) the national health 
insurance program; (ii) scholarships for poor families; (iii) the Program of Family 
Hope, a conditional cash transfer program; (iv) Rice for Poor Households; and 
(v) a temporary unconditional cash transfer program (Barca and Chirchir 2014).
In 2011, Central Bureau of Statistics Indonesia conducted a large-scale survey 
that assessed household income, updating the list of poor households (World 
Bank 2012e). The resulting unified database contains data for 24 million 
households (96 million individuals) in more than 77,000 villages (Barca 
and Chirchir 2014). This system allows web access to data that includes 16 
indicators. Presently, data are received by e-mail or hand-delivered computer 
disks, and then entered manually into the database.
In the Philippines, the government has developed a sophisticated national 
database under its flagship 4Ps. The National Household Targeting System for 
Poverty Reduction uses proxy means targeting, which replaced the ineffective 
targeting mechanisms in place before 2007 (Fernandez 2012). The associated 
database is a cornerstone of the government’s convergence strategy, the aim of 
which is to link all social protection programs (Fernandez 2012). Government 
regulations stipulate that all conditional cash transfer beneficiaries be enrolled 
in the subsidized health insurance program of the Philippine Health Insurance 
Corporation (PhilHealth) (Chaudhury, Friedman, and Onishi 2013). Some 
local governments and NGOs have expressed willingness to use this national 
database for targeting local programs.
There are some other promising initiatives in the region. For instance, the 
government in Pakistan has developed a national targeting system using a 
proxy means test (poverty scorecard) under its flagship BISP. The BISP national 
database includes 27 million households (Malik and Pop 2013). Using the 
database may enable various provinces to undertake new programs or to adjust 
existing programs to respond to local needs and priorities. It can also help 
reduce duplication and overlap of interventions (World Bank 2013).
Intragovernment Arrangements
Decentralization can improve responsiveness in the provision of social 
protection and social services (UNDP and UNCDF 2011). In particular, the 
proximity of local agents to the population groups that they serve can help 
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identify needs and preferences effectively and provide contextually appropriate 
services.
In India, a criticism of centrally administered social protection programs is that 
they have a “one-size-fits-all” approach that allows little scope for flexibility 
and services tailored to local conditions (World Bank 2011a). In recent years, 
state governments have been allowed increased flexibility in adapting social 
protection program administration to local context. However, India’s social 
protection policy mix is largely determined in a top-down fashion, with little 
scope for adapting programs to local needs. This poses particular problems for 
poorer states in that they have limited resources for financing and implementing 
their own programs. Due to India’s sheer size and diversity, giving states greater 
autonomy in the use of centrally allocated social protection funds would enable 
them to better respond to local conditions (World Bank 2011a).
At the same time, a high degree of decentralization contributes to policy 
fragmentation, as well as interregional variations in levels of social assistance 
benefits, often resulting in inadequate benefit levels in poorer regions (UNDP 
and UNCDF 2011). This problem presents a challenge for central government 
policy makers, who have the mandate to ensure equitable development and 
access to services across regions and population groups.
The social assistance programs in the PRC are highly decentralized, including 
the means-tested Minimum Living Standard Guarantee (MLSG) Scheme. This 
allows local governments significant autonomy in decision making with regard 
to regulation, financing, and implementation (ADB unpublished). District and 
county-level city governments are responsible for regulating the eligibility 
thresholds, which determine who is to be covered as well as the level of support 
provided.
The MLSG eligibility thresholds are often set by the local governments to 
reflect their fiscal capacity rather than the difference in the cost of living. As 
a response to fiscal difficulties, richer regions, with more resources and fewer 
poor residents, tend to set higher lines; poorer regions set lower ones, despite 
their greater need (Ravallion 2009, World Bank 2009). The significant degree 
of local discretion in setting MLSG thresholds thus restricts eligibility and the 
adequacy of benefits to meet people’s basic needs in poorer areas. It also 
undermines horizontal equity, resulting in a variation in the extent to which 
individuals with similar standards of living are treated across locations. 
The challenge is to design and establish institutional roles of different levels of 
government to balance responsiveness in service provision with the objectives 
of inclusion and equity. There are three main governance functions that need 
to be adequately addressed in developing intragovernment systems to ensure 
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quality and equity of service delivery: (i) setting policies, standards, and rules; 
(ii) implementation; and (iii) financing (UNDP and UNCDF 2011). 
Under centralized systems, the national government defines broad policy 
and identifies the main service delivery rules and procedures. In particular, 
the central government determines eligibility criteria, size of benefits, and 
implementation rules such as procedures for determining eligibility in targeted 
programs. Conversely, a high level of decentralization, such as in the PRC, 
implies that local governments are responsible for most aspects of program 
governance.
The involvement of the central government in regulating key rules 
and procedures, while allowing local adjustments to reflect contextual 
circumstances, can help balance policy priorities. In particular, in countries 
with moderate decentralization, central governments have an important role 
in regulating program rules, but they also allow significant local autonomy. 
They set requirements governing eligibility and benefit calculations, limiting 
excessive local discretion. Local governments in these countries still play 
key roles in determining eligibility and setting benefit levels, although the 
extent of local discretion is controlled, helping ensure greater inclusion and 
interregional equity.
Program Implementation
Communication and Outreach 
The issue of communication is at the heart of social protection governance and 
permeates all stages of the program cycle, including application, beneficiary 
selection, benefit delivery, monitoring, and grievance redress. It is crucial that 
people be aware of their entitlements and procedures for claiming them. 
During beneficiary selection, access to information is key to ensure that people 
understand selection criteria and accept the decisions made by program 
administrators and community leaders. At the stage of benefit delivery, 
beneficiaries must know the amount of benefits and their entitlements. 
Finally, beneficiaries must be aware of the avenues for involvement in program 
monitoring as well as procedures for grievance redress.
Empirical evidence from numerous countries in the region demonstrates that 
inadequate communication and outreach negatively impact all phases of 
the program cycle. A major constraint to effective outreach and information 
dissemination in the region is institutional capacity. For example, staff 
limitations often prevent local governments from disseminating information 
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regarding social protection programs across large geographic areas (UNDP 
and UNCDF 2013). Further, local government officials, as well as members 
of NGOs involved in program delivery, often lack the knowledge required 
for implementing effective information awareness campaigns (UNDP and 
UNCDF 2013). 
Generally speaking, access to information by women in the region is often 
far more restricted than it is for men. As a result, many social protection 
entitlements—cash transfers in particular—specifically target women to 
ensure that women receive much-needed support. Yet, women have less time 
due to domestic work and care responsibilities to engage in the public arena 
and thus to receive information about social protection programs. In some 
contexts, limited opportunities for public engagement are due to restrictive 
cultural norms. Limited awareness may result in exclusion from services due 
to non-take up or improper paperwork. It may also make it difficult to apply 
and comply with all the program requirements, such as conditionalities of cash 
transfer programs.
This section discusses empirical evidence from Viet Nam and India. In both 
of these countries, communication and outreach greatly impact the degree to 
which socially excluded groups are able to access program benefits. In particular, 
these individuals are often constrained in their ability to take advantage of 
entitlements under existing programs because of various barriers, such as 
geographic isolation, language, disabilities, prejudice, and social discrimination.
In Viet Nam, information regarding social assistance programs is normally 
communicated through bulletins issued by the relevant commune people’s 
committee, verbal communication by commune officers at village and 
neighborhood meetings, and through representatives of mass organizations 
(Gianozzi et al. 2010). The provincial department of labor, invalids, and social 
affairs usually conducts training sessions for the staff of the district division of 
labor, invalids and social affairs, as well as for ward social officers.
In some cases, existing communication and outreach efforts may be insufficient 
to reach residents living in remote areas or vulnerable groups (Gianozzi et al. 
2010). Language and literacy barriers—particularly for minority groups who 
neither speak nor read Vietnamese—further mitigate against access to program 
benefits. Similarly, migrants, as well as women who lack the time to participate 
in neighborhood meetings or who are not members of mass organizations, may 
also be disadvantaged in this regard.
Similarly, the literature identifies a number of barriers to accessing health 
care by socially excluded scheduled castes in India (Sabharwal et al. 2014). 
In addition to affordability, such barriers include discriminatory attitudes on 
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the part of health care providers and remoteness of health care facilities from 
the areas in which potential beneficiaries live. Access to information likewise 
appears to be a major factor in restricting access to health care services. For 
example, a review of the Janani Suraksha Yojana (Maternal Safety Program) 
scheme in seven states found that women belonging to scheduled castes were 
not informed, or were otherwise unaware of, auxiliary midwife timings or village 
and health nutrition meetings (Sabharwal et al. 2014).
Low levels of awareness among persons with disabilities is yet another factor 
that limits access to benefits under social protection programs in India, such as 
social pensions and the unemployment allowance for persons with disabilities 
(O’Keefe 2009).85 A World Bank survey suggested that more than 60.0% of 
persons with disabilities in rural Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu states did not 
even know that these programs existed. As a result, only 9.0% of such persons 
benefited from them.86 The level of awareness of the rights of persons with 
disabilities to participate in public works programs has also been found to be 
quite low, even though the 1995 Persons with Disabilities Act requires state 
governments to reserve not less than 3.0% of their resources under poverty 
alleviation programs, including public works, for persons with disabilities. 
Nevertheless, more than 90.0% of households included in the survey were 
unaware of this reservation under public works programs.
Targeting the Poor
Social protection programs in the region use different methods for identifying 
and selecting program beneficiaries, including categorical targeting based on 
geographic location and/or socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, 
means testing, proxy means testing, community-based targeting, and 
self-targeting. As mentioned, many programs are income or means-tested; 
that is, they distribute benefits to people whose income falls below a minimum 
threshold. A major challenge associated with means testing in countries with 
sizable informal economies is how to accurately measure and verify people’s 
income in the selection of program beneficiaries. 
Targeting effectiveness largely depends on a program’s governance, that is, 
the design and implementation arrangements and practices. The review of 
85 Most states in India have disability social pension programs and unemployment allowance programs 
for persons with disabilities registered with employment exchanges for more than 2 years, who have 
not found employment. Unemployment allowance benefit levels in 2004 varied from Rs50.00 ($1.03) 
in Meghalaya to Rs500.00 ($10.33) in Sikkim. The corresponding figures for disability social pension 
benefits were Rs60.00 ($1.24) in Chandigarh and Rs500.00 ($10.33) in West Bengal and Goa (O’Keefe 
2009).
86 The study surveyed slightly more than 1,400 households that both included and lacked members with 
disabilities.
186 Social Protection for Informal Workers in Asia
evidence suggests that poor governance of social protection programs has 
contributed to targeting errors. Some of the key governance bottlenecks in 
the region include inadequate outreach and communication, lack of clear 
and transparent eligibility criteria, low awareness of eligibility criteria among 
implementers and inadequate knowledge about weighing different criteria, 
inconsistent application of scoring criteria, inadequate income verification, 
limited community participation in the verification of beneficiary lists, weak 
monitoring and oversight, and ineffective grievance redress.
The well-documented case of Indonesia’s temporary Bantuan Langsung Tunai 
(direct unconditional cash transfer program) illustrates how weaknesses in 
program implementing arrangements result in significant social exclusion and 
poor program performance (SMERU 2006; World Bank 2012a, 22–27; Hossain 
et al. 2012). The program used a variant of proxy means testing to select 
households with monthly expenditures of less than Rp175,000.00 ($16.80).87 
Evidence suggests that the program was poorly targeted and that households 
who were neither poor nor near-poor received 30.0%–40.0% of all program 
benefits (World Bank 2012a). This outcome led to community-wide tension, 
envy, allegations of corruption, and protests (Hossain et al. 2012). 
Lack of transparency and clarity regarding eligibility criteria contributed to a high 
degree of community dissatisfaction with the program (Hossain et al. 2012). 
Moreover, information was provided to beneficiaries in a nonsystematic or 
inconsistent manner (World Bank 2012a). The entire beneficiary identification 
process was largely top-down in nature, and verification of beneficiary lists did 
not rely on participation by local residents (Hossain et al. 2012). Beneficiary 
lists thus failed to take into account the knowledge of local residents regarding 
who was poor, which further contributed to the mistrust and frustration of local 
residents.
As a result of weak program monitoring and evaluation procedures, and 
ineffective grievance mechanisms, few opportunities existed for rectifying 
targeting errors under the program (World Bank 2012a). In particular, the 
program’s poor grievance redress system contributed to many beneficiaries 
either not knowing how to complain about the existing procedures, or to 
a perception that complaints would not result in any positive outcome 
(World Bank 2012a). In fact, there was a perception on the part of program 
administrators and supervisors that complaints did not necessarily require 
appropriate responses.
87 Exchange rates are derived from Asian Development Bank. 2010. Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 
2010. Manila.
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While Bangladesh’s social safety net programs provide important support to 
the poor, targeting errors prevent these programs from reaching a substantial 
number of the poor or marginally poor (Barkat et al. 2013, Ahmed 2007, Sharif 
2009). A World Bank review of the Vulnerable Group Development program 
and the Primary Education Stipend Program suggested that 27.0% and 47.0% 
of beneficiaries from each program, respectively, were not poor at all (World 
Bank 2006). The 2005 Household Income and Expenditure Survey confirmed 
that one-fifth of all beneficiaries belonged to Bangladesh’s two highest income 
quintiles (Ahmed et al. 2013). Inclusion of ineligible households meant 
displacement of eligible poor households.
Ineffective governance arrangements, including rules and procedures for 
beneficiary selection and monitoring systems, contribute to targeting errors 
in Bangladesh. Limited administrative capacity makes it difficult to accurately 
verify whether individuals meet the selection criteria. The respondents of a 
qualitative study complained about the existing selection criteria, which they 
perceived to be cumbersome and difficult to implement (Barkat et al. 2013). 
Local government officials receive little guidance and support on how to 
effectively conduct beneficiary identification and selection. For example, the 
government manual for implementing the Old Age Allowance outlines several 
priority criteria but fails to explain how these criteria are to be applied (Begum 
and Wesumperuma 2012). Further, the Union Parishad chair or members are 
often unaware of existing criteria, and rarely read the government manual.88 
Finally, as discussed, the monitoring systems employed are weak and do not 
effectively identify or address targeting shortcomings (World Bank 2006, 
Ahmed 2007).
Available evidence further suggests that effective governance arrangements 
positively impact service delivery outcomes. For example, elite capture and 
corruption were not problematic features of Pakistan’s National Rural Support 
Programme. This outcome in large measure resulted from procedures for 
monitoring beneficiary identification incorporated into program design (Yusuf 
2010). Similarly, under Nepal’s Food for Work program, appropriate program 
design mitigated elite capture and misappropriation of program benefits. The 
program conducted regular audits and displayed information in public areas; it 
exposed cases of misappropriation at public meetings and required the persons 
culpable to reimburse funds equal to the shortfall in benefits (Yusuf 2010).
88 Union Parishad (union councils) are Bangladesh’s lowest-level governmental units. These bodies 
comprise 1 chair and 12 members elected by local residents. Each union comprises nine wards.
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Benefit Delivery
To adhere to good governance standards, cash or in-kind transfers must 
be predictable, that is, must be provided on a timely and regular basis. 
Accountability requires that beneficiaries receive their entitlements in full, 
and that leakage or misappropriation of cash or in-kind resources do not 
take place.
Examples from food transfers in Bangladesh illustrates how poor governance 
contributes to leakage and mismanagement in the absence of effective 
mechanisms and capacity to control and adequately finance benefit delivery.
Evidence from Bangladesh suggests the capture of food transfers is possible 
due to lack of transparent procedures for their distribution and inadequate 
monitoring (World Bank 2006). Leakages in food transfer programs such as the 
Vulnerable Group Development and other similar programs were estimated to 
range from 10.0% to 50.0% (World Bank 2006). A number of intermediaries are 
involved at various stages of the food distribution process in Bangladesh, under 
which loading and unloading of food is frequent. Institutional arrangements 
under these programs have to offer sufficient incentives for service providers 
to achieve the level of services envisioned. Moreover, no sanctions were levied 
against service providers who failed to deliver food (World Bank 2006). As 
discussed in this chapter, most implementing ministries in Bangladesh lack 
sufficient capacity for monitoring programs or controlling the behavior of food 
supply chain intermediaries.
Payment Methods
High-quality service delivery requires service providers to be responsive. That 
is, they must be able to identify public needs and preferences, and adjust 
service delivery to make it consistent with people’s needs. In this regard, 
responsiveness refers not only to the type, mix, and quantity of services, but also 
to delivering services in a manner that is convenient, cost-free, and respectful 
of beneficiaries.
Benefit payments may be delivered through banks, local government 
offices, electronic transfers, or directly through home delivery. The choice of 
benefit payment methods can have significant implications for beneficiaries’ 
experience. In fact, alternative benefit delivery mechanisms vary widely in terms 
of the monetary, physical, or time-cost that they impose on beneficiaries. This 
variation in cost is best illustrated by the benefit delivery arrangements used by 
social pension programs in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Thailand.
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A study conducted in Nepal’s Rolpa District identified two methods by 
which the Old Age Allowance was delivered to beneficiaries. In two village 
development committees studied, residents collected their pensions either 
from a bank or a village development committee office (KC et al. 2014). 
Distributing benefits in this manner compelled many beneficiaries to travel 
long distances, which often entailed long wait times for vehicles to transport 
them to their designated collection points. In the case of residents living in 
remote wards, this required significant expenditure on transport, and in some 
cases, food. Both the requisite travel time and the physical ability required 
for enduring the journey to the collection point was difficult for older people, 
often frail beneficiaries who did not have relatives to collect benefits on 
their behalf. The respondent beneficiaries, therefore, preferred to have their 
benefits delivered directly to their homes.
In Bangladesh, the Old-Age Allowance is distributed through the banking 
system, a method clearly favored by beneficiaries (Begum and Wesumperuma 
2012). While this delivery method reduces the corruption and leakage likely 
to occur when payments are collected at physical delivery points, the banks 
that distribute the benefits lacked the capacity to service large numbers of 
beneficiaries. The result was long queues, which in turn imposed significant 
physical costs on beneficiaries. For example, the number of seating and toilet 
facilities provided for beneficiaries was insufficient in light of the number of 
beneficiaries serviced and the extended wait times. As in the case of Nepal, 
the beneficiaries incurred significant monetary costs for transport and food. 
Moreover, on some occasions, the banks were unable to disburse the full 
amount of beneficiary payments, thus necessitating a return visit the following 
day, which multiplied the costs imposed on the beneficiaries.
In Thailand, the Old-Age Allowance is delivered in cash directly to the 
beneficiary’s home or through banks (Suwanrada and Wesumperuma 2012). 
Most beneficiaries prefer home delivery in cash by designated officers, since 
this avoids the travel and time-cost associated with collecting benefits at 
local banks. 
Ultimately, the responsive design of payment arrangements depends on the 
existing channels for effective identification and assessment of people’s needs 
and preferences. This implies the need to set mechanisms for beneficiary 
feedback to inform the design of convenient payment methods.
Program Monitoring, Evaluation, and Oversight
The capacity of service providers to systematically monitor program 
performance is crucial for promoting accountable, transparent, and efficient 
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service delivery. Routine program monitoring can help generate evidence of 
whether the program meets its objectives and make adjustments to improve 
implementation.
The region’s existing systems for monitoring are weak. The examples pertaining 
to Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Viet Nam that appear below illustrate this 
weakness. A fourth example, the 4Ps conditional cash transfer program of the 
Philippines, provides an example of an effective monitoring system.
In Bangladesh, inadequate monitoring of social safety net programs contributes 
to leakage and misallocation (World Bank 2006). In fact, most of the country’s 
implementing ministries lack sufficient capacity to effectively assess program 
implementation progress, measure quality and effect of processes and 
procedures, and inform program design and implementation. For example, the 
Bangladesh Ministry of Food and Disaster Management, implementing the 
Employment Generation Program, carries out little monitoring of the program 
(van Stolk and Tesliuc 2010). The ministry has a weak monitoring system to 
assess whether funds were spent according to regulations; generate estimates 
of errors, fraud, and corruption; and observe systematic outcomes of program 
inspections.
In Viet Nam, there is no coherent national framework and standardized 
procedures for monitoring and evaluation of social assistance (cash transfers 
for different categories of vulnerable persons under Decree 67/13) (Giannozzi 
et al. 2010). There is no formal national registry of beneficiaries based on a 
common electronic format. The information on beneficiaries is transmitted 
and stored on paper. District social affairs departments maintain simple 
Excel files with beneficiary information, but do not regularly transfer them 
to province and central levels. Program administrators create these files by 
their own initiative and do not have an obligation to share, store, or update 
them. The format of these files is different across districts and provinces. 
The existing data are not consolidated; as a consequence, it is not possible 
to cross-check beneficiaries across districts or to monitor the program at the 
national level.
As for Indonesia’s Jaminan Kesehatan Masyarakat (Jamkesmas) national health 
insurance program, the Ministry of Health collects and assesses information 
relating to health insurance claims to identify statistical outliers and potential 
abuse (Harimurti et al. 2013). A number of weaknesses affect the program’s 
current routine monitoring system. For the most part, program monitoring 
focuses on budgetary allocations and aggregate utilization rates, rather than 
tracking health insurance payments or financial outcomes (Harimurti et al. 
2013). Existing data relating to utilization rates are not used to inform service 
delivery or to improve health outcomes.
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Monitoring of the 4Ps conditional cash transfer program of the Philippines 
ensures transparency and accountability in both targeting and benefit 
delivery (World Bank 2014). The country’s national-level MIS stores data 
on each of the 4  million beneficiary households, including information 
obtained during the initial assessment of each beneficiary household. This 
allows beneficiary compliance with eligibility requirements, payments, and 
grievances to be recorded and tracked (World Bank 2014). The MIS allows 
processing administrative and financial transactions handling a large volume 
of data. It contributes to the quality and integrity of program implementation 
(World Bank 2014).
Program evaluations are important for assessment of program outcomes and 
impacts. Program evaluations include beneficiary and institutional assessments, 
as well as impact assessments, and typically use both quantitative and 
qualitative evaluation methods. Many programs integrate evaluations directly 
into the program cycle and use them to inform implementation procedures and 
practices.
In addition to monitoring and evaluation, effective program oversight is crucial 
for promoting effective and accountable service delivery. Program oversight 
can be performed through a variety of mechanisms, including internal and 
external audits, program reviews, and periodic spot checks. As the examples 
below illustrate, program oversight was found to be weak in Viet Nam, but it was 
better utilized in Indonesia’s Jamkesmas and the 4Ps of the Philippines.
In Viet Nam, due to institutional capacity constraints, the frequency of 
supervision visits by staff of the district divisions of labor, invalids and social 
affairs at both the provincial and district levels is limited (Gianozzi et al. 2010). 
Similarly, the Ministry of Food and Disaster Management in Bangladesh has a 
limited internal capacity for conducting internal audits or fraud investigations 
(van Stolk and Tesliuc 2010).
Jamkesmas uses both internal and external audits to verify use of funds and 
payment for services (Gianozzi and Khan 2011). The Inspectorate General of 
the Ministry of Health conducts regular internal audits to verify that funds are 
used in a manner consistent with program objectives. The State Audit Agency 
performs external audits of Jamkesmas, and the Local Audit Agency performs 
external audits of local health insurance schemes. 
The Department of Social Welfare and Development in the Philippines 
performs third-party biannual reviews of key aspects of program design and 
implementation of the 4Ps using both quantitative and qualitative methods 
(Arulpragasam et al. 2011). These reviews incorporate interviews with 
beneficiary households, school principals, and health care providers. Spot 
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checks of key aspects of program design and implementation also form part of 
the program’s oversight system. Finally, to ensure accountability and services 
quality, the program also incorporates an extensive grievance redress system.
Information and Communication Technology 
Over the past decade, a number of innovative information and communication 
technology (ICT)–based monitoring mechanisms have been used in the 
region’s social protection programs. These include mobile banking, digitized 
monitoring of food distribution, and use of biometric smart cards (Bhatnagar 
2014).
Biometric cards, such as the card used by India’s national health insurance 
program, Rashtriya Swastha Bima Yojana (RSBY) and the national identification 
Aadhaar card, have been extensively promoted by the government. The RSBY 
card holds beneficiary information, including fingerprints and photographs of 
all family members belonging to each beneficiary’s household. The card can 
be used in any hospital registered under the program, and enables cashless, 
paperless payment for health care services (Sabharwal et al. 2014). The cost 
of the services provided is then reimbursed to the hospital concerned by the 
insurance company. Such costs are automatically deducted from the total 
stored on the card, until use exceeds the annual allowance of Rs30,000.00 
($619.80) (JLN 2011). Use of the RSBY card has reduced fraud (JLN 2011).
Full use of the Aadhaar card faces a number of challenges (Bhatnagar 2014). 
First, the card is not mandatory, and to be useful in service delivery, it requires 
enrollment of a significant share of the population. Second, technical errors 
associated with use of the card must be minimized (Bhatnagar 2014). For 
example, there are documented cases when the biometric system failed 
to recognize the user, which may result in denial of entitlements (Masiero 
and Prakash unpublished). Finally, government agencies need to use the 
Aadhaar card for delivering services, and front-end delivery points (e.g., PDS 
shops) need to be adequately equipped to capture electronic transactions 
(Bhatnagar 2014).
A study in Kerala suggested that while ICT-based monitoring of PDS 
transactions improved governance, it did not prevent leakage (Masiero 2014). 
Recently, the system was integrated with the Aadhaar card, which allows 
not only identification of PDS users through fingerprints, but the amount of 
commodities purchased in each transaction to be registered. This decreases 
the ability of authorized ration dealers to fabricate sales. Yet while this system 
checks fraud by ration dealers and ineligible persons, it cannot monitor the 
entire PDS supply chain (Masiero 2014). 
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Ultimately, ICT-based monitoring in India does not address structural causes 
of corruption (Masiero 2014). A major impact of the government’s transition 
from a universal system to a targeted subsidized food distribution system was 
a significant reduction in the number of program beneficiaries. However, as 
pointed out earlier, this shrank the ration shops’ customer base and profitability, 
thus exposing them to debt. In the end, this caused ration dealers to engage 
in additional illegal practices as a means of boosting profits and ensuring the 
viability of their businesses.
Grievance Redress
Grievance redress systems are formal accountability mechanisms that enable 
citizens to provide feedback to service providers and to voice concerns 
regarding problems that they experience with particular programs or services 
(Ringold et al. 2012). Grievances may concern administrative errors, exclusion 
from benefits, or negative attitude of service providers. Grievance redress is 
critical for mitigating targeting errors, as well as for monitoring corruption and 
mismanagement (Bassett et al. 2012).
Grievance redress mechanisms use both physical and virtual means of reporting 
complaints (Ringold et al. 2012). Physical mechanisms require proximity to 
local social services centers, while virtual mechanisms only require access to 
the internet. Regardless of the mechanism used, effective grievance redress 
requires institutional arrangements for recording, tracking, and evaluating 
complaints (World Bank 2012b). Effectiveness of grievance redress can be 
enhanced through integration in MIS to allow effective registration and tracking 
of complaints.
There are two types of appeal mechanisms under social protection programs: 
administrative and judicial (Grosh et al. 2008). Administrative appeals are 
processed by frontline service providers and a specialized branch within 
the agency concerned. Frontline service providers provide quick responses, 
particularly in cases in which errors or misunderstandings have occurred. For 
example, a grievance may relate to a clerical error in the applicants’ file; or it 
may require an explanation or additional information regarding application 
procedures. When a grievance cannot be satisfied by a frontline service 
provider, it is referred to the specialized branch of the agency concerned. This 
line of appeal may provide recourse with regard to eligibility decisions or help 
rectify targeting errors that could leave out eligible applicants.
Judicial appeals use the legal system to resolve grievances relating to rights-
based social protection services. Legal redress is a powerful way to invoke 
changes in governance systems, as it often causes rules or their interpretations 
to be modified (Grosh et al. 2008).
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People’s abilities to express grievances and to claim their entitlements depend on 
the extent of their awareness of their rights and grievance redress opportunities 
(Babajanian 2014). Effective information dissemination and proactive citizen 
outreach are crucial for informing people about the opportunities for complaints 
and feedback. An outreach campaign and a comprehensive communication 
strategy are especially crucial for promoting people’s participation in grievance 
redress in remote areas and among disadvantaged groups (World Bank 
2012b). Many poor and marginalized communities have limited access to 
grievance redress because they may be illiterate, lack awareness about their 
rights, have limited access to ICT, or perceive that complaining will be a hassle 
or that the government or project staff will not properly address their appeal 
(World Bank 2012b).
While the region’s social protection programs typically include grievance 
redress mechanisms, not all of them function effectively. A review of grievance 
redress mechanisms in World Bank projects suggested that grievance redress 
mechanisms “exist on paper, but not always in practice” (World Bank 2013, 16). 
In particular, while many project appraisal documents incorporate a grievance 
redress component, few projects develop and enforce such mechanisms 
(World Bank 2013, 16). The reasons for this include resource constraints and 
time constraints faced by project staff. Most crucially, enforcing effective 
grievance redress requires a genuine conviction of project leaders and client 
governments about the value of implementing grievance redress.
Many of the region’s social protection programs suffer from inadequate 
grievance redress. This often results in unfair beneficiary selection, as in the case 
of Bangladesh’s Old-Age Allowance. The program’s beneficiaries are envisaged 
to file complaints with the ward committee formally responsible for beneficiary 
selection (Begum and Wesumperuma 2012). As the Union Parishad chair or 
other influential members dominate the selection process, residents appeal 
to them with their complaints. These complaints, however, are not lodged in 
writing but are only conveyed verbally. As discussed, the Union Parishad officials 
often allocate benefits to ineligible people driven by political affiliation or rent 
seeking and often exclude eligible persons. As a consequence, they are reluctant 
to accommodate grievances to address unfair benefit allocation for which they 
are responsible in the first place.
A study of four social protection programs in Indonesia found that all four had 
weak grievance redress mechanisms, although the PKH scored higher than 
the other three programs. Most survey respondents—which included both 
beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries—expressed dissatisfaction with the way 
these programs function, particularly with regard to beneficiary targeting (OPM 
2012). However, none of the respondent beneficiaries lodged complaints, since 
none of these four programs systematically promoted socialization of grievance 
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redress mechanisms. In addition to these program-related problems, there were 
also sociocultural factors underlying people’s attitudes. Thus, the prevailing 
perception was that “complaining was not really worth the trouble for fear of 
receiving no response, approaching people of authority, appearing ungrateful, 
embarrassment, losing face, revealing one’s ignorance, or retaliation” (OPM 
2012, 8).
Evidence from Nepal’s remote Karnali Zone suggests that local residents—a 
large share of whom are socially excluded Dalits—were often unaware of their 
rights, rarely claimed their entitlements, and seldom demanded accountability 
(Adhikari et al. 2014). This contributed to limited accountability of local 
governments, who, as respondents claimed, were responsible for payment 
irregularities and nepotism. Women were especially reluctant to voice their 
concerns in the public arena (Adhikari et al. 2014), and existing sociocultural 
norms reinforced this. Women perceived public participation to be a man’s job 
and they were worried that complaining may result in losing access to services 
and benefits that they were receiving.
The World Bank (2013) suggested that it is important to design institutional 
arrangements that take into account context-specific local governance 
arrangements. This includes, for example, linking grievance redress to existing 
traditional and social structures such as village chiefs and local councils. The 
review found that in Viet Nam and the PRC, where grievance redress systems 
were disconnected from existing institutions, most project beneficiaries did not 
use them and sought redress through existing channels such as village leaders.
The grievance redress system under the 4Ps in the Philippines, which is 
considered to be one of the most successful in the region, is directly integrated 
into the program’s design and operations. A primary goal of the mechanism 
is to address estimation errors due to possible misclassification and the use 
of proxies as well as errors incurred through implementation (Fernandez 
2012). Between 2008 and 2014, the program recorded more than 485,000 
grievances (World Bank 2014). A total of $71.00 million was paid retroactively 
to beneficiary households following verification of grievances. Approximately 
40,000 households (equivalent to 1.0% of all beneficiaries) were de-listed after 
being found to be ineligible for the program.
Grievances can be submitted through multiple mechanisms, including 
through the municipality concerned, directly to program officers, a text-
messaging hotline, an e-mail, a letter, or through drop boxes located in each 
village (Arulpragasam et al. 2011). The majority of grievances are submitted 
face-to-face through parent leaders at the village level to city or municipal links 
(World Bank 2014).
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The quality of grievance redress is upheld through the existing system of 
regular internal monitoring and reporting of the program (World Bank 2014). 
Routine spot checks by senior officials and independent parties are used to 
determine the quality and effectiveness of grievance redress. The program 
convenes periodic communication activities to increase public awareness 
about grievance redress.
The 4Ps grievance redress system is supported by a comprehensive database 
that efficiently records and tracks grievances (World Bank 2014). Three 
different databases are used for this purpose, all of which are currently being 
integrated into the Unified Information and Communication System–Client 
Relation Management database. This system tracks the nature, origin, location, 
and status of complaints. The grievance officers also consult the information on 
program beneficiaries in the MIS to verify and check the complaints.
Citizen Participation and Feedback
Social monitoring is a demand-side accountability mechanism that involves 
citizens in oversight. Its purpose is to generate citizen feedback that improves 
both accountability and service delivery. Social monitoring allows citizens 
to monitor service delivery and outcomes, and to scrutinize the behavior 
of government officials and service providers. Numerous monitoring and 
evaluation tools are used, including citizen report cards, community score 
cards, social audits, and opinion surveys.
Social audits are widely used in public works and food distribution programs in 
India, their use being facilitated by the 2005 Right to Information Act that gives 
citizens unrestricted access to government records (Posani and Aiyar 2009). 
Social audits are often initiated by civil society groups that mobilize people and 
organize public hearings, at which irregularities in service delivery are revealed 
and accountability is demanded. The MGNREGA has institutionalized social 
audits in its operations in Andhra Pradesh, making it an integral part of the 
program’s monitoring system. Strong state government support has been 
essential for the viability of the social audits, and this has included giving the 
auditors access to documentation and ensuring their safety (Maiorano 2014).
Social audits in the MGNREGA are designed to promote public participation in 
obtaining and verifying government records and expenditure on services against 
the testimonies of the beneficiaries. The information generated through this 
process is discussed at public meetings, where beneficiaries, panchayat (local 
self-government) members, and public officials discuss the discrepancies and 
violations, including misuse of funds, working conditions, and poor-quality 
implementation. 
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Effective information dissemination and outreach are crucial for promoting 
people’s willingness and ability to take part in consultations and social 
monitoring activities. It is especially important to reach out to marginalized 
groups and to facilitate their participation. Due to their proximity to the local 
population, civil society organizations are often well placed to carry out social 
mobilization and to catalyze public participation.
Demands for accountability and exposure of corruption may not improve 
service delivery, unless they are backed by investigations into corruption, formal 
sanctions, and adjustments in service delivery (Joshi 2010, 12; Aiyar et  al. 
2009, 49). This, in turn, depends on the existing mechanisms for horizontal 
accountability, and more specifically, the ability of state institutions to enforce 
the rule of law and to guarantee fair redress.
Ultimately, if citizen participation is to be sustained, social accountability 
mechanisms need to be institutionalized. However, in Asia, most social 
monitoring initiatives are not integrated into public service delivery systems 
(Babajanian 2014). This has implications for the sustainability and regularity of 
public engagement. It is unlikely that one-off initiatives can result in long-lasting 
changes in citizens’ ability to participate in service delivery in the absence of 
institutional spaces for engagement with service providers and channeling 
grievances.
Gender-Sensitive Governance of Social Protection Programs
Social protection for female informal workers is crucial, as they are often more 
economically and socially disadvantaged than men and experience a high 
degree of vulnerability and deprivation (Lund and Srinivas 2000, ISST 2012). 
Context-specific social, political, and institutional constraints may contribute 
to exclusion and discrimination of women in accessing social protection and 
influencing service delivery. Social protection programs must be accompanied 
by effective governance arrangements that address these constraints and 
promote the ability of women to access benefits, articulate their needs and 
preferences, and voice concerns. Women can be vulnerable to the risk of 
exclusion and discrimination at various stages of a program cycle, including 
information and outreach, benefit delivery, monitoring, and grievance redress. 
As discussed, even when programs specifically target women, information 
opportunities for women are often more restricted than for men due to 
women’s heavy workload and, in many contexts, more limited mobility and 
restricted participation in the public sphere due to existing sociocultural norms. 
The limited awareness may result in exclusion from services due to non-take 
up or improper paperwork; women may not be aware of key requirements (e.g., 
conditionalities) for complying with program rules.
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Some sociocultural contexts directly restrict the participation of women in social 
protection programs. For example, rigid gender roles affect women’s access to 
public works as specific types of activities, such as construction, promoted 
through public works programs are often traditionally associated with men 
(Kabeer 2010, 178). Women may also be discriminated against in accessing 
benefits. For example, women are often paid less than men for equivalent work 
under public works programs.
Restrictive informal sociocultural norms often rigidly prescribe women’s roles 
in the public space and limit their ability to express themselves and influence 
communal decision making (World Bank 2011b; Hutagalung, Arif, Suharyo 
2009). For example, they may constrain women’s ability to speak collectively, 
engage with government agencies in participatory monitoring initiatives, or 
attempt to influence service providers through grievance redress mechanisms. 
Women face enormous time pressure due the heavy burden of domestic and 
child care responsibilities, which can preclude them from participating in public 
meetings (MacPherson 2008). 
Over the past decade, programs that promote the well-being of women and 
girls have expanded considerably in the region. These programs seek to alleviate 
poverty and to diminish the vulnerability that women experience at specific 
stages of their life cycle. Examples include programs that offer assistance to 
adolescent girls, mothers, widows, and older people. 
Some of these programs have in-built institutional arrangements for addressing 
gender-specific constraints and women’s empowerment. For example, specific 
design and implementation features of the Bangladesh Rural Advancement 
Committee’s Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty Reduction-Targeting the 
Ultra Poor (CFPR-TUP) program facilitate women’s access to program benefits 
(Holmes and Jones 2013). The program directly addresses exclusion of women 
in the poorest households by providing them with both productive assets 
(e.g., livestock) and a stipend. The program also provides these women with 
training and support in managing assets, subsidized health and legal services, 
training in social development, and a support network.
CFPR-TUP activities are informed by a gender-based assessment of the poverty 
and vulnerability of each beneficiary household (Holmes and Jones 2010). The 
program acknowledges the greater labor constraints that households headed 
by women face in comparison with households headed by men, because there 
are generally fewer income earners in households headed by women, and there 
are additional care responsibilities. Each beneficiary household’s productive 
capability is assessed to provide the productive asset that would be most 
appropriate. For example, raising chickens is less labor-intensive than caring 
for dairy cows or goats. The CFPR-TUP’s monitoring and evaluation system 
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uses data disaggregated by gender, as well as indicators of socioeconomic and 
women’s political empowerment (Holmes and Jones 2013). 
There are also programs that do not specifically target women but are designed 
in a gender-sensitive manner. They incorporate institutional arrangements to 
address gender constraints to enhance program benefits for women. The design 
of the MGNREGA provides an example of such institutional arrangements 
(Holmes and Jones 2013). Under this program, a minimum of one-third of all 
workers in each state must be women; wages paid to both women and men 
must be equal; and women must be represented in the “mates committees” that 
supervise work and record attendance, local committees, and state and central 
councils. Further, all social audit processes are required to include women.
Conclusion
This chapter identifies a number of weaknesses in the governance of social 
protection programs aimed at supporting informal workers in Asia at a 
broader, system level as well as at the operational, program level. Governance 
shortcomings associated with particular program outcomes described are 
summarized in the Appendix Tables A4.1 and A4.2.
At the system level, social protection systems are fragmented. Existing programs 
are administered by different agencies, including agencies at various levels of 
government, as well as nonstate actors. They often have different objectives 
and capacities and use different institutional arrangements. There are also 
successful efforts to consolidate programs by integrating basic management, 
information, and administrative systems. Some countries, such as Cambodia, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines have taken action to integrate data and 
information management through a single registry and MIS.
Institutional arrangements that determine the roles and responsibilities of 
various levels of government in governing social protection programs affect the 
responsiveness, inclusiveness, and equity of these programs. For example, while 
service delivery in India is centralized and top-down, with little responsiveness 
to local needs, the PRC has a highly decentralized system, which gives rise 
to local discretion in setting eligibility and benefit levels and undermines 
horizontal equity. The challenge for central government policy makers is to 
develop intragovernment institutional arrangements to balance responsiveness 
in services provision with the objectives of inclusion and equity. 
At the program level, governance challenges exist at all stages of the program 
cycle, including communication and outreach, targeting, benefit delivery, 
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monitoring, evaluation and program oversight, and grievance redress. 
Information constraints negatively impact the uptake of program benefits, 
inclusion, benefit delivery, and participation in program monitoring and 
grievance redress. Informal sector workers often have difficulty accessing their 
entitlements due to limited awareness; information opportunities are especially 
restricted for women, ethnic minorities, persons residing in remote areas, and 
other marginalized groups.
Many poverty-targeted programs exhibit a high degree of exclusion and inclusion 
at the stage of beneficiary identification and selection. While accurate targeting 
poses perhaps the greatest governance challenge, the process of benefit 
delivery is also prone to irregularities. Limited information dissemination, weak 
monitoring and supervision, and inadequate administrative capacity result 
in discretionary practices and make it possible for local officials to distribute 
partial and irregular benefits. Food distribution and public works programs are 
particularly susceptible to misappropriation and leakage. 
Service providers may not be responsive to people’s needs, as they lack 
adequate capacity and mechanisms to identify benefit delivery methods that 
are convenient, cost-free, and respectful. Evidence from Nepal and Bangladesh 
shows that the choice of payment methods affects benefit receipt and may 
impose a significant cost on beneficiaries. Electronic benefit transfers tend 
to improve delivery effectiveness (Andhra Pradesh), but require significant 
technical and financial capacity.
Most countries of the region have weak monitoring and evaluation systems. 
This translates into a limited ability to systematically track and assess program 
performance, generate feedback, and make adjustments. Some countries lack 
electronic national registries to manage information on beneficiaries. Due 
to the highly fragmented nature of social protection, however, monitoring 
arrangements of different programs are often distinct and poorly coordinated. 
In addition to monitoring and evaluation, effective program oversight is crucial 
for promoting effective and accountable service delivery. 
The region has enjoyed some success in institutionalizing ICT-enabled systems 
for monitoring disbursement of cash transfers and food. Use of participatory 
social audits has achieved significant results by exposing corruption and 
empowering citizens, although it did not rid the system of opportunities for 
corruption.
Grievance redress systems in the region are underdeveloped. This undermines 
effectiveness in mitigating exclusion and inclusion errors and controlling 
corruption and mismanagement. 
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Social protection programs must be accompanied by effective governance 
arrangements that address gender-specific constraints and promote the ability 
of women to access benefits, articulate their needs and preferences, and voice 
concerns. 
Recommendations
Appropriate analysis, planning, design, and implementation of social protection 
programs can help prevent, reduce, or mitigate governance risks. Good 
governance in social protection also requires long-term effort to address 
broader institutional and governance constraints at the national level.
Assessing Context and Capacity Constraints
Analysis of the context of the social, institutional, and political economy is 
crucial for informing design and implementation arrangements. Careful analysis 
can reveal social and community characteristics, sociocultural norms, power 
structures, and social inequalities that influence service delivery standards. 
Such analysis can help identify governance risks and inform the design and 
implementation of institutional arrangements to prevent or mitigate them. 
It can also be used to determine why specific problems occur, or persist, in 
ongoing programs.
Analysis of institutions and governance must be integrated into the assessment 
of the effectiveness of existing programs to identify bottlenecks and to improve 
governance arrangements and practices. At a system level, this includes 
mapping social protection programs and assessing institutional linkages. 
At a program level, it requires an assessment of institutional arrangements 
such as rules, roles, and control mechanisms governing a program. It 
also involves analyzing the incentives and interests of all relevant actors, 
including program staff, government officials, and other actors involved in 
benefit delivery.
Program design must be accompanied by a feasibility assessment to establish 
whether available resources and capacity will enable agencies to support 
good governance standards. This can entail an assessment of (i)  financial 
and technical resources, that is, the mix and amount of resources to finance 
staff salaries, maintenance and administrative costs, equipment, and 
technology; and (ii) existing administrative capacity, including the mix, type, 
and amount of human resources with adequate qualifications and skills 
(Mathauer 2004).
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Setting Good Governance Standards
Setting normative benchmarks is a key precondition for improving governance. 
It is important that programs develop service quality standards, such as 
responsiveness, accountability, and transparency, and use them as goals and 
indicators to inform program design and to measure performance. Promoting 
good governance is an incremental process, and it cannot be achieved at once. 
These benchmarks can guide the process of identification and development of 
institutional arrangements to address governance constraints. They can also be 
used for identifying indicators for measuring and monitoring progress in achieving 
good governance.
Improving System Governance
Developing a well-coordinated and coherent social protection system is crucial 
for effective service delivery. This necessitates setting coherent policy goals 
and coordinating programs in terms of their objectives, target groups, benefit 
levels, and administrative systems. 
Systemic integration can be promoted through developing integrated MIS. 
Adequate financial and technical capacity of the central government is 
important for formulating and implementing institutional arrangements to 
promote integration. The establishment of single registries can be facilitated 
with donors’ financial and technical support.
Responsive and equitable service delivery requires careful delineation of 
institutional and financing arrangements between different levels of government. 
The involvement of the central government in regulating eligibility criteria, 
benefit calculation, and eligibility thresholds, while allowing local adjustments 
to reflect contextual circumstances, can help balance responsiveness in service 
provision with the objectives of inclusion and equity.
Improving Program Design and Implementation
It is important to establish and enforce context-specific institutional 
arrangements for good governance, including transparent and clearly defined 
rules and procedures for communication and outreach, targeting, service 
delivery, monitoring, evaluation and oversight, and grievance redress.
Communication and outreach. Programs need to incorporate requirements for 
information dissemination and outreach. The program design needs to account 
for the resources required to implement effective information dissemination 
and outreach. Programs must contain indicators to allow policy makers to 
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assess the effectiveness of outreach efforts to promote participation of women 
and socially excluded groups.
Targeting. Global evidence suggests that accurate poverty targeting is 
technically and operationally challenging, and programs are unlikely to achieve 
“perfect” targeting. Designing feasible mechanisms for measuring and verifying 
income in countries with large informal economies is especially difficult. At 
the same time, carefully designed institutional arrangements and effective 
governance practices can reduce targeting errors. Clearly defined eligibility 
criteria and procedures are essential for fair and transparent beneficiary 
selection. It is important that the rules be transparently documented and 
communicated. Potential beneficiaries and community members need 
to be aware of eligibility requirements and selection procedures. The 
capacity of line agencies to undertake appropriate monitoring and effective 
oversight can ensure fairness in beneficiary selection. Effective grievance 
redress and social monitoring can reduce the likelihood of unfair selection 
and exclusion.
Benefit delivery. ICT-assisted benefit delivery and monitoring mechanisms 
can minimize the likelihood of benefit capture and improve the transparency 
and accountability of cash transfer delivery. For example, secure and direct 
payments to beneficiaries through bank or postal transfers and ICT-enabled 
methods (e.g., mobile phones and mobile ATMs) can reduce opportunities 
for misappropriation (Chêne 2010, van Stolk and Tesliuc 2010). Digitalized 
program monitoring involving links with registries, front-end sales points, and 
smart cards can minimize food leakage. 
Payment methods. Benefit payment methods (e.g., banks, local governments, 
and home delivery) must take into account the specific vulnerabilities of 
beneficiaries related to their life cycles as well as geographic and infrastructure 
constraints. The choice of payment methods must be done to minimize the 
monetary, time, and physical cost to beneficiaries. Effective benefit delivery 
may be constrained by geographic remoteness, inadequate banking facilities, 
and limited administrative capacity of local governments or branches of line 
ministries in charge of social protection. Introduction of ICT-based payment 
methods requires significant financial investments and technical capacity. It is, 
however, important that programs set benchmarks for developing convenient 
and cost-free delivery methods and identify contextually appropriate options 
that can be achieved incrementally as they develop service delivery capacity. 
International partners and donors have an important role to play in strengthening 
capacities for effective benefit delivery.
Monitoring, evaluation, and oversight. Consolidating existing administrative 
monitoring systems, and developing new ones, is essential for managing the flow 
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of information and finance. The financial and technical support of international 
organizations can promote the development of effective monitoring systems. 
The decisions to undertake ICT-enabled monitoring must be based on a careful 
analysis of the availability of technical infrastructure and human resources. 
In addition to regular monitoring, program evaluations can provide valuable 
information about program outcomes and impacts to improve program 
implementation. Effective oversight mechanisms are crucial for monitoring 
and controlling program implementation and promoting quality control. This 
requires public agencies to be able to undertake internal and external audits, 
periodic program reviews, and spot checks.
Grievance redress. The availability of channels for feedback, appeals, and 
complaints must be supplemented with adequate institutional arrangements 
for registering and processing grievances. Regular monitoring and spot checks 
are important to ensure the effectiveness of grievance redress mechanisms. As 
the 4Ps shows, the link to a computerized database can significantly enhance 
the effectiveness of the system in recording and tracking complaints. Finally, 
effective communication and outreach is key to promoting people’s awareness 
about grievance redress opportunities.
Social monitoring. Effective social monitoring depends on the existing 
capacity to mobilize citizen participation. It also requires that service providers 
and government officials establish spaces for citizen participation. Social 
monitoring must contain rules and procedures to ensure inclusion of diverse 
social groups such as women, ethnic minorities, and other marginalized groups. 
Social monitoring has its limits; it may not tackle the long-standing roots of 
corruption, which need to be addressed through broader structural changes. 
Social monitoring needs to be institutionalized to make citizen participation 
systematic and continuous; this, however, poses the risk of cooptation into the 
formal bureaucratic system and erosion of a grassroots basis.
Gender-sensitive governance. Social protection programs, even if they do not 
seek to promote female empowerment or to target women, must be designed 
to benefit women. They must take into account gendered constraints in their 
institutional arrangements to ensure women’s access and inclusion. Program 
design must be based on a careful assessment of contextual constraints and 
vulnerabilities that may restrict women’s access to social protection benefits 
and services. Operational rules must stipulate women’s participation in 
social monitoring. Programs must incorporate indicators to assess the extent 
of women’s participation and empowerment. For example, these include 
gender-disaggregated indicators to monitor the usage of grievance mechanisms, 
and quantitative and qualitative criteria for assessing the nature and depth of 
women’s participation in social monitoring. 
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Cross-Sector Reform
Governance arrangements at a program level cannot be effective without 
reference to the broader institutional and political economy environment at 
the national level. Structural reform and improvements across the public sector 
are necessary to remove legal, administrative, and informal barriers that prevent 
people benefiting from their entitlements.
Upholding good governance requires robust systems of horizontal 
accountability, that is, the ability of public institutions to carry out effective 
oversight of program administrators and service providers and to enforce 
the rule of law. Ineffective horizontal accountability mechanisms can lead 
to officials who may not fear punishment for preferential treatment and rent 
seeking. National institutions, including the judiciary and all relevant sector line 
agencies, must regularly monitor, expose, and sanction violations of program 
rules and illegal behavior such as exclusion of eligible individuals, corruption, 
and misuse of funds. 
Horizontal accountability is crucial for guaranteeing serious consideration of 
citizen feedback and adequate rule enforcement for fair redress. It is equally 
important for promoting demand-driven mechanisms that involve citizen 
participation in service delivery monitoring.
Political Commitment and Institutional Capacity
Political commitment and institutional capacity for policy formulation, analysis, 
and implementation are several factors that affect the ability of national 
agencies to establish effective governance mechanisms in social protection.
Formulating and implementing institutional arrangements for good governance 
of social protection requires vision and the commitment of political leadership. 
For instance, the Government of the Philippines was committed to the goal 
of poverty reduction and decided to undertake an ambitious social welfare 
reform (Fernandez 2012). It allocated appropriate funding and mobilized 
human and technological resources to achieve this task. Similarly, the support 
and commitment of senior state officials was essential for the effective 
institutionalization of social audits in the MGNREGA in Andhra Pradesh (Singh 
and Vutukuru 2008). 
Inadequate capacity can restrict the ability of government agencies to undertake 
social and institutional assessments, as well as plan and design policies and 
programs. Equally challenging is the ability to finance effective program 
execution. Poor implementation capacity can undermine the effectiveness of 
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program design and ultimately impact program outcomes (van Stolk 2010). 
Outreach and dissemination activities are costly and require qualified and 
well-trained staff, while development and use of ICT-based monitoring and 
payment systems require significant monetary investment and technical 
expertise. Adequate staff remuneration and capacity are crucial for minimizing 
errors and fraud and to improve implementation processes (van Stolk 2010). 
It is important that governments undertake a realistic assessment of existing 
capacity constraints, but limited capacity must not preclude them from 
initiating and undertaking measures to promote good governance. There are 
various policy and programming options, and not all of them require significant 
resource investments. Institutional analysis can help assess possible options and 
prioritize choices. For example, developing transparent criteria and procedures 
for program implementation may be less resource-intensive than introduction 
of ICT-based payment systems. Therefore, policy makers may prioritize the task 
of establishing effective rules and procedures as a solid governance foundation, 
before directing efforts toward identifying options for more costly activities. 
When effectively delivered and utilized, technical assistance by international 
partners and donors can strengthen national capacity for policy formulation 
and implementation.
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APPENDIX
Table A4.1: Social Protection Program Outcomes  
and Governance Shortcomings in Asia
Program Outcome Governance Shortcoming
Duplication and coverage gaps
Inefficient program performance
Fragmentation at the system level, with limited 
coordination and linkages between programs
Limited horizontal equity across 
the country concerned
High degree of decentralization of services 
regulation and delivery
Limited uptake and low levels of 
awareness in remote areas and 
among disadvantaged groups
Inadequate communication and outreach
Weak monitoring and oversight
Exclusion and inclusion errors in 
beneficiary selection
Inadequate communication and outreach
Lack of transparent eligibility criteria
Low levels of awareness of eligibility criteria 
among implementers and inadequate knowledge 
about how criteria should be applied
Inconsistent application of eligibility criteria
Inadequate income verification procedures
Limited community participation in beneficiary 
verification
Weak monitoring and oversight
Weak grievance redress mechanisms
Leakage, mismanagement, and 
corruption
Partial and irregular payments
Inadequate outreach and communication
Inadequate division of roles and responsibilities 
in implementation
Inadequate monitoring and oversight
Limited use of positive and negative incentives to 
motivate service providers
Disbursement constraints resulting from central 
budgetary problems
Weak grievance redress mechanisms
continued on next page
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Program Outcome Governance Shortcoming
Weak monitoring and oversight
Poor use of evaluation results in informing 
program design and implementation
Inconvenient, irregular,  
and costly benefit delivery
Limited identification and assessment of 
beneficiary needs and preferences
Inappropriate choice of payment methods
Weak grievance redress mechanisms
Exclusion of women, 
persons with disabilities, 
ethnic minorities, and other 
marginalized groups
Inadequate outreach and communication
Design and implementation practices fail to 
address sociocultural and institutional factors 
that restrict people’s inclusion or access to 
program benefits
Source: Author based on the review of literature.
Table A4.1 continued
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Table A4.2: Social Protection Programs Reviewed
Program Coverage Benefits Budget
Rashtriya Swasthya 
Bima Yojana 
(India)
Total 
hospitalization 
cases: 7.164 million 
(2014)
Active smart 
cards: 37.19 million 
(2014)
Inpatient 
treatment of 
Rs30,000.00 
per year for five 
members of the 
household
Rs1,096.70 million 
(2012–2013)
Janani Suraksha 
Yojana maternal 
health scheme 
(India)
10,000,000 
beneficiaries 
(2009)
Graded assistance 
scales:
Rs700.00–
Rs2,000.00 urban
Rs600.00–
Rs1,200.00 rural
Rs14,768.00 million 
(2009)
Public Distribution 
System (India)
65.200 million 
persons (2009)
Below-poverty 
line families: 
35 kilograms 
subsidized rice or 
wheat per month 
Above-poverty 
line families: 
15 kilograms of 
subsidized rice or 
wheat per month
Rs289,340.00 
million (2009)
Mahatma Gandhi 
National Rural 
Employment 
Guarantee Act 
(India)
54.900 million 
persons  
(2010–2011)
100 days of 
guaranteed 
employment at 
minimum wage 
of a state, varies 
from Rs162.00 to 
Rs500.00 per day
Rs39,377.27 million 
(2010–2011)
Benazir Income 
Support 
Programme 
unconditional cash 
transfer (Pakistan)
2.275 million 
persons (2010)
PRs1,000.00 per 
person per month
PRs34,000.00 
million (2010)
National 
Rural Support 
Programme 
(Pakistan) 
1.266 million 
households (2015)
29,841 physical 
infrastructure 
schemes 
completed (2015)
PRs7,014.56 million 
(2015)
continued on next page
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Program Coverage Benefits Budget
Jamkesmas 
(Indonesia)
76.4 million 
persons (2010) 
Premium 
Rp6,500.00 per 
capita per month
Comprehensive 
health coverage
Drugs are covered 
if prescribed within 
formulary
Rp5,343.00 billion 
(2010)
Bantuan 
Langsung Tunai 
unconditional 
cash transfer 
(Indonesia)
18.5 million 
households 
(2008–2009)
Rp100,000.00 
per month 
for 9 months 
(Rp900,000.00 
total)
Rp18,966.00 billion 
(2008–2009)
Program Keluarga 
Harapan 
conditional 
cash transfer 
(Indonesia)
1.454 million 
households (2012)
Average transfer 
per family per year 
Rp1,800,000.00 
(2013)
$228.29 million 
(2012)
Social assistance 
transfers for 
vulnerable persons
12.173 million 
persons (2009)
Basic allowance 
of D180,000.00 
per person living in 
communities and 
D360,000.00–
D450,000.00 per 
person living in 
social protection 
centers
D2,011,037.50 
million (2009)
Old-Age 
Allowance 
(Thailand)
6.785 million 
persons (2012)
Age cohort-
based, B600.00–
B1,000.00
B52,535.00 million 
(2012)
Pantawid 
Pamilyang 
Pilipino Program 
conditional 
cash transfer 
(Philippines)
4.326 million 
households (2014)
Health grant: 
P500.00 per 
household per 
month
Education grant: 
P300.00 per child  
per month for  
10 months
P62.60 billion 
(2014)
(Urban) Minimum 
Living Standard 
Guarantee (PRC)
21.435 million 
persons (2012)
Average transfer 
per person per 
month CNY239.10
CNY67.43 billion 
(2012)
Table A4.2 continued
continued on next page
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Program Coverage Benefits Budget
(Rural) Minimum 
Living Standard 
Guarantee (PRC)
53.445 million 
persons (2012)
Average transfer 
per person per 
month CNY104.00
CNY71.80 billion 
(2012)
Child Grant 
(Nepal)
551,916  
(2011–2012)
NRs200.00 per 
child per month
NRs1.30 billion 
(2013)
Universal Old Age 
Allowance (Nepal)
644,000  
(2008–2009)
NRs500.00 per 
person per month
NRs8.50 billion 
(2012)
Employment 
Generation 
Program 
(Bangladesh)
4.5 million (2010) Tk100.00 per 
person for 7 hours 
work per day
Tk10,761.10 
(million) (2010)
Rural 
Advancement 
Committee’s 
Challenging 
the Frontiers of 
Poverty Reduction 
Targeting the Ultra 
Poor (Bangladesh)
271,700 (2011) 
households (ultra 
poor especially 
targeted)
Asset transfer: 
Tk3,000.00–
Tk9,000.00
Monthly stipend: 
Tk10.00 daily for 
12–15 months
Training
Health support
Tk2.40 billion 
(2013)
Vulnerable Group 
Development 
Programme 
(Bangladesh)
750,000 persons 
(2010)
Monthly stipend: 
Tk100.00 for  
24 months
Food support:  
30 kilograms of rice
Training
Tk5,951.70 million 
(2010)
Primary Education 
Stipend 
Programme 
(Bangladesh)
5,200,000 persons 
(2010)
Tk100.00 per 
month per first child
Tk125.00 per month 
for second child
Tk5,748.40 million 
(2010)
Old Age Allowance 
(Bangladesh)
2,250,000 persons 
(2010)
Tk300.00 per 
month per person, 
every 3 months
Tk8,100.00 million 
(2010)
Allowance for 
the Widowed, 
Deserted and 
Destitute Women 
(Bangladesh)
920,000 persons 
(2010)
Tk300.00 per 
beneficiary every  
3 months
Tk3,312.00 million 
(2010)
B = baht, CNY = yuan, D = dong, NRs = Nepalese rupees, P = peso, PR = Pakistan rupees, PRC = People’s 
Republic of China, Rp = rupiah, Rs = Indian rupees, Tk = taka.
Sources: ADB Social Protection Index Country Reports (http://spi.adb.org/spidmz/index.jsp); various 
program reports and policy briefs.
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CHAPTER 5
Social Protection for Informal 
Workers in Pakistan:  
A Case Study of Small and  
Medium-Sized Enterprises
Hina Shaikh
Abstract
Extending social protection to Pakistan’s diverse, growing informal economy is a challenge. This study contributes to the policy discourse on extending social protection coverage to informal workers. It also provides insight 
into some pervasive factors that impede the extension of social protection 
to informal workers. Central to this study is a survey of 202 informal workers 
employed in three subsectors of Pakistan’s small and medium-sized enterprise 
sector (construction, garment manufacturing, and street vending). Most 
workers surveyed are uneducated and live in rural or semi-urban areas. Members 
of their households lack adequate employment skills and have incomes that are 
too low to support savings. Thus, they remain vulnerable to transitory poverty 
and economic shocks.
Around half of the workers surveyed receive monthly payments that amount 
to less than, or around, the minimum wage. About 45.0% of respondents have 
no employment contracts, and of those that did, only 21.6% have written 
contracts, while the rest have only verbal contracts. The study finds that 
overall working conditions in the informal sector to be unsatisfactory. There is 
little evidence of factory owners ensuring safety measures for workers exposed 
to hazardous materials or providing appropriate safety equipment. Women are 
particularly vulnerable because of their concentration in home-based work 
with lower wages and limited access to social protection. Trade unions are 
largely absent from the informal economy, and there is also a general lack of 
awareness among informal workers about their basic labor rights. 
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This study recommends hiring only from registered contractors, applying 
recommended minimum wage rates for domestic workers, and introducing 
adequate labor welfare standards for factory workers. Informal workers need 
government support, such as a basic level of economic security through regular 
work or wages, to integrate into mainstream social protection schemes. 
Introduction
Pakistan’s labor force in the informal economy is generally poorly educated, 
highly segmented by gender, concentrated in low value-added activities, and 
lacking in access to social protection. These characteristics hinder economic 
growth and poverty reduction. The International Labour Organization (ILO) 
stated that the country’s unemployment rate will remain around 6.0% in the 
coming years, indicating shrinking income opportunities available in the legal 
labor market and an increasing trend of finding employment in the growing 
informal sector (Naseer 2014).
Most informal workers are employed on a temporary, casual, or contractual 
basis. They can be retrenched at any time without any legal recourse, and they 
normally do not have access to any form of social protection. Informal sector 
activities are not regulated by the government, nor are they reflected in national 
statistics. Lack of access to social protection is part of the definition of informal 
employment (Tahir and Tahir 2013).
With a population of over 182 million and the 10th-largest labor force in 
the world, Pakistan’s informal sector is rapidly expanding.89 Nearly 34.0% 
(60 million) of the total population constitutes the recorded civilian labor force 
(for all age groups), of which males comprise 77.0%. Nearly three-quarters 
of nonagriculture employment is in the informal sector.90 Simultaneously, the 
country’s growing informal sector is reducing the already narrow coverage of 
social protection programs and applicability of minimum wage laws.91 The low 
productivity of informal employment was accompanied by a decline in paid 
employment from 40.4% in 2002 to 36.5% in 2010, and an increase in unpaid 
family work from 18.8% to 24.2% over 2002–2013 (ILO 2014). 
At the same time, the percentage share of women in total employment rose 
from 22.3% in 2002 to 38.7% in 2013. Women constitute just slightly less than 
89 As per government calculations performed in 2013 and released in 2014 (MOF 2014). 
90 The share of informal sector employment in nonagriculture employment increased from 63.8% in 
2002 to 73.3% in 2013, as per the most recent ILO figures (ILO 2014).
91 Although it remains only a portion of the median wage, the minimum wage has increased since 2001.
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30.0% of the total adult workforce (MOF 2014). Of the more than 3 million 
jobs created for women over the periods 2001–2002 and 2005–2006, 72.0% 
were in unpaid family work in agriculture, and 19.0% were in paid nonfarm jobs 
(World Bank 2011). The share of women in informal nonagriculture employment 
in Pakistan (4.0% of all employment) is the lowest in the world (GOP 2011). 
These women are highly concentrated in home-based and domestic work. In 
fact, it is estimated that out of the 8.5 million domestic workers in Pakistan, the 
majority are women (ILO 2015). 
Despite their sizable contribution to the national economy (36.8% of gross 
national product), women in Pakistan remain largely invisible and disempowered, 
both socially and economically (GOP 2011). Their presence in the workforce is 
also conspicuous in the informal sector. Most women earn less than their male 
counterparts (Mete and Jamil 2013), and the latest gender wage gap is reported 
at 38.5% (van Klaveren, Gregory, and Schulten 2015). 
The small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) sector in Pakistan absorbs 
significant numbers of informal workers as contract or temporary employees. For 
example, nearly 90.0% of the work in garment manufacturing is subcontracted 
to home-based workers.92 Smaller enterprises are labor-intensive and hire 
workers informally to reduce both direct and indirect costs. Such workers 
are not covered by any type of from social protection programs. Absence of 
employment contracts creates worker insecurity, while poor working conditions 
and ineffective administration make these workers quite vulnerable and 
insecure.
Objectives
This study assesses the provision of social protection to informal workers in 
Pakistan, and provides recommendations for improving coverage for these 
workers. It is based on a survey of labor conditions in three SME subsectors: 
construction, garment manufacturing, and street vending. 
The study analyzes how workers are regulated by the government, private 
sector organizations, and national and international legislation, and examines 
the degree to which different groups of informal workers are able to access 
social protection programs through their employment as well as through general 
public provisions. It also presents implications for policy and practice with 
92 Subcontracted home-based workers are contracted by an individual entrepreneur or firm, often 
through an intermediary. They are usually given raw materials and paid per piece. They typically do 
not sell finished goods. They do, however, cover many production costs, including those relating to 
procurement of a workplace, equipment, supplies, utilities, and transport.
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regard to both reshaping existing social protection mechanisms and enforcing 
labor regulation and legally mandated social protection. 
Methodology
The study is based on (i) a desk review, (ii) data generated through a quantitative 
survey in Lahore, (iii) focus group discussions, and (iv) key informant interviews 
with stakeholders.93 A total of 202 surveys were completed: 70 respondents 
in the construction subsector, 61 respondents in garment manufacturing, and 
71 street vendors. The study also draws on the qualitative findings of recently 
conducted research in Sheikhupura (a city adjacent to Lahore) that examined 
linkages between labor law and the implementation of social protection 
schemes (Altaf 2014). 
Informants who live in Lahore and work in the three SME subsectors under 
study were selected through a mix of purposive snowball and convenience-
sampling techniques that provided qualitative and quantitative data.94 A 
questionnaire was used to construct a database that included information 
on the demographic characteristics of the informants, as well as quantitative 
indicators pertaining to their levels of skills training, job satisfaction, working 
conditions, access to social protection, remuneration, and pay structures. 
These data and information were then used to identify the primary variables 
that shape access to social protection by informal workers in Pakistan. 
Limitations of the Study
During the survey phase of the study, some employers were reluctant to share 
information regarding access to social protection by their employees. Thus, at 
times, the survey questionnaire had to be redesigned to exclude direct questions 
about the role of employers in the provision of social protection. Further, 
personal contacts often had to be used to facilitate access to construction sites 
or garment factories. 
In addition, except for the garment-manufacturing subsector, it was difficult to 
find female workers in the subsectors under study. To compensate for this, data 
and information relating to domestic and home-based workers were appended, 
93 Lahore is the capital of Punjab Province and is the second-largest city in Pakistan.
94 Purposive sampling, also referred to as criterion-based selection, is a sampling technique in which 
particular settings, persons, events, or areas are deliberately chosen for the purpose of obtaining certain 
information that is central to study objectives. The term “snowball” refers to using one contact to help 
recruit another contact, which in turn puts the researcher in touch with yet another contact. The initial 
contact may be a friend, relative, neighbor, or someone from a social group or formal organization. As 
the term implies, this method allows recruitment of contacts to gain momentum as the researcher 
builds up layers of contacts. 
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as female workers are particularly concentrated in the latter two subsectors in 
Pakistan. Finally, some of the questions in the original survey questionnaire were 
not applicable to street vendors, as the questionnaire was originally designed for 
obtaining data and information from employees who work in small enterprises.
The Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Sector  
in Pakistan
Overview 
The State Bank of Pakistan (2011) defined an SME as any entity, ideally not a 
public limited company, that does not employ more than 250 persons if it is 
a manufacturing company, and not more than 50 persons if it is a trading or 
services company. This definition was used to target the firms for the primary 
research underlying this study. The latest economic census (PBS 2005) listed 
3.2 million business enterprises nationwide, with SMEs constituting about 
90.0% of all enterprises in Pakistan.95 SMEs are mainly concentrated in the 
services, construction, and small-scale manufacturing sectors.96 
Generally, the SME sector is less formally organized than larger firms. More than 
96.0% of SMEs are owned and managed by a single individual. Only 2.0% of 
SMEs are partnerships, and few (if any) corporate entities are represented. 
Most SMEs operate on a modest scale. Nearly 98.0% of SMEs engaged in 
wholesale and retail trade employ fewer than 5 workers, and 99.0% of them 
employ fewer than 10 workers. Similarly, almost 87.0% of SMEs in manufacturing 
employ fewer than 5 workers, and 98.0% employ fewer than 10 workers. The 
sole exception is mining, in which SMEs tend to employ larger numbers of 
95 There has been no comprehensive survey of SMEs in Pakistan since the last economic census. There 
is thus an urgent need to update these data to reflect changes in the SME sector over the past decade. 
Further, data collection for the 2005 economic survey actually took place in 2001–2003. Due to the 
limitations of the census (PBS 2005), these statistics should be interpreted with caution. In particular, 
most of the larger firms in both the private and public sectors did not provide complete information. 
The survey normally covers firms that are registered; however, a large number of small-scale firms were 
not recorded because they wished to remain hidden. Further, in some cases, the enumerators were not 
fully motivated to include small-scale firms in the dataset. Similarly, the survey did not cover mobile 
units, such as street vendors and other small businesses that do not have permanent locations. While 
some updated data on SMEs are available in World Bank (2013a), these are still based on a subsample 
of those on which PBS (2005) was also based.
96 The service sector includes wholesale and retail trade, eating and drinking establishments, and tourism 
(e.g., hotels and entertainment establishments). The construction sector includes construction of 
buildings, both residential and commercial. Small-scale manufacturing mainly includes the garment, 
textile, and leather industries, as well as fabrication of metal products, manufacturing of furniture, 
repairs, and food processing.
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workers. The same patterns are similar for all other SME subsectors. In short, 
96.6% of SMEs employ 1–5 workers, 2.7% employ 6–10 workers, 0.9% employ 
11–50 workers, and 0.1% employ more than 50 workers (PBS 2005).
The SME sector is critical to the growth of the national economy, as its 
percentage share in GDP is 40.0%. Nearly 53.0% of SMEs engage in wholesale 
and retail trade, and restaurants and hotel activities. Community, social, and 
personal services SMEs account for an additional 22.3% of all SMEs, and 
manufacturing, 19.7% (PBS 2005). The SME sector produces 30.0% of all 
goods exported, nearly 35.0% of all value addition in manufacturing, and 78.0% 
of nonagriculture employment. 
While the government acknowledges the importance of SMEs in propelling 
economic growth, several constraints restrict the sector’s growth: (i) limited 
technology base, (ii) lack of access to finance, (iii) lack of market information, 
(iv) limited opportunities for skills development, (v) regulatory obstacles, and 
(vi) low value addition. 
As mentioned, SMEs are constrained by the lack of a knowledge-based economy 
in Pakistan. According to the most recent Enterprise Survey, only 32.5% of firms 
offer formal training (World Bank 2013a). Further, because most SMEs deal in 
traditional products, they are unable to climb the technology ladder. Banks also 
view SMEs as a high-risk sector, and thus are unwilling to extend credit to them, 
despite their potential for expansion. Finally, SMEs are more prone than their 
larger-scale counterparts to external risks and tend to find tax-related issues 
more restrictive. 
Pakistan has no specific SME regulatory regime in place. The SME sector’s 
extensive size limits the ability of the government and business support 
institutions to achieve complete coverage of SMEs with usual business support 
programs. There is also evidence that small firms are discriminated against by 
government and business support institutions and the banking sector, relative 
to large firms.97 
Subsector Profiles
Construction
Alongside rising infrastructure activities, increasing demand from the housing 
sector, rapid urbanization, and construction recovery—especially after the 
97 See, for example, Nenova, Niang, and Ahmad (2009); SMEDA (2002); Afraz, Hussain, and Khan 
(2013); Bari, Cheema, and Ehsan-ul-Haque (2005); World Bank (2010); and World Bank Group. 
Enterprise Surveys. 
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severe earthquake in 2005 and flooding in 2010—Pakistan’s construction 
industry has expanded significantly. The Pakistan Bureau of Statistics put 
construction spending at nearly $5.20 billion per year, accounting for 3.0% of 
the country’s gross domestic product in 2012–2013 (MOF 2014). 
Construction and maintenance of buildings are labor-intensive activities, 
generating many jobs per unit of investment, both on and off a building site. 
Compared with other countries, construction in Pakistan is more labor-
oriented, involving 2.5 to 10 times as many workers per activity (Farooqui and 
Arif 2009). About 9.0% of the country’s workforce (mostly male) is involved 
in construction (GOP 2011). However, the efficiency of this labor force is poor, 
and availability of skilled and semi-skilled labor is inadequate. Construction is 
also ranked as the third-most hazardous industry in Pakistan, with high rates of 
injuries, occupational diseases, and fatalities (GOP 2011). 
Garment Manufacturing
The textile and garment subsector accounts for nearly 50.0% of Pakistan’s 
exports, and is the largest component of the manufacturing sector (MOF 2014). 
The share of garment manufacturing in total textiles is growing, with around 
4,000 manufacturing units across major cities. This sector also accounts for 
30.0% of value addition in large-scale manufacturing and 40.0% of industrial 
employment. 
The garment industry is labor intensive which generates significant economic 
growth and employment. The industry consists of a large number of SMEs 
sandwiched between large textile firms that sell yarn and raw fabric, and mega-
sized retailers that buy the finished products. Garment manufacturing requires 
skilled labor, and many of the workers receive their training on the job. Overall, 
the garment industry is expected to do well, given Pakistan’s attainment of 
Generalised Scheme of Preferences-Plus status by the European Union, which 
has opened up a large market for the country’s garment exports.98 
Street Vending
The bulk of the unskilled, low-wage, and semi-permanent migrant workforce 
works as street vendors or roadside traders. Street vendors vary not only 
with respect to the economic activities undertaken, but also in terms of 
working hours and average income. Many are self-employed, running their 
98 The main challenge in maximizing the benefits from Pakistan’s access to this preferential tariff scheme 
is ensuring labor law compliance in the four provinces, and in both the formal and informal sectors, as 
a significant portion of global production is outsourced to contractors and subcontractors that hire 
informal workers to produce their output. 
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own enterprises and preferring to work independently, while others are wage 
earners who are employed by other informal operators. Most own carts or stalls, 
and sell products using public spaces such as parks, streets, and rail and bus 
stations. While the goods traded and services offered are predominantly legal, 
the legality of their status as workers may be tenuous. They work in hazardous 
conditions, often near fast-moving traffic, and are thus exposed to smoke, dirt, 
and noise. 
Most street vendors are also internal migrants, and are deprived of basic services. 
Internal migration is a fundamental demographic, social, and economic feature 
of Pakistan, affecting up to half of the population.99 It refers to the movement of 
people from rural areas to urban centers. Internal migration is not mentioned in 
the Labour Policy (GOP 2010), and no laws exist in Pakistan for protecting the 
rights of such workers.
Regulatory Framework for Providing  
Social Protection to Informal Workers
Labor welfare and social protection laws in Pakistan generally originate from 
the Constitution, collective agreements, international treaties, customary 
laws, human rights treaties, trade agreements, and national commitments. 
Pakistan’s national social protection strategy defines social protection as a set 
of policies and program interventions that address poverty and vulnerability by 
contributing to raising the incomes of poor households, controlling the variance 
of income of all households, and ensuring equitable access to basic services 
(Planning Commission 2007). 
In Pakistan, social assistance, social insurance (including pensions), community 
programs (i.e., social funds), and labor market interventions are all components 
of social protection (GOP 2007). The Constitution also contains a range of 
provisions with regard to labor rights. It ensures social protection, and holds 
the state responsible for the “well-being of people,” “social protection by 
compulsory social insurance,” and provision of “basic necessities of life” to 
the indigent, disadvantaged, and socially excluded (GOP 1973). However, 
translating these rights into legislation for informal workers remains a challenge. 
Laws pertaining to social protection of informal workers have mostly been 
formulated through a series of ad hoc initiatives undertaken by successive 
governments over time. Such extensive labor legislation is prohibitive, as 
99 Estimates using household surveys, labor force surveys, and census data in Memon (2005). 
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enterprises have to deal with 56 labor laws. However, not all laws are equally 
important or applicable. Findings from a recent study found five laws to be the 
most relevant today: (i) the Factories Act of 1934, (ii) the Minimum Wages 
Ordinance of 1961, (iii) the Payment of Wages Act of 1936, (iv) the Punjab 
Industrial Relations Act of 2010, and (v) the Workmen’s Compensation Act 
of 1923 (Altaf 2014). These laws collectively determine several dynamics of 
employment that include employment contracts, working hours, paid leave 
and other leave entitlements, maternity benefits, minimum age for work 
and protection of young workers, occupational safety, and access to social 
protection.
Promulgated in 2010, the 18th Constitutional Amendment devolved financial 
and administrative powers to the provinces, altering the power-sharing dynamic 
between the provinces and the central government. Following devolution of 
certain powers of the Ministry of Labour and Manpower, the provincial labor and 
human resources departments became responsible for protecting labor rights. 
This change caused the federal government to lose its mandate for declaring 
minimum wage levels for unskilled labor, and the provincial governments to 
be assigned this responsibility. Minimum wage boards, which are constituted 
in each province, now recommend wage levels for workers of different skills 
levels and in different industries.100 In light of this devolution of power, flexibility 
across all levels of government is required if labor laws are to be harmonized 
with international commitments. 
Legislation for Informal Workers
Application of most labor laws does not extend to informal workers. Multiple 
laws with differing definitions of “worker,” “employer,” “establishment,” and 
“ensuing wages” also imply lack of uniform coverage. Own-account and unpaid 
family workers, agriculture, home-based, and domestic employees are not 
recognized as workers, nor are their places of work as “workplaces” (PILER 
2011). Upon legal recognition, these workers can register with their provincial 
employees social security institutes (PESSIs) to receive social protection for 
health and education. 
Most labor laws only apply to firms with 10 or more workers. As a result, 
most small establishments are exempted from them. Moreover, it is common 
practice for SMEs and informal establishments to hire labor on a contractual 
basis, either directly or through outsourcing, to avoid declaring their employees 
as “workers.” Because most labor legislation applies only to workers employed 
100 The status of provincial minimum wage boards is only advisory. As a result, the power to declare wage 
levels rests with the provincial government.
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directly, this arrangement lets employers circumvent labor legislation, reduce 
overhead costs, and allows a cheap supply of labor. 
Over the years, superior courts have taken notice of this legal subterfuge or 
strategy to conceal (Hisam 2015).101 They now hold that a laborer is considered 
a factory owner’s employee, even if the laborer is technically the employee of 
a subcontractor. Liability for labor now rests with the individual who effectively 
benefits from its production. Nonetheless, laborers usually lack the capacity to 
acquire adequate knowledge of the law or legal representation. 
Labor policies have also remained divorced from legislation. As a result, the 
country’s five official labor policies (1955, 1959, 1969, 1972, and 2001) have not 
resulted in any significant pro-labor legislation. The 2001 Labour Policy—that 
came out after 29 years—did not even acknowledge the right of association 
for all workers. It also failed to extend this right to agriculture and informal 
sector workers. The most recent Labour Policy (GOP 2010) is also considered 
deficient on several accounts. For example, it only applies to agriculture workers 
who work on mechanized farms. Even then, this coverage only extends to 
compensation for work-related injuries or death, which is already a provision of 
the Workmen’s Compensation Act (1923).
Women and Labor Laws
The only labor laws specific to women include the right to maternity leave and 
protection from sexual harassment, the latter resulting from the Protection of 
Women against Harassment at the Workplace Act (2010). However, a new law 
for home-based workers (mostly women) is currently under consideration.102 
There is also a law that grants working women and children the right to work 
fewer hours than men, but this is rarely implemented. 
The Labour Policy (GOP 2010) fails to outline strategic actions for addressing 
gender disparities in the workforce and at the workplace. There are no provisions 
for post-delivery conditions, such as for breast-feeding mothers. Moreover, as 
mothers with young children are not given any concessions, or options for child 
care, they are often forced to abandon their employment.
101 Most recently in Fauji Fertilizer Company Ltd. v. National Industrial Relations Commission (Pakistan Labor 
Case 2014 Supreme Court 10).
102 This applies to two basic categories of home-based workers: (i) those who are self-employed; and 
(ii) those who are subcontracted, piece-rate workers (i.e., home-based workers). Starting in 2006, civil 
society went through a long consultative process to prepare a draft national policy on home-based 
workers. Later, this draft was endorsed by the Ministry of Women Development, who then handed over 
the policy in November 2009 to the Ministry of Labour and Manpower for presentation to the federal 
cabinet for approval. 
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Labor Inspection Laws
The Labor Inspection Policy was issued in 2006, but actions to implement it 
have been slow (ILO 2014). At present, only registered factories and shops are 
covered by the inspection system, while the larger informal sector—including 
agriculture and service sector workers—remains excluded. 
Generally, workers are not consulted during labor inspections, nor are they made 
aware of what an inspection reveals. Although the number of labor inspectors 
has increased from 293 in 2001 to 337 in 2012, there is only one inspector 
for every 250,000 workers in the formal nonagriculture sector (Dawn 2014). 
Furthermore, working conditions have become especially worrisome after the 
provincial governments of Punjab and Sindh suspended labor inspections on 
manufacturing premises for 9 years (2003–2012) under pressure from factory 
owners.103 
Occupational Safety and Health
Existing labor laws are not harmonized with prevalent health and safety 
standards and practices and are practically inadequate to protect workers, as 
they do not conform to international practices. Post-devolution, the Provincial 
Directorate of Labour Welfare is now responsible for implementing laws 
relating to health and safety in industrial and commercial establishments. 
However, there is no independent legislation on safety and health. Instead, 
occupational safety and health considerations are mainly governed by the 
Factories Act (1934) and the Hazardous Occupations Rule (1963), which 
prescribe few technical standards. 
Although they are common all over the world, occupational exposure limits 
on concentrations of any hazardous substance in workplace for a particular 
material or class of materials are also absent from Pakistan’s labor legislation.104 
Many sectors, such as agriculture, construction, and cottage industries that 
entail grave occupational health and safety hazards, are not covered by any law. 
Neither are informal, home-based, or seasonal workers. 
103 Factory inspections have been banned in many areas, supposedly with the aim of ensuring a better 
investment climate. Unfortunately, this change has only served to advance unsafe, unhealthy work 
environments.
104 Occupational exposure limits have been in force for airborne workplace chemicals by multiple 
regulatory and authoritative organizations around the world for more than 60 years. These are 
quantitative standards that set an upper limit on acceptable concentrations of hazardous substances 
in workplace air that apply to a particular material or class of materials.
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Workers’ Welfare and Social Protection
A major social insurance program, the old-age pension program for civil 
servants and military personnel, covers only formal government employees. 
Total federal and provincial pensions payments in 2012–2013 stood at 1.3% 
of gross domestic product, showing that pension expenditures in Pakistan are 
extremely low. As per ILO’s social protection floor databank (2010), only 2.3% 
of the total population receives an old-age pension (ILO 2014). 
A much smaller contributory pension program, the Employees Old-Age 
Benefits Institution (EOBI) provides employees of private sector enterprises 
with 20 employees or more with pensions.105 However, even within this segment 
of the population, it does not achieve full compliance. Although businesses 
with fewer employees can get their employees registered with the EOBI on a 
voluntary basis, this rarely occurs. In 2011, the EOBI started a self-registration 
scheme, but due to administrative and compliance issues, the scheme could 
only cover 1,500 workers and had to be canceled until a law supporting it 
was drafted. In 2012–2013, the EOBI covered 0.373 million beneficiaries 
(MOF 2014). 
Established under the Provincial Employees Social Security Ordinance of 
1965, the Employees Social Security Institution is the country’s major social 
security program. It is financed through a levy of 7.0% of workers’ wages, up to 
a maximum payable by employers of industrial and commercial establishments 
that employ five or more workers. Registered workers are entitled to have 
access to medical facilities through a network of hospitals and dispensaries 
in the provinces, while cash benefits relate to sickness, injury, and maternity 
benefits; a disablement gratuity and pension; and death grant. The target group 
is similar to the EOBI’s. In 2012–2013, it covered about 1.56 million workers 
employed in 41,498 establishments across Pakistan. However, its coverage is 
very low, at less than 3.0% of the total formal sector labor force (Labour Watch 
Pakistan 2011).
Established in 1971, the Workers Welfare Fund provides housing for workers. 
This other sizable social protection program in Pakistan is financed through a 
2.0% levy on the total income of employers as is assessable under the Income 
Tax Ordinance.106 However, its coverage remains extremely low, and of those 
covered, many are not even aware of the current benefits paid under the 
105 An amendment to the EOBI Act limiting its area of applicability to establishments employing more 
than 20 workers instead of 10 further shrunk its coverage.
106 The assessment of income is made in accordance with income tax returns deposited under the Income 
Tax Ordinance.
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scheme. Several SMEs and informal sector establishments avoid registration 
of their workers with the fund to evade the requirement of having to pay their 
mandated contributions. In 2012–2013, the number of beneficiaries under the 
scheme was quite small, at 29,473. 
Another major insurance program is run by retired army officials under the Fauji 
Foundation.107 This program provides social insurance to retired army officers 
and their dependents. The welfare services provided under the scheme include 
health care, education, and vocational and technical education. Although 
it provides employment opportunities for retired army officers, 60.0% of its 
beneficiaries are drawn from the civil sector. While its beneficiaries total nearly 
9 million or 5.0% of the population, the scheme only covers the formal sector 
(Nishtar 2006). 
Health insurance programs are in their infancy in Pakistan, and several 
conditions that favor mandatory social health insurance are not yet evident 
(World Bank 2013b). Although civil servants, both serving and retired and 
their dependents, are provided a fairly comprehensive health coverage, 
health insurance for the private sector remains limited. Where it does exist, 
subscription is optional, and practices differ across establishments. 
The National Rural Support Programme has provided micro health insurance 
for the poor in collaboration with Adamjee Insurance since 2005.108 The Benazir 
Income Support Programme (BISP)109 also introduced a group life insurance 
program called Waseela-e-Sehat in collaboration with State Life Insurance. 
This latter program covered 4.10 million beneficiaries as of 2012.110 While the 
BISP has also begun piloting a micro health insurance program, its coverage 
is limited to BISP beneficiaries. As per figures from 2013, the total number 
of microcredit-linked microinsurance holders in Pakistan is 3.17 million. This 
includes 1.38 million health insurance holders and 1.79 million life insurance 
holders (Arshad 2013). 
107 Fauji Foundation is among the largest business conglomerates in Pakistan that oversees the welfare of 
its beneficiaries through healthcare, education, training, and employment. http://www.fauji.org.pk/fauji/
108 Established in 1991, the National Rural Support Programme is the largest rural support program in terms 
of outreach, staff, and development activities. Adamjee Insurance, a leading insurance company in 
Pakistan, was incorporated as a public limited company on 28 September 1960. 
109 The BISP is a nationwide income support program that provides a minimum income package to the 
poor to protect them against chronic poverty. It has become the country’s flagship social protection 
initiative since 2008, having disbursed over $3.00 billion to more than 5 million beneficiary families. 
110 State Life Insurance Corporation, a state-owned enterprise established by the Nationalization Order of 
1972, carries out business associated with life insurance.
232 Social Protection for Informal Workers in Asia
Quantitative and Qualitative Assessment
This section presents the results of the survey of informal workers in three 
SME subsectors (construction, garment manufacturing, and street vending) 
conducted as part of the study. 
Sources of Livelihood
Most respondents were primary earners. Hence, their job security is critical to 
ensuring sustainability of their household’s income. The average number of 
earning members per household was 2.0, which corresponds to the 1.9 average 
number of earning members per household reported by the Household Income 
and Expenditure Survey (HIES) (PBS 2015). Apart from the primary earner, other 
earning members were also likely to be engaged in low-paying, high-risk work. 
Almost 37.0% reported that their households have no alternate source of income 
other than that brought in by the primary and secondary earners. There was, 
thus, heavy reliance on informal work as the main source of livelihood among the 
households.
Household Size and Average Age
Workers from the construction subsector had larger families (i.e., seven 
members on average) and more dependents than the other two subsectors, 
a larger family being an important indicator of the vulnerability of such 
households. The latest HIES recorded the average household size at 6.4, with 
a slightly lower urban household size of 6.1 (PBS 2015). The average number 
of dependents per worker surveyed was 6.7. This is slightly higher than the 
average household size of 6.4 reported by the HIES, which may reflect the fact 
that these households belong to the low-income stratum that has higher-than-
average fertility rates (PBS 2015). 
The average age of the respondents was 30–35 years. More than 40.0% of the 
workers were in their 20s, and around 65.0% were married with dependents. This 
is not surprising, given that Pakistan is currently going through a demographic 
transition.
Literacy and Educational Background
A high percentage of the construction workers (41.4%) and street vendors 
(45.1%) were illiterate (Table 5.1). This figure was much lower for the garment 
sector (14.3%), possibly due to the sector’s demand for more skilled work 
such as stitching, operating machines, and cutting. Generally, the respondents 
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belonged to households with a huge deficit of core skills (i.e., literacy and 
numeracy), which employers value and allow a worker to command a relatively 
high wage. On average, 6.4% could only read, 55.2% could both read and write, 
and 34.5% were completely illiterate. 
The majority of respondents had low levels of education, with 30.0% having 
received no schooling at all. Barely 14.0% of the workers had completed 
secondary schooling (i.e., grades VI–VII), while 25.0% had completed primary 
schooling (i.e., grades I–V). Only 5.2% of the respondents had completed 
intermediary schooling (i.e., grades IX and X). 
Valid Identity Cardholders
One positive finding is the relatively high number of Computerized National 
Identity Cardholders among the respondents, at nearly 80.0%. The government’s 
recent drive to enhance registration of the country’s population by the National 
Database and Registration Authority (NADRA), especially for those belonging 
to the low-income strata, now means that access to social protection services 
can potentially be targeted through the Computerized National Identity Card 
database, as is already being done under the BISP.111
111 Established in 2000, Pakistan’s NADRA, is one of the earliest developing country identification 
agencies to use biometrics to ensure unique identification numbers for its citizens. With the estimated 
coverage of the adult population at almost 90.0%, the Computerized National Identification Card 
has become the dominant form of identification for most transactions. NADRA has worked closely 
with the BISP to ensure robust identification of the beneficiaries of the country’s largest cash-transfer 
program, and has helped implement an e-payment system that is linked to this form of identification.
Table 5.1: Literacy Rates of Respondents by Subsector  
(%)
Construction Street Vendors
Garment 
Manufacturing Average
Read 11.4 5.6 1.4 6.4
Read and 
write 47.1 49.3 71.4 55.2
Neither read 
nor write
41.4 45.1 14.3 34.5
Number of 
respondents 70 71 61 202
Source: Survey of Informal Workers 2015 compiled by the author.
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Type of Employment
The respondents included managerial, clerical, and operative workers, with 
sharp variations across the three subsectors.112 In the construction sector, 
27.1% of the respondents were unskilled workers who were hired as daily wage 
earners to do menial physical labor, while 51.4% were low-skilled workers. In the 
garment subsector, 77.1% were high-skilled, 9.8% were low-skilled, and none 
were unskilled (Table 5.2). 
This variation across subsectors is associated with the dynamics of the product 
sold or services offered in the subsector concerned. For instance, the garment 
sector requires highly skilled labor. In contrast, while highly labor-intensive, 
the construction sector does not require all labor to be skilled. Street vendors 
operate on a much smaller scale, with several working as self-employed persons, 
and often only one worker being employed. Hence, the variation in the skillset 
required by the street vendor subsector was less distinctive.
Employment Status
Most employees at the managerial or supervisory level were recruited directly 
by industrial establishments, while others were hired indirectly through a 
subcontractor with whom the employer had formally contracted for providing 
112 For the garment-manufacturing subsector, low-skilled occupations include helpers, storekeepers, 
and guards. High-skilled occupations include cutters, machine operators, packers, pressers, stitchers, 
and technicians. For the construction subsector, supervisors include contractors and supervisors; 
low-skilled occupations include aluminum workers, beam fillers, carpenters, lantern fillers, masons, 
painters, scaffolders, steel fixers, and welders; while high-skilled occupations include electricians, 
engineers, and machine operators.
Table 5.2: Percentage Shares of Respondents Based on Labor Skills
Skill Level Construction Garment Manufacturing
Supervisory 12.9 13.1
High-skilled 8.6 77.1
Low-skilled 51.4 9.8
Unskilled 27.1 0.0
Average number of 
dependents per household 
of respondent (person)
7.0 6.3
Source: Survey of Informal Workers 2015 compiled by the author.
Social Protection for Informal Workers in Pakistan 235
such services.113 Overall, around 42.0% were permanent, 24.0% were contract-
based, 16.0% were daily wage earners, and 17.0% were self-employed, all of 
the latter being street vendors. The highest number of permanent employees 
was in the garment subsector (Table 5.3). Contract-based work was mostly 
concentrated in the construction sector. Daily wagers were found only in the 
construction sector and among street vendors. Street vendors were mostly 
hired on a casual or temporary basis.
Previous Experience
About 30.0% of the respondents had previous employment experience, mostly 
in similar jobs elsewhere. The majority of the workers in the construction 
subsector had been in their current job for 11 years on average, as opposed to 
6 years in garment manufacturing, and 5 years in street vending. The results 
for the construction subsector seem to indicate that construction work is not 
a temporary occupation for most workers. This may be due to the fact that 
transition to higher-paying jobs is difficult from such low-paying, unskilled jobs. 
On the whole, the study finds hardly any evidence of upward mobility. 
Periods of Unemployment
About 36.7% of the respondents had experienced unemployment during 
the past 5  years, with the average duration of unemployment being a little 
113 The subcontractor, in turn, hires labor informally. The factory owner pays the subcontractor a fixed 
price per worker. As can be expected, even if a firm pays the subcontractor the legal minimum wage per 
worker, the workers receive less than the legal minimum wage. The majority of subcontracted workers 
are not represented in official records.
Table 5.3: Respondents with Various Types of Employment 
(%)
Construction
Street 
Vendors Garments Average
Permanent 34.0 24.0 71.0 41.7
Contractual 40.0 4.0 30.0 24.3
Seasonal 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.7
Daily wage 24.0 21.0 0.0 15.8
Unpaid family 
worker
0.0 1.0 0.0 0.4
Self-employed 0.0 48.0 0.0 16.9
Source: Survey of Informal Workers 2015 compiled by the author.
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over 1 year (Table 5.4). The study also finds that workers in the construction 
and street vending subsectors experienced more frequent episodes of 
unemployment (43.0% and 45.0%, respectively) in contrast to workers in 
garment manufacturing (20.0%). Seasonal fluctuations were also common 
throughout the three subsectors, and job availability oscillated in tandem with 
rises and falls in demand, especially in vending fruits, vegetables, and other 
food items. 
Table 5.4: Employment Status of Respondents 
(%)
Construction
Street 
Vendors Garments Average
Previously unemployed 42.9 45.1 20.0 36.7
Current employment 
less than 1 year
35.7 18.1 18.0 24.2
Current employment 
more than 1 year
7.1 6.9 4.9 6.4
Average number 
of years in current 
employment (year)
0.6 1.9 0.9 1.1
Source: Survey of Informal Workers 2015 compiled by the author.
Perceived Degree of Job Security
Around 38.8% of respondents felt that it would be easy to lose their job at any 
time, as they had no job security. Almost 60.0% of the workers in construction, 
39.0% of street vendors, and 13.0% in garment manufacturing felt they could 
easily lose their jobs. The major reasons cited included lack of employment 
contracts and susceptibility to external shocks, particularly in the case of street 
vendors. Those working at the supervisory or contractor level found their jobs 
to be more secure and assumed that their employers would find it harder to 
let them go. 
Job Satisfaction
Most workers felt relief that they are currently employed. However, they were 
well aware that there is an excess supply of unskilled labor, and that they 
could be fired at any time and be replaced with more compliant workers. For 
this reason, workers were willing to stay away from home for months to earn 
an income. 
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Relationship with Current Employer
In terms of employer accessibility and interaction with senior management, 
most workers responded positively. Some of this frequent interaction was 
attributable to the nature of the work itself, such as in the construction 
subsector, which demands that management regularly engage with labor on-
site. For the garment subsector, systems were more streamlined in a factory 
setup. More than 47.0% of the street vendors interviewed were own-account 
workers and, as such, this question was not applicable to them.114 
Work Agreements
About 45.0% of the respondents had no employment contracts. Of those that 
did, 21.0% had written contracts, while the rest had only verbal agreements. 
Overall, barely 11.0% of the respondents had written contracts or employment 
letters from their employers (Table 5.5). For street vendors, work agreements 
were not always possible. 
Table 5.5: Type of Employment Contract by Subsector  
(%)
Type of 
Contract Construction
Street 
Vendors Garments Average
Written 14.0 0.0 20.0 10.9
Verbal 57.0 15.0 48.0 39.5
No contract 29.0 70.0 33.0 44.6
Source: Survey of Informal Workers 2015 compiled by the author.
Skills and Training Requirements
Only 4.3% of respondents (excluding street vendors) had received any kind of 
formal training. Most learned their job skills from experience in the informal 
sector. Around 36.7% of the workers in the garment subsector and 14.0% in 
the construction subsector felt that they could use their skills in another job. 
Since workers in the garment subsector had skills that were more specialized 
than in the other two subsectors, their chances of finding other employment 
were correspondingly higher. Only 14.0% of the respondents were aware of any 
114 Defined in ILO (International Classification by Status in Employment).
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opportunities for improving their skills. Even fewer (around 9.0%) were aware 
of training opportunities provided by the government.
Working Conditions and Hours of Work
On average, most workers worked 9.9 hours per day, 6.6 days per week. Around 
34.5% also worked regular night shifts, and around 7.0% worked night shifts 
only when the employer demanded it (Table 5.6). The demand for night 
work was usually in the garment subsector, particularly when deadlines were 
approaching. Close to 66.0% of the workers in the garment subsector and 81.0% 
in construction worked 8 hours per day. Street vendors worked significantly 
longer hours; around 72.0% worked more than 12 hours per day, and all worked 
Table 5.6: Working Hours by Respondents 
(%)
Construction
Street 
Vendors Garments Average
Hours worked per day
Less than 8 1.0 3.0 2.0 2.0
8 81.0 3.0 66.0 49.1
9 6.0 3.0 15.0 7.7
10 4.0 10.0 7.0 7.0
11 3.0 9.0 2.0 4.8
More than 12 4.0 72.0 10.0 29.7
Average hours per day 8.6 12.2 8.8 9.9
Days worked per week
4 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.4
5 6.0 0.0 0.0 2.1
6 41.0 0.0 64.0 33.5
7 51.0 100.0 36.0 63.7
Average days per week 6.4 7.0 6.4 6.6
Breaks during the day
Yes 97.0 77.0 95.0 89.4
Worked at night
Yes 29.0 54.0 18.0 34.5
No 71.0 46.0 58.0 58.3
Sometimes 0.0 0.0 23.0 7.0
Source: Survey of Informal Workers 2015 compiled by the author.
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Table 5.7: Safety at Workplaces of Respondents 
(%)
Construction Garments Average 
Feel safe at work 79.0 97.0 56.7
Gender-specific dimensions 0.0 3.0 0.9
Negative impact on health 11.0 7.0 5.9
Ever been injured 56.0 22.0 26.1
Note: There are no data for street vendors.
Source: Survey of Informal Workers 2015 compiled by the author.
7 days per week. Almost 10.0% of the respondents did not take a break during 
the day. Again, this number was highest, at 23.0%, among street vendors.
Occupational Health and Work Safety
Around 21.0% of workers in the construction subsector and 3.0% in garment 
manufacturing felt unsafe at work. Of the workers who felt that adequate safety 
regulations were in place, in garment manufacturing, 8.6% said that emergency 
exits are in place, 31.0% said that masks and gloves are regularly used during 
work, 11.4% use helmets and goggles, and 5.7% claimed that regular fire drills 
occur. In the construction subsector, 53.0% reported helmet use, 53.0% wore 
proper boots during work, 13.0% wore masks and gloves, and 13.0% followed 
safety regulations (Table 5.7). 
However, 11.0% of construction workers and 7.0% of garment workers 
claimed that their work negatively impacts their health. The main health and 
safety risks cited included workers (i) inhaling dust and poisonous chemicals, 
(ii)  developing breathing problems and dust allergies, and (iii) falling from 
heights. It was obvious from direct observation during the surveys that working 
conditions are unsatisfactory in some factories and on some work sites. Few, 
or no, safety precautions were advised, particularly in the construction and 
garment subsectors. In fact, two of the firms surveyed did not allow questions 
about safety regulations. Workers eagerly expressed their desire to be shielded 
against hazardous environments and to be provided with adequate safety 
equipment. 
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Remuneration and Benefits
Payment Terms
All of the workers were paid in cash. Of these, 38.0% received monthly 
payments, 26.0% (mostly in the garment subsector) were paid per piece, and 
14.0% (mostly in the construction subsector and street vending) received daily 
payments. Workers were usually paid on time, with 94.0% paid just before the 
end of the month (Table 5.8). A significant number (42.0%) were also paid 
overtime. However, 33.0% of the respondents said there were instances in 
which they had been paid late or not paid at all. 
Fines are usually imposed for legal violations, and additional compensation is 
mandated if workers are underpaid, particularly those who work in factories. 
However, the study confirms that the fines levied constitute an insufficient 
disincentive. As most employers underreport employment because of the 
outsourcing loophole, fines and compensation add up to less than the increase 
Table 5.8: Payment Terms of Respondents 
(%)
Payment Term Construction
Street 
Vendors Garments Average
Monthly 26.0 25.0 67.0 38.0
Daily 19.0 23.0 0.0 14.7
Hourly 6.0 0.0 0.0 2.1
Piece-rate 0.0 52.0 25.0 25.8
Bimonthly 21.0 0.0 8.0 9.8
Weekly 23.0 0.0 0.0 8.0
Lump sum 6.0 0.0 0.0 2.1
Paid on time? 90.0 95.0 97.0 93.9
Frequency of Payment
Start of the month 3.0 2.0 21.0 8.1
End of the month 27.0 23.0 52.0 33.1
Daily 16.0 75.0 0.0 31.9
Weekly 29.0 0.0 7.0 12.2
Bimonthly 20.0 0.0 18.0 12.4
Lump sum 6.0 0.0 2.0 2.7
Not paid 20.0 80.0 2.0 33.1
Source: Survey of Informal Workers 2015 compiled by the author.
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in total cost that would result from full compliance with the law. Acceptance 
and payment of fines are thus the less expensive and more preferred alternative 
for most employers.115 
Salary Range
On average, respondents earned PRs16,802.00 per month. The average 
income earned was lowest among street vendors at PRs14,342.00 per month, 
and highest among construction workers at PRs18,229.00 (Table 5.9). 
However, incomes within the subsectors greatly varied. A few high earners at 
the supervisory level may have inflated the average income for construction 
workers. 
Almost 23.0% of the workers in the construction subsector earned more than 
PRs20,000.00 per month. Among the street vendors, only 14.0% earned more 
than PRs20,000.00 per month, with the corresponding figure for garment 
workers being only 7.0%. 
Interviews with laborers across all subsectors indicated that monthly 
compensation for unskilled workers range from PRs6,000.00 to PRs20,000.00 
115 In the event of noncompliance (i.e., nonpayment of the legal minimum wage by employers), the law 
specifies a penalty of up to 6 months of imprisonment, a fine (PRs200.00–PRs500.00 [$1.95–$4.87]), 
or both, along with payment of arrears to the employee. Such punishments are too mild to provide 
an appropriate disincentive for noncompliance, and need to be made more stringent if complete 
compliance with the law is to be ensured.
Table 5.9: Monthly Salary Range of Respondents 
(%)
Wage 
(’000) Construction
Street 
Vendors Garments Total
Less than PRs10.00 14.0 31.0 21.0 22.4
PRs10.00–PRs15.00 31.0 38.0 46.0 37.7
PRs15.00–PRs20.00 31.0 17.0 26.0 24.9
More than PRs20.00 23.0 14.0 7.0 15.0
Average PRs per 
month
18,229.00 14,342.00 18,028.00 16,802.00
PRs = Pakistan rupees. Exchange rate in 2015 is $1.00 = PRs102.77.
Source: Survey of Informal Workers 2015 compiled by the author.
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for 8–10 hours per day (against the official minimum wage of PRs12,000.00).116 
Female respondents reported lower wages for equivalent work. The average 
monthly salary of female workers in garment manufacturing was PRs8,500.00 
against the overall average of PRs14,000.00. Almost all respondents agreed 
that their compensation is barely enough for subsistence, leaving little or no 
opportunity for saving. In their opinion, higher wages would make them more 
productive. 
Minimum Wage
According to recent research, a family of four in Pakistan requires two household 
members earning the legal minimum wage just to survive (WIEGO 2015). Field 
findings indicated that around half of the respondents were unable to earn the 
legal minimum wage, and that they had more than six dependents on average. 
Only 17.0% of the respondents in construction and garment manufacturing 
were aware of the concept of a legal minimum wage, while none knew the 
correct amount. Far fewer workers in construction (13.0%) were aware of the 
legal minimum wage than garment workers (44.0%). Results from a different 
survey found that only 30.0% of the factories in Shiekhupura paid the legal 
minimum wage to their employees.117 
Benefits
Regarding benefits, 42.5% of the construction and garment worker respondents 
did not receive any benefits, probably because (i) these workers are not 
officially enrolled in any welfare scheme; and (ii) due to a general lack of 
awareness about social protection and welfare schemes, these workers do not 
expect any benefits from their employers. Of those that did receive benefits, 
11.0% received end-of-year bonuses, 13.0% received medical aid, 2.0% received 
funeral benefits, 9.0% contributed to a pension fund, 11.0% were entitled to 
paid sick leave, and just under 2.0% received a housing subsidy. Around 42.0% 
were also paid overtime for extra work, and 31.0% had taken 1 month’s advance 
salary at some point during their current employment, this latter figure being 
highest among garment workers at 56.0%. 
116 Details on minimum wage levels applicable in Punjab Province can be found at Paycheck.pk. In his 
Federal Budget 2015–16 speech, Finance Minister Ishaq Dar announced an increase in the minimum 
wage for private sector workers from PRs12,000.00 to PRs13,000.00 ($126.50) per month. Provincial 
budgets are expected to be released soon, and it is hoped that the minimum wage will be increased in 
these locations as well. 
117 Altaf (2014) mentioned this in the explanation of the methodology employed by that study.
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Knowledge and Awareness of Social Protection
Access to, or awareness of, social protection was very limited among the 
respondents. Only 22.3% had knowledge of any public social protection 
scheme, and only 21.0% recognized the benefits of having access to social 
protection programs (Table 5.10). Only 4.2% of the construction and garment 
workers were currently beneficiaries of any welfare scheme. Again, because 
they did not recognize the benefits of social protection programs, these workers 
were unwilling to enroll in them. Of these, only 36.5% knew how to access social 
protection schemes. Only 8.8% contributed to any social protection program. 
Discussions with government departments also revealed that construction 
workers—especially daily wagers—often refuse to register with PESSIs, as 
they are unwilling to pay a certain proportion of their income as a contribution 
to pension and health insurance. In larger firms, trade unions put constant 
pressure on employers to register their employees for access to social pretection 
provisions. In the informal sector, however, the absence of trade unions and 
collective bargaining units allow smaller firms to bypass social security laws. 
Table 5.10: Respondents’ Knowledge on Social Protection 
(%)
Construction
Street 
Vendors
Garment 
Workers Average
Currently a 
beneficiary of a 
welfare scheme
6.0 0.0 7.0 4.2
Know how to 
gain access
33.0 0.0 83.0 36.5
Contribute 
to any social 
security scheme
0.0 0.0 29.0 8.8
Aware of any 
public social 
security scheme
13.0 0.0 59.0 22.3
Aware of the 
benefits of social 
security
9.0 0.0 59.0 20.9
Taken any loan 
in the past 
6 months
16.0 17.0 11.0 14.8
Source: Survey of Informal Workers 2015 compiled by the author.
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Employee Representation and Associations
One of the significant findings is the absence of unions in most factories and 
worksites visited. This is despite the fact that the rights to organize, form unions 
independent of government or employer influence, and bargain collectively are 
all recognized as fundamental rights of workers by ILO and the government. 
In the construction subsector, only one respondent was a member of a labor 
union. The fact that the law is silent on absence of unions in the informal 
sector is itself a loophole that facilitates noncompliance with the current labor 
legislation. 
In the more organized garment-manufacturing subsector, nearly 35.0% of 
workers were aware of the role of labor unions. However, only 7.0% of the 
construction workers had any knowledge about them. Hence, attempts to 
organize workers are inadequate, despite the fact that 23.0% of the workers 
said they would welcome a union in the firm for which they worked. In fact, 
12.0% of construction and garment workers had already attempted to organize 
themselves for a common objective. Nonetheless, several are afraid of losing 
their jobs, and thus have refrained from collective action altogether. Many also 
felt that since they are receiving their salaries on time, they should not act against 
their employers, even if just to ask for a raise to which they feel rightfully entitled. 
Gender Dimensions
Women are essential to the subcontracting system, especially in the SME 
sector. Most of these workers operate either in small workshops or in their own 
homes. Madadgaar, a working women’s helpline, estimated at least 12 million 
women among the 20 million home-based workers in Pakistan. As per other 
estimates, home-based female workers constitute almost 75.0% of the entire 
informal sector labor force, and include own-account (13.4%), piece-rate or 
subcontracted (24.6%), and unpaid family workers (61.9%) (Azhar 2011). These 
workers have limited access to education, health services, safety provisions, 
and social protection schemes. 
The study finds generally low rates of female participation in paid labor, 
particularly in the construction and street vendor subsectors in which no 
women were among the workers surveyed. In contrast, 16.0% of the garment 
sector respondents were female.
Most females surveyed (i) were young (the average age was 29 years); (ii) were 
unmarried (70.0%); (iii) were literate (i.e., had a few years of formal schooling); 
(iv)  had around three dependents on average; (v) lived in low-income 
settlements adjacent to manufacturing units and factories in urban areas; and 
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(vi) worked either as home-based or piece-rate workers, or were employed on 
a contract basis. 
In the garment subsector, female workers were mainly concentrated in low-
paid, labor-intensive, downstream production activities, while men dominated 
capital-intensive activities such as spinning, and weaving. None of the female 
garment workers surveyed worked in a senior-level position except one 
who was a batch auditor, which is a supervisory position. Despite this, the 
number of small, formally registered factories employing women is significant 
(Altaf 2014). 
SMEs often struggle with regulations that require them to provide maternity 
leave and other benefits for women, as this acts as a disincentive to hire 
women. The lack of supportive facilities such as child care, transport, and 
accommodation in the formal sector discourages women from gaining formal 
employment. The lack of human capital investment in women also results in 
many women from poor and low-income households taking jobs in the informal 
sector that pay little, and that do not require high levels of skills or education 
(Nikitin 2011).
In the absence of facilities for these women, extended family support systems 
often fill the void, although not all working women have access to such systems. 
Further, the uneven division of household labor makes full-time employment 
difficult for many women, particularly poor women who cannot afford the cost 
of child care, even when it is available.
Role of Employers
Most factory owners have found ways to avoid implementing the social 
protection provisions of Pakistan’s labor laws. Even the representative of a 
government agency indicated that factory owners and business people often 
do not cooperate with the social security departments in contributing funds for 
their employees as required by law. 
For instance, it is common practice for factories to underreport their number of 
employees.118 Fieldwork in Sheikhupura revealed that a factory employing 1,300 
workers reported only 200 on its books, and only these workers were insured 
and eligible for social protection entitlements. Second, many factory owners 
hire workers on a temporary basis, thus limiting access by these workers to 
social security and insurance schemes. For example, the Pakistan Readymade 
Garments Manufacturers and Exporters Association accounts for only those 
118 Also confirmed by interviews with members of the PESSI, and by Altaf (2014). 
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workers who are registered with the EOBI and PESSIs. For example, if a unit has 
2,000 workers and only 500 are regular workers, the association only reports 
those 500 workers. As verified through field visits, workers in each registered 
unit include a mix of salary-based registered workers, a larger number of piece-
rate unregistered contract workers who work on the production line (on the 
factory premises), and piece-rate home-based workers.
While on-the-spot inspection of enterprises and construction sites can act as 
a deterrent to concealing facts that would necessitate compliance with labor 
laws, collusion between employers and labor inspectors is common. It is often 
implicitly understood that factory owners know when inspections take place, 
thus giving them ample time to misrepresent numbers. Despite the fact that 
the minimum wage introduced by the government is rarely implemented, 
inspections also fail to uncover violations of the minimum wage law. Such weak 
inspection systems enable factory owners to get away with noncompliance 
with labor laws generally. 
Conclusions and Policy Implications
Informal workers in Pakistan come from a full spectrum of economic 
backgrounds, and are more prone to transitory poverty than their formal sector 
counterparts, because most informal workers are uneducated, lack adequate 
core skills, have minimal income to enable savings, belong to large families with 
a significant number of dependents, and experience seasonal fluctuations in 
employment. Hence, the household income, of informal workers are commonly 
fluctuated. 
Most informal workers (especially home-based and domestic workers, street 
vendors, and other unskilled laborers) are not recognized as workers by official 
policies. As a result, they are denied access to labor protection and social 
welfare. Information or knowledge among workers about social protection 
initiatives, entitlement to welfare and labor protection, and overall labor rights 
are also limited, making it easier for SMEs and informal employers to circumvent 
social security provisions.
The earnings of most informal workers are just around, or even below, the 
level of the legal minimum wage, the latter being neither publicized widely 
nor enforced properly. Women are particularly vulnerable with regard to wage 
discrimination toward informal workers, because (i) they are concentrated in 
the informal sector, particularly in home-based work; and (ii) their average 
wages are lower overall than those of their male counterparts. 
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Long-term employment relationships have been replaced by contract 
employment, outsourced or part-time, or home-based work. Firms prefer 
short-term contractual arrangements, as these save on financial contributions 
toward social security, including those paid to provident funds, pensions, 
insurance, compensation for occupational injury or death, maternity benefits, 
and education access. In short, there is no effective social protection for workers 
hired indirectly through subcontractors.
Employers frequently underreport the number of their employees and pay 
wages below the minimum wage. Further, they discriminate against workers 
who complain about such behaviors, and discourage collective action that 
would reveal that they are evading compliance with legal requirements. Fines, 
where imposed, are an insufficient deterrent to violations, as they are much less 
than the cost factories would incur to comply with labor laws. Trade unions are 
largely absent from the informal economy, in part because informal workers 
remain mostly disparate and spread out. 
The recent substantial rise in the total number of computerized national 
identity cardholders in Pakistan has significant implications for expanding social 
protection coverage to informal workers. This is because workers with cards 
are qualified to receive skills training at any vocational training institute and/or 
employment in the formal sector. 
Overall working conditions in the informal sector are unsatisfactory. Factory 
owners do not ensure safety measures for workers exposed to hazardous 
materials or provide them with appropriate safety equipment. Unlike formal 
businesses, street vendors often lack access to basic infrastructure such as 
shelter, toilets, electricity, and water. 
Much needs to be done to integrate informal workers into mainstream 
social protection programs beyond short-term targeted social assistance. 
Despite institutional and legal frameworks for securing basic workers’ rights, 
implementation excludes the vast majority of informal workers from social 
protection. Informal workers need government support that focuses on 
providing some basic level of economic security in terms of wages; regularity 
of work; and other factors that allow regular, decent, and productive work, 
in addition to ensuring provision of basic amenities (e.g., shelter, education, 
and health). 
To improve social protection coverage for informal workers, it is important 
to increase budgetary allocations for social protection that built into the 
government’s medium-term budgetary framework. 
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There is a need for compulsory coverage of social protection for informal sector 
workers by allowing workers to self-register with social security institutions. 
Where applicable, payments linked to social protection provisions should be 
matched to the status of the enterprise concerned and the ability of the worker 
to pay.
Any effective and well-grounded skills development strategy should incorporate 
the informal sector workers and identify areas for appropriate interventions. 
Since many informal workers are poor and have little education, courses must 
be tailored to their needs. Training programs that integrate on-the-job training 
with classroom components are seen as being more successful than courses 
that exclusively include classroom components (Horati and McArdle 2013). 
Public training funds can be transferred to private and nonprofit providers 
on a competitive basis. Performance-based tendering creates incentives for 
ensuring the relevance of training courses, while contracting can be designed 
so that the groups that are the most difficult to reach are not excluded. 
A formal structure within the existing legal framework can be made for 
contractors who supply informal labor to factories and other establishments. 
Companies could be allowed to hire only from registered contractors. This 
would, in turn, provide an incentive for contractors to register themselves as a 
prerequisite for operating in the labor market.
Minimum wage boards need to be able to recommend minimum wage rates for 
domestic workers, and to also have the right to announce enforceable minimum 
wages. Publication of a detailed minimum wage notification in a provincial 
government’s official gazette is not by itself sufficient to ensure that employers 
and workers know about the newly announced rates. Minimum wages should 
be widely publicized through print and electronic media. Detailed notifications 
must also be made available on provincial labor departments’ websites.
The government needs to establish a council on health and safety or a similar 
institution that ensures a legal framework that covers all workers. It must 
also establish and empower tripartite monitoring committees at the district, 
provincial, and federal levels that efficiently and strictly monitor compliance 
with labor rights, and initiate an incentive scheme for employers to directly 
commit to improving working conditions in their companies.
In addition, labor welfare standards need to be introduced for all factory workers, 
including those employed through subcontractors. Independent monitoring 
units must periodically assess factories, and assign ratings based on the degree 
to which the standards have been met. Employers who receive high ratings can 
be rewarded through tax benefits or other financial incentives.
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CHAPTER 6
Social Protection for Informal 
Workers in the People’s 
Republic of China: A Study  
of Micro, Small, and  
Medium-Sized Enterprises
Xiulan Zhang and Yuning Wu
Abstract
Two-thirds of employees who work in micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are informal workers; most are migrant workers. Informal employment 
is largely concentrated in the construction, small-scale manufacturing, and 
service sectors. 
This study aims to assess various social protection programs for informal 
workers in the PRC. It reveals that the PRC’s high social insurance contributions 
make it difficult for MSME employers to comply with labor laws. The hukou 
system (the official registry of residents at their places of birth) also makes 
it cumbersome for migrant workers in the informal sector to access social 
protection programs in their new jurisdiction. Moreover, fewer female 
employees have labor contracts compared with their male counterparts, and 
female MSME employees participate less in social protection programs.
The study recommends amending policies to accommodate the participation 
of MSME employers and employees in social protection programs, including 
increasing the level of benefits to narrow the gap between the levels paid 
by programs for residents and those for employees. There should also 
be streamlined administration of social insurance programs to facilitate 
participation and benefit payments, particularly in transferring vested rights 
from one residence to another. Furthermore, it is recommended to provide 
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more training opportunities for informal workers, increase awareness of labor 
rights, and represent employee interests in trade unions or other organizations.
Introduction
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has a labor force of 773 million, of 
which 393 million work in urban areas (MOHRSS 2015). No specific statistics 
concerning informal workers are available, as there is no official definition 
of informal workers in the PRC. Those in urban areas with no official labor 
contracts or social insurance are defined as informal workers. In all, five types 
of work-related social insurance programs for employees are available in the 
PRC: (i) basic pension insurance for employees, (ii) basic medical insurance for 
employees, (iii) unemployment insurance, (iv) work-related injury insurance, 
and (v) maternity insurance.
Eighty-eight percent of the labor force works for enterprises under labor 
contracts, but not all of these workers participate in social insurance programs, 
despite such participation being legally required by both labor contract law 
and social insurance law. Informal workers, including part-time workers, 
casual workers, and self-employed persons, can participate in social insurance 
programs for employees on a voluntary basis. However, such participation is 
limited to pension insurance and medical insurance for employees. 
Park, Wu, and Du (2012) estimated the extent of informal employment in the 
urban labor market by using 2010 household survey data. They concluded 
that informal urban workers accounted for 37.2% of all urban workers. Their 
estimate differs from that of this study, because their calculations were based 
on six large cities, whereas this study uses national data. Table 6.1 shows the 
numbers of workers participating in the five social insurance schemes, as well as 
their percentage shares in the total number of urban workers. 
In the PRC, migrants constitute the bulk of informal workers. Most are farmers 
who have farmland in rural areas under the hukou system (official registry of 
residents at their places of birth), but who work in nonfarm activities. According 
to a survey conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), there were 
274 million migrant workers in 2014. Of these, 168 million migrated to urban 
areas where they now work and live, while the rest remained in their villages and 
continued to work, but in nonagriculture occupations (State Council of China 
2015). About 41.0% of migrants living in urban areas had contracts with their 
employers. 
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If the rate of participation in social insurance programs is used to estimate 
the percentage share of formal workers in the total number of migrants, the 
resulting estimated percentage share is rather low—much lower than if the 
share of formal workers in the total number of migrants is estimated by using 
the share of migrant workers with employment contracts (Table 6.2).
Table 6.2: Share of Migrants in Urban Areas Covered  
by Social Insurance Programs  
(%)
Type of Insurance Program Coverage
Pension insurance 16.4
Medical insurance 18.2
Unemployment insurance 9.8
Work-related injury insurance 29.7
Maternity insurance 7.1
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China. 2014. China Population and Employment Statistics Yearbook 
2014. Beijing. 
This study aims to assess various programs and policies designed to expand 
social protection programs for workers in micro, small, and medium-sized 
enterprises (MSMEs). It also seeks to offer a pragmatic approach for assisting 
workers in the informal economy to address risks and reduce poverty and to 
Table 6.1: Workers Covered by Social Insurance Programs
Type of Coverage
Number of Workers
(millions)
Percentage Share in 
Total Urban Workers
Pension insurance 255 64.9
Medical insurance 210 53.5
Unemployment insurance 170 43.4
Work-related injury insurance 206 52.5
Maternity insurance 170 43.3
Sources: Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (MOHRSS), Government of the People’s 
Republic of China. 2014. Human Resources and Social Security Development Report 2014. Beijing: Social 
Protection for Informal Workers in the People’s Republic of China, p. 285; MOHRSS. 2015. Human Resources 
and Social Security Development Report 2014. http://www.mohrss.gov.cn/SYrlzyhshbzb/dongtaixinwen/ 
buneiyaowen/201505/t20150528_162040.htm [in Mandarin].
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distill policy lessons for expanding social protection programs for workers in 
MSMEs.
Methodology
A survey of 273 randomly selected MSME workers across the country was 
conducted to analyze the implementation of social protection for informal 
workers. Of these, 119 were located in Chongqing (the southwest), 104 in 
Changsha (the central region), and 50 in Beijing (the east). These firms were 
in the construction, small-scale manufacturing, and service sectors. Of the 
273 respondents, 12.5% worked in construction, 25.3% in manufacturing, and 
62.3% in the service sector. Their gender composition was 36.8% female and 
62.8% male. 
In addition to using a survey questionnaire, statistical data released by the 
government were gathered. Data on migrant workers is based on the annual 
NBS surveys. 
Limitations of the Study
This study is not meant to be exhaustive, and its limitations are as follows. First, 
the study does not differentiate between migrant workers and local workers. 
As a result, comparing the disparity between local and migrant workers on 
the degree of access to social protection programs is not possible. Second, 
the survey was performed in large cities such as Beijing and Chongqing 
directly under the administration of the State Council. Thus, the urban focus 
may overestimate the number of informal workers who have employment 
contracts, since the study focused on Changsha, the provincial capital of 
Hunan Province and the results may have been used as proxy variables for 
entire provinces or the nation as a whole. Similarly, the study’s urban focus may 
overestimate the degree to which employees are covered by social insurance 
programs. Finally, the same constraints apply to results on the remuneration 
levels of MSME employees.
Micro, Small, and Medium-Sized Enterprises  
in the People’s Republic of China
There are more than 50 million MSMEs in the PRC, and the contribution of 
these firms to the national economy is significant. In fact, the share of MSMEs 
in gross domestic product (GDP) exceeds 60.0%. These firms have contributed 
significantly to the PRC’s economic and social development (Wang 2014). The 
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2002 SME Promotion Law sets guidance and standards for government support 
to SMEs such as training, environmental protection, or starting a business. 
In 2011, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology issued the 
Regulations on MSME Classification Criteria. The new guidelines replaced 
the previous set of criteria promulgated by the State Economic and Trade 
Commission in 2003. Significant differences between the two sets of criteria 
include a narrowed scope of the definition of medium-sized enterprises, 
expanded scope of the definition of small enterprises, and establishment of a 
new category for micro enterprises (Table 6.3). 
The 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2012 
emphasized the development of small and micro enterprises, especially 
in technology, as an important driver in promoting transformation of the 
national economy. According to the 2013 report on small and micro enterprise 
development by the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (2014), 
there were 15.3 million enterprises, of which 11.7 million were small or micro 
(76.6% of the total). If the 44.4 million individual businesses are included in this 
total, small and micro enterprises account for 94.2% of all MSMEs.
Micro and small enterprises have become the PRC’s major source of 
employment since they (i) create 4–5 times more workplaces than large and 
medium-sized enterprises at the same level of assets per capita, (ii) are easy 
to establish, (iii) provide jobs for the urban unemployed and redundant-labor 
farmers who have migrated from rural areas to urban locales, (iv) absorb 70.0% 
of new employment and reemployment, and (v) employ more than 80.0% of all 
migrants (State Administration for Industry and Commerce 2014).
Most informal employment is concentrated in the three sectors of construction, 
small-scale manufacturing, and services. In 2013, the PRC’s construction GDP 
was CNY3.90 trillion ($629.00 billion),119 equivalent to 6.9% of the national 
GDP. It is difficult for some construction workers to participate in and contribute 
to social insurance programs because workers are paid by the day or task. As a 
result, work-related injury insurance has very low coverage among construction 
workers (about 14.0% based on the NBS [2014]). 
The small-scale manufacturing sector is geographically scattered, located 
in rural–urban junction areas, and generally characterized by few technical 
skills with undesirable work environments and low pay. As a result, this sector 
primarily hires migrant workers. Meanwhile, the service sector is relatively 
119 US dollar amounts are derived from ADB (2014). The average exchange rate is CNY6.20 to $1. 00.
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Table 6.3: Classification Standards for Some Micro, Small,  
and Medium-Sized Enterprises in the People’s Republic of China
Sector
Specific 
Standard  
(upper limit) Medium-Sized Small Micro
Agriculture, 
forestry, 
livestock, 
farming, and 
fisheries 
Operating 
revenue less than 
CNY200.00 
million
Operating 
revenue more 
than or equal to 
CNY5.00 million
Operating 
revenue more 
than or equal to 
CNY0.50 million
Operating 
revenue less than 
CNY0.50 million
Retail sales Number of 
employees less 
than 300 persons 
or operating 
revenue less than 
CNY200.00 
million
Number of 
employees at 
least 50 persons 
and operating 
revenue at least 
CNY5.00 million 
Number of 
employees at 
least 10 persons 
and operating 
revenue at least 
CNY1.00 million
Number of 
employees less 
than 10 persons 
or operating 
revenue less than 
CNY1.00 million
Transport Number of 
employees 
less than 
1,000 persons 
or operating 
revenue less than 
CNY300.00 
million
Number of 
employees at 
least 300 persons 
and operating 
revenue at least 
CNY30.00 
million 
Number of 
employees at 
last 20 persons 
and operating 
revenue at least 
CNY2.00 million 
Number of 
employees less 
than 20 persons 
or operating 
revenue less than 
CNY2.00 million
Restaurants 
and catering
Number of 
employees less 
than 300 persons 
or operating 
revenue less 
than CNY100.00 
million
Number of 
employees at 
least 100 persons 
and operating 
revenue at least 
CNY20.00 
million
Number of 
employees at 
least 10 persons 
and operating 
revenue at least 
CNY1.00 million
Number of 
employees less 
than 10 persons 
or operating 
revenue less than 
CNY1.00 million
Software and 
information 
technology 
services
Number of 
employees less 
than 300 persons 
or operating 
revenue less 
than CNY100.00 
million
Number of 
employees at 
least 100 persons 
and operating 
revenue at least 
CNY10.00 
million
Number of 
employees at 
least 10 persons 
and operating 
revenue at least 
CNY0.50 million
Number of 
employees less 
than 10 persons 
or operating 
revenue less than 
CNY0.50 million
Real estate 
development 
Operating 
revenue less 
than CNY2.00 
billion or total 
assets less than 
CNY100.00 
million
Operating 
revenue at least 
CNY10.00 
million or total 
assets at least 
CNY50.00 
million
Operating 
revenue at least 
CNY1.00 million 
or total assets at 
least CNY20.00 
million
Operating 
revenue less 
than CNY1.00 
million or total 
assets less than 
CNY20.00 
million
Note: CNY6.46 = $1.00.
Source: China Briefing. 2011. China Issues Classification Standards for SMEs. http://www.china-briefing.
com/news/2011/07/07/china-issues-classification-standards-for-smes.html
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labor-intensive and includes economic activities such as wholesale and retail, 
hotels and catering, transport, and resident services.
Policy and Regulatory Framework 
Social protection for informal workers mainly includes work security and social 
insurance, both of which are mainly mandated by the Ministry of Human 
Resources and Social Security (MOHRSS) under the State Council. According 
to the Law of Labor Contract, the administrative department of labor under 
the MOHRSS is in charge of supervising and administering implementation 
of the labor contract system nationwide. Counterpart administrative 
departments of labor have likewise been established as local government 
units at the provincial, city, and county levels. These agencies are responsible 
for the supervision and implementation of the labor contract system in their 
respective jurisdictions. 
The Law of Labor Contract also stipulates that trade unions should protect 
the legitimate rights and interests of workers, including implementation 
supervision of collective contract agreements by employing units. In the 
event that an employing unit violates labor laws or regulations, or breaches 
the provisions of a collective labor contract, the trade union has the right to 
put forward its case and to request rectification. Further, if a worker requests 
arbitration or initiates a lawsuit against an employing unit, the trade union has 
the right to provide him or her with support and assistance in accordance with 
the law.
The Social Insurance Law stipulates that the social insurance administrative 
departments of the State Council are responsible for administering social 
insurance programs throughout the country. Other relevant departments 
of the State Council are responsible for certain aspects of social insurance 
programs per their respective duties. There are also counterpart social 
insurance administrative departments at the provincial, county, and city 
levels that are responsible for various aspects of administration of social 
insurance programs. 
Social insurance agencies affiliated with government social insurance 
administrative departments are responsible for providing social insurance 
services such as social insurance registration, creation of personnel records, 
and payment of social insurance benefits. Trade unions also protect the legal 
interest of workers in accordance with the law. As a result, they are entitled to 
study social insurance issues, join social insurance supervision commissions, 
and supervise issues related to the social insurance interests of workers.
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Compliance and Effectiveness of Labor-Related Laws 
The labor contract and social insurance laws entitle all full-time workers 
employed by MSMEs to social protection. They allow such workers to clarify 
the responsibilities of administrative departments and trade unions as these 
relate to protecting employee interests. 
However, not all of the provisions of the laws are fully implemented. Migrant 
workers, particularly who work in MSMEs, provide a notable exception. In fact, 
only 41.4% of rural migrants in urban areas work under written employment 
contracts. Further, less than half of these participate in employee social 
insurance programs as required by both laws. 
Several factors are responsible for this. First, many informal employees—migrant 
workers in particular—are not aware of their rights under the labor contract 
and social insurance laws. Second, it is not uncommon to have agreements 
between MSME employers and employees to not participate in employee 
social insurance programs due to the relatively high rates of contribution. 
Young, healthy workers often prefer to maximize their take-home pay and 
have their insurance premiums included in their net income than to make the 
contributions themselves. Third, migrant workers already participate in medical 
and pension insurance schemes for residents in their hukou; as a result, they are 
not eligible to participate in schemes of the areas to which they have migrated. 
Fourth, the government faces a difficult choice regarding enforcing legally 
mandatory participation in social insurance schemes by MSMEs and their 
employees. 
Most MSME employers cannot fulfill their obligation to pay insurance 
contributions due to the high levels of contribution relative to their low financial 
capacity. Government labor and social insurance departments try to ensure 
compliance with the labor contract and social insurance laws, but they are 
also aware that employer contributions account for about 30.0% of payrolls.120 
Forcing full compliance could result in closure of many MSMEs, resulting in 
significant increase of unemployment rate. Thus, employers’ participation has 
become voluntary and, in effect, a violation of existing law. 
Labor unions do not generally exist in MSMEs. The focus of the All-China 
Association of Trade Unions is mostly on working conditions, ensuring that 
workers are paid the full amount of wages that they are due, and ensuring 
compliance with work-related injury insurance.
120 Typically, pension insurance accounts for 20.0% of the total payroll; medical insurance, at least 6.0%; 
unemployment insurance, 2.0%; work-related injury insurance, 0.9%; and maternity insurance, 0.8%.
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Social Protection Programs
Social Insurance Programs for Employees
Basic Pension Insurance for Employees
Basic pension insurance for employees was established in 1991 to replace 
the retirement scheme. This program benefits all working units and their 
employees. The benefits payable under the program consist of the social 
pooling pension and individual account pension. The social pooling pension is 
calculated as the average (i.e., mean) level of wages in relevant localities paid 
during the previous year, plus the indexed contributory wages of the employee 
concerned paid during all contributory years times the number of years 
of employment. 
The employer’s contribution to the social pooling fund should not exceed 
20.0% of that employer’s payroll. Employees then pay 8.0% of their contributory 
wages to their individual accounts. To receive a monthly pension, the employee 
must have (i) made contributions into the social pooling fund for at least 
15 years; and (ii) reached the legal retirement age, which is 60 years for males, 
55 years for female management staff members and professionals, and 50 years 
for female laborers. In 2014, the national monthly average pension was about 
CNY2,000.00 ($326.00).121
Basic Medical Insurance for Employees
Basic medical insurance for employees, which covers all working units and 
their employees in urban areas, was established in 1999. Both employers and 
employees contribute to basic medical insurance. The only exceptions are 
employees who work irregular hours, for whom participation is voluntarily. An 
employer’s required contribution is 6.0% of the total payroll, while individuals 
contribute 2.0% of their gross wages. 
This program has both a social pooling fund component and an individual 
account component. The social pooling fund covers medical expenses for 
inpatient care and chronic illnesses that are treated in clinics, while the 
individual account covers outpatient services and minor illnesses. 
Individuals are also required to make co-payments when medical services 
are received, which are paid through deductibles. For the social pooling fund, 
121 The exchange rate is CNY6.14 to $1.00. ADB (2015).
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the deductible paid by the individual is 10.0%. There is a ceiling on individual 
payments, which is six times the annual local average wage of the previous year. 
Retirees who have completed the required number of years of contributions 
are eligible for medical benefits without having to make further contributions. 
Their deductibles and co-payments are also lower than those of the working 
population. 
Unemployment Insurance
The PRC established unemployment insurance in 1986, and the State Council 
promulgated the Regulation on Unemployment Insurance in 1999. The 
eligibility requirements include (i) having contributed for at least 1 year, (ii) being 
involuntarily unemployed, and (iii) being actively engaged in seeking work. The 
level of benefits paid is subject to a ceiling, which is equal to the minimum 
wage, and a floor, which is equal to the minimum living guarantee amount set 
by the local government concerned. The maximum duration of unemployment 
insurance benefits depends on the duration of employment, which is 
(i) 12 months for those who have contributed for 1–5 years, (ii) 18 months for 
those who have contributed 5–10 years, and (iii) 24 months for those who have 
contributed more than 10 years. 
Work-Related Injury Insurance
Issued in 2003 and revised in 2010, the Regulation on Work-Related Injury 
Insurance governs administration of this program. Employers are fully 
responsible for funding the program. There are three contribution rates, each 
related to the level of risk of work-related injury in the industry. In addition, 
floating rates are applied to each enterprise according to its incidence of 
work-related injury over the previous 1–3 years. The national average 
contribution rate is less than 1.0% of the total amount of the payroll of the 
enterprise. 
Benefits are paid to workers injured at their workplaces as a result of their 
employment, or for any work-related reason. Benefits include payment for 
medical treatment and rehabilitation from work-related injuries, lump-sum 
payment in the event of death or loss of capacity to work, lifetime injury 
allowance for complete or partial loss of capacity to work, allowance for nursing 
expenses, and survivors’ allowance. 
Maternity Insurance
Maternity insurance mainly covers enterprises and employed workers in urban 
areas. Employers are fully responsible for funding the entire program. Currently, 
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the maximum contribution rate is not more than 1.0% of the total payroll of the 
firm. In addition to covering medical and maternity costs incurred in a hospital, 
participating female workers who give birth can receive a maternity allowance 
for a duration of not less than 90 days. This allowance is equal to the average 
wage at the working unit of the employee. 
Social Insurance Programs for Residents 
Basic Pension Program for Residents
In 2008, a new national rural pension program was introduced, consisting of a 
basic pension and individual account pension (State Council of China 2009). 
According to the State Council policy, all rural residents aged 16 years or above 
(excluding students) are required to make a monthly contribution of CNY60.00 
($8.21)122 to the basic pension. The central government is financially responsible 
for contributions to programs operating in the middle and western provinces, 
and incurs half of the funding for programs operating in eastern provinces such 
as Guangdong. 
To encourage residents’ participation in the program, the Guangdong provincial 
government, for example, provides CNY10.00 ($1.37), while the city and 
county government each provides an additional CNY10.00 ($1.37) to the 
participant (Guangdong Government 2009). In practice, the local government 
can increase its level of contribution at its own discretion. Meanwhile, residents 
contribute to the individual account pension, with the government matching 
the funds. 
The new basic pension program for residents who live in rural areas was piloted 
in 10.0% of all counties nationwide in 2009. Coverage was expanded nationwide 
to 40.0% of all counties in 2011 and 100.0% of all counties in 2012. The basic 
pension program for urban residents was established in 2011; contributions for 
urban residents were set at a higher level than rural residents. By 2012, the basic 
pension program for urban residents covered all urban areas. In 2014, the State 
Council merged the programs for rural and urban residents into one program, 
with an expected average contribution of CNY100.00 (about $16.00)123 
per month. 
By the end of 2014, 842.3 million, or 70.6%, of eligible people participated in at 
least one pension insurance program (MOHRSS 2015). Of these participants, 
229 million were those who received pension benefits. 
122 Exchange rate of CNY7.30 to $1.00.
123 See footnote 124. 
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New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme
The Rural Cooperative Medical Program was based on the collective economy 
that operated during the 1960s and 1970s. In 2003, the PRC initiated the New 
Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme to cover expenses associated with serious 
illnesses contracted by rural residents. This scheme is pooled at the county 
level with voluntary household participation and administered by the National 
Health and Family Planning Commission. 
In 2014, the per capita contribution level was CNY362.00 ($59.00), of which 
CNY320.00 ($52.00) was paid through government subsidies, with individuals 
bearing the remainder of the cost. In 2010, 836 million rural residents, or 
96.0% of the population, participated in the program. However, by 2014, the 
number of participants declined to 802 million, in part because the program 
was integrated into the medical insurance program for urban residents in some 
localities. Program participation for rural residents will likely continue to decline 
in the coming years due to increasing urbanization. 
Medical Insurance for Urban Residents
In 2007, the State Council required local government units to establish a 
medical insurance system for urban residents who had no jobs and lacked 
medical insurance coverage. Due to individual contributions being heavily 
subsidized by the local governments, today enrollment is growing rapidly. By the 
end of 2014, about 1.3 billion people were covered by one medical insurance 
scheme or another.
In 2014, the annual local government subsidy for each urban resident 
was CNY320.00 ($52.00), while the average individual contribution was 
CNY120.00 ($19.00). Participant co-payment of this program is quite high, but 
reimbursement rates are relatively low. In 2014, only 70.0% of medical expenses 
within the covered range were reimbursed by the fund. 
Social Assistance Programs
Minimum Living Standard Guarantee 
The minimum living standard guarantee is of two types: urban dibao124 and 
rural dibao. Both are means-tested programs that provide regular cash and/or 
in-kind support to poor households whose income falls under a certain 
threshold. However, there are significant disparities in the allowance levels 
124 Dibao is defined as regular cash and/or in-kind support to poor households up to a locally defined 
poverty line.
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of urban and rural areas across provinces, including allowances paid in cities 
within a single province. In addition, government units responsible for setting 
the level of the allowance locally often set their allowance levels based on their 
own financial capability. 
Initiated by some of the more economically developed regions in the 1990s, 
urban dibao was subsequently expanded to include all regions under the 
Regulation on Urban Dibao, which the State Council issued in 1998. While 
both the central government and local government units share the financial 
responsibility for the urban dibao program, the central government fully 
finances the program in the middle and western regions. In 2014, the average 
level of monthly benefits paid to recipients of the urban dibao program was 
CNY275.00 ($45.00). 
Following the expansion of the urban dibao program to all of the country’s 
urban areas, the PRC began expanding the program to rural areas, replacing 
the traditional low-level and less-regular support systems that operated 
there. Currently, local governments finance the rural dibao program, with the 
central government supporting the program. In 2014, the national average 
level of monthly benefits paid to individuals under the rural dibao program was 
CNY125.00 ($20.00). 
By the end of 2014, the Minimum Living Standard Guarantee program—the 
country’s largest social assistance initiative—covered 52.1 million rural poor 
residents and 18.8 million of the PRC’s urban poor. 
Medical Assistance Program
Launched in late 2003, the medical assistance program protects poor 
households against the impact of serious illness, a major source of poverty in 
the PRC. Jointly financed by the central and local governments, the medical 
assistance program supports participation by poor households in the New Rural 
Cooperative Medical Scheme or its counterpart medical insurance scheme for 
urban residents, and provides payment for the medical expenses of these poor 
households.
Implementation Challenges and Opportunities 
The PRC provides social protection to all of its citizens. However, some 
constraints to delivering social protection to informal workers remain. 
First, the social insurance system for employees was initially designed for formal 
workers, and was only later extended to informal workers. As a result, the 
system faces challenges to match affordability to pay the contribution with the 
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willingness of informal sector employers and employees to participate in them. 
The wages that informal workers receive are lower than their formal sector 
counterparts. On average, the percentage share of informal workers’ income 
on social insurance contributions is larger than that of the formal sector. MSME 
employers also face affordability challenges, paying only contributions to their 
core employees or none at all. Strict enforcement of compliance regulations for 
employer participation becomes a challenge.
Second, many social protection programs for residents were designed for 
those with hukou status. Local government units finance these programs, 
but they are not responsible for financing social protection benefits for 
hukou residents of jurisdictions outside of their own, unless these out-of-
jurisdiction residents are employed and contribute as employees in the 
jurisdiction to which they have migrated. As a result, migrant workers can only 
participate in social insurance programs as residents of the jurisdictions in 
which they are hukou-registered, which means returning to their jurisdictions 
of origin to participate in these programs. If they become ill in an area to which 
they migrated, the rate reimbursed in that city is lower than the rate paid in 
their jurisdiction of origin. However, if there were no hukou constraints on 
migration, the relatively high levels of social protection benefits paid in major 
cities—already overpopulated—would act as a magnet for yet more migrants, 
further burdening their urban financial and administrative systems. 
Third, migrant workers are allowed to transfer their social insurance rights as 
employees to the jurisdictions to which they have migrated. However, the 
amount of time required for completing the administrative procedures for 
transferring their vested rights is significant. This lengthy process hinders 
migrants from participating in employee social insurance programs administered 
by the jurisdictions to which they have migrated. 
Some opportunities to improve coverage of social insurance for informal 
workers have emerged. First, the State Council now requires local government 
units to establish residents’ medical insurance programs for serious illnesses, 
which are complementary to current medical insurance for residents, 
effectively increasing the overall level of reimbursement of medical costs of 
residents. This will help narrow the gap between medical benefits paid by 
social insurance programs for employees and those paid by social insurance 
programs for residents. Narrowing this gap would benefit informal workers 
currently unable to participate in medical insurance schemes for employees, 
but who can still participate in medical insurance schemes for residents. 
Second, development of information technology, will facilitate enrollment, 
transfers of contributions between programs administered by different 
jurisdictions, and direct settlement of costs between jurisdictions. In the long 
term, these developments will facilitate informal workers’ participation in the 
social insurance programs. 
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Results and Assessment
This study surveyed 273 workers employed by 71 MSMEs in selected provinces. 
Information at the individual level pertaining to employment, job security, 
training, participation in social protection programs, and membership in trade 
unions were collected. 
Level of Educational Attainment and Number of Dependents 
Among the respondents, 3.3% completed primary education, 4.8% completed 
intermediate education, 31.5% entered secondary school, 19.0% received 
vocational training, and 40.0% received tertiary education. Of the 255 
respondents who answered the question on dependent support, 6.6% had 
one dependent, 24.5% had two dependents, 20.5% had three dependents, and 
31.5% had four or more dependents. In all, 83.1% were supporting dependents. 
Employment History and Relationship
Of the 273 respondents surveyed, 48.4% had held their current job for 5 years 
or more, while only 16.8% had held their current job for 1 year or less. Regarding 
previous employment, 141 respondents completed the survey question pertaining 
to their previous job. Of these, 39 (27.7%) had worked in their previous job for 
1 year or less, 32 (22.7%) for 2 years, and 37 (26.2%) for 5 years or more.
Respondents generally felt that it was easy for informal workers to find a similar 
new job. Of the 93 respondents who responded to the question on previous 
unemployment experience, only 11 remained unemployed for 1 year or more, and 
most found their current job within 6 months. Further, 51 of these workers had 
changed their jobs within the previous month. This suggests that the PRC’s rapid 
pace of economic growth in recent years has resulted in many work opportunities. 
However, 69 respondents (25.0%) expressed fear of unemployment, either 
because of a possible idle economy or due to their low skills level.
Of all workers surveyed, 142 (54.8%) had signed contracts with their employers; 
18 (6.9%) had only verbal contracts, while 99 (38.3%) had no contracts 
(Table  6.4). Thus, workers in manufacturing are more likely to be employed 
formally than workers in the services or construction sectors.
Skills and Training Requirements of Current Employment
Two-thirds of respondents received formal training for their current jobs that 
could be useful in another job. Of the 255 respondents who answered this 
question, 72.5% said that they have opportunities for improving their skills 
268 Social Protection for Informal Workers in Asia
at their current job. Of these, more than 70.0% said their employers would 
organize and finance improvement of their skills, and about 30.0% said that 
they could pay for training themselves. However, responses to this question 
varied widely across the three economic sectors.
Working Conditions and Hours of Work
Of all of the respondents, 80.0% said that their jobs were safe, while only 20.0% 
(most of whom worked in construction) said that their jobs were unsafe. Among 
the respondents, 61.5% worked 8 hours a day, 25.0% worked more than 8 hours 
a day, and only 7.3% worked less than 8 hours a day. 
According to labor law, work hours should not exceed 44 hours per week. 
However, 58.3% of the respondents worked more than 44 hours a week. Of the 
three economic sectors, 85.2% of construction workers worked more than 44 
hours a week, along with 63.1% of manufacturing workers and 51.6% of service 
workers (Table 6.5). 
Table 6.5: Number of Hours Respondents Worked per Week 
(%)
Sector
Hours Worked per Week
Less than 44 More than 44 
Manufacturing 36.9 63.1
Construction 14.8 85.2
Services 48.4 51.6
Average 41.7 58.3
Source: Survey of Informal Workers 2015 compiled by the authors.
Table 6.4: Percentage Share of Respondents with Employment 
Contracts by Economic Sector 
(%)
Sector
Type of Employment Contract
Written Verbal None 
Manufacturing 66.7 0.0 33.3
Construction 54.5 21.2 24.2
Service 50.0 6.9 43.2
Average 54.8 6.9 38.3
Note: Percentages may not total 100.0% because of rounding.
Source: Survey of Informal Workers 2015 compiled by the authors.
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Remuneration, Social Protection, and Union Representation
Of the total number of respondents, 23.0% had a monthly income of less than 
CNY2,000.00; 19.0% had a monthly income of CNY2,000.00–CNY3,000.00; 
and 33.5% had a monthly income of CNY3,000.00–CNY4,000.00.125 The 
incomes of 75.1% of respondents fell short of the national average monthly 
wage, which was CNY4,164.00 at the time that the survey was conducted. 
Table 6.6 shows work-related allowances and benefits. 
For all three economic sectors, 61.8% said that their employers make social 
insurance contributions on their behalf. In manufacturing, 74.6% of respondents 
had social insurance with employer contributions, while the corresponding 
percentage shares for construction and service were 69.7% and 54.8%, 
respectively.
Regarding participation in individual social protection programs, 61.5% 
participated in pension insurance schemes, 63.5% in medical insurance 
programs, 46.9% in work-related injury insurance programs, 34.8% in 
unemployment insurance, 33.0% in maternity insurance, and 18.3% in a housing 
provident fund. The lowest participation rates were in unemployment insurance 
and maternity insurance. Only one-third of respondents participated in all five 
125 See Footnote 124.
Table 6.6: Number and Percentage Share of Respondents  
Receiving Work-Related Allowances and Benefits
Type of Benefit Number Percentage 
Year-end bonus 124 45.4
Medicaid 105 38.5
Death benefit 48 17.6
Annuity 74 27.1
Long leave, sick leave, paid leave 96 35.2
Housing allowance 44 16.1
Transport allowance 86 31.5
Other 16 5.9
No response 4 1.5
Source: Survey of Informal Workers 2015 compiled by the authors.
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social insurance schemes as mandated by law, which made them compliant 
with the strictest definition of formal sector workers. 
The study indicates that 73.3% of respondents were satisfied with their current 
jobs, and that only 26.7% were dissatisfied due to low wages, long work hours, 
fatigue, or other factors. Even in the absence of employment contracts or 
participation in social insurance programs, many respondents were satisfied 
with their current jobs. However, this may be a result of lack of awareness of 
social insurance rights. 
Among the respondents, 15.9% said that formal organizations represent their 
interests as workers, 20.2% said that they rely on informal organizations to 
represent their interests as workers, while the remaining two-thirds said that no 
organization represents their interests as workers (Table 6.7). On membership 
in formal work-related organizations, 46.2% who worked in manufacturing 
belonged to such an organization, along with 36.1% in service and only 15.6% 
in construction.
Table 6.7: Percentage Share of Respondents Who Had a Formal  
or Informal Organization Represent Their Interests as Workers  
by Sector 
(%)
Sector
Type of Organization 
Formal 
Organization 
Informal 
Organization No Organization 
Manufacturing 24.6 21.5 53.8
Construction 6.3 9.4 84.4
Services 14.2 21.9 63.9
Average 15.9 20.2 63.9
Note: Percentages may not total 100.0% because of rounding.
Source: Survey of Informal Workers 2015 compiled by the authors.
Only 18.3% of respondents had heard of an active union at work, while the 
majority believed that unions have limited functions. Among the respondents, 
25.6% said there is an opportunity for collective representation and action, 
and 62.9% would welcome unions at their places of work. Some of those 
uninterested in unions doubted their functions, while some thought that the 
firms at which they worked are too small for unions to be organized. Those 
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who worked in manufacturing were the most welcoming to trade unions 
(74.1%), followed by construction workers (64.5%), and in the service sector 
(57.5%). Many respondents focused on wages, work conditions, and provision 
of additional training and benefits as possible areas of improvement in social 
protection schemes.
Gender-Related Considerations
The labor and social security rights of female workers are protected under 
the Law of Protecting Women’s Rights, which provides that the government 
should guarantee female workers the same labor and social security rights as 
male workers, particularly with regard to equal pay for equal work. That said, the 
survey results indicate a significant difference in the degree of social protection 
extended to male and female workers. First, 42.1% of female respondents had 
no employment contracts, while the corresponding figure for male workers was 
35.4%. Second, the average wage of female respondents was approximately 
85.0% of that of male respondents. Third, only 58.6% of female respondents 
received formal training, compared with 67.3% of their male counterparts. 
Fourth, 51.2% of female respondents said that their employers do not make 
contributions to social insurance programs on their behalf, while this applied 
to only 31.4% of male respondents. Finally, fewer female respondents had 
employment contracts than male respondents, with female MSME employees 
more likely to be informal workers than their male counterparts. 
The rate of satisfaction in current employment reveals that female respondents 
(68.4%) are less satisfied with their jobs than men (77.5%). The survey results 
also show no difference between male and female respondent attitudes 
on representation, as about 60.0% of both genders stated that they would 
welcome trade unions that represent their interests as workers.
Conclusions
The relatively high rates of social insurance program contributions make it 
difficult for MSMEs to comply with the labor contract and social insurance 
laws. Since most MSMEs use labor-intensive production techniques and 
are thus sensitive to labor costs, the lowest-paid employees are those who 
typically cannot afford to contribute to social insurance programs as required 
by law. Labor and social insurance administrative departments generally do not 
enforce mandatory participation for social insurance schemes by MSMEs due 
to a possible increase in overall production costs that can lead to possibility of 
operations ceasing.
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In the PRC’s current social protection system, informal workers not covered 
by employee social insurance programs can still participate in government 
schemes offered to residents. However, as the government heavily subsidizes 
these schemes, the level of the benefits is relatively limited. Further, laws on 
labor relations require workers to participate in all five social insurance programs 
simultaneously. Thus, informal workers who do not participate in employee 
pension and medical insurance schemes are excluded from participation 
in work-related social insurance programs such as employment insurance, 
work-related injury insurance, and maternity insurance. 
The current birth registry system, hukou, makes it difficult for migrant workers 
in informal sector to access social protection programs in the jurisdiction 
to which they have migrated. They can generally only access such programs 
in their jurisdiction of origin. Further, if they are covered by employee social 
insurance programs in their current jurisdictions and then later move to another 
jurisdiction, they must transfer their vested social insurance rights to their new 
jurisdiction, which involves a lengthy and cumbersome administrative process.
Under law, women are entitled to the same rights as men. However, females are 
less often employed in the formal sector, such as in the public sector or in state-
owned enterprises, than men. The percentage share of female employees in 
MSMEs that have labor contracts is lower than that of their male counterparts. 
Further, their rate of participation in social insurance programs is significantly 
lower than male employees. 
In the PRC, government is the main provider of social protection programs. 
As a result, the role of nongovernment organizations and charities is limited. 
Only one-third of respondents said that a formal or informal nongovernment 
organization protected their interests as workers, although 60.0% of 
respondents would welcome trade unions at their places of work. 
Recommendations
The government should modify policies to accommodate participation of 
MSME employers and employees in social insurance. First, the government 
should amend current regulations to allow MSME employees to opt in or out of 
individual social insurance programs. For example, if MSME employees cannot 
afford to participate in pension and medical insurance programs for employees, 
then they should be allowed to participate in pension and medical insurance 
programs for residents. However, work-related injury insurance should remain 
mandatory. The second option is to not simply enforce mandatory participation 
in social insurance programs for employees, but to require lower contributions 
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of MSME employees. For example, social insurance contributions of employees 
earning only the legal minimum wage, or whose wage rate falls short of a 
mandated threshold, should be based on their actual wage. This would relieve 
employees of the relatively disproportionate contribution rates.
The benefits paid by social insurance programs for residents, which are mainly 
financed by the government, should be recalculated to reflect the PRC’s 
current, relatively high rate of economic growth. These recalculated benefits 
would comprise wage increases, including those related to changes in the cost 
of living. Many informal workers have irregular schedules and earn relatively 
low wages that cannot support participation in social insurance programs for 
employees. Such individuals should be able to participate in social protection 
programs for residents, the benefit levels of which should guarantee them a 
minimum standard of living. 
The next step should be improving the administration and management of the 
country’s social insurance programs, particularly using information technology 
to ensure universal participation and convenience in social insurance programs. 
Increased uptake of information technology could also facilitate the transfer of 
vested rights from one jurisdiction to another, which would, in turn, help protect 
the rights of migrant workers. 
The government should also continue its public awareness initiatives to make 
every worker, particularly every migrant worker, understand his or her rights. 
This would help facilitate employee monitoring of employer compliance with 
laws on provision of universal social insurance. 
The government should further encourage employees to establish trade 
unions or other organizations that protect their interests as workers and ensure 
that they receive the social insurance benefits to which they are entitled. 
For MSMEs, trade unions based either on the economic sector to which the 
firm belongs, or the geographic location in which the firm operates, could be 
established with government support. The role of such organizations should 
be expanded to include protection of employee rights, and participation in 
negotiations with employers to improve employee salaries, job security, and 
employer participation in social insurance programs. 
Labor administration departments should also pay particular attention to 
protecting the rights of workers, particularly female workers. It is important 
to expand the training opportunities available to female workers, which could 
facilitate higher income and increase job security for female employees. 
Finally, in addition to government social protection programs, nongovernment 
organizations should be allowed to provide social protection services and 
274 Social Protection for Informal Workers in Asia
to share the government’s burden of meeting the diverse needs of workers 
nationwide. Additional scope for allowing market-based entities to provide 
social protection services should also be considered.
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CHAPTER 7
Social Protection for Informal 
Workers in Bangladesh: A Case 
Study of Micro, Small, and 
Medium-Sized Enterprises
Mohammad Yunus
Abstract
The importance of a well-designed social protection system within a comprehensive framework is an overarching issue in Bangladesh. This study aims to evaluate the status of social protection for workers in the 
informal sector and to highlight the challenges of designing a social protection 
framework for them. 
The survey results reveal that the majority of workers have no permanent 
employment contracts with their employers. They are not paid the legal minimum 
wage and do not have access to other social protection benefits. These workers 
also reported limited access to safety equipment and lack of medical supplies in 
their workplaces, ineffective human resources divisions, the absence of training 
and a lack of awareness in maintaining a healthy working environment, and no 
penalties when rules and regulations are breached. Also, almost none of the 
workers know of any organization that represents their work-related interests. 
Male workers mostly dominate the managerial and clerical services, while the 
majority of workers in the operative services are female, particularly in the 
ready-made garment sector.
This study recommends focusing on two areas of social protection for 
the working-age population—unemployment insurance and work-related 
injury insurance—to address the needs of the growing informal sector in 
Bangladesh. Financing options, such as employer and employee contributions 
and government tax and nontax revenue, can also be explored. Finally, the 
government has an important role to play in ensuring effective labor law 
enforcement and necessary interventions to initiate social protection for 
informal workers.
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Introduction
Social protection coverage for workers in the informal sector in Bangladesh is 
inadequate. Despite the well-accepted notion that “informal work is normal 
work” and that those who work informally have the right to social protection 
(Lund and Nicholson 2006), most workers in the informal sector are exposed 
to significant risks in terms of their employment tenures, work environments, 
and precariousness of their livelihoods. There are a number of reasons for 
this. First, the conditions under which they live and work expose them to 
substantial risks. Second, their income is low. They are therefore less likely to 
save for contingencies than those with higher incomes. Third, they have little 
or no access to formal means of managing life-related risks such as through 
insurance, pension funds, or social assistance.
Given Bangladesh’s sustained rate of growth of its gross domestic product 
(GDP) in recent years, the informal sector is growing rapidly. Of the country’s 
total labor force of 56 million in 2010, about 89.0% of all jobs were in the 
informal labor market. Of these, about 76.0% of workers were informally 
employed in urban areas, with the corresponding figure for rural areas at 92.0%. 
The informal sector accounted for more than 40.0% of Bangladesh’s total gross 
value added, with the greatest contributions to total value added occurring in 
the agriculture, fisheries, trade, and industry sectors, where the capital–labor 
ratio was relatively low. Informal enterprises generated about 77.0% of total 
employment (ADB 2012).
About 40.0% of men and 76.0% of women in the informal sector were laborers 
and unskilled workers. About 94.0% of these workers were employed in single 
proprietorships, individual businesses, or farms, about two-thirds of which did 
not keep any accounting records. While employees in the formal sector worked 
51 hours per week, those in the informal sector worked 53 hours per week. 
The former group received Tk2,320.00 ($29.76)126 per month on average, as 
compared with Tk1,710.00 ($21.94) per month for the latter.
The sectors in which this informal labor force works are characterized by several 
structural problems that make the firms that comprise these sectors either 
incapable of providing social protection programs for their workers, or unwilling 
to do so. First, both the relatively high labor intensity of the output of these 
firms, as well as the informal status of their employees, results in exclusion from 
social protection schemes. Second, the absence of employment contracts 
creates worker insecurity, which in turn provides a disincentive for employers 
to offer social protection programs to their employees. Third, administration of 
126 Data were collected 15–30 December 2014, and the exchange rate was in 2015 Tk77.95 to $1.00.
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Bangladesh’s laws, rules, and regulations pertaining to labor relations is relatively 
weak and inefficient.
This study assesses the position of informal workers in the construction, 
hospitality, and ready-made garment (RMG) sectors, given their importance 
in employment generation, gross value addition, and labor productivity. The 
discussion pays particular attention to (i) the different ways in which people 
are employed in the three sectors and how this makes them vulnerable in 
different ways at different points in the chain of production and distribution; 
(ii) the different ways in which men and women are able to participate 
in these sectors, the conditions under which they work, and their relative 
degree of control over work-related conditions; (iii) how workers in different 
settings and of a different employment status are regulated, including 
regulation by the government, organizations of employers, and formal and 
informal organizations of workers, as well as by national and international 
labor standards; (iv)  the different entitlements of groups of workers to 
social protection, both through their employment and through wider public 
provision; (v) the link among stakeholders in these sectors, and the role 
that they can play in strengthening social protection; and (vi) implications 
for policy and practice with regard to reshaping existing mechanisms and 
enforcement of labor regulations covering workers at the national level, 
strengthening and scaling up social protection for workers, particulary in the 
informal sector.
Methodology
Workers in the informal sector are often not included in official statistics. As the 
survey conducted under this study was limited to the construction, hospitality, 
and RMG sectors, the space from which the survey sample was drawn is the 
total number of informal workers in these three sectors, irrespective of their 
working category. The formula for determining the sample size in case of 
proportions was 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
2
2 1 1 2 2
1 2
1 2
1 1 1 1/az r p p z p p p pn
r p p
β
 + − + − + −
 =
 − 
where za/2 and zß are z scores of significance level and power. It may be noted 
that the above expression is not only a function of p1 and p2 but also of p–(1 – p–). 
The general expression for p– is 
( )
1 2
1
p p
p
r
+
=
+
, where r is the ratio of the larger 
group to the smaller group. Since the ratio of gross value added in the informal 
sector may be assumed to be equal to that in the formal sector, r becomes unity. 
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In that case, 
( )
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1
p p
p
r
+
=
+
 becomes 1 2
2
p p
p
+
= , where r is the ratio of the larger 
group to the smaller group. 
With approximately p1 = 0.60 and p2 = 0.40 as the shares in average value 
added in the formal and informal sectors in Bangladesh, and assuming a 10.0% 
error probability level (90.0% level of significance) and 80.0% power (in a 
two-tailed test), the above expression gave rise to the required sample, the 
estimated size being 76 ≈ 80 (with nonresponse adjustment) in each of the 
three sectors. Since the study was conducted in three sectors, the total sample 
of workers was 240.
The criterion used for selecting the firms to be surveyed was their contribution 
to output or employment in the three economic sectors. For the construction 
sector, the Real Estate and Housing Association of Bangladesh was contacted 
for the approximate number of establishments in Dhaka and Chittagong, 
as well as their relative size distribution. Once the factories to be included 
in the survey were identified, four or five workers from each factory were 
interviewed. For the RMG sector, the directory of members of the Bangladesh 
Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association was used to determine 
the number of garment factories in Dhaka and Chittagong. Since there was no 
known association of hospitality firms, a few officials from large hotels were 
contacted to estimate the size distribution of the firms in this sector, as well 
as the number of workers that they employ. Based on this information, the 
required number of hotels was visited, and the requisite number of workers 
was interviewed.
The survey sample included managerial, clerical, and operative workers in the 
three sectors, with roughly one-third of each of these three categories being 
interviewed. A total of six focus group discussions and nine key informant 
interviews were conducted in the three sectors. Two-thirds of the respondents 
were from Dhaka, as it has the highest concentration of industrial firms; the 
remaining one-third of the respondents were from Chittagong, which has 
Bangladesh’s second-highest concentration of industrial firms.
Profile of Micro, Small, and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises in Bangladesh
Numerous definitions of micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) 
are used in Bangladesh, as government agencies such as the Ministry of 
Industries (MOI), Bangladesh Bank, and Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) 
all have their own definitions. Even within the same government agency, the 
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definition used has varied considerably over time. While the definitions used 
by MOI and Bangladesh Bank focus on capital and employment, BBS focuses 
solely on employment. Other than this difference, the three definitions are 
quite similar (Table 7.1). 
Table 7.1: Definitions of Micro, Small, and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises Used by the Ministry of Industries and Bangladesh Bank
Type of Enterprise Sector
Fixed Assets  
(Tk million)
Number of 
Employees
Ministry of Industries
Cottage <0.50 <10
Micro >0.50–≤5.00 >10–≤24
Small Manufacturing >5.00–≤100.00 >25–≤99
Services >0.50–≤10.00 >10–≤25
Medium-Sized Manufacturing >100.00–≤300.00 >100–≤250
Services >10.00–≤150.00 >50–≤100
Bangladesh Bank
Cottage <0.50 <10
Micro Manufacturing >0.50–≤5.00 >10–≤24
Services <0.50 ≤10
Trade <0.50 ≤10
Small Manufacturing >5.00–≤100.00 >25–≤99
Services >0.50–≤10.00 >10–≤25
Trade >0.50–≤10.00 >10–≤25
Medium-Sized Manufacturing >100.00–≤300.00 >100–≤250
Services >10.00–≤150.00 >50–≤100
Trade >10.00–≤150.00 >50–≤100
Notes: 
1. Tk77.17 = $1.00.
2. The value of fixed assets excludes land and buildings. 
3.  Under Bangladesh Bank (2011), if any enterprise falls under a particular category with regard to one 
criterion (i.e., total fixed assets or employment), but under a larger category following another criterion, 
then the enterprise is classified as belonging to the larger category.
Sources: Ministry of Industries (MOI), Government of Bangladesh. 2010. Industrial Policy of Bangladesh. 
Dhaka; Bangladesh Bank. 2011. SMESPD Circular. No. 1. Dhaka. 19 June.
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In its Survey of Manufacturing Industries (SMI) 2012, BBS provides 
establishment and employment distributions that follow the definitions in 
Table  7.1, except for the cottage industry category (BBS 2013). Table 7.2 
summarizes the information available from the SMI, which includes the number 
of firms, total number of workers engaged, and category of establishment 
concerned.
Table 7.2: Distribution of Manufacturing Establishments  
Employing at Least 10 Workers, 2010–2011
Description
Micro
(10–24 
workers)
Small
(25–99 
workers)
Medium-Sized
(100–249 
workers)
Large
(250 or more 
workers) Total
No. of 
establishments
17,384
(40.6%)
15,666
(36.6%)
6,105
(14.3%)
3,639
(8.5%)
42,792
(100.0%)
Total persons 
engaged
271,644
(5.4%)
738,801
(14.7%)
1,041,220
(20.8%)
2,964,272
(59.1%)
5,015,936
(100.0%)
Gross value 
added
(Tk million)
92,092.00
(5.9%)
369,974.00
(23.7%)
363,646.00
(23.3%)
737,235.00
(47.2%)
1,562,947.00
(100.0%)
Value added 
per worker  
(Tk ’000) 339.00 501.00 349.00 249.00 312.00
Note: Tk77.17 = $1.00.
Source: Bangladesh Bank. 2011. SMESPD Circular. No. 1. Dhaka. 19 June.
According to Tables 7.1 and 7.2, 43,000 manufacturing establishments in 
Bangladesh had 10 workers or more in 2010–2011.127 These firms employed 
nearly 5 million workers, each of whom contributed Tk311,596.00 ($3,998.00)128 
in gross value added on average. In fact, these MSMEs were a significant 
component of Bangladesh’s manufacturing sector, in that they accounted for 
51.0% of all firms, 36.0% of total employment, and 52.0% of gross value added. 
That MSMEs were more productive than larger enterprises is evident from the 
extent of MSME value added per worker. More specifically, the weighted average 
value added per worker for MSMEs was Tk4,029.00 ($51.69), compared with 
Tk249.00 ($3.19) for larger firms. Further, nearly 64.0% of all establishments 
were located in rural areas, generating about 60.0% of total employment (BBS 
2005).
127 Bakht and Basher (unpublished) reported that the number of manufacturing units with 10 or more 
workers was recorded to be 59,748 in the 2013 census, as compared with 42,792 recorded in the SMI 
in 2012. Since the SMI is basically a sample survey and the BBS lacks satisfactory arrangements for 
updating the manufacturing universe, one would suspect the SMI figure to be an underestimate.
128 Gross value added per worker is derived from 1,562,947 x 1,000,000/5,015,936.
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Bakht and Basher (unpublished) reported that during the inter-census period 
between 2001–2002 and 2013, firms that employed 10–49 workers and 50–99 
workers experienced more rapid growth in output than did firms that employed 
fewer than 10 workers and 100 or more workers. This suggests that MSMEs that 
employed 10–99 workers were the most dynamic component of Bangladesh’s 
manufacturing sector during this period.
Thus, it can be concluded that achieving Bangladesh’s target of double-digit 
annual growth in GDP largely depends on the performance of micro and small 
enterprises. However, such enterprises contributed only about 5.2% of total 
GDP in 2011–2012, and this share has not increased much over the past decade.
Given the importance of MSMEs to the economy, it is important to examine 
their efficiency levels with regard to resource use (i.e., their factor intensity), 
and their potential for contributing to industrial development (i.e., their factor 
productivity) (Table 7.3).129 Most estimates indicate that MSMEs as a whole 
are more efficient users of resources, except for their capital–labor ratios, and 
that they are also economically more productive than their larger counterparts 
(Ahmed 2008). 
A significant number of literature suggests that MSMEs face numerous 
constraints (Miah 2007, Ahmed and Chowdhury 2009). These constraints can 
be categorized as structural and policy-induced. The former includes constraints 
such as lack of access to finance, modern technology and information, and 
infrastructure. 
129 It should be noted that these estimates are based on a survey with a small sample of 70, and thus are 
not expected to provide precise estimates of the indicators concerned.
Table 7.3: Output–Labor, Capital–Output, and Capital–Labor Ratios 
for Firms in the Manufacturing, Services, and Trade Sectors  
in Bangladesh
Type
Gross Output–
Labor Capital–Output Capital–Labor
Manufacturing 214.4 0.9 189.7
Services 356.3 0.6 196.3
Trade 143.2 3.1 449.4
All 219.2 1.1 238.5
Source: Adapted from K. M. N. Islam, S. C. Zohir, and M. Hossain. 2011. SME Development in Bangladesh 
with Emphasis on Policy Constraints and Financing. Background paper prepared for the Sixth Five Year Plan 
of Bangladesh, 2011–2015. Dhaka: Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies and General Economics 
Division, Planning Commission, Government of Bangladesh.
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Further, MSMEs in Bangladesh struggle to obtain credit and loans, as many 
financial institutions are reluctant to offer loans to MSMEs on the pretext 
that they are high-risk borrowers. MSMEs also have limited access to modern 
technology and training facilities, which leads to lack of expertise, innovation, 
and ideas and, in turn, results in poor marketing and promotional strategies. 
MSMEs also have limited access to information technology; in fact, only 15.0% 
of MSMEs use computers, and only 8.0%–10.0% of MSMEs are internet users 
(Ahmed and Chowdhury 2009). Moreover, MSMEs require targeted fiscal 
incentives to become successful, but they receive no deferential treatment 
with regard to tax incentives or business subsidies, contrasting sharply with 
the tax holidays that large firms enjoy. Most MSMEs pay practically the same 
value-added tax of 15.0% as do their large counterparts. Registration is also a 
cumbersome process for MSMEs due to legal, regulatory, and administrative 
constraints. Lack of transparency and corruption are still other problems 
(Hossain 1998). As a result, many entrepreneurs—especially female 
entrepreneurs, who run many MSMEs—do not register their businesses, and 
they forego the government incentives that are provided.
Regulatory Framework and Enforcement  
of Social Protection for Workers 
Comprising 354 articles, the Bangladesh Labour Act (2006) is fairly 
comprehensive and progressive. The act was ammended in 2013 to make more 
consistent with the Conventions of the International Labour Organization 
(ILO)—in particular, the right of workers to organize and to bargain collectively. 
This amendment saw some of the original articles modified, and new articles 
included. 
The comprehensive nature of the law can immediately be seen from its coverage. 
It addresses conditions of service and employment, youth employment, 
maternity benefits, health and hygiene, safety, welfare, working hours and 
leave, wages and payment, compensation for injured workers, trade unions and 
industrial relations, disputes, labor courts, participation of workers in company 
profits, regulation of employment and safety of dock workers, provident funds, 
apprenticeships, penalties and procedures, administration, and inspections 
(Jabbar 2003).
Employment Standards
Appointment letters and service books are both mandatory and free of 
charge for workers. The law specifies which information is to be included in 
appointment letters and service books, and requires the latter to be signed by 
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both the employer and worker. In the case of retrenchment or discharge, the 
employer is required to serve prior notice and to pay compensation or a gratuity. 
However, the employer is allowed to terminate the services of workers without 
providing an explanation by simply invoking termination simplicitor.130
The Bangladesh Labour Act also addresses the issue of wages, including (i) any 
bonus payable or any other additional wages as per the terms and conditions of 
employment; (ii) any remuneration payable during leave, holiday, or overtime; 
(iii) any amount payable against an order of the court or under an award or 
settlement; (iv) any amount payable upon expiry of employment by dismissal, 
discharge, retrenchment, or termination, whether arising out of a contract 
or under the law; and (v) any amount payable due to layoff or temporary 
suspension. 
Workers are entitled to holidays, casual leave, festival leave, annual leave, and 
sick leave. Employers must pay equal wages for male and female workers for 
work of an equal nature or value. The new law increases the length of maternity 
leave from 12 weeks to 16 weeks, and decreases the duration of the qualifying 
service period for claiming this benefit from 9 months to 6 months. No children 
under 14 years of age are allowed to work in any occupation or establishment. 
The Minimum Wage Board determines minimum wage rates in various sectors, 
taking into consideration numerous criteria that include cost of living, standard 
of living, cost of production, productivity, price of products, capability of the 
business concerned, and economic and social conditions in the country. 
However, the act is silent on the issue of forced labor, even though it is prohibited 
by the Constitution.131
Occupational Safety and Health
The Bangladesh Labour Act entrusts inspectors with ensuring that adequate 
measures for the safety and health of workers have been taken. Establishments 
are required to have one first-aid box and one trained person per first-aid 
box for every 150 workers, as well as an equipped dispensary with a patient 
room, doctor, and nursing staff. Employers are required to take appropriate 
measures for protecting workers from danger, as well as damage due to fire. 
Every establishment is required to provide drinking water, sufficient light and 
ventilation, and separate toilets for male and female workers, and to be kept 
clean.
130 Termination simplicitor means termination of the services of an employee in accordance with the 
contract of services, without casting any stigma on his or her performance.
131 Article 34 of the Constitution states, “All forms of forced labor are prohibited, and any contravention of 
this provision shall be an offence and shall be punishable in accordance with Law.”
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Workers’ Welfare and Social Protection 
The Bangladesh Labour Act defines wages by referencing both inclusion and 
exclusion lists. Gratuity as a severance payment is defined as the amount of 
the wages of at least 30 days payable to a worker who had worked in a factory 
for not less than 6 months at the expiry of her or his employment. Similarly, 
the provident fund is considered to be wages, and is thus payable within 30 
days of expiry of employment. The act provides that if any worker dies after 
completing 2 years of continuous service with an employer, the worker shall 
be entitled to benefits of 30 days’ wages for each year of service completed, 
or 6 months thereof, or gratuity, whichever is greater. Every establishment or 
employer is required to form a provident fund if three-quarters of its workers 
demand it by written application, as well as a workers’ participation fund and 
a workers’ welfare fund. Establishments with 200 or more workers are to offer 
group insurance.
Labor Relations and Social Dialogue 
Every worker has the right to form and join a trade union of his or her choice. 
Trade unions have the right to draw up their own constitution and rules and 
to elect representatives. Also, trade unions have the right to form and join a 
federation, and such unions and federations have the right to affiliate with 
any international organization or confederation of trade unions. Trade unions 
are allowed to serve as a collective bargaining agent in any establishment. 
Employers cannot recruit new workers during the period of a strike. They are 
also prohibited from terminating workers during the period when a trade union 
is organizing in a particular establishment.
The Bangladesh Labour Act stipulates a list of activities on the part of an 
employer that are considered to be unfair labor practices. These include 
(i) imposition of any condition in a contract of employment that seeks 
to restrain the right of a person to join a trade union or to continue her 
or his membership in a trade union; 
(ii) refusal to employ or continue to employ an individual on the grounds 
that he or she is, or is not, a member or officer of a trade union; 
(iii) discrimination against any person with regard to any employment, 
promotion, or condition of employment on the grounds that such 
person is, or is not, a member or officer of a trade union; 
(iv) discharge or dismissal of any person on the grounds that that person is, 
or is not, a member or officer of a specific trade union; 
(v) instigating or pressuring a person to become a member of a particular 
trade union; 
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(vi) inducing a person to refrain from becoming, or to cease to be, a 
member or officer of a trade union; 
(vii) compelling any officer of a collective-bargaining agency to sign a 
memorandum of settlement by intimidation or by coercion; 
(viii) interfering with, or in any way influencing, balloting in the election 
of a collective-bargaining agency; 
(ix) recruitment of new workers during a legal strike; 
(x) willful failure to implement the recommendations of a participation 
committee; 
(xi) failure to respond to any communication made by the collective-
bargaining agency regarding any industrial dispute; 
(xii) transfer of the president, general secretary, organizing secretary, or 
treasurer of a trade union; and 
(xiii) imposition of an illegal lockout and continuance thereof, or persuading 
a person to participate in such an illegal lockout.
Enforcement 
The Bangladesh Labour Act makes it mandatory for a factory where more 
than 50 permanent workers are employed to form a participation committee 
comprising representatives of both workers and employers. The law makes a 
provision for implementing the committee’s recommendations within a time 
period set by itself. Otherwise, willful negligence will result, and will be treated 
as an unfair labor practice.
The government appoints the director of labor and “such number” of 
additional directors of labor as necessary for monitoring workplace activities. 
The government appoints a chief inspector, and a requisite number of deputy 
chief inspectors and assistant chief inspectors. These officers have the power 
to enter, inspect, and examine workplaces and to ascertain compliance with 
labor laws. The government has the power to establish as many labor courts as 
it considers necessary.
The act also provides that a labor court shall consist of a chair and two members 
(one representing employers and the other representing employees) to advise 
him or her. The chair shall be a serving district judge or an additional district 
judge. The court shall be constituted with all three members, except for the trial 
of any offence under Section 215, or for the trial of any matter under chapters 
X and XII of the Bangladesh Labour Act, where the court shall consist of the 
chair only. The act likewise specifies that no labor court shall recognize any 
offense 6 months after the date on which the offense was alleged to have been 
committed. Another change is that no magistrate court may try offenses under 
the act.
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The Department of Inspection for Factories and Establishments, under the 
Ministry of Labour and Employment, is the organization authorized to monitor 
compliance with standards in Bangladesh. The department has a headquarters, 
23 district offices, and 993 staff members. Of these, 679 new posts were 
created in the revenue budget. From 2013 to 2015, the number of inspectors 
increased from 92 to 270. It is encouraging to note that 44 of these inspectors 
are female. Despite its significant staff strength, infrastructure and logistical 
support are meager when compared with the total number of factories, shops, 
and commercial establishments over which it has jurisdiction.132
Study Results
Those who work informally have the right to social protection as stipulated in 
the Bangladesh Labour Act (2006) and its amendment in 2013. This study 
assesses if conditions differ across the construction, hospitality, and RMG 
sectors—the sectors that employ informal workers to the greatest extent in 
Bangladesh. To that end, 240 respondents were surveyed, roughly one-third 
drawn from each of the three sectors.
Socioeconomic Profile of Respondents
The average size of the households surveyed was 3.9 (Table 7.4). This is smaller 
than the average size of urban households as reported in the Household Income 
and Expenditure Survey 2010 (BBS 2011a). This smaller household size may 
be attributed to both a lower fertility rate than is average for Bangladesh, and 
the disintegration of extended families into nuclear families. The demographic 
dependency ratio in the respondent households was estimated at 72.1%, which 
compares with the demographic dependency ratio of 60.3% in Bangladesh’s 
urban areas.133
More than 60.0% of the members of respondent households aged 10 years 
or over were married, which is about 10 percentage points higher than the 
urban average for the country as a whole. The higher percentage of married 
members of respondent households is perhaps due to the employment status 
of members of these households as compared with average urban households. 
132 See Department of Inspection for Factories and Establishments. http://www.dife.gov.bd/index.php/en/
133 The demographic dependency ratio is the sum of the population aged 0–14 years and 60 years and 
older divided by the total population at any given point in time.
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The literacy rate134 of the members of respondent households aged 7 years and 
above was 79.0%. About 15.0% of the members of respondent households did 
not pass grade I at the primary level, whereas about 19.0% passed grades I–V. 
Another 37.0% of the members of respondent households completed grades 
VI–X, and 13.0% of members of respondent households were graduates or had 
additional education. These rates roughly correspond with those reported for 
urban areas.
The average number of wage-earning members per respondent household 
was 1.9 persons. Unsurprisingly, the most common occupation among wage-
earning members of respondent households was salaried employment, which 
accounted for 45.0% (Table 7.5). This was followed by self-employment, 
and wage employment in the farm and nonfarm sectors at 11.0% and 6.0%, 
respectively. 25% of members of respondent households—particularly female 
members—performed unpaid domestic chores. Consequently, the economic 
dependency ratio of respondent households was 62.0%. This compares with 
the 69.0% economic dependency ratio calculated by the 2010 labor force 
survey (BBS 2011b).
The average monthly income per household was estimated at Tk18,120.00 
(Table  7.6), which ranged from a low of Tk15,192.00 for RMG workers to 
Tk22,092.00 for construction workers.135 Per capita income was Tk5,374.00, 
and the same pattern held for workers in all three sectors. Respondent workers 
134 For purposes of this study, the literacy rate of the population aged 7 years and above is the ratio of the 
population aged 7 years and above who passed grade III, divided by the total population in the same 
age group, expressed as a percentage. In contrast, BBS (2011a) defined it as the ratio of the population 
aged 7 years and above who can write a letter, divided by the total population in the same age group, 
expressed as a percentage.
135 Tk77.17 = $1.00.
Table 7.4: Sociodemographic Characteristics  
of Respondent Households
Characteristics
Respondent 
Households
Household Income 
and Expenditure 
Survey 2010 (Urban)
Household size (person) 3.9 4.4
Demographic dependency ratio (%) 72.1 60.3
Not married (%) 34.0 44.6
Married (%) 60.6 50.9
Widow, divorced, or separated (%) 5.4 4.5
Source: Survey of Informal Workers 2015 compiled by the author.
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Table 7.5: Major Occupations of Wage-Earning Members  
of Respondent Households
Occupation
Share of Particular Occupations  
of All Wage-Earning Members  
of Respondent Households  
(%)
Wage employment in farm and nonfarm 
sectors
6.1
Salaried employment 45.1
Self-employment in farm and nonfarm 
sectors
10.5
Unpaid domestic chores 24.6
Unemployed 4.2
Students 6.8
Others 2.9
Economic dependency ratio (%) 62.3
Source: Survey of Informal Workers 2015 compiled by the author.
Table 7.6: Average Monthly Household Income of Respondent 
Households and Percentage Share of Respondent Workers  
in Monthly Income 
(Tk)
Income Category Total Construction Hospitality
Ready-Made 
Garment
Household income 18,120.00 22,092.00 17,187.00 15,192.00
Per capita income 5,374.00 6,892.00 5,027.00 4,245.00
Respondent’s 
contribution
9,242.00 14,142.00 8,019.00 5,698.00
Share of 
respondent’s 
contribution (%)
51.0 64.0 46.7 37.5
Note: Tk77.17 = $1.00.
Source: Survey of Informal Workers 2015 compiled by the author.
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contributed about half of the total monthly income of their households, which 
ranged from Tk4,245.00 for RMG workers to Tk14,142.00 for construction 
workers. For their part, construction workers contributed 64.0% of the total 
monthly income of their households, as compared with 38.0% in the case of 
RMG workers.
Employment Profile of Respondents 
There was significant variation in the employment profiles of respondents 
across the three sectors (Table 7.7). While the managerial category dominated 
the construction sector, the operative category dominated the RMG sector. 
In the hospitality sector, the managerial and clerical categories were equally 
dominant. This variation across these three categories of workers is associated 
with the nature of the goods and services that the three sectors produce. While 
the RMG sector is labor-intensive and therefore requires large numbers of 
unskilled operatives, the other two sectors require skilled labor and are relatively 
capital-intensive.
Table 7.7: Percentage Share of the Managerial, Clerical,  
and Operative Categories of Workers 
(%)
Work Category Total Construction Hospitality
Ready-Made 
Garment
Managerial 34.2 60.8 43.0 0.0
Clerical 32.5 24.1 50.6 23.2
Operative 33.3 15.2 6.3 76.8
Average years 
in current 
employment (year)
3.8 3.5 4.5 3.4
Source: Survey of Informal Workers 2015 compiled by the author.
About half of the respondent workers had previous similar employment 
experience. In comparing their past and present employment, there was 
hardly any upward mobility for the workers in the three sectors. Most of the 
respondent workers had several years of work experience in their current 
job. For the managerial category, the number of years in current employment 
varied between 0 and 30 years, the average being 4.7 years. For clerical posts, 
the corresponding range was 0–13 years, with an average of 3.1 years, and for 
operative posts, 0–20 years, with an average of 3.5 years.
About 27.5% of all respondents reported that they had been unemployed 
for a significant period during the previous 5 years. While the average 
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duration of unemployment was more than 5 months, for hospitality workers 
it was about 10 months, with construction workers experiencing the second-
longest periods of unemployment. One reason for this significant duration of 
unemployment for informal workers in the hospitality sector is the seasonality 
of demand for their services. December to February are usually the peak 
months for domestic tourism, which increase demand for employment in the 
service industry.
Majority of respondents (90.0%) reported that they can easily lose their jobs at 
any time as there is no job security. The main reason that 98.0% of them cited 
for this was lack of permanent employment contracts with their employers 
(Table 7.8). About 30.0% also reported that the lack of scope for promotion 
in their current jobs, is another factor that makes their positions insecure. An 
almost equal percentage of respondents felt that they could be fired at any 
time, as their workplaces are not unionized.
Table 7.8: Reasons for Apprehension of Job Loss  
by Respondent Workers 
(%)
Reasons Total Construction Hospitality
Ready-Made 
Garment
No permanent contract 
with employer
98.2 96.9 100.0 97.4
No scope for promotion 
in current job
30.1 42.2 35.5 14.5
No labor union at  
the workplace
29.6 35.9 39.5 14.5
Underqualified for  
the job
6.0 6.3 7.9  4.0
Other 5.6 7.8 4.0  5.3
Source: Survey of Informal Workers 2015 compiled by the author.
Only about 25.0% of respondents reported that they have employment 
contracts. However, of these, about 82.0% reported that their contracts are 
verbal rather than written. Those with written contracts with their employers 
reported that they have an option for compensation for wrongful termination, 
and that their employment contracts include penalty clauses for breach of 
contract by the employee.
In most cases, the contracts revealed significant uncertainty regarding the 
duration of employment. About 71.0% of all respondents said that their 
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employers can terminate their contracts at their discretion, while only 44.0% 
of respondents said that the contracts can be terminated at the employee’s 
discretion. Provisions for mandatory notice before termination existed in 46.0% 
of all contracts, the notice period varying from 1 week to 3 months. About 
34.0% of respondents reported that despite the probation period specified in 
their contracts, the contracts do not specify the terms for achieving permanent 
employment status. Thus, there is no guarantee that their jobs are permanent, 
even after successful completion of the probationary period. In contrast, only 
about 30.0% reported that their contracts provide for permanent employment 
upon completion of a specified probationary period.
About 40.0% of respondents reported that they learned their job skills in 
informal settings from experienced employees in related jobs. About 69.0% 
of respondents believed that their current job skills could be used in another 
job. However, about 70.0% of respondents did not believe that there are 
opportunities for them to upgrade their job skills. The finding was similar 
across the three sectors. About 40.0% of those who believed that there are 
opportunities for upgrading their skills thought that these opportunities are 
presented in their current jobs. About 37.0% thought that they can improve 
their skills from learning materials provided by their employers.
Working Conditions
On average, respondents worked 10.5 hours per day and 6.4 days per week. 
About 41.0% reported that they work at night. The average number of nights 
worked per week was 4.2, and the average duration of work at night was 
5.6 hours. 
About 60.0% of respondents reported that they feel safe at work. Those who 
feel safe at work cited the following reasons: (i) an adequate number of exits 
are available if they have to evacuate the premises due to an accident (91.0%); 
(ii)  the number of fire extinguishers available at the workplace is adequate 
(76.0%); and (iii) the light, ventilation, and sanitation facilities available at the 
workplace are adequate (78.0%). Other reasons cited included availability of 
first-aid boxes, medical supplies, and safety equipment such as masks and 
gloves.
Respondents who do not feel safe at work cited insufficient safety equipment 
(70%), and 49.0% cited an inadequate number of first-aid boxes and medical 
supplies. Other reasons for feeling unsafe at work included lack of a permanent 
medical officer or nurse; lack of availability of transport to the hospital if 
required; lack of health insurance; and inadequate light, ventilation, and 
sanitation facilities.
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About 54.0% of the workers reported that the work that they perform exerts a 
negative impact on their physical and mental health, as evidenced by illness or 
disease. Those who said there was a negative impact on their health described 
headaches (54.0%); colds, coughs, or fevers (40.0%); and musculoskeletal pain 
(37.0%). Other reasons cited were poor appetite, vision-related problems, chest 
pain, and fatigue. About 22.0%–30.0% of respondents reported major health 
problems such as jaundice, respiratory diseases, tuberculosis, and typhoid.
When asked about their work environments, 66.0% reported feeling safe and 
comfortable at work. The major reasons cited were transparent and comfortable 
relationships between co-workers (76.0%), between workers and employers 
(62.0%), the presence of an alert and accessible human resources division 
(60.0%), a zero-tolerance policy for verbal and physical abuse (51.0%), a zero-
tolerance policy for sexual harassment (28.0%), presence of an adequate 
number of vigilant guards and caretakers during overtime hours or late-night 
work, and child support or daycare facilities at the workplace.
Those who do not feel safe or comfortable at their workplaces mainly cited an 
ineffective or inaccessible human resources division (62.0%); lack of employer-
provided training, which led to a lack of awareness about healthy working 
relationships; and no penalties for breaching rules and regulations (44.0%). 
Other reasons included lack of sanctions for verbal or physical abuse, and an 
inadequate number of security guards during late-night work hours.
Remuneration and Benefits
On average, respondents earned Tk9,944.00 ($129.00) per month. About 
76.0% of the respondents reported that they earn the same amount of money 
regularly, with 24.0% reporting that they earn different amounts of money at 
different times, or that their wages depend on the number of orders received 
for production each month (68.0%).
About 63.0% of the respondents reported that their employer does not pay the 
legal minimum wage. Regarding benefits, 67.0% of the respondents reported 
that they receive two festival bonuses (paid in equal installments twice a year, 
or in more installments). About one-fifth received housing allowances, about 
19.0% received year-end bonuses, 18.0% had sick leave and paid leave, and 
17.0% received one festival bonus (paid once a year). However, very few had 
maternity leave or received commissions from the profits earned by their firms.
More than 92.0% said that they do not contribute to a pension fund. Further, 
99.0% of the respondents reported that their employers do not pay the full 
amount of the gratuity upon exit or retirement, and that they do not have health 
insurance. About 77.0% of the respondents reported that they do not have any 
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benefits for work-related accidents. About half of those who do have benefits for 
work-related accidents reported that their employer has paid the full amount 
of any medical bill, as well as compensation in case of a work-related accident.
About 46.0% of the respondents were satisfied with their current jobs, 
because they felt that their wages are lucrative, they receive bonuses, have 
opportunities to work overtime, have job security, and can advance in their 
current employment. Those who were not satisfied with their jobs (54.0%) 
cited unsatisfactory payment (88.0%); lack of availability of overtime, bonuses, 
benefits, or other incentives (54.0%); job insecurity (54.0%); irregular payment 
(46.0%); lack of scope for promotion (40.0%); lack of scope for training and 
development (36.0%); or health and safety issues not being properly addressed 
(21.0%).
Employee Representation and Associations
Nearly 90.0% of the respondents reported that they had not heard of a trade 
union in the sectors in which they worked. Of these, about 95.0% reported that 
there had not been any attempt to organize workers in the firms in which they 
worked. When asked why there had been no attempt to form a union, 67.0% 
reported that either the employer or the employees are not interested, while 
65.0% reported that there is no regulation. A few also reported that there is no 
awareness among workers about the benefits of unionization, and that there is 
no donor or sponsor demand for forming a union.
Despite this scenario, about 78.0% of the respondents said that they would 
welcome unionization in the firms in which they work. All of the respondents 
believed that a union would ensure that workers receive timely wages, bonuses, 
and benefits. Others felt that unionization would prevent wrongful termination 
of an employee (72.0%), ensure that workers receive full compensation for the 
health and safety hazards to which they are exposed (63.0%), ensure proper 
working schedules for all employees (60.0%), help resolve any internal and 
external disputes between workers or between employers and employees (31.0%), 
and resolve contractual problems between employers and workers (29.0%).
In the respondents’ view, a number of people in their overall work environment 
needed improvement. More than half of the respondents felt that employers 
could increase or regularize wages, incentives, bonuses, pensions, or 
remuneration based on job performance; ensure favorable working hours, paid 
and nonpaid leave (i.e., sick, casual, and festival), and overtime; and address 
grievances regarding remuneration and solve them immediately. Meanwhile, less 
than half of the respondents reported that employers could initiate or upgrade 
health and safety measures (e.g., precautions, preventions, and compensation 
for work-related accidents) as a one-time investment and maintain the 
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upgraded standards afterward; improve regulation (i.e., pollicy intervention) 
related to workers’ rights, and allow unions to ensure zero tolerance for verbal, 
physical, or sexual abuse.
Some also suggested that awareness programs and training relating to 
improvement of the work environment and attitude of employers, co-workers, 
and supervisors could be arranged; cooperation of employers in day-to-day 
work management could be increased; and presence of industrial police or 
other external monitoring authorities should be facilitated.
Gender Disparities in the Sectors 
Table 7.9 reports gender disparities of workers in the wage and salaried 
categories in the three sectors. Less than one-third of the workers in all three 
sectors were female, although the highest female participation occurred in the 
RMG sector. About 89.0% of workers reported having salaried employment 
with a higher male participation rate than female, despite the fact that the 
study concludes that male and female workers are comparable in terms of 
educational attainment. 
As the study finds hardly any difference in the level of educational attainment 
when the workers were disaggregated by gender, male and female workers should 
have roughly equal treatment in the labor market. Based on this assumption, 
Table 7.9: Employment Category of the Respondents by Sex 
(%)
Employment 
Category
Total 
(number) Construction Hospitality
Ready-Made 
Garment
Wage employment, 
female
20 0.0 0.0 100.0
Salaried 
employment, female
55 1.8 1.8 96.4
Total number  
of females
75 1.3 1.3 97.3
Wage employment, 
male
7 0.0 42.9  57.1
Salaried 
employment, male
158 49.4 47.5 3.2
Total number  
of males
165 47.3 47.3  5.5
Source: Survey of Informal Workers 2015 compiled by the author.
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the gender aspects of respondent workers were analyzed in terms of the type 
of jobs that they performed, their length of service in their current jobs, the 
workload they endured, their compensation levels and other benefits that they 
received, the specific problems that they encountered at their workplaces, and 
the suggestions that they made for improvement of their workplaces.
Employment Status Disaggregated by Sex
Employment status reflects working conditions and work arrangements, the 
latter notably including (i) the presence or absence of an explicit or implicit 
employment contract; (ii) the degree of control a worker has over the work 
performed and output attained; and (iii) the degree of exposure to, and 
responsibility for, the level of risk borne by the worker. 
The study finds significant differences in the type of worked performed by male 
and female workers (Table 7.10). Male workers dominated the managerial and 
clerical services category, whereas female workers dominated the operative 
services category, in large measure because female workers are predominant in 
the RMG sector. As a result, the distribution of employment is uneven across the 
sectors under study, with male workers dominating in two of the three sectors. 
It would be interesting to examine whether this lagging female representation—
notably in the hospitality sector—is a result of the work performed, or female 
representation in particular economic sectors.
Male workers, on average, worked 11 hours per day, while female workers worked 
10 hours per day. While the highest number of hours worked per week for male 
workers was in the construction sector, it was in the RMG sector for female 
Table 7.10: Types of Work Performed by Respondent  
Male and Female Workers 
(%)
Job Category Total Construction Hospitality
Ready-Made 
Garment
Managerial (male) 98.8 98.0 100.0 …
Managerial (female) 1.2 2.1 … …
Clerical (male) 75.6 100.0 97.5 5.3
Clerical (female) 24.4 … 2.5 94.7
Operative (male) 31.3 100.0 100.0 12.7
Operative (female) 68.8 … … 87.3
… = data not available.
Source: Survey of Informal Workers 2015 compiled by the author.
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workers. Similarly, while male workers worked more than 6 days per week, the 
female workers worked slightly more than 6 days per week and too little time for 
performing household chores. 
In disaggregating hours of work per week by sector, the study finds that both 
male and female workers worked the longest hours in the hospitality sector. 
About 41.0% of male workers in all three sectors together reported having 
worked night shifts, although the corresponding figure for the hospitality sector 
was about half of that. However, in the RMG sector, about 44.0% of female 
workers reported having worked night shifts. Since the study finds that both 
male and female workers worked about 5–6 hours per night, about 50.0% of 
working hours were found to occur at night. That said, the study finds that male 
workers completed their night shift work in 5 of their 6 working days per week, 
while female workers completed their night shift work in about 3 working days 
per week.
As the respondents were unsure about the exact working hours at their 
workplaces, they reported that extended working hours plays a negative role 
in various aspects of their lives. Most of the female workers reported too little 
rest time within their work hours and too little time for performing household 
chores. The resulting lack of rest made them tired and hampered overall 
productivity. Female workers reported that unexpectedly working longer than 
their normal work shifts negatively impacted their personal lives, as for the most 
part, the contribution of respondent women workers to household income was 
of a supportive rather than a primary nature. 
The dual role played by female respondents of housewife and income earner 
undermines both the position and negotiating power of female workers in 
the paid labor market. For example, women tend to seek employment of a 
particular type—such as informal or part-time employment—that offers 
sufficient flexibility in work arrangements to permit them to combine work with 
household responsibilities (Box 7.1). This vulnerability hampers the productivity 
of female workers, which in turn adversely impacts the overall welfare of their 
households.
There are also security issues relating to long working hours, especially at night. 
Most respondents reported that they feel insecure when they work late. Sexual 
harrasment is also an issue in workplaces.
Most respondent workers had been employed for 3–4 years. However, the 
average length of current employment was greater for male workers than for 
their female counterparts (Table 7.11). The length of current employment 
for male workers was greatest in the hospitality sector at 4.8 years. This 
compares with 3.6 years for female workers in the RMG sector. Similar 
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Box 7.1: The Tenuous Balance between Working Life  
and Family Life
Reshma is a 36-year-old mother of two who works in a ready-made garment factory in Dhaka. She shared her problems in balancing family life with 
working life:
I am working in a factory as an operator. My working conditions are very 
inflexible and rigid. I work 12 hours a day. Very often I have to work the night 
shift, and also have to work the next-day morning shift. When I return home 
from the night shift, it is already very late. To catch up for the morning shift, 
I have to wake up very early in the morning and have to prepare food for my 
family. I have to be in a hurry because if I am late, it will cause a lot of problems 
in my job; it may even cause the employer to fire me. Definitely, I feel very tired, 
but I have no other options. When I work the night shift consecutively, I feel 
very anxious about my children. Most of the time, I feel that I am not giving 
them proper time and care.
Source: Survey of Informal Workers 2015 compiled by the author.
observations can be made about the previous employment of respondent 
workers. While the duration of previous employment for male workers was 
4 years, the corresponding figure for female workers was 3 years. Thus, in 
terms of duration of current and previous employment, respondent male 
workers had been in both types of employment marginally longer than their 
female counterparts.
Table 7.11: Respondents’ Length of Current  
and Previous Employment by Sex 
(in year)
Job Duration Total Construction Hospitality
Ready-Made 
Garment
Duration at current 
job (male)
4.3 3.7 4.8 4.4
Duration at current 
job (female)
3.5 2.3 0.9 3.6
Duration at 
previous job (male)
3.8 4.0 3.7 1.9
Duration at previous 
job (female)
2.9 3.3 0.8 3.0
Source: Survey of Informal Workers 2015 compiled by the author.
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A large number of male workers reported that they were unemployed for a 
significant period in the past 5 years. The average duration that they remained 
unemployed was about 6 months. In contrast, female workers remained 
unemployed less than 2 months. The longest duration of unemployment was 
experienced by workers in the hospitality sector (11 months), followed by those 
in the construction sector (5 months). In contrast, in the RMG sector where 
female workers dominate, the duration of unemployment was about 1–2 months.
Monthly Earnings and Contribution to Household Income by Gender
The average monthly earnings of respondent female workers was Tk5,693.00. 
In contrast, that for respondent male workers was Tk11,876.00 (Table 7.12). The 
lower earnings of female workers is expected, as most worked as operatives 
in the RMG sector. Further, there is large variation in the earnings across the 
sectors under study. Workers in the construction sector—irrespective of 
gender—earned more per month than their counterparts in the other two 
sectors. Given that the study finds that the respondent male and female 
workers are similar in terms of educational attainment, and that the female 
workers lag behind male workers in terms of duration of employment only 
marginally, it is interesting to assess the gender earnings gap between the 
two groups.136
136 The gender earnings gap can be measured as: GWGi = 
wim – wif 
wim
 where wim is wage rate for male workers
 in sector i; wif is earnings (wage rate) for female workers in sector i. This measurement conveys the 
extent of gender-based discrimination in wages.
Table 7.12: Monthly Earnings from Employment by Gender
Earnings and 
Differentials
Average 
for the 
Three 
Sectors Construction Hospitality
Ready-Made 
Garment
Earnings by male 
workers (Tk)
11,875.60 15,844.40 8,337.20 8,144.40
Earnings by female 
workers (Tk)
5,693.50 9,000.00 4,000.00 5,671.40
Gender earnings gap (%) 52.1 43.2 52.0 30.4
Share of worker’s 
contribution, male (%) 
56.5 64.1 46.5 58.8
Share of worker’s 
contribution, female (%) 
35.6 58.5 31.0 35.0
Note: Tk77.17 = $1.00.
Source: Survey of Informal Workers 2015 compiled by the author.
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The overall gender earnings gap is about 50.0% when all three sectors are taken 
together. The gender earnings gap when disaggregated by sector is also notable. 
The smallest gender earnings gap is in the RMG sector at about 30.0%, while 
the largest is in the hospitality sector at 52.0%. The smallest gender earnings 
gap of 6.0% occurred in the construction sector, where female earnings were 
about 43.0% of male earnings.
As female workers seem to perceive employment uncertainty to a greater 
degree than male counterparts (described in Box 7.2), most female workers work 
under mental pressure, which in turn hampers their concentration and lowers 
their productivity levels. Many of the respondent female workers reported that 
gender segregation is widespread in their workplaces. This segregation causes 
women to be concentrated in only a few positions such as operators or helpers 
(i.e., horizontal gender segregation) and to be underrepresented in power and 
decision-making positions (i.e., vertical gender segregation).
Female respondents reported that maternity leave is rarely available in their 
jobs. Instead, their employers try to lay female workers off on any pretext at the 
earliest opportunity once it is known that they are pregnant. Female workers are 
also reluctant to participate in any representative organization, as the leaders of 
these organizations are predominantly male. 
Box 7.2: Gender Wage Difference   
in the Ready-Made Garment Sector
Salma is a 21-year-old woman working in a ready-made garment factory in Chittagong. During a focus group discussion, she described gender inequality:
I am working in a factory as a helper. In my department, two helpers are 
designated to do the work. My male colleague is also working as a helper. One 
of our main duties is to carry fabrics from the ground floor to the third floor, 
and to move other inputs and products from one part to another part of the 
factory. As most of the supervisors are male, they have good relationships with 
the male helper. So he gets to rest during working hours and hence shoulders 
less work. Despite being female, I work a lot and endure the majority of the 
work load. But at the end of month, the male helper draws Tk300.00 ($3.85) 
more than I do.
Source: Focused group discussion conducted by the author.
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About half of the respondent female workers reported provision for minimum 
wage in their workplaces. About 60.0% of the female workers reported that 
other than wages, they receive two festival bonuses of an equal amount. The 
other group receives one festival bonus, or one year-end bonus. While 19.0% 
received long paid leaves of absence for sickness and housing allowances, only 
5.5% received health insurance and transport allowances.
Social Protection Programs in Bangladesh 
Bangladesh’s current social protection system is fragmented, comprising a large 
number of programs managed by many ministries. The Ministry of Finance 
lists 146 programs under the country’s social protection system. Of these, 
138 programs were financed through the budget in fiscal year 2015, with the 
total amount spent on these programs in that year being Tk307.50 billion 
($3.94 billion), which is equivalent to 2.3% of the GDP.137 Although this level 
of funding is modest by international standards, when measured against the 
government’s budget constraints, this represents a substantial commitment, as 
it accounts for 12.0% of total government spending.
Bangladesh’s social protection programs are administered by 30 line ministries 
and agencies, without any formal mechanism for sharing information between 
them. These programs are often duplicative, have low budget allocations for 
individual programs, and involve multiple implementation agencies. The 
monitoring and evaluation aspects of these programs are inadequate, and 
implementation progress is mainly measured in terms of the amount of money 
disbursed rather than results achieved. It is reported that there are serious 
overlaps among the various programs, with many being too small to have any 
significant impact on the target groups. About 58.0% of the programs have an 
annual budget of less than Tk500.00 million ($6.41 million) and collectively 
account for only 4.0% of the government’s total social protection spending 
(GED 2015). In addition, many of these programs do not qualify as social 
protection programs in the strict sense of the term. It is only 35 programs listed 
in the assessment of Social Protection Index (SPI) of Bangladesh in 2012 (ADB 
2015) were considered as social protection programs. These programs were 
classified into three major social protection components: (i) social assistance, 
(ii) social insurance, and (iii) labor market.
139 See Ministry of Finance, Government of Bangladesh. Social Safety Net Programs. http://www.mof.gov.
bd/en/budget/14_15/safety_net/safety_net_en.pdf
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General Challenges Facing Implementation of Social Protection 
Programs 
Despite the pledge by the government to implement social protection programs 
as part of its poverty reduction strategy, many of these programs have operational 
shortcomings. These include lack of transparency in the selection of beneficiaries, 
a plethora of programs that leads to high transaction costs for beneficiaries, and 
inadequate administrative capacity to implement the programs.
The importance of well-designed social protection programs within a 
comprehensive framework is an overarching issue for Bangladesh. Ideas such as 
social protection floors would serve social protection well within the development 
agenda. It is a priority increasingly reflected in policy documents, such as the Sixth 
Five Year Plan, as well as Vision 2021, of inclusive growth and middle-income 
status. However, realization of the country’s social protection goals set out in 
these documents would encounter legal, institutional, and financing challenges.
Two missing areas of social protection for the working-age group are 
unemployment insurance and work-related injury insurance for informal 
workers. As Bangladesh continues to develop its manufacturing and service 
income and employment opportunities, the importance of these two social 
security interventions will grow. The lack of social insurance is more pronounced 
for the informal sector, which accounts for 87.5% of all employment. Any 
strategy for reforming the present social protection system will need to pay 
attention to these aspects of protection for the working-age population.138
Legal Issues
The current legal framework, mostly set forth in the Bangladesh Labour Act 
(2006) and its amendment in 2013, is the backbone of the basic structure of 
social protection for workers in all sectors, public and private, including the 
informal sector (see earlier section on legal framework). 
For example, Chapter XVII discusses issues relating to provident funds. The 
major features of the latter section include the category of workers entitled to 
provident funds in private sector establishments, board of trustees of the fund, 
cost of administration, contributions, recovery of damages, nonliability of the 
provident fund to attachment, setting of priority of payment of contribution 
138 However, ILO is consulting with stakeholders in Bangladesh’s RMG sector to introduce an employment 
injury insurance scheme for workers in this top export-earning sector. The scheme will be made up of 
contributions from employers and managed by an autonomous body under the country’s Ministry of 
Labour and Employment, including government, worker, and employer representatives. For details, see 
Donaldson (2015).
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over other debts, and employer’s compulsion for not reducing wages or other 
amenities in providing provident funds.
However, establishment of a provident fund is not mandatory. It is dependent 
on demand by a prerequisite number of workers. Group insurance is also 
dependent on a requisite number of workers, and that number is quite high. 
The amount of compensation given to workers due to work-related injury, 
disability, or death is not adequate for workers and their families. The provision 
of compensation is also discriminatory in terms of age of the worker, with an 
adult worker getting Tk125,000.00 ($1,604.00) for complete permanent 
impairment, whereas a child, adolescent, or young worker gets nothing. Other 
aspects of social protection have remained untouched in labor law, such as 
provisions for pensions and medical and life insurance for workers.
As for social protection for informal workers, including gratuities, provident 
funds, group insurance, and maternity benefits, there are frequent 
noncompliance of the laws that pertain to these, as workers often have no 
access to these protections. According to the law, employers should provide 
compensation to workers for work-related injuries, disability, and death. 
However, most employers intentionally try to avoid paying compensation. Such 
an outcome frequently occurs, since law enforcement agencies including the 
police, courts, and government department or ministry concerned fail to follow 
up on such cases due to corruption and bureaucratic complexity. In particular, 
laws pertaining to discrimination against women are violated to an even greater 
extent.
Institutional Issues
Bangladesh’s social protection system is plagued by duplication of program 
activities, ad hoc approaches, thin dispersal of resources, and absence of 
a comprehensive and strategic framework. As a result, there is a need for 
strategically addressing the country’s long-term vision, governance, leadership, 
and administration in implementing the national social protection strategy.
It may be noted that improving institutional framework for setting up social 
protection for informal workers will be an enormous challenge in view of 
the involvement of several ministries, the problem of vested interests, and 
overall bureaucratic resistance. It is also important that consultation with key 
stakeholders be pursued to encourage an exchange of ideas and public debate 
with active involvement of development partners.
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Financing Issues
There are several sources of finance for social protection programs for workers. 
Following the Bangladesh Labour Act (2006) and its amendment in 2013, 
some portion of social protection, such as benefits relating to illness, accident, 
and maternity, can be financed through contributions by employers and 
employees, once the appointment letter and identification card sections of the 
act are strictly enforced. For the other sections, especially coverage during the 
post-retirement period, government tax and nontax revenue should be the 
financing vehicle.
Financial sustainability of social protection programs is a major challenge 
in Bangladesh. It may be noted that developed countries are able to finance 
social protection of workers through payroll taxes. However, it is unlikely that 
Bangladesh could replicate such a means of financing due to both its limited 
capacity to raise revenue through taxation, and the sheer size and importance 
of informal employment to the national economy.139 However, the experience 
of developed countries shows that social protection financing issues cannot 
be considered in isolation. Instead, their political and economic underpinnings 
must be acknowledged.
Finally, financing issues cannot be examined fully within a resource mobilization 
framework. Instead, they need to be set in a broader context if they are to 
accomplish the following objectives: (i) generate the resources necessary for 
establishing and strengthening appropriate social protection systems, and 
(ii) secure legitimacy for social protection institutions and policies. Ultimately, 
sustainability and legitimacy are the most important prerequisites for 
long-term resource mobilization.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
Despite the fact that “informal work is normal work,” and that those who 
work informally have the right to social protection measures in Bangladesh, 
most informal sector workers are exposed to significant risks in terms of job 
tenure, the environment in which they work, and the precariousness of their 
livelihoods. In 2010, about 89.0% of all jobs in Bangladesh’s labor market were 
filled informally, with women comprising the majority of these workers. 
Several sections of the Bangladesh Labour Act (2006) and its amendment in 
2013 affect workers in the formal and informal sectors directly or indirectly. 
139 The ratio of tax revenue to GDP remains sticky at around 11 in recent years.
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The most important relate to employment standards, occupational safety 
and health, welfare and social protection, labor relations and social dialogue, 
and enforcement. The aim of the act and other related laws is to ensure the 
rights of workers. However, these laws have lost their appropriateness because 
of implementation weaknesses, as the agencies responsible for ensuring 
compliance are dependent on other institutions for enforcement. Existing 
policies and programs need to be revised and redesigned to extend the coverage 
of social protection programs to informal workers. Unless the government takes 
appropriate steps to establish labor rights, a development path of sustainable 
work environments—especially for MSME workers—will remain an elusive goal 
for Bangladesh.
This study also reveals that it is easy to lose a job at any time. There are usually 
no permanent employment contracts, and most contracts are in verbal rather 
than written form. The study also finds that most workers have never heard of 
organizations that represent their work interests, nor has there been any attempt 
to organize workers, as the workers themselves do not see any opportunity for 
collective representation or action. Further, employers are not interested in 
seeing their firms unionized.
Two areas of social protection are notably missing for the working-age group: 
unemployment insurance and injured workers’ insurance. The importance of the 
latter emerged in the wake of a series of devastating fires and building collapses 
in the RMG sector. As Bangladesh continues to develop its manufacturing 
and services opportunities, the importance of these two social protection 
interventions will grow. 
Following the Bangladesh Labour Act (2006) and its amendment in 2013, 
some part of the social protection system, such as benefits relating to illness, 
accident, and maternity, can be financed through contributions by employers 
and employees, once the appointment letter and identification card sections of 
the act are strictly enforced. For the other sections—especially coverage during 
the post-retirement period—government tax and nontax revenue should be 
the ultimate choice of a financing vehicle.
Since MSMEs are at the heart of the economy, a two-pronged intervention is 
necessary to initiate social protection for workers: the economic viability of firms 
must be ensured, and the safety and security of workers in these firms must be 
addressed. To this end, the following policies and actions are recommended.
The government should take all steps necessary to ensure that labor laws are 
enforced, even if that requires revision and redesign of existing policies and 
programs. The government should also enact laws that prohibit unfair labor 
practices by employers.
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The government should also strengthen enforcement of laws and regulations. 
For example, termination simplicitor should be removed and replaced by a 
provision that makes serious misconduct grounds for dismissal of a worker 
only after that worker is provided with due process, including the right to be 
informed, right to be heard, and right to seek the truth through an objective and 
fair process.
Finally, the implementation of labor inspection should be upgraded, and labor 
unions should be involved in the development of inspection standards and 
norms. The Ministry of Labour and Employment should specify how organized 
and unorganized workers can seek redress for grievances in various forums—in 
the workplace, through a relevant government agency, or in labor courts.
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CHAPTER 8
Social Protection for Informal 
Workers in Indonesia: A Case 
Study of Micro, Small, and 
Medium-Sized Enterprises
Diahhadi Setyonaluri and Dinda Radjiman
Abstract
Informal workers in Indonesia have limited access to social protection programs, particularly health and unemployment insurance. This study assesses the current status of, and gaps in, social protection for informal 
workers, and provides recommendations for closing these gaps.
The study reveals that participation in social protection programs by informal 
workers in micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) is relatively 
low. The inability to pay insurance premiums, lack of national identity cards, 
low awareness of and knowledge about registration procedures, and poor 
coordination in enforcing existing legislation are major obstacles to expanding 
social protection for informal workers in Indonesia.
This study has four key recommendations: (i) improve awareness of social 
protection program benefits among employees and MSMEs, (ii) simplify 
requirements for registration procedures and collection of contributions, 
(iii) create a mechanism for flexible payment of premiums for health and 
unemployment insurance, and (iv) improve the financial and institutional 
capacity of MSMEs to provide decent work with social protection programs for 
their employees. 
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Introduction
Indonesia’s Constitution mandates that every citizen has the right to social 
protection. However, despite many efforts to expand coverage of social 
protection programs in the country, it remains inadequate for many. The lack 
of social protection is largely concentrated among workers in the informal 
economy. As recent trends suggest that the informal sector is likely to grow, 
expanding social protection to them is an important part of the country’s overall 
strategy for improving the welfare of its population. 
The term “informal economy” generally refers to economic activities that lie 
outside of formal institutional arrangements, particularly as those activities 
relate to legal rules and institutions (Angelini and Hirose 2004, World Bank 
2010). In contrast, the definition provided by Badan Pusat Statistik Indonesia 
(Central Bureau of Statisitcs) relates to both work status and type of occupation 
(Anwar and Supriyanto 2012, World Bank 2010).140 “Formal employment” thus 
includes employees, employers with permanent workers, and professionals or 
managers other than those classified as family workers. A simplified working 
definition of informal employment, for this study, includes all family workers, 
self-employed persons who employ temporary or family workers, casual 
workers, and unpaid family workers (Anwar and Supriyanto 2012). 
Indonesia has the world’s fourth-largest population. Both the overall population 
and labor force have grown continually over the past decade. In fact, total 
employment grew by nearly 4.0% between 2004 and 2013, with the number of 
workers increasing from 65.3 million to 66.0 million. Over the same period, the 
number of informal workers in Indonesia declined by 6.0%, which suggests that 
the share of formal employment in total employment grew over this period.141 
Since 2010, economic growth has occurred against a backdrop of increasing 
labor productivity, regulatory reform, and expansion of social protection. 
All of these factors together may have played a role in the growth of formal 
employment over the period as well (ILO 2014). 
140 Statistics Indonesia’s definition of the “informal economy” differs from that of the International 
Conference of Labour Statisticians. The conceptual framework developed by the International Labour 
Organization links the enterprise-based concept with the job-based concept of informal employment. 
As a result, the International Labour Organization variously defines informal employment as 
(i) employment in the informal economy; (ii) informal employment; (iii) employment in the informal 
sector; and (iv) informal employment outside of the informal sector, including in both the formal sector 
and households. As a consequence, Statistics Indonesia’s definition of informal workers suffers from 
exclusion–inclusion problems. See ADB and Statistics Indonesia (2011). 
141 This calculation employs the simplified definition of informal employment used by Statistics Indonesia. 
For a more detailed definition, see Anwar and Supriyanto (2012). 
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Providing a relatively large informal sector with social protection creates 
numerous challenges. In particular, the informal sector mainly comprises small 
firms and family businesses with irregular incomes that employ unpaid family 
workers (World Bank 2012).
Tambunan and Purwoko (2002) found that as a result of lack of capital, 
technology, and skilled workers, small businesses in the informal sector are 
generally characterized by low productivity and wages. Many view these 
characteristics as major obstacles in providing social protection for workers in 
the informal sector. 
This study has two major objectives: (i) to examine the gaps in the current 
provision of social protection to informal workers in Indonesia, especially for 
those who work in micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs), and 
to identify factors that contribute to their nonparticipation in social protection 
programs; and (ii) to examine the institutional arrangements for implementing 
social protection programs, to identify strategies to overcome obstacles to 
improve coverage, and to provide recommendations for expanding social 
protection for informal workers. 
The study employs both a quantitative survey and a qualitative assessment. The 
quantitative survey examined the current status of social protection coverage 
among MSME workers through interviews with 250 workers in three major 
MSME subsectors: clothing manufacturing, individual services, and retail trade. 
The majority of interviewees were employed by micro and small enterprises 
(48.0% and 48.4%, respectively), with only 3.6% employed by medium-sized 
enterprises.142 
The qualitative assessment examined gaps in social protection coverage for 
informal workers, as well as obstacles to, and strategies for, expanding such 
coverage. This was done from the perspective of both workers and other 
stakeholders, such as government agencies, MSMEs, and nongovernment 
organizations (NGOs). Four focus group discussions were conducted, convened 
separately for male and female workers. Similarly, 10 key informant interviews 
were conducted with representatives of government agencies that implement 
social insurance schemes, other government agencies, representatives of 
groups of informal workers, MSMEs, and NGOs. 
142 Whether an enterprise is defined as micro, small, or medium-sized is determined by the number of 
workers that it employs. A micro enterprise employs 1–4 workers; a small enterprise, 5–19 workers; 
and a medium-sized enterprise, 20–99 workers. Note that the size of the enterprise in question was 
determined by the number of workers employed at the time of the survey. 
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Profile of Micro, Small, and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises in Indonesia
Based on the definition set out in Law No. 20/2003 on MSMEs by the Ministry 
of Cooperatives and Small and Medium Enterprises (MOSMEs), enterprises are 
classified on the basis of total assets and the value of annual sales. In contrast, 
the definition used by the Central Bureau of Statistics is based solely on the 
number of workers employed by the firm in question (Table 8.1). 
Table 8.1: Typology of Micro, Small, and Medium-Sized Enterprises 
Size
Ministry of Cooperatives and  
Small and Medium Enterprises 
(Law No. 20/2008) Statistics Indonesia
Assets  
(Rp million)
Annual Sales  
(Rp million)
Number of 
Workers
Micro and 
home industry
0–50.00 0–300.00 1–4
Small 50.00–500.00 300.00–2,500.00 5–19
Medium-sized 500.00–10,000.00 2,500.00–50,000.00 20–99
Note: Rp8770.43 = $1.00 based on ADB. Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2012. Manila.
Source: Adapted from Ministry of Cooperatives and Small and Medium Enterprises, Government of Indonesia. 
2012. Statistics of Micro, Small and Medium Scaled Enterprises (MSMEs), 2010–2011. Jakarta.
The contribution of MSMEs to the national economy has been significant. For 
2011, the share of these firms in the gross domestic product (GDP) of Indonesia 
was approximately 57.0% (BAPPENAS 2014). Further, between 2009 and 2013, 
the total number of these enterprises increased from 52.8 million to 57.9 million 
(BAPPENAS 2014). In terms of employment, in 2010, 99 million individuals 
worked in MSMEs (MOSMEs 2012). Of this, the share of micro enterprises in 
total employment exceeded 90.0%, while small and medium-sized enterprises 
accounted for about 10.0% of total employment. 
Most MSME activities were concentrated in the agriculture sector, followed 
by retail trade, hotels and restaurants, transport and communications, and 
manufacturing (Table 8.2). Similarly, the agriculture sector accounted for nearly 
half of MSME employment, followed by retail trade, hotels and restaurants, and 
manufacturing. 
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Table 8.2: Share of Micro, Small, and Medium-Sized Enterprise 
Subsectors in Total Economic Activity and Employment, 2011 
(%)
Sector Activity  Employment
Agriculture 48.9 44.8
Mining 0.5 1.4
Manufacture 6.4 10.0
Electricity, gas, and water 0.0 0.1
Construction 1.6 4.1
Trade, hotels, and restaurants 28.8 22.1
Transport and communication 6.9 7.2
Finance, rent, and company services 2.4 1.6
Other individual services 4.5 8.8
Source: Adapted from Ministry of Cooperatives and Small and Medium Enterprises, Government of 
Indonesia. 2012. Statistics of Micro, Small and Medium Scaled Enterprises (MSMEs), 2010–2011. Jakarta.
Despite their significant contribution to the economy, development of 
MSMEs has been challenging, in large part because most of them operate in 
the informal economy. Similarly, the percentage of MSMEs in Indonesia that 
remain unregistered is significantly higher than in other countries (World Bank 
2009). Further, the average amount of time that MSMEs in Indonesia remain 
unregistered is an average between 2.4 to 2.8 years (World Bank 2009). Thus, 
MSMEs tend to suffer from low productivity, lack of investment, constrained 
access to financial resources, and lack of business development capacity. 
Labor productivity of MSMEs in Indonesia is lower than their larger-scale 
counterparts (Tambunan 2012). This is manifested in the continued use 
of traditional production methods and marketing techniques by MSMEs, 
even when businesses are growing.143 Their comparatively low rate of labor 
productivity also results from their limited uptake of skilled workers, which 
in turn is a consequence of their continuing use of manual, labor-intensive 
production methods (Mourougane 2012; Sandee, Isdijoso, and Sulandjari 
2002). 
143 Weijland (1999) found that most MSMEs in Indonesia started as traditional activities catering to the 
needs of local communities, and that these activities grew when entrepreneurs helped expand the 
business to surrounding areas. However, although their businesses are growing, many MSMEs continue 
to use the same production methods that they used when their businesses were first established. As 
a result, developing MSMEs is challenging, particularly in the face of the mass production techniques 
used by larger firms (Wicaksono 2013).
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MSMEs also lack investment capital, which is a consequence of their limited 
access to financing (Mourougane 2012, Tambunan 2012).144 MSMEs generally 
fund their businesses with the personal savings of the owners; retained 
earnings; or loans from nonfinancial institutions, families of owners, or even 
their employees (Zakir and Huda 2011). For the most part, their access to credit 
is limited because of (i) the size of their firms, (ii) lack of collateral, and (iii) lack 
of skills necessary to apply for credit from formal financial institutions (Bank 
Indonesia 2012, Mourougane 2012). 
Bureaucratic constraints encountered in obtaining business licenses also 
constrain MSME growth (Tambunan 2012, Mourougane 2012). Obtaining 
numerous business licenses is a prerequisite for running and expanding a 
business in Indonesia, and they are expensive. While such licenses are not 
required of micro firms with assets of less than Rp5.00 million ($394.00),145 
they are required for small firms with assets in excess of this amount. For small 
firms, licensing fees are considerable in relation to their cost of production 
(Mourougane 2012). 
The government has implemented a number of policies and programs intended 
to increase the contribution of MSMEs to the national income. For the most 
part, these strategies focus on supporting the establishment of enterprises, 
expanding their access to financing, building their managerial capacity, 
supporting partnerships between MSMEs and large enterprises, and facilitating 
MSME access to both local and global markets.
In 2015, MOSMEs set four main targets to support MSME development: 
(i) increase the productivity and competitiveness of MSMEs, particularly in the 
market that comprises the Association of Southeast Asian Nations; (ii) reach 
an annual growth rate of MSME exports of 20.0%; (iii) expand the supply of 
innovative entrepreneurs; and (iv) expand access to credit by MSMEs. With 
regard to the latter, the total amount of such credit to be made available 
in 2015 under the Kredit Usaha Rakyat (Credit for MSMEs) program was 
Rp20.00 trillion ($1.60 billion) (Coordinating Ministry for Economy 2015). 
While numerous policies for strengthening the MSME sector have been planned 
and implemented, these policies have given little attention to the welfare of 
MSME workers. Instead, the majority of these policies support marketing 
of MSME products through exhibitions or introducing MSMEs to potential 
144 Tambunan (2012) found lack of capital to be the biggest constraint to MSME expansion, followed by 
marketing problems, and accessing affordable raw materials. Respondents were less concerned about 
labor costs and skills levels, although labor costs increased more than five times between 2005 and 2010. 
145 US dollar amounts are derived from the Bank Indonesia website.
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customers. Meanwhile, policies for improving MSME human resources 
generally only aim to improve MSME managerial and marketing strategies. 
Social Protection Systems and Coverage  
of Informal Workers 
In 2004, the government promulgated Law No. 40/2004 on the National 
Social Security System, targeting universal social protection coverage. Labor 
Law No.  13/2003 outlines the rights of workers, as well as the obligations of 
employers, to provide for employee participation in social protection programs, 
occupational health and safety, the legal minimum wage, and training. According 
to these laws, a worker is entitled to four types of employment insurance: 
old-age benefit, health insurance, death benefits, and work-related accidental 
benefits. 
Under Law No. 40/2004, social protection for workers is implemented in two 
stages. The first stage comprises achievement of universal health coverage for 
all. The second stage comprises establishment of employment insurance for all 
workers. Two badan penyelenggara jaminan sosial (BPJSs), and national boards 
for implementing national social security programs, were established. The BPJS 
for the health insurance scheme, which became fully operational on 1 January 
2014, implemented Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional (Jamkesmas) (national 
health insurance program) with the aim of covering the entire population. The 
BPJS for employment insurance, which began operation on 1 July 2015, covers 
workers employed in both the formal and informal sectors. 
Neither law—No. 40/2004 nor No. 13/2003—explicitly requires employers 
to contribute to their workers’ pension funds. Article 167 only states that 
employers can terminate employment when workers reach retirement age, 
and that employers must provide severance pay, even if the employee has 
contributed to a worker’s pension fund. 
Law No. 1/1970 on Health and Safety at Work and Law No. 23/1992 on Health 
provide guarantees on the implementation of occupational health and safety 
requirements.146 Law No. 23/1992 emphasizes the obligation of employers 
to provide for occupational health at work, including health checks for new 
146 The law defines work-related accidents and health hazards to include fires and explosions. The safety 
measures required include fire evacuation plans; health and safety gear for workers as appropriate; and 
plans for reducing the spread of hazards that could potentially harm the health of workers, including 
those associated with temperature, humidity, dirt, smoke, gas, and radiation. The law also requires 
provision of a clean, healthy, and safe work environment.
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employees, health care services for maintaining health at work, and prevention 
of work-related illnesses.147 
The rights of workers to receive benefits and allowances are not stipulated 
in Indonesia’s labor law. However, the Ministry of Manpower Regulation 
No.  4/1994 states that employers are required to pay Tunjangan Hari Raya 
(religious holiday allowances) for all workers who have worked at least 3 
consecutive months. The amount of this allowance is stipulated to be equivalent 
to 1 month’s salary, or prorated according to the duration of employment for 
employees who have worked less than 12 months in their current jobs.
Provision of social protection for informal workers is regulated by Ministry of 
Manpower Decree No. 24/2006. This decree limits the definition of “informal 
workers” to those who do not have a formal employment relationship with 
an employer, or those who do not receive a salary or wage from an individual 
or company; the definition of “informal workers” provided under this decree 
thus also includes self-employed workers. The decree sets out the details 
of a voluntary social protection scheme for informal workers that includes 
accidental, death, and health insurance. 
Health Insurance
The current national health insurance system, Jamkesmas, has two types of 
beneficiaries: those with subsidy and without subsidy. There are 86.4 million 
beneficiaries with subsidy, which include poor and vulnerable households 
(TNP2K 2014).148 The premium for people without subsidy is presented in 
Table 8.3.
The nonsubsidized group comprises individuals who can afford health insurance 
premiums. This group is further disaggregated into three categories, based on 
their employment status:
(i) Pekerja penerima upah (paid workers) are those who receive a salary 
from their employers, regardless of whether they are civil servants or 
work in the private sector.
147 Ministry of Health Decree No. 1405/2002 further regulates the health-at-work requirements imposed 
on employers.
148 Central Bureau of Statistics and Tim Nasional Percepatan Penanggulangan Kemiskinan (National 
Team for the Acceleration of Poverty Alleviation) use the unified database derived from Pendataan 
Program Perlindungan Sosial (the Data Collection of Social Protection Programs) 2001 to determine 
the eligibility of the subsidized group. In 2014, members of households drawn from the lowest 35.0% 
of the national income spectrum were eligible for subsidized health insurance premiums. The Ministry 
of Social Affairs (MoSA) and local government agencies further verify eligibility for subsidized 
premiums as per Government Regulation No. 101/2012, which addresses eligibility for being penerima 
bantuan iuran jaminan kesehatan nasional (beneficiaries of the subsidized premium for national health 
insurance). 
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(ii) Pekerja bukan penerima upah (unpaid workers) are those who work 
but do not receive a salary directly from their employers, such as 
self-employed individuals and unpaid family workers.
(iii) Bukan pekerja (nonworkers) are individuals who do not work but 
receive income from investments, which includes investors, business 
owners, and beneficiaries of government transfer payments. 
Coverage of Social Health Insurance
Table 8.4 shows that 50.5% of Indonesia’s population lacks any type of health 
insurance (Ministry of Health 2013). The World Bank (2010) estimated an 
even lower rate of insurance coverage for informal workers, with only 2.3% 
of informal workers having voluntary insurance or access to health or life 
insurance through a family member.149 Similarly, BAPPENAS (2012) found that 
only 27.1% of informal workers in both rural and urban areas were covered by 
Jamkesmas, while another 5.6% were covered by Jaminan Kesehatan Daerah 
(local or subnational health insurance). In 2014, 32.5 million (44.3%) informal 
workers remained uncovered by health insurance. 
149 The World Bank’s calculations were based on Statistics Indonesia (2008), and followed the definitions 
of the formal and informal sectors formulated by Statistics Indonesia. 
Table 8.3: 2015 Premiums under Indonesia’s  
National Health Insurance System
Category Subcategory Premium
Employer Share 
(%)
Paid workers Government 
employees
5.0% of monthly 
salary
3.0
Private sector 
employees
4.5% of monthly 
salary
4.0
Unpaid and 
nonworkers
All subcategories Level 1: Rp59,500.00
Level 2: Rp42,500.00
Level 3: Rp25,500.00
Notes: 
1. Exchange rate is $1 = Rp10,461.24 in 2013.
2. For purposes of calculating the health insurance premium, “monthly salary” is defined as the total basic 
monthly salary plus any fixed allowances, the amount of which is unaffected by a worker’s absence. 
3. Premium payments are due on the 10th of each month for both categories of national health insurance 
participants. The penalty for late payment is approximately 2.0% of the total premium that is overdue. 
4. The exchange rate was derived from Asian Development Bank. 2013. Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 
2013. Manila.
Source: Presidential Decree No. 12/2013 on Health Insurance. 
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If Indonesia is to reach its target of achieving universal health insurance 
coverage by 2019, the gaps in coverage must be addressed. Further, the current 
scheme that separates zero-level contributions to health insurance from full 
contributions based on a single income threshold results in inequity for informal 
workers, as those with an income slightly higher than the threshold level are 
required to pay the full contribution (Mukti unpublished), whereas those 
whose incomes are slightly lower than the threshold level pay no contribution. 
This means that there are significant differences in the health insurance 
contributions of workers with nearly the same income levels. Conversely, 
subsidizing the health insurance premiums paid by informal workers means 
that individuals with the same ability to pay are differentiated solely on the basis 
of their employment status (as either formal or informal sector workers). 
Several studies have argued that coverage could be improved if contributions 
were collected from some of the beneficiaries who are currently fully 
subsidized, particularly nonpoor informal sector workers who have the ability 
to pay the full amount of their contributions (ILO 2009; GIZ, AusAID, 
Table 8.4: Indonesia’s National Population Covered by Health 
Insurance in 2013, by Type of Insurance Coverage  
(%)
Scheme Membership
Percentage 
of National 
Population 
Covered
ASKES or ASABRI Civil servants or military personnel 6.0
Jamsostek Formal, private sector workers 4.4
Private insurance Voluntary coverage at individual level 1.7
Company insurance Private sector company workers 1.7
Jamkesmas Poor and near poor (lowest 40.0% of income 
spectrum)
28.9
Jamkesda Subnational health insurance scheme 9.6
No health insurance 50.5
ASABRI = Asuransi Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (insurance for Indonesia Armed Forces), 
ASKES = Asuransi Kesehatan (health insurance for government employees), Jamkesda = Jaminan 
Kesehatan Daerah (local or subnational health insurance), Jamkesmas = Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional 
(national health insurance), Jamsostek = Jaminan Sosial Tenaga Kerja (employment insurance).
Note: Riset Kesehatan Dasar (basic health research) notes that as participation in more than one health 
insurance scheme is permitted, some beneficiaries may be covered by more than one health insurance 
program. 
Source: Ministry of Health, Government of Indonesia. 2013. Results of 2013 National Basic Health Survey 
(Riset Kesehatan Dasar). http://www.depkes.go.id/resources/download/general/Hasil%20Riskesdas%20
2013.pdf
.
318 Social Protection for Informal Workers in Asia
BAPPENAS 2013). One study found that 55.0% of informal workers prefer to 
pay the contribution directly to the BPJS health insurance scheme at branch 
offices, field offices, or via bank transfer (BAPPENAS 2012). The study also 
found that 67.0% of informal workers prefer to pay their contributions on a 
monthly basis, while the remainder prefer other payment frequencies. GIZ, 
AusAID, and BAPPENAS (2013) suggested using a third party to collect 
contributions since administrative costs of direct collection from informal 
workers are relatively high. This was supported by the evaluation of Sirojudin 
(2013) on Asuransi Kesejahteraan Sosial (ASKESOS) (social welfare 
insurance), which revealed that third-party collection of contributions could 
extend coverage. 
Insurance Schemes for Workers
The insurance schemes include four programs: old-age benefit, accident 
and disability benefits, death benefit, and health insurance.150 This program, 
previously implemented by PT Jamsostek (Social Insurance for Private 
Sector Workers), originally catered to employees in private sector and some 
state-owned enterprises. 
Before the establishment of the BPJS for employment insurance, the insurance 
scheme for workers was based on government regulation nos. 14/1993 and 
53/2012. Under these regulations, formal sector employees were registered 
for all four employment insurance schemes, while government regulation nos. 
24/2006 and 5/2013 were added to address the needs of informal workers (e.g., 
self-employed or employees without formal contracts). 
Coverage of Insurance Scheme for Workers
The insurance scheme for workers mainly targets government and formal 
private sector workers. The extent of coverage and amount of contributions 
collected for this insurance from formal sector workers are expected to increase 
after this BPJS becomes fully operational in July 2015.151 
Although the labor law makes employment insurance compulsory, coverage of 
formal sector workers under Jamsostek (social insurance for private workers) 
150 Before 2014, employment insurance was implemented by four state-owned enterprises, with their 
programs mainly covering formal sector employees including civil servants and military personnel. 
151 In early 2014, the program offered by the BPJS for employment insurance had 12.1 million active 
members, and by the end of 2014, it had collected Rp2.40 trillion ($189.00 million) in contributions for 
work-related accident insurance, Rp20.10 trillion ($1.60 billion) for old-age benefit insurance, and 
Rp1.10 trillion ($87.00 million) for death benefit insurance (BPJS Ketenagakerjaan 2015).
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is low. In 2012, only 27.0% of formal workers in Indonesia were covered by the 
scheme (Setyonaluri et al. 2014).152 
Further, the rate of coverage of informal sector workers by the employment 
insurance provided by PT Jamsostek is even lower. The World Bank (2010) 
estimated that in 2008, only 2.5% of all workers had access to pension 
benefits.153 In 2013, 67.7 million individuals worked in the informal sector 
(Statistics Indonesia 2013), which means that Jamsostek covered only less than 
1.0% of all workers. 
ILO (2009) identified several constraints that limit informal worker participation 
in Jamsostek: 
(i) The regulations that address social protection for workers limit the 
obligation to provide employment insurance to firms employing 
10 workers or more, or to workers with a monthly salary of more than 
Rp1.00 million ($79.00), both of which are generally characteristics of 
formal sector enterprises.
(ii) The irregular income of informal workers limits their ability to pay 
fixed contributions on a scheduled basis. Similarly, their generally 
limited disposable income constrains the amount of income that 
they can allocate to insurance contributions. Finally, informal workers 
are geographically dispersed, and are generally excluded from formal 
financial institutions, which complicate the collection of contributions 
on a regular basis (World Bank 2012). 
(iii) Informal workers have limited awareness of the concept of social 
protection. This negatively impacts their willingness to pay insurance 
premiums. 
(iv) The scheme lacks flexibility, in that it requires documentation for 
claiming benefits, as well as documentation for registration, collection 
of contributions, and recordkeeping.
ASKESOS is an employment insurance program for informal workers. 
Implemented by the Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA) in 1996, this program 
targets poor informal sector workers, and pays one-off cash benefits for illness, 
work-related injuries, and death (Table 8.5).154 Lembaga Pengelola ASKESOS 
152 In 2012, the National Labour Force Survey reported 42.1 million individuals working in the formal 
sector, while the number of active participants in the employment insurance schemes offered by PT 
Jamsostek was 11.5 million workers. See Setyonaluri, Wisana, and Perkasa (2014) for further details. 
153 The World Bank’s calculations were based on Statistics Indonesia (2008), and used the definitions of 
the formal and informal sector formulated by the Central Bureau of Statistics. 
154 Asuransi Kesejahteraan Sosial (ASKESOS) was terminated in 1998 due to the economic and political 
crisis, but was reinstated in 2003. See Sirojudin (2013) for further details. 
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(community-based organizations) selected by MOSA manage funds on behalf 
of program participants (ILO 2012). Half of the government’s contribution is 
used for developing productive activities such as rotating savings accounts and 
credit associations, microenterprise development, and agriculture activities, 
while the other half comprises reserve funds used for paying insurance benefits 
(MOSA 2011). 
In 2011, ASKESOS covered 358,000 participants, who were managed by 1,790 
local organizations in 33 provinces (ILO 2012).155 In 2011, total expenditures were 
Rp12.6 trillion ($1.4 billion),156 which increased to Rp15.6 trillion ($1.5 billion)157 
in 2013. In addition to limited coverage, the program faced constraints similar 
to those faced by PT Jamsostek because its beneficiaries were all informal 
sector workers. 
In 2012, MOSA piloted a modification of ASKESOS. Referred to as ASKESOS 
New Initiative, it pays the same work-related injury, disability, and death 
benefits as those paid by PT Jamsostek’s worker’s insurance benefit schemes 
155 ASKESOS level of coverage reported in ILO (2012) exceeded that reported by the MoSA. 
156 Based on $1 = Rp8,770.0 in 2011.
157 Based on $1 = Rp10,461.0 in 2013.
Table 8.5: ASKESKOS (Employment Insurance for Informal 
Workers) Contributions, Benefits, and Eligibility
Contribution •	  Government: Rp20.00 million–Rp30.00 million for 3 years per 
organization
•	 Members pay Rp5,000.00 per month
Benefits •	 Cost of emergency hospitalization up to 20 days
•	  Medical treatment costs up to Rp300,000.00 per person  
per year
•	  Death benefit of Rp400,000.00 (first-year membership), 
Rp600,000.00 (second-year membership), Rp800,000.00 
(third-year membership)
Eligibility •	 Must work in informal sector
•	 Earn income of up to Rp300,000.00 per month
•	  Reside in the geographic area of the local organization’s jurisdiction
Note: Exchange rate is $1 = Rp10,461.24 in 2013.
Sources: Ministry of Social Affairs, Government of Indonesia. 2011. 2011 Report on Performance Accountability 
(Laporan Akuntabilitas Kinerja). http://www.kemsos.go.id/modules.php?name=Downloads&d_op=viewdo
wnload&cid=88&orderby=ratingA; S. Sirojudin. 2013. Micro Insurance and Social Protection for Workers in 
the Informal Sector in Indonesia: A Study of the Social Welfare Insurance Program (SWIP/ASKESOS). PhD 
thesis. Berkeley, CA: University of California, Berkeley.
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(ILO 2012). The amount of premium paid by the ministry to PT Jamsostek 
was Rp8,000.00 ($0.63) per month per individual for work-related accidents, 
and Rp2,400.00 ($0.19) per month per individual for death benefits. A BPJS 
representative interviewed indicated that the program would be integrated into 
the new system after the BPJS became fully operational in July 2015. 
Impact of Labor Laws on the Welfare of Informal Workers
Labor Law No. 13/2003 aims to improve the overall welfare of workers and 
addresses four new aspects of labor relations: (i) flexibility with regard to 
hiring, (ii) increased severance payments, (iii) minimum wage legislation, and 
(iv)  legislation pertaining to industrial relations. However, enactment of the 
law sparked a debate regarding increased labor market rigidity that arose in the 
wake of the law’s enactment. 
The World Bank (2014) argued that the larger size of the severance payment 
mandated by the law increases the costs of terminating employees. The law 
requires employers to provide a severance payment of at least 100 weeks of 
wages. This requirement is, in fact, equivalent to a “hiring tax” of one-third of a 
worker’s annual wage (World Bank 2010, 2014). This provision makes Indonesia 
one of the Asian countries with the highest severance pay requirements, which 
creates the highest degree of labor market rigidity (World Bank 2010, 2014). As 
a result, the increase in severance pay mandated by the law impedes expansion 
of formal sector employment. 
Such a significant increase in the legally mandated severance pay requirement 
incentivizes the majority of companies to either avoid signing formal contracts 
with workers altogether, or to hire workers solely on a short-term contract 
basis.158 In fact, the World Bank (2014) noted that the rate of compliance of 
companies with this regulation is relatively low, which causes the majority of 
workers receiving severance pay to be awarded an amount less than that to 
which they are legally entitled.159 
Another aspect of Labor Law No. 13/2003 that has been extensively discussed 
is the impact of the legal minimum wage on improving the overall welfare of 
workers. The minimum wage in Indonesia has increased 30.0% since 2010.160 
158 The Minister of Manpower and Transmigration also implemented tighter restrictions on the use of 
temporary employment contracts and outsourcing, in that both are limited to a maximum of 3 years. 
159 The World Bank (2010) estimated that 66.0% of workers did not receive any severance payment at 
all, that 27.0% received partial severance payments, and that only 7.0% received their full severance 
payments in 2010. 
160 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2010) noted that Indonesia’s 
minimum wage is high compared with other countries, in that it is equivalent to 65.0% of the average 
wage of salaried workers.
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Further, in the capital, Jakarta, it increased 44.0% in 2013 (World  Bank 
2014). However, enforcement of the legal minimum wage remains low 
because (i) a significant share of all workers are self-employed, (ii) many of 
them work in the informal sector and thus lack formal work contracts, and 
(iii) enforcement of the minimum wage by both the central government and 
local government agencies is limited (World Bank 2014). Empirical evidence 
supports the argument that increases in the minimum wage inhibit growth 
of formal employment and fail to protect vulnerable workers.161 In this case, 
as well, minimum wage legislation has failed to improve the overall welfare 
of workers. 
Current labor legislation also excludes the majority of workers in the informal 
sector, or those who work without an employment contract. Although the 
Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration has established regulations that 
provide social protection, enforcement of these regulations is also lacking. 
Study Findings
Data were collected from a survey of 250 respondents with an average age of 
28 years (19–60 years). The respondents were 58.0% male, 42.0% female, and 
more than half were married. Fifty-one percent had received senior secondary 
education, with females having a higher level of education (51.5%) compared 
with males (36.1%).
Of the 250 survey respondents, 40.0% worked in the retail sector, while the 
remainder worked in clothing manufacturing (30.0%), and individual services 
(30.0%). The majority of respondents worked in micro and small enterprises 
(96.0%), while only 3.6% worked in medium-sized enterprises.162 The 
percentage of respondents who worked in micro enterprises in the individual 
service sector was the largest (63.0%), followed by retail (53.0%), and clothing 
manufacturing (27.0%). 
Ninety-four percent of the respondents who worked in retail were shop 
attendants, while others worked as cashiers and administrative workers. In the 
clothing manufacturing sector, 55.0% of respondents were apparel workers 
161 Sukmana and Ichihashi (2014) found that the increase in the relative minimum wage had a negative 
impact, as it decreased employment among the working-age population in rural areas, but not in urban 
areas. Comola and de Mello (2009) also found that the increase in the relative minimum wage had 
a lighthouse effect, as higher wages in the formal sector were associated with higher wages in the 
informal sector. 
162 The number of workers employed by an enterprise determines its scale. Footnote 137 provides further 
details. 
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(e.g., custom tailors or sewers), while 8.0% worked as managers or supervisors. 
In the individual service sector, the percentage of respondents who worked as 
hairstylists or barbers was the highest (35.0%), followed by laundry workers 
(25.0%) and cashiers (15.0%). 
The study reveals that the majority of respondents (71.0%) were regular workers. 
The percentage of female nonregular workers (31.0%) was slightly higher than 
that of male nonregular workers (26.4%). The percentage of both male and 
female nonregular workers was highest in clothing manufacturing (45.0%) and 
individual services (43.0%), while nonregular workers comprised only 5.0% of 
respondents who worked in retail. 
Only 2.0% of workers had written employment contracts, while the majority had 
either a verbal contract or no employment contract. The service industry had 
the highest percentage of workers without verbal or written contracts. Female 
workers, had more written and verbal contracts than their male counterparts, 
although the greater number was not particularly significant.
On average, the respondents worked 9.5 hours a day. Longer average working 
hours were found among male respondents (9.8 hours) and those working in 
clothing manufacturing (10.4 hours). The shorter working hours in retail may 
be correlated with the opening times of retail centers that generally follow 
regular office hours. The working hours of respondents working in clothing 
manufacturing depended on production levels, and sales volumes or the size of 
the orders received by a clothing manufacturing firm. 
Remuneration
The survey finds that about 42.0% of respondents received a fixed salary, 
while 33.0% received a combined fixed salary with piece-rate payments.163 The 
remaining 25.0% were paid solely by the piece. This means that the amount 
of the monthly take-home pay of more than half of the workers in the sample 
was irregular. The average monthly remuneration of respondents receiving only 
a fixed salary was Rp1.6 million, while the average monthly piece-rate salary 
was Rp1.45 million, and that of workers whose remuneration combined a fixed 
salary with piece-rate payments was approximately Rp2.0  million. This total 
reported income earned by respondents was less than the minimum monthly 
wage in Jakarta in 2014 (about Rp2.45 million). 
163 In Indonesia, piece-rate remuneration systems are tied to sales volumes or production levels, rather 
than simply being paid as a fixed amount per piece produced. 
324 Social Protection for Informal Workers in Asia
The average monthly income earned by female workers (Rp1.5 million) 
was lower than that of males (Rp2.4 million). This may be a result of female 
respondents working fewer hours (9.0) than male respondents (9.8). The 
choice of occupation may also have been a factor. The study finds that women 
typically worked in low-income occupations (e.g., as shopkeepers, cashiers, 
and laundresses) while male respondents worked in higher-income jobs 
(e.g., managers, supervisors, hairstylists, and tailors). 
Retail workers had a higher average monthly income (Rp2.4 million) than 
workers in manufacturing and services (Rp1.9 million and Rp1.8 million, 
respectively). This salary difference is a result of different skills requirements 
and geographic locations of MSMEs (i.e., urban, semi-urban, and rural).
Only 0.4% of respondents said that their employers make contributions to their 
pension funds. However, the majority of respondents received Tunjangan Hari 
Raya (Bonus during Islam Traditional holiday). The value of this allowance was 
mostly less than that required by labor laws (i.e., 1 month’s salary for those who 
have worked for a minimum of 1 year).
Knowledge and Participation of Workers on Social Insurance
Forty percent of respondents had knowledge of health insurance benefits 
and government health insurance schemes as well as providers. However, 
only 34.0% of respondents knew the names associated with health insurance 
programs provided by the government (e.g., Kartu Indonesia Sehat [Indonesian 
Health Card] or Kartu Jakarta Sehat [Jakarta Health Card]). Of those who 
were familiar with the health insurance programs provided by the government 
(85 respondents), 47.0% knew the amount of the least costly premium for 
Jamkesmas. 
Despite their familiarity with health insurance, only 24.0% of respondents 
participated in health insurance programs. This relatively low rate of 
health insurance coverage seems to be unrelated to the irregularity of their 
incomes, but rather closely related to their income levels.164 The study finds 
also that the percentage of respondents not covered by health insurance 
who received a fixed salary was significantly lower than those paid on a 
piece-rate basis, or who were paid under a combined fixed-salary and 
piece-rate remuneration system. Nonparticipation was highest among 
respondents from the lowest-income, fixed-salary group. 
164 This finding should be interpreted with care, since the number of respondents who worked in 
medium-sized enterprises or had written contracts (nine and five respondents, respectively) was 
quite small. 
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Fifty-nine percent of respondents lacked knowledge about procedures to 
obtain health insurance, 15.0% of respondents felt that health insurance is not 
important, and 13.0% had no time to register for health insurance. Some of 
the respondents indicated that high insurance premiums, particularly for the 
entire family, are unaffordable. Further, the lack of awareness of the benefits of 
social protection programs result more from the fact that the benefits of social 
insurance occur in the future, whereas payment for these benefits occurs in the 
present, and thus must compete with current needs. 
Willingness to pay for health insurance premiums was discussed. Sixty-three 
percent of respondents were willing to pay a monthly premium of Rp20,000.00–
Rp30,000.00 ($1.70–$2.50), while 6.4% felt that the government should 
provide free health insurance. This finding suggests that the majority of MSME 
workers are willing to pay a small health insurance premium and that urban 
workers tend to have more willingness to pay than rural workers since the latter 
have less income than urban workers. 
However, the study suggests that affordability could limit extending social 
protection to informal workers. For example, the health insurance program 
provided by Jamkesmas requires informal workers to enroll not just as individual 
members but also all of their family members under individual premium 
schemes. However, the current premiums for individual health insurance 
programs are beyond the financial reach of most informal workers. 
The study indicates that a payment schemes and rate of premium of health 
schemes that caters to the specific requirements of informal workers is needed 
if participation is to be expanded. The benefit packages currently offered by 
existing social protection programs are directly based on the amount of the 
contribution of the participant concerned. This applies to all types of members, 
including informal workers. Due to the irregular income of most informal 
workers, sustaining contributions to such a scheme is problematic. Instead, the 
amount of the premium paid by informal workers should somehow be based on 
affordability and income level. As one representative of the BPJS employment 
insurance scheme said, 
Ideally, there has to be layers of voluntary schemes. The premiums are 
what matter the most. For [the] work-related accident scheme, the 
premiums should be based on the income of the participants. If the 
income is low, the premiums will automatically be low.
This affordability issue also relates to the social insurance schemes, and health 
insurance in particular. According to a representative of the BPJS health 
insurance scheme, 
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Based on the regulations, MSMEs are counted as enterprises, and [thus] 
should comply with the paid worker’s insurance scheme [in which] the 
monthly premium contribution would be based on the worker’s basic 
salary. When workers do not have [a] fixed salary, the health insurance 
premium should be based on the regional minimum wage, which is 
generally higher than the wage of workers in MSMEs. I think most MSMEs 
in Indonesia will not be able to contribute to their workers’ [health 
insurance schemes] because of this reason. 
In addition, the majority of respondents were not aware of employment 
insurance (e.g., accidental, disability, death, and old-age insurance), and only 
15.0% knew of government employment insurance programs. This reflects the 
results of the study that only 2.0% of respondents participated in employment 
insurance. 
The study also reveals that the majority of respondents (83.0%) did not know 
the application procedures for the program, and some did not view the program 
as important. Less than 4.0% of respondents felt that they cannot afford the 
premium. The study shows that 40.0% of respondents were willing to allocate, 
on average, 2.1% (1.4%–3.5%) of their monthly income to pay for premium 
employment insurance, while 6.4% said that employers should provide 100.0% 
of the premium. Employers also had limited knowledge of social protection 
programs, including the procedures necessary for facilitating and managing 
employee participation in social protection programs. Further, most employers 
had not considered that providing social protection for their employees could 
provide benefits such as increased worker productivity. 
The study further shows that the financial capability of MSMEs constrained their 
capacity to contribute to worker participation in social protection programs. In 
the words of a representative of Asosiasi Pengusaha Indonesia (APINDO), an 
association of MSMEs, “MSMEs cannot be compared to large enterprises … 
with all of [the MSMEs’] limitations, they cannot pay the minimum wage and 
contribute to social protection of workers as mandated by the labor law.” 
Compensation for Sickness and Work-Related Accidents
The study finds that 38.0% of respondents were not guaranteed compensation 
for sickness or work-related accidents, although 10.0% of respondents did not 
know whether they are guaranteed such compensation. 
Employers in Indonesia have widely varying policies regarding sick leave for their 
employees. Some do not pay employees any salary at all when they are absent 
from work for any reason, while others pay the full salary during periods in which 
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sick leave is taken. The study finds that 48.0% of respondents did not get paid 
for sick leave. The highest percentage of respondents who are not paid when 
they take sick leave (53.0%) were those who worked in clothing manufacturing. 
This was followed by those who provided individual services (47.0%) and 
respondents who worked in retail (42.0%). This outcome may be because 
respondents who work in clothing manufacturing generally have their salary tied 
to production volume. Finally, more than 30.0% of respondents said that their 
employers do not provide full compensation for medical costs incurred from 
work-related accidents. 
Occupational Health and Safety
Regarding health and safety facilities at work, most respondents reported 
having access to a clean water source (94.0%), and clean toilets and sanitation 
facilities (86.0%). Only half of the respondents reported availability of fire 
extinguishers and facilities for responding to work-related accidents. This is 
significant, since the risk of fire and work-related accidents is relatively high 
for workers in clothing manufacturing as compared with those who work in 
retail and services. This notwithstanding, the survey finds that the percentage 
of respondents who reported availability of fire extinguishers and safety gear 
was lower in clothing manufacturing than it was in the service sector. 
Only half of the respondents reported that their employers promoted health 
and safety requirements. Only 18.0% were required to wear or use safety gear, 
30.0% were provided with guidance about workplace health and safety, and 
24.0% reported the presence of signs reminding them about the need for 
maintaining health and safety in their workplaces. 
Representation in Workers’ Associations
Only 6.0% of respondents were aware of the role and function of workers’ 
associations, while the majority (65.0%) had no knowledge of workers’ 
associations and their functions. This lack of knowledge includes facilitating 
members’ participation in employment insurance and lobbying employers for 
improving working conditions.
Skills Development Opportunities for Workers 
Only 21.0% of respondents had formal training, either at work or outside of 
the workplace. The percentage of female workers who received such training 
(25.0%) was slightly higher than that of male respondents (17.0%). The highest 
percentage of respondents who received formal training (36.0%) worked in 
the individual services subsector, while training for clothing manufacturing 
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was 17.0%, and 12.0% for retail sales. These include training on the use of 
computers, beauty salon operation and hairstyling, and sewing and embroidery. 
The percentage of respondents who had been provided with English-language 
training was particularly low at 2.0%.
Challenges of Expanding Social Protection Programs
Registration Requirements
Possessing a Kartu Tanda Penduduk (KTP), a national identification card, is the 
main requirement for an individual to register with Jamkesmas. The Nomor 
Induk Kependudukan (population identification number) is also needed by the 
BPJS to create a database of insured members. However, many still do not have 
KTPs. There is also some anecdotal evidence that some have more than one 
KTP, with different names or residential addresses. Lack of official identification 
is a major constraint to recruiting new program participants, particularly for 
individual memberships, which are voluntary.
Lack of Coordination and Enforcement of Regulations
The relatively low rate of social protection coverage among informal workers 
also results from the lack of enforcement of existing regulations, as well as a 
lack of coordination among stakeholders, particularly government agencies. 
This issue was raised in the interviews conducted for the study, particularly by 
the agencies that implement social insurance programs. As one representative 
from the BPJS employment insurance scheme said, “The line ministries only 
focus on their own objectives, and not the national goal [to provide] social 
protection for all Indonesian citizens.” 
A representative from the BPJS health insurance scheme felt that “[s]anctions 
should be implemented for those who [do] not comply with the laws, including 
employers who do not provide health insurance for their workers. The BPJS can 
only provide names to the line ministries who have the authority to give the 
sanctions. However, we do not know what actions have been taken.” 
Socialization and Education
Representatives of the BPJS health and employment insurance schemes 
revealed that to expand social protection coverage for informal workers, 
awareness campaigns are being put on for various stakeholders, including 
informal workers’ associations at both the national and regional level. In 
addition, they are providing information concerning social protection programs 
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to informal workers at markets and other places where informal workers 
congregate.
Meanwhile, the BPJS employment insurance scheme is developing a strategy 
that it calls “active protection,” which is a direct approach to educating informal 
workers about the benefits of participating in employment insurance schemes 
and to recruiting their participation. 
One socialization strategy would be to have informal workers disseminate 
information regarding social protection programs directly to other informal 
workers. In addition, socialization through media—particularly television—
could be effective in disseminating information about registration procedures, 
as well as the benefit of participating in social protection programs generally. 
Enrollment of Health and Employment Insurance 
A gradual approach may be needed to increase the rate of compliance of 
MSMEs with the social protection aspects of the labor law. In the short term, 
employers can register their workers for individual memberships, aggregate 
their workers’ contributions, and pay them directly to the BPJS, even without 
employer contributions to workers’ premiums. This strategy can be applied 
to MSMEs at an early stage of business development when firms have limited 
financial capacity for employee premium contributions. One MSME has already 
begun following such a procedure. 
An alternative strategy is having a third-party function as an intermediary 
between the BPJSs and informal workers. One MSME owner stated that her 
workers are informally planning to collectively enroll in Jamkesmas. Using 
an intermediary agency may be an option for reducing the cost of collecting 
contributions.
Designing effective systems for collecting contributions is also an important 
aspect of expanding social protection for informal workers. One strategy raised 
in the interviews was locating service points nearer to the areas where informal 
workers live and work. Service points of this type should also cater to the 
characteristics of informal workers. Accordingly, as part of its “active protection” 
strategy, the BPJS employment insurance scheme plans on establishing service 
points that accommodate the needs of informal workers. It plans to collaborate 
with commercial banks, minimarket chains, and local government agencies and 
authorities, using internet and mobile banking services to facilitate collection of 
contributions.
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Empowerment of Micro, Small, and Medium-Sized Enterprises
The study also indicates a need to facilitate development of the MSMEs 
themselves. Some of the informants felt that MSMEs could provide social 
insurance for workers once their firms were better established in terms of 
procuring business licenses, obtaining access to formal credit, and attaining 
more regular production levels and revenue streams. Although the rate of 
compliance with labor regulations by large firms is relatively low, ensuring that 
MSMEs are able to grow is an important aspect of ensuring that MSMEs will 
ultimately have the financial capacity to support employee participation in 
social insurance schemes. 
One way of supporting empowerment of MSMEs is to facilitate their 
sustainability as businesses. The MSMEs Center at the University of Indonesia, 
an NGO that facilitates development of MSMEs, suggested providing insurance 
for MSMEs that covers the risk of total loss of a business, as well as protection 
for their workers. Such an insurance package could be accompanied by training 
programs that help MSMEs develop. Associations of informal workers can also 
be used to support participation in social protection programs by their members. 
One way of accomplishing this would be for the government to acknowledge 
that formal and informal sector workers both have equal rights under the law 
with respect to implementation of labor-related legislation.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Despite the efforts that have been made to extend social protection to informal 
workers in Indonesia, their current rate of participation in social protection 
programs remains limited. Understanding both the current relatively low rates 
of social protection coverage and the challenges inherent in increasing such 
coverage are important aspects of expanding social protection coverage among 
informal workers. 
There are few major obstacles to increasing coverage among informal workers: 
the nature of informal employment itself, and the lack of institutional capacity 
for including them under existing social protection programs. The quantitative 
survey and qualitative assessment reveal three major challenges in expanding 
participation in social protection programs for informal workers: 
(i) Lack of awareness of the benefits of social protection programs 
among workers and employers in the informal sector. Lack of 
information on enrollment procedures, the affordability of insurance 
premiums, and the low priority given to social protection are some of 
the reasons for low enrollment in health and employment insurance.
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(ii) Lack of financial capability. The majority of MSME workers have 
irregular incomes with no written contracts and cannot afford to 
pay premiums for health and employment insurance. Furthermore, 
MSMEs lack the financial capacity to provide premium contributions 
due to limited resources and inadequate law enforcement. 
(iii) Lack of regulatory enforcement. Of particular note in the study is the 
lack of a coordinated effort among government stakeholders to ensure 
employer compliance through existing labor-related legislation. In this 
regard, improved coordination and collaboration between the relevant 
government line ministries and BPJSs is needed, particularly to develop 
systems and programs that are appropriate to the informal sector. 
The results of both the quantitative and qualitative assessments underscore the 
following policy recommendations for supporting provision of social protection 
to informal workers:
(i) Improve awareness of micro, small, and medium-sized enterprise 
employees and employers of social protection programs. A capacity 
development program should be designed that not only increases 
the level of awareness of informal workers but also increases their 
willingness to participate in social insurance programs. Informal 
workers and MSME owners should also become the main agents for 
this program. The major responsibility for conducting such education 
programs should be that of the BPJSs in collaboration with government 
agencies at both the national and local levels, associations of informal 
workers, associations of MSMEs, and NGOs. 
(ii) Design methods to register and collect insurance premiums for 
informal workers. The challenges of participant registration and 
collection of contributions include the large number of informal 
workers and unique characteristics of the sector itself. Simple 
registration and contribution collection to expand participation in 
social protection programs requires the involvement of stakeholders 
such as government agencies, NGOs, and financial institutions. 
Payment methods can be tailored to match the irregularity of informal 
workers’ income such as adopting advance payments, and adjusting 
monthly contributions to the level of the individual worker’s monthly 
salary. 
(iii) Empower micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises. Current 
efforts to support the development of MSMEs should be continued. 
Further, policies that address MSMEs should be directed to facilitating 
their growth into established enterprises. Improving access to financial 
resources, streamlining procedures for obtaining business licenses and 
processing applications, and providing training to improve the skills of 
managers and workers are of particular importance in this regard. It is 
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important to note that empowerment of MSMEs will not automatically 
expand social protection coverage among informal workers. However, 
ensuring MSME growth in both production volumes and revenues 
would increase the capacity of MSMEs to facilitate their workers’ 
participation in social protection programs. 
(iv) Reduce the business risks that micro, small, and medium-sized 
enterprises face. One option is to design insurance programs 
that provide comprehensive protection for MSMEs as well as their 
employees. Insurance may include compensation in the case of 
bankruptcy, damage by fire or natural disasters, and severance 
payments for workers should the firm close. Such an insurance 
program would require the involvement of the MOSMEs, Ministry of 
Manpower, and the BPJS for the employment insurance scheme. 
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CHAPTER 9
Social Protection for Informal 
Workers in the Philippines: 
A Study of Micro, Small, and 
Medium-Sized Enterprises
Ahmid Bualan
Abstract
The informal sector plays a major role in economic growth and poverty reduction in the Philippines, and majority of businesses are micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs). This study assesses various 
programs and policies of social protection schemes for informal workers in the 
Philippines.
The study reveals that most MSME workers in urban Manila are nonregular 
employees. They have low participation in workers’ associations, low benefit 
and work compensation, and limited social protection coverage. These 
informal workers are less represented in labor organizations. About 40.0% of 
MSME workers and more than half of industrial home workers are paid below 
the minimum wage. Lack of awareness of social protection programs and 
affordability issues are among the reasons for low social protection coverage.
The study recommends expanding social protection coverage to informal 
workers by intensifying awareness campaigns, providing affordable insurance, 
establishing a unified database for informal workers, providing unemployment 
benefits, improving avenues for worker representation in labor-related 
organizations, and ensuring strict enforcement of existing labor-related laws.
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Introduction
The informal sector has played an important role in accelerating economic 
growth in the Philippines, as a significant portion of the country's lower-income 
population works in the informal sector. 
Informal workers comprise (i) industrial home workers, usually paid on a 
piece-rate basis who work at or near their homes in the production of goods 
under agreements with employers or contractors; (ii) self-employed or own-
account workers who have no employer, operate their own businesses, and 
have no paid employees; (iii) employers similar to self-employed workers, but 
who employ one or more paid workers; (iv) employees who are paid employees 
of informal enterprises; and (v) unpaid family workers who work occasionally 
without pay on farms or at businesses operated by a member of their immediate 
family (Sibal 2007). 
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) statistics show that the 
informal sector accounts for a significant share of total employment nationally. 
The country's estimated 21 million informal sector workers accounted for about 
75.0% of the total working population in 2013 (World Bank 2013). 
The number of self-employed and unpaid family workers has increased 
significantly over the past few years. Data published by the Philippine Statistics 
Authority showed that from 2013 to 2014, the number of self-employed 
workers grew from 11.9 million to 12.1 million. Over the same period, the number 
of unpaid family workers expanded from 3.9 million to 4.1 million.165
Among the reasons for engaging in self-employed or industrial home-based 
work are the lack of skills, lack of opportunities, and ease of making money 
for daily sustenance.166 Further, because of the lack of opportunities for 
decent work in the Philippines, many are compelled to look for short-term or 
temporary employment, or to even create their own employment to survive 
(Pastrana 2009).
Informal employment occurred in almost all sectors, including construction, 
manufacturing, services, and sales when legal enforcement for protecting 
employees is weak or absent. For example, Soriano (n. d.) observed that in 
165 This figure refers to self-employed persons without any paid employees, and employers in 
family-operated farms or businesses.
166 Data obtained during focus group discussions from industrial home-based worker and self-employed 
respondents in Valenzuela City, Metro Manila.
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the construction sector, compliance with labor and safety standards virtually 
disappears at levels of subcontracting. 
These practices are not limited to the construction sector. Several studies 
have shown informal employment subcontracting arrangements in the formal 
garment-manufacturing subsector, which is evident in its relatively low wages 
and lack of provision of social protection. Such arrangements are so common 
that an entire industry of subcontracting agencies outsourcing production on 
behalf of formal sector establishments has become profitable, with formal 
sector establishments paying agencies to ensure output. While these practices 
minimize production costs for formal sector firms, they also induce possible 
noncompliance through nonpayment of contributions to social protection 
programs such as social security, health insurance, or other employee benefits. 
Profile of Micro, Small, and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises and Informal Workers in the Philippines
A micro, small, and medium-sized enterprise (MSME) (Table 9.1) is defined 
as any business activity or enterprise engaged in industry, agribusiness, and/
or services that (i) has assets (excluding land) not exceeding P100.00 million 
($2.20 million), and (ii) employs less than 200 workers.167 Business ownership 
is not a factor in such classifications (Senate Economic Planning Office 2012).
Table 9.1: Classification Criteria for Micro, Small,  
and Medium-Sized Enterprises 
Scale 
Criteria
Assets  
(’000) Number of Employees
Micro Up to P3,000.00 1–9
Small P3,000.00–P15,000.00 10–99
Medium-Sized P15,000.00–P100,000.00 100–199
Note: P44.19 = $1.00.
Source: Senate Economic Planning Office. 2012. The MSME Sector. https://www.senate.gov.ph/publications 
.asp
167 This definition is based on Republic Act No. 9501—the Magna Carta for MSMEs—which was 
amended by Republic Act No. 8289 and Republic Act No. 6977. The definition is further based on the 
establishment category used by the National Statistics Office.
Social Protection for Informal Workers in Indonesia 339
In 2014, the Philippines had about 950,000 business enterprises. Of these, 
99.6% were MSMEs. Micro enterprises accounted for 90.3%; small enterprises, 
9.3%; and medium-sized enterprises, 0.4% (Department of Trade and Industry 
2014). Many MSMEs were engaged in wholesale and retail sales. Automobile 
and motorcycle repair accounted for 46.0% of all MSMEs; accommodation and 
food services, 13.0%; and manufacturing, 12.0%. 
MSMEs provided about 4.9 million jobs in 2014. MSMEs contributed almost 
63.0% of the total jobs generated by all types of business establishments for 
that year. Of the total number of jobs that MSMEs created, micro enterprises 
accounted for 30.5%; small enterprises, 25.5%; and medium-sized enterprises, 
6.8% (Department of Trade and Industry 2014). 
The magnitude of employment created by MSMEs underscores the vital role 
these firms play in the national economy. However, the value added by MSMEs 
remained relatively low. The Department of Trade and Industry estimated that 
MSMEs accounted for only 35.7% of the total value added, which is a smaller 
percentage share than in other Asian economies. For example, Indonesia's 
MSMEs accounted for 53.3% of total value added; Viet Nam's, 39.0%; and 
Thailand's, 37.8% (Senate Economic Planning Office 2012).
Growth of the MSME sector has also not been sufficient to propel economic 
growth at the national level (MSMED Council 2011). This is in part due to the 
constraints that MSMEs face, which include (i) nonfinancial barriers such as 
the cost of electricity, heavy regulatory burdens, relatively high tax rates, and 
corruption; (ii) financial barriers such as difficulty in accessing formal financial 
services; and (iii) technological barriers such as using low-quality technology 
(Senate Economic Planning Office 2012).
Policy and Regulatory Framework of Workers  
to Promote Their Welfare
The Philippine Constitution of 1987 reflects the requirements of the 
International Labour Organization by guaranteeing protection for workers and 
promoting their welfare (Government of Philippines 1987). The Constitution 
also guarantees full protection of labor, regardless of whether the place of 
employment is in the Philippines or a foreign country, and whether labor is 
formally organized.
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Labor Regulations on Wages and Employee Benefits
Most of this section is directly quoted from Bureau of Working Conditions 
(2014). Labor regulations include several provisions that guarantee social 
protection for workers, which include the following.
Minimum Wage
Republic Act No. 6727 (also known as the Wage Rationalization Act) mandates 
setting minimum wage levels for a broad range of nonagriculture subsectors, 
such as work on plantation and nonplantation agriculture, cottage and 
handicraft enterprises, retail sales, and services. However, in some economic 
sectors, application of minimum wage levels depends on the number of workers, 
capitalization, or gross annual sales.
Minimum wage levels apply to all private sector workers and employees 
regardless of position, designation, or employment status, and irrespective 
of the means by which their wages are paid. The only exception to this rule 
is workers of duly registered barangay168 micro business enterprises operating 
under a certificate of authority issued by the relevant office of the municipal or 
city treasurer.
As of 4 April 2015, the daily minimum wage in the National Capital Region169 was 
P481.00 ($10.60) for nonagriculture work.170 An 8-hour working day is typical 
for application of this rate. Minimum wage levels are also prescribed for output-
based workers such as home and piece-rate workers, as well as pakyawan (task-
based workers). The law requires that workers paid according to output should 
not receive less than the minimum wage rate prescribed by the Regional Wage 
Orders for normal working hours, which should not exceed 8 hours per day.171
Holiday Pay and Premium Pay
The legal definition of holiday pay is a regular daily-wage payment made to an 
employee for an unworked regular holiday. Employees who work during regular 
holidays are entitled to at least twice their regular daily wage. This applies to 
all employees except government employees, retail and service establishment 
168 A barangay is roughly equivalent to a village.
169 The National Capital Region (NCR) is the seat of government, the second most populous region and 
is the most densely populated region of the country.  The NCR is composed of Manila, Quezon City, 
Caloocan, Las Piñas, Makati, Malabon, Mandaluyong, Marikina, Muntinlupa, Navotas, Parañaque, 
Pasay, Pasig, San Juan, Taguig, Valenzuela and the Municipality of Pateros.
170 At exchange rate of P45.50 = $1.00.
171 http://www.dole.gov.ph/labor_codes/view/4
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employees who regularly employ less than 10 workers, household helpers, 
managerial employees, officers or members of managerial staff, and field 
personnel. In contrast, premium pay is additional compensation for work 
performed within 8 hours on nonwork days such as rest days and “special 
days.”172 Workers not permitted to work on special days are not entitled to 
premium pay.
Overtime Pay
Overtime pay is additional compensation for work performed beyond an 
8-hour day. Exceptions include government employees, managerial employees, 
officers or members of a managerial staff, household helpers, output-based 
workers, and field personnel. 
Night Shift Differential
Night shift differential pay is additional compensation of 10.0% of an employee’s 
regular wage for each hour of work performed between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. 
Exceptions to those entitled to night shift differential pay are government 
employees, retail and service establishment employees with no more than five 
workers, household helpers, managerial employees, officers or members of a 
managerial staff, and field personnel. 
Thirteenth-Month Pay
Thirteen-month pay is applied to all rank-and-file employees, regardless of the 
nature of their employment and the method by which they are paid. However, 
to be eligible for 13th-month pay, an employee must have worked for at least 
1 month during a calendar year. Exceptions include government employees; 
employees already paid by employers of 13th-month pay in a calendar year 
during issuance of Presidential Decree No. 851; and employees in the service 
industry, including employees paid on commission, boundary, or a specific task.
Severance Benefit
This monetary benefit is given to employees who are terminated for authorized 
causes. The amount is equivalent to one-half of 1 month's pay for each year 
of service rendered. Computation of the severance benefit of an employee 
is based on the employee’s most recent salary rate. Grounds for termination 
172 According to the Philippine Manual on Labor Standards (DOLE 2004), special days are calendar days 
(i.e., from 12 midnight to 12 midnight or a 24-hour period) that include All Saints Day (1 November) and 
the last day of the year (31 December).
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that result in forfeit of severance benefit are gross and habitual neglect of duty, 
fraud, commission of a crime, and other similar causes.
Retirement Pay
Labor law prescribes retirement pay for employees aged 60 years and above 
who have served a company for at least 5 years. This privilege applies to all 
employees except government employees, and employees of retail, service, 
and agriculture establishments that regularly employ not more than 10 workers. 
Labor Regulations Governing Nonmonetary Benefits
All workers are eligible for several types of leave from work, including service 
incentive leave,173 weekly rest periods, paternity leave, maternity leave, and 
leave granted to single parents. 
The law provides special leave of 7 working days for single parents each year.174 
This is in addition to leave granted under existing laws to employees who have 
rendered at least 1 year of service to a company. Such individuals are given full 
pay, including basic salary and mandatory allowances. Further, leave for victims 
of violence against women and their children can be provided to private sector 
female workers. 
Occupational Safety and Health Regulations
Adherence to occupational safety and health regulations is generally accepted 
as a basic right that calls for concerted action by all stakeholders, including 
government agencies, employers’ and workers’ organizations, and civil society 
organizations (OSHC 2006). Occupational safety and health regulations aim to 
protect all workers against risk of injury, sickness, or death through maintaining 
safe and healthy working conditions. Workers are likewise responsible for 
ensuring adherence to regulations by reporting to supervisors any hazard that 
may be discovered in a workplace, and making proper use of all safeguards and 
safety devices. Such regulations specifically require training of personnel and 
workplace health and safety committees (DOLE 1989). 
173 The Manual on Labor Standards (DOLE 2004) defined service incentive leave as a leave privilege 
of 5 days with pay per year for those with at least 1 year of service; it is commutable to its monetary 
equivalent if not used within 1 year.
174 This is provided for by Republic Act No. 8972, which also provides for flexible work schedules where 
applicable for single parents.
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Participation of Workers in Labor Unions  
and Labor Organizations
The Labor Code of the Philippines (1974) states that the government must 
promote collective bargaining and negotiations, awareness of workers’ 
rights and obligations as union members and employees, and free-trade 
unionism to enhance democracy and social justice. It also seeks to foster free, 
voluntary organization of a strong, united labor movement; provide adequate 
administrative machinery for prompt settlement of labor or industrial disputes; 
ensure stable, just, and dynamic industrial peace; and guarantee workers’ 
participation in decision- and policy-making processes that affect their rights, 
duties, and welfare.
The Labor Code further states that labor organizations have the right to act as 
representatives of their members for collective bargaining, and to be certified 
as exclusive representatives of all employees in an appropriate bargaining unit 
for collective bargaining. Membership in unions or labor organizations is open 
to all persons employed in commercial, industrial, and agriculture enterprises, 
including employees of government-owned or -controlled corporations 
without original charters established under the Corporation Code, as well 
as employees of for-profit and nonprofit religious, charitable, medical, or 
educational institutions (DOLE 2003).
Study Findings
The findings of this study is based on the survey and focus group discussions with 
informal workers of industrial home workers, self-employed, and employees of 
MSME manufacturing subsector in Metro Manila.
Methodology
The geographic area chosen for the study is Metro Manila, because it has the 
largest share of MSMEs in the country (22.0%), and the largest share of total 
MSME employment (32.0%). According to the Philippine Statistics Authority, 
manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, and automobile services—which 
are the sectors targeted by this study—are the primary MSMEs in the region 
and a relatively large share of the total number of informal workers175 (NSO 
2012). The study used surveys, interviews, and focus group discussions in 
data gathering. 
175 The industry classifications are those used by Philippine Statistics Authority (2009), which are 
commonly reported in National Statistics Office and DOLE publications.
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There were 318 respondents comprising 198 MSME workers, 48 industrial 
home workers, 51 self-employed, and 21 employers, owners, or supervisors. The 
study was conducted in selected barangays of Valenzuela, Quezon City, and 
Makati. The selection of the three cities is based on analysis of industry-wise 
and city-wise data on a number of MSMEs and total employment in MSMEs in 
the 2012 List of Establishments (NSO 2012).
Sociodemographic Characteristics of Respondents
The average age of all respondents was 36 years, with most respondents being 
26–35 years old, although industrial home workers were typically 36–45 years 
old. Most self-employed respondents were more than 36 years old. While male 
respondents outnumbered female respondents (58.0% versus 42.0%), women 
accounted for 69.0% of industrial home workers and 75.0% of self-employed 
respondents. This is because self-employment—particularly sari-sari (small-
scale convenience store) retail and food and garment manufacturing—are 
typically home-based activities that attract female entrepreneurs, allowing 
income to be combined with household tasks. 
Female respondents dominated the MSME manufacturing subsector, 
with 59.0% of entrepreneurs engaged in informal sector garment and food 
manufacturing. Corresponding percentage shares for industrial home workers 
and self-employed food and garment manufacturers were 69.0% and 91.0%, 
respectively. More than half (62.0%) of self-employed respondents engaged in 
wholesale and retail were women. 
Only 2.0% of industrial home workers, 8.0% of MSME workers, and 10.0% of 
self-employed respondents were university graduates or had completed some 
university. 62.0% who were either university graduates or had completed some 
university were women. However, more male respondents than women had 
completed vocational training. The majority (60.0%) of respondents were high 
school graduates, as most establishments require job applicants to have a high 
school diploma. 
Employment Status
More than half (53.0%) of all respondents were engaged in irregular employment. 
Among these respondents, 34.0% engaged in project-based or contractual 
employment, with the corresponding figure for casual, seasonal, or on-call 
employment at 14.0%; 3.0% on probationary employment or employment 
as an apprentice or trainee; and 2.0% were hired through an agency. Of the 
respondents who were regular workers, 55.0% were men.  
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Approximately 40.0% of respondents were paid below the legal minimum 
wage, 32.0% were paid the legal minimum wage, and 11.0% were paid above the 
minimum wage. Of the respondents who work for MSMEs, 38.0% were engaged 
in wholesale, retail, and automobile repair subsectors, while 51.0% worked in 
MSME manufacturing firms. Daily wages are below the legal minimum wage 
in MSME manufacturing firms. 54.0% of industrial home workers were paid 
below the minimum wage. Some of the respondents who worked for MSMEs 
who were not paid the minimum wage enjoyed other benefits, such as live-in 
workers who were provided free room and board. 
49.0% of the respondents who worked for MSMEs mentioned that their 
employers did not provide retirement benefits or severance benefit. Similarly, 
45.0% of MSME workers and 94.0% of industrial home workers did not 
receive holiday pay. Very few (2.0%) of industrial home workers said that their 
employers provided 13th-month pay. Of respondents who worked in MSMEs, 
35.0% said that regular employees were provided 13th-month pay. 
The study finds that most workers—even those who worked for formal sector 
enterprises—have no protection against contract termination. Only 37.0% of 
MSME worker respondents had a written contract, 10.0% had a verbal contract, 
and 32.0% said that they can be terminated at any time. Respondents who had 
an employment contract tended to be those who had worked fewer months at 
their current job than other workers. MSME workers who had an employment 
contract (64.0%) had worked at their current job for only 5 months. In most 
cases, employees were provided 5-month employment contracts, as the Labor 
Code requires employees to be regularized after 6 months of employment. 
For the industrial home worker respondents, only 17.0% had a written 
employment contract, while 71.0% had no employment contract. In fact, during 
a focus group discussion for industrial home workers, some respondents said 
that their jobs were always at risk due to lack of written employment contracts. 
The study finds that few respondents had been formally trained to perform 
the duties required in their current jobs. Only 21.0% of MSME and industrial 
worker respondents said that they had received such training, and only 14.0% 
of self-employed respondents had received formal training in starting their 
own businesses. Similarly, few MSME and industrial home workers had been 
provided with training for improving their skills. Only 3.0% of MSME workers 
and 6.0% of industrial home workers said that they were provided with such 
training in their current jobs.
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Social Insurance 
Social insurance176 in the Philippines consists of several programs. While several 
government agencies have initiated social protection programs in the event of 
calamity, sickness, old age, or death, this list is not exhaustive. 
Social Security System
Established in 1957, the Philippine Social Security System (SSS) is a defined-
benefit program that pays benefits based on the number of contributions paid and 
the monthly salary credit of the participant. The SSS also pays benefits in the event 
of sickness or pregnancy (de Quiros 2014). As of September 2014, 4.3  million 
registered self-employed individuals (35.0% of all self-employed persons) were 
SSS participants, and 4.3 million individuals were voluntary SSS participants 
(SSS 2014). 
Several attempts were made to expand SSS coverage to informal workers. In early 
2012, the SSS AlkanSSSya Program—a microsavings program offering convenient 
collection and remittance of contributions by informal workers—was launched. 
The program was designed to encourage informal sector workers to save. Metal 
safety boxes with secure mini compartments have been installed in various 
accessible locations to store AlkanSSSya savings. Every member is assigned a 
mini compartment to drop P10.00–P12.00 ($0.20–$0.30) per day for 30 days to 
complete his or her minimum SSS contribution of P330.00 ($7.80) per month. 
As of May 2014, this program attracted more than 74,000 members from 748 
informal sector groups nationwide. In fact, a total of 180 informal sector groups 
representing more than 17,000 members joined the program during the first 
5 months of 2014 (PTV News 2014). 
The study reveals that only 62.0% of the 318 respondents were MSME workers 
who were active SSS participants, while 8.0% were inactive participants. Inactive 
participants are those who were registered with the SSS, but have discontinued 
their payments because they transferred to another company and their new 
employers failed to contribute to their monthly premiums. Of all MSME workers, 
30.0% were not registered with the SSS (Table 9.2).
The most common reason for inactive SSS status given by industrial home workers 
and self-employed respondents was “loss of job” and “no employer to share the 
contribution,” both of these being related to the cost of the premiums required. 
Half of the industrial home workers and 63.0% of self-employed individuals 
previously worked with other companies before becoming home-based 
176 Social insurance includes programs that cover the risks associated with unemployment, sickness, 
maternity, disability, industrial injury, and old age (ADB 2011).
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workers or self-employed entrepreneurs. As a result, they were SSS members, 
but discontinued their contributions because they cannot afford to pay their 
premiums independently. 
More than half (56.0%) of MSME workers said that they are not SSS participants 
because their employers had not registered them, while 17.0% said that they do 
not have registration information. Of the industrial home workers, 33.0% said 
that they do not know how to join, 17.0% said they cannot afford their premiums, 
and another 17.0% consider SSS participation to be unimportant. Finally, 51.0% 
of the respondents were completely or only partially aware of the benefits of SSS 
participation. Forty percent of the self-employed respondents said that they do 
not know how to apply for SSS participation, while 35.0% said they cannot afford 
the premium, since they are expected to pay the full amount. Fifty nine percent 
of the self-employed respondents were unaware or only partially aware of the 
benefits of SSS participation. 
The low rates of SSS coverage of industrial home workers, self-employed 
respondents, and MSME workers result from lack of awareness of program 
benefits, nonaffordability, and dependence on their employers to pay the share 
of premium of social insurance programs. Ultimately, both of these outcomes 
also relate to weak enforcement of labor laws.
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation
The Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth) is a tax-exempt 
government corporation attached to the Department of Health. In October 
1997, PhilHealth replaced the Government Service Insurance System as 
implementing agency of the Medicare program for government and private 
sector employees, and replaced the SSS in April 1998. In 1999, PhilHealth 
Table 9.2: Social Security System Participation  
by Type of Occupation 
(%)
Type of Membership MSME Workers 
Industrial 
Home Workers Self-Employed
Members (active) 62.0 18.0 25.0
Members (inactive) 8.0 40.0 33.0
Nonmembers 30.0 42.0 42.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
MSME = micro, small, and medium-sized enterprise.
Source: Survey of Informal Workers 2015 compiled by the author. 
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programs began covering self-employed persons and informal workers. In 
2005, PhilHealth replaced the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration as 
the implementer of functions pertaining to overseas Filipino workers.
PhilHealth has undertaken several initiatives to improve health services such 
as the introduction of a primary and catastrophic benefit package to provide 
universal coverage to all. In 1997, PhilHealth began its indigent program, 
partnering with local government units to enroll families with lack of access to 
health care (PhilHealth 2013). Administrative Order No. 2010-0036 ensured 
health care coverage of vulnerable groups through an operational strategy 
called Kalusugan Pangkalahatan (universal health care), which seeks to ensure 
equitable access to quality health care by all, especially those in the lowest-
income quintiles. Informal workers also have access to PhilHealth's Individually 
Paying Program. 
As of 31 December 2014, PhilHealth’s membership included 2.4 million 
informal sector and self-employed individuals. Findings of this study further 
reveal that nearly one-half of all MSME workers and 71.0% of industrial home 
workers were not PhilHealth members. Table 9.3 shows that only 43.0% of 
self-employed respondents were active PhilHealth members, probably due 
to subsidized contributions by the sponsorship program, or through programs 
such as conditional cash transfers or the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program 
(Bridging Program for the Filipino Family) or other programs under which the 
government finances the cost of PhilHealth membership.
Table 9.3: PhilHealth Membership by Type of Occupation 
(%)
Type of 
Membership
MSME 
Workers 
(198) 
Industrial 
Home 
Workers  
(48) 
Self-
Employed  
(51)
Total 
(297)
Active 46.0 23.0 43.0 42.0
Inactive 5.0 6.0 29.0 9.0
Nonmembers 49.0 71.0 28.0 49.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
MSME = micro, small, and medium-sized enterprise.
Source: Survey of Informal Workers 2015 compiled by the author.
Social Protection for Informal Workers in the Philippines 349
The study finds that the lack of awareness of program benefits accounts for 
the relatively low rate of PhilHealth membership among respondents, as 55.0% 
of MSME worker respondents, 71.0% of industrial home worker respondents, 
and 59.0% of self-employed respondents were unaware or only partially aware 
of the benefits of PhilHealth membership. Industrial home workers cited the 
unaffordable premium cost, payment inconvenience, difficulty in claiming 
benefits, small benefit amounts, and long waiting periods as reasons for letting 
their memberships lapse.
The study also reveals that very few MSME workers were covered by the various 
forms of private insurance, such as life insurance, health insurance, and personal 
accident insurance. In fact, the study finds that only 14 of the 198 MSME worker 
respondents had some sort of private insurance. 
Pag-IBIG Fund (Home Development Mutual Fund)
In 1978, Presidential Decree No. 1530 (later amended by Presidential Decree 
No. 1752 and Republic Act No. 7742) established the Pag-IBIG Fund (Home 
Development Mutual Fund), a national savings program that provides 
affordable home financing for workers, with a parallel fund for government 
employees and the SSS for private sector workers, both administered by the 
Government Service Insurance System. 
The Pag-IBIG Fund introduced several innovative benefit programs to 
expand its membership and to target groups of informal sector self-employed 
individuals, overseas Filipino workers, and nonearning spouses. Members 
contribute at least 2.0% of their income to the fund. However, the fund also 
provides schemes to ensure inclusion of informal workers by reducing the 
required monthly contribution to as low as P80.00 for those earning at least 
P1,000.00 per month. 
At the end of 2013, the Pag-IBIG Fund had 13.5 million members, with its self-
employed membership having grown by 18.0% from 160,331 in 2012 to 189,940 
in 2013 (Pag-IBIG Fund 2013). As of December 2014, the total self-employed 
membership was 199,795, about 1.7% of the total number of self-employed 
persons in the Philippines.177 
Membership is mandatory for all employees, regardless of employment status. 
However, while registration is required of all persons with a monthly income 
of P1,000.00 or more, the study finds that only 39.0% of MSME workers were 
active members, and the corresponding figures for industrial home workers and 
self-employed respondents were only 8.0% and 14.0%, respectively (Table 9.4). 
177 Data provided by the Pag-IBIG Fund (2013).
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Of MSME worker respondents who were active Pag-IBIG Fund members, 53.0% 
said that their employer shares the cost of their monthly contributions, while 
39.0% said that their employers pay the full cost. Industrial home worker and 
self-employed respondents who were active members said that they pay the 
full cost of membership.
A number of reasons for inactive Pag-IBIG Fund membership were given during 
the survey interviews and focus group discussions. Most respondents said 
that monthly premiums are unaffordable. The study also reveals that 70.0% 
of MSME worker respondents were only somewhat aware of the benefits of 
membership.
Working Conditions
The conditions under which MSME worker respondents worked were far better 
than those of industrial home workers and self-employed respondents. Only 
14.0% of the self-employed respondents and 38.0% of industrial home workers 
owned fire extinguishers, and only 31.0% of self-employed respondents had 
access to health or safety equipment. 
Although 40.0% of MSME worker respondents were not paid the legal minimum 
wage, 30.0% worked more than the prescribed 8 hours per day. While only 
18.0% of MSME workers and 8.0% of industrial home workers received training 
in occupational health and safety, none of the self-employed respondents 
received such training. 
Table 9.4: Pag-IBIG Fund Membership by Type of Occupation 
(%)
Type of 
Membership
MSME Workers  
(198) 
Industrial Home 
Workers 
(48) 
Self-Employed  
(51) 
Active 39.0 8.0 14.0
Inactive 3.0 13.0 22.0
Nonmember 58.0 79.0 64.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
MSME = micro, small, and medium-sized enterprise.
Source: Survey of Informal Workers 2015 compiled by the author. 
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Representation in Labor Unions and Organizations
DOLE data shows that as of 2013, there were 32,424 workers' associations 
in the Philippines with about 1.3 million members, and 16,638 private sector 
unions with about 1.4 million members.
The study shows that only 2.0% of the 318 respondents were members of 
labor unions. One of the reasons for nonparticipation of MSME workers in 
labor organizations was frequent resignation and termination of workers. Such 
resignations mainly relate to salary or work environment issues. The study also 
finds that in some cases, labor unions and workers’ organizations were simply 
inaccessible to rank-and-file workers, and that union leaders were typically 
chosen by the employers themselves.
Employer Compliance with Labor Regulations
One of the issues mentioned during the interviews was that the labor laws 
are too protective of workers. For example, existing labor law provisions make 
discharging regular workers difficult, and the process for firing employees 
requires many cumbersome requirements.
The study, which included interviews with 21 MSME employers and supervisors, 
finds that 90.0% of supervisors were aware of the legal minimum wage set by 
the government for the National Capital Region. Of those interviewed, 57.0% 
believed that some employers were not compliant with the current minimum 
wage legislation. Of these interviewees, 54.0% felt that such noncompliance 
resulted from inadequate enforcement of labor laws. 
Only 38.0% of the employers and supervisors interviewed said that they provide 
regular employees with retirement benefits. More than half (52.0%) said they 
do not provide regular workers with severance benefits (see Table 9.5).
DOLE’s role as an enforcer of labor law compliance is challenging, interviewees 
pointed out that in most cases, labor law compliance officers have difficulty 
executing their functions because some enterprises simply refuse to cooperate. 
While other government agencies are attempting to facilitate the formalization 
of informal enterprises, most prefer their current informal status, as it allows 
them to avoid strict compliance with labor laws. 
The study finds that only 52.0% of the employers and supervisors interviewed 
said that they paid SSS contributions on behalf of their regular employees the 
previous year, with nonregular workers being even less likely to be covered by 
SSS participation. Only 43.0% said that they paid SSS contributions on behalf 
of their nonregular workers the previous year. 
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As for PhilHealth, 52.0% paid PhilHealth contributions for their regular 
employees the previous year, although less than half (43.0%) said that 
they paid contributions for their nonregular workers the previous year. 
Pag-IBIG Fund MSME worker coverage was likewise low, as less than half (48.0%) 
said that they made Pag-IBIG Fund contributions for their regular workers the 
previous year, and only 43.0% paid contributions for their nonregular workers. 
The most common reason for not paying social insurance contributions was 
the cost of the Pag-IBIG Fund, PhilHealth, and SSS premiums. Other reasons 
included employees not being registered with the SSS, employees paying their 
own contributions, or having those contributions paid by other sources. 
The study also finds that the lack of access to payment collection centers in 
some areas is one of the reasons for the relatively low informal worker coverage 
rates (DOLE et al. 2014). Representatives of most government agencies 
interviewed believed that social insurance awareness campaigns should be 
intensified through the assistance of local government units, colleges and 
universities, nongovernment organizations, and religious organizations.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Extending social protection coverage to an estimated 21 million informal 
workers requires considerable resources. The number of informal workers 
Table 9.5: Lack of Provisions for Work-Related Benefits 
(%)
Benefits Nonprovision of Benefits
Holiday Pay for Regular Workers 38.0
13th-Month Pay 43..0
Paid Sick Leave 62.0
Overtime Wages for Overtime Work 48.0
Legally Mandated Nightshift Wage Differential 62.0
Paid Maternity Leave 57.0
Paid Paternity Leave 76.0
Parental Leave for Single Parents 71.0
Special Leave for Female Employees 81.0
Service Incentive Leave for Regular Workers 57.0
Source: Survey of Informal Workers 2015 compiled by the author. 
Social Protection for Informal Workers in the Philippines 353
covered by PhilHealth as of 31 December 2014 was only about 2.4 million 
(11.0%) of the total estimated number of informal workers.178 
The lack of awareness of the benefits of social insurance is a major constraint 
to extending such coverage. There are few informal workers who have secured 
personal insurance to protect themselves against the financial burden 
associated with sudden death, illness, or accidents. The workers should be 
informed on the benefits of program participation and their rights under the 
existing social protection programs.
The affordability of social security and health insurance premiums is another 
major constraint to expanding social protection coverage for informal workers. 
Subsidizing social insurance premiums is not a sustainable solution, in part 
because provision of such subsidies depends on local government financial 
capacity. Instead, flexible social insurance programs that are tailored to the 
budget constraints of low-income groups would be welcomed by informal 
workers.
To achieve universal coverage, coordination among government agencies 
tasked with provision of social protection must be improved. This is particularly 
important to avoid the duplication of efforts that occurs when multiple social 
protection programs target the same population. Regular data collection 
on informal workers is encouraged. This unified database that covers the 
entire informal sector179 can then be used to facilitate the expansion of social 
protection coverage for informal workers. 
Representation of workers in trade unions and collective-bargaining agreements 
has also shown a decreasing trend in recent years. Worker representation 
in workers' associations or unions can help them assert their legal rights as 
workers. The working conditions of industrial home workers and self-employed 
persons need more frequent monitoring by authorities, if the safety of these 
workers is to be ensured. Further, government efforts at fostering MSME worker 
participation in policy discussions on social protection for informal workers 
should be intensified.
178 The figure includes self-earning individuals, as reflected in PhilHealth (2014).
179 Cited during focus group discussions with food factory workers.
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CHAPTER 10
Overcoming Barriers 
and Addressing Gender 
Dimensions in Universal 
Health Care for Informal 
Workers: Lessons from India 
and Thailand
Martha Chen and Frances Lund180
Abstract
This chapter explains the necessity of health care for the working poor, especially women. It also provides solutions to address barriers to health care access. India and Thailand, which have very different health care 
systems, are used as case studies to explore these barriers and to examine the 
extent to which these are gendered. The chapter is based on research done in 
collaboration with organizations of informal female workers in both countries: 
the Self Employed Women’s Association in India and HomeNet Thailand.
Informal employment comprises 84.0% of nonagriculture employment in 
India, the highest percentage share in South Asian countries for which data are 
available. In contrast, it comprises only 42.0% of nonagriculture employment in 
Thailand, the lowest percentage share in East and Southeast Asian countries. 
Informal workers, by definition, work without employment-based social 
protection. There is gender segmentation in informal employment, with men 
more likely than women to be employed in informal enterprises. 
180 The authors are grateful for the inputs of Mirai Chatterjee and Susan Thomas (Self Employed Women’s 
Association [SEWA]) and Poonsap Tulaphan and Chonticha Tangworamongkon (HomeNet Thailand). 
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The chapter presents a framework for classifying health care risks and barriers, 
including three major employment variables (status in employment, branch 
of economic activity, and place of work). Although the two countries studied 
have different health systems and standards, the barriers to health care access 
faced by informal workers are similar, despite the fact that both countries have 
been in the process of health reforms that are inclusive of informal workers. 
The chapter further identifies problems on the demand side but reveals that 
problems on the supply side present more significant barriers to health care 
access for informal workers, all of which impact women’s incomes.
Introduction
Slow recovery from the global recession, as well as growing inequality, have 
moved universal social protection and universal health care to the forefront 
of the development agenda. More countries are considering how to extend 
social protection as well as access to health care, particularly to those who 
lack such access. This includes low-income households, vulnerable groups, 
and the informal workforce. Yet recent reforms in the health systems of some 
countries include capping the number of health workers and increasing fees 
for health services, making access to health care more difficult for low-income 
households, vulnerable groups, and the informal workforce. 
This chapter (i) examines the health care systems of India and Thailand, 
(ii) presents recent findings on the health care needs and challenges of informal 
workers in one city in each country, and (iii) establishes some guidelines and 
principles for health policy reform that supports access to health care by 
informal workers. 
In most developing countries more than half of the workforce is employed in 
the informal sector, with the percentage share of informal workers in the total 
labor force reaching 90.0% in some South Asian countries. The overall burden 
of illness, accidents, and disability tends to be high for informal workers, given 
what they do and where they work and live. At the same time, their access to 
health care services tends to be low, given the relatively low employment status 
of these workers and their disadvantaged social status.
This chapter explains why access to health care for the working poor in the 
informal economy—female members in particular—is necessary to reduce 
poverty and inequality. It likewise outlines necessary actions to extend health 
care to informal workers. More specifically, it details efforts undertaken in India 
and Thailand to increase access to health care by informal workers. On that 
basis, recommendations are provided for improving the design and delivery of 
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health services, including how organizations of informal workers can be involved 
in policy reform as well as in extending access to health care. 
The scope of the topic of increased access to health care by informal workers is 
as broad as the issue itself. As a result, this study does not aim to treat this topic 
in a comprehensive manner, either geographically or substantively. Instead, its 
focus is restricted to the urban rather than the rural setting. Similarly, this chapter 
does not address financing of health care in any significant detail. Instead, recent 
experience and research findings in two Asian cities—Ahmedabad, India, and 
Bangkok, Thailand—are presented. The fact that these two countries have 
different health systems allows the chapter to illustrate the issues pertaining 
to access to health care by informal workers in two distinctly different settings. 
Thailand has a strong national commitment to universal access to health care; 
in contrast, while many parts of India’s health system are good, overall access 
to it is patchy. Nevertheless, similar mechanisms of exclusion operating in both 
settings are found. 
The chapter draws on two recent studies by the Self Employed Women’s 
Association (SEWA) in Ahmedabad, India, and HomeNet Thailand, based 
in Bangkok, which were conducted in collaboration with Women in Informal 
Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO). The first study—the 
Informal Economy Monitoring Study (IEMS)—investigated recent changes in 
the urban informal economy. This study, which covered 3 economic sectors and 
10 cities, surveyed home-based workers and street vendors in Ahmedabad, as 
well as home-based workers in Bangkok. The sources for the data included (i) a 
survey questionnaire distributed to 150 informal workers in each sector in each 
city, (ii) focus group discussions with half of the sample, and (iii) interviews with 
key informants. 
The second study—Informal Workers’ Health—explored the barriers to health 
care access faced by informal workers. The data and information underlying this 
study were obtained from respondents who included (i) home-based workers 
and street vendors in Ahmedabad (Chatterjee and Thomas 2014a, 2014b); 
and (ii) domestic workers from Thailand and Myanmar, as well as home-based 
workers in Bangkok (Tangworamongkon and Tulaphan 2014a, 2014b). 
In addition to the two studies, the conclusions and recommendations of this 
chapter also draw on the extensive knowledge and experience of HomeNet 
Thailand, SEWA, and WIEGO. The collective experience of these organizations 
was mainly obtained by organizing informal workers around health and other 
issues, researching the health status of informal workers, and advocating for 
universal health care, the latter being broadly defined to include occupational 
health and safety (e.g., Namsomboon unpublished). 
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Before entering into the specific domain of the informal economy and informal 
workforce, some general points are presented that relate to gender and the 
labor force. This chapter is, of necessity, highly stylized. For deeper analysis of 
the points presented, see Chen et al. (2005), ILO (2008, 2010), and Kabeer 
(2012). 
In short, there is a gender wage gap in both the formal and informal labor markets. 
That is, men earn more than women, even when years of education and skills 
levels are controlled for. In its 2010 study on this wage gap, the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) reported a slight decrease in the gap between 
women and men’s earnings from 26.2% in 1995 to 22.0% in 2005. Given 
this, the question remains whether women choose jobs with lower earnings 
(because these jobs are part-time and thus allow more time for family and 
care responsibilities, for example), or whether there are structural forces that 
limit women to lower-paid positions. Although more women in both developed 
and developing economies are now entering the labor market at lower earning 
levels than men, women still shoulder the main tasks of unpaid domestic and 
care work in families. The only exceptions to this are families that can afford 
to employ domestic or care services, most of which, however, are usually 
other women.
Informal Workforce
There are three official statistical terms or definitions relating to the informal 
workforce: (i) the informal sector, which refers to production and employment 
that takes place in unincorporated small-scale or unregistered enterprises (ILO 
1993); (ii) informal employment, which refers to employment without legal and 
social protection, both inside and outside of the informal sector (ILO 2003); 
and (iii) the informal economy, which refers to all units, activities, and workers 
so defined, and the output that they produce. Together, workers employed in 
the informal economy form the broad base of the workforce and economy in 
many countries, especially in the developing world (Chen 2012).
Informal employment is a large, heterogeneous category. For the purposes of 
this chapter, it is useful to subdivide informal employment into self-employment 
and wage employment, and then, within these broad categories, into more 
homogeneous subcategories according to status in employment: 
(i) Informal self-employment. This includes employers in informal 
enterprises, own-account workers in informal enterprises (owner-
operators who do not employ others), contributing family workers in 
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informal and formal enterprises, and members of informal producers’ 
cooperatives.
(ii) Informal wage employment. This includes employees hired without 
social protection contributions by formal enterprises, informal 
enterprises, or households. Certain types of wage work are more likely 
than others to be informal, including employees of informal enterprises, 
paid domestic workers,181 and casual or day laborers (Chen 2012).
Increasingly, formal firms are hiring workers under informal conditions without 
making contributions to their health insurance or other health care assistance. 
In many countries, therefore, informal wage employment outside of informal 
enterprises is a large and growing segment of informal employment. While 
efforts should be made to mandate that employers, in both formal and 
informal firms, help ensure access to health care for their employees, the trend 
is in the opposite direction. By definition, then, neither self-employed nor 
wage-employed informal workers enjoy contributions to health insurance, paid 
sick leave, or other health care assistance from employers. 
Global Overview
In the late 1990s, WIEGO commissioned two reviews of the links among 
informality, poverty, and gender: one of these was of available literature 
(Sethuraman 1998), and the other was of available statistics (Charmes 1998).182 
Both reviews found that average earnings in the informal economy are quite 
low, and that most informal workers are poor. Both reviews also found a similar 
hierarchy of earnings and segmentation by status in employment and gender 
within the informal economy. These findings provided the basis for WIEGO’s 
multisegmented model of informal employment, which is illustrated in Figure 10 
(Chen et al. 2005, Chen 2012). Subsequent analyses of national data by 
WIEGO and others have tested and reaffirmed this model (Chen et al. 2005). 
In Figure 10, health risks are subsumed under poverty risks. As SEWA has 
often pointed out, ill health is both a cause and an effect of poverty. The figure 
shows the gendered distribution of visibility, earnings, and risk of poverty 
across the different types of employment, with women overrepresented at the 
bottom of the pyramid, having lower earnings than men and facing higher risks 
of poverty.
181 With the establishment of the International Domestic Workers Federation in 2008, passage of 
International Convention C189 on Decent Work for Domestic Workers in 2011, and subsequent 
ratification of this convention in a growing number of countries, more domestic workers are likely to 
receive workers’ benefits and social protection coverage. 
182 Both reviews were funded by the World Bank.
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Over the years, through research on the health status of informal workers, 
WIEGO and its partners have found the following: 
(i) Informal workers face high health risks. They face relatively high 
exposure to general health risks because of where they live and 
work, often without adequate shelter, sanitation, water, or electricity, 
all of which are key social determinants of health. They also face 
occupational health risks due to what they do, where they work, and 
the arrangements of their work.
(ii) Status in employment, branch of economic activity, and place of 
work impact the health risks and needs of informal workers. Status 
in employment places higher risks on specific groups of informal 
workers. For example, industrial outworkers (who are more likely to be 
women) are more likely to suffer injuries than factory workers doing 
similar work. Similarly, casual day laborers in the construction sector 
(where there are more men than women in many countries, although 
large numbers of working poor women in India are in the construction 
Figure 10: The Women in Informal Employment Globalizing  
and Organizing Model of Informal Employment: Hierarchy  
of Earnings and Poverty Risk by Status  
in Employment and Gender
Sources: M. Chen, J. Vanek, F. Lund, and J. Heintz with R. Jhabvala and C. Bonner. 2005. Progress of 
the World’s Women 2005: Women, Work and Poverty. New York: United Nations Development Fund 
for Women (UNIFEM). M. A. Chen. 2012. The Informal Economy: Definitions, Theories, and Policies. 
WIEGO Working Paper Series. No. 1. Cambridge, MA: WIEGO.
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sector, usually as unskilled manual laborers) are more likely to suffer 
injuries than regular employees in the construction sector. Further, 
the branch of economic activity and place of work expose specific 
groups of informal workers to greater risks than others. For example, 
street vendors are more exposed to the elements, pollution, and 
traffic accidents than are market traders, who are more exposed to 
fires. Similarly, waste pickers who work in dumps are more exposed to 
injuries than waste pickers who collect waste from homes or streets.
(iii) Female informal workers tend to face greater health challenges 
than male informal workers. Women are more likely to be 
outworkers and unpaid contributing family workers, and less likely 
to be employers. They are more likely to work at home or on the 
streets, rather than in workshops or factories. They are more 
likely to be assigned the most menial tasks. For example, in the 
waste-recycling sector, women and children tend to be overrepresented 
among those who do the primary collection and sorting of waste. They, 
likewise, are conditioned to assume the primary responsibility for 
caring for the young, elderly, and ill members of households. However, 
because they tend to work longer hours each day combining paid 
and unpaid work, they have less time to access health services for 
themselves, or to accompany young, old, and sick members of their 
households to health facilities. 
(iv) For informal workers, health care is a high priority. Because they 
do not enjoy employer contributions to health insurance and are 
not usually covered by existing health insurance systems, informal 
workers are often further impoverished by health expenditures, not 
only for hospitalization but also for outpatient services and the cost 
of medications. Yet many informal workers compromise their health 
by working in hazardous conditions because of their need to earn an 
income (Lund and Marriott 2011). 
In regard to occupational injuries by status in employment, a comparative study 
of factory-based and outworkers in the clothing industry in Australia found that 
the level of self-reported injury was over three times higher among outworkers 
than factory-based workers undertaking similar tasks. The most significant 
factor explaining this difference was the payment system. All outworkers were 
paid solely by the piece, whereas factory workers were paid either under a 
time-plus-production bonus system, or solely on a time basis. While the 
incidence of injury was far higher among outworkers, factory-based workers 
paid under an incentive system reported more injuries than those paid solely 
on a time basis. Increasing injury rates were correlated with piecework payment 
systems (Mayhew and Quinlan 1999). 
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With regard to occupational injuries, a major obstacle to obtaining data is that 
neither workers nor their injuries are properly reported. Examples include the 
porter who gets knocked over while crossing a busy street, the waste picker 
who is cut by broken glass from the garbage, and the industrial outworker 
who is burned while packing fireworks at home with gunpowder that ignites. 
While men predominate in some occupations that are especially hazardous 
(e.g., construction and transport), informal female workers are also found in 
hazardous occupations (e.g., waste picking) and places of work (e.g., streets 
and dumps).
Regional Comparisons of Informal Employment
Size
Informal employment comprises more than half of nonagriculture employment 
in most regions of the developing world, except for the Middle East and North 
Africa, where it represents 45.0% of nonagriculture employment (Vanek 
et al. 2014). While regional estimates provide a useful overview, they hide the 
diversity that exists within regions. It is important to note that the incidence 
of informal employment in Thailand is below the regional average for East and 
Southeast Asia, while the incidence of informal employment in India is above 
the regional average for South Asia (Table 10.1).
Table 10.1: Average Percentage Share of Informal Employment  
in Total Nonagriculture Employment, 2004–2010,  
and Range of Percentage Share by Region
Region and Country
Average Percentage Share  
of Informal Employment 
(%)
South Asia 82.0
 Sri Lanka 62.0
 India 84.0
East and Southeast Asia 65.0
 Thailand 42.0
 Indonesia 73.0
Sources: J. Vanek, M. A. Chen, F. Carré, J. Heintz, and R. Hussmanns. 2014. Statistics on the 
Informal Economy: Definitions, Regional Estimates and Challenges. WIEGO Working Paper 
(Statistics) Series. No. 2. Cambridge, MA: WIEGO. 
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Composition 
Informal employment inside of the informal sector comprises all employment 
in informal enterprises, which includes employers, employees, own-account 
workers, contributing family workers, and members of cooperatives. Informal 
employment outside of the informal sector includes employees in formal 
enterprises (including public enterprises, the public sector, private firms, and 
nonprofit institutions) not covered by social protection through their work; 
employees in households (e.g., domestic workers) without social protection 
through their work; and contributing family workers in formal enterprises who 
lack social protection through their work.
In Asia, informal employment inside of the informal sector is a larger component 
of nonagriculture employment than informal employment outside of the 
informal sector. The former ranges from a high of 69.0% of nonagriculture 
employment in South Asia to 57.0% of nonagriculture employment in East 
and Southeast Asia (Vanek et al. 2014). In Asia, nonagriculture informal 
employment is almost evenly split between wage and self-employment. 
Self-employment comprises employers, employees, own-account workers, 
and contributing family workers. Across Asia, own-account workers who 
do not hire others are the largest category. Self-employment accounts for 
two-thirds of nonagriculture employment in East and Southeast Asia, and 
nearly 40.0% of nonagriculture informal employment in South Asia. The 
second-largest category is contributing family workers, who comprise about 
9.0% of nonagriculture informal employment in East and Southeast Asia, and 
12.0% in South Asia. Few informal workers are employers: only 2.0% in South 
Asia and 9.0% in East and Southeast Asia.
Gender
Informal employment is a greater source of nonagriculture employment for 
women than it is for men in three of the six regions for which data are available. 
For example, in South Asia, the percentage share of informal employment in 
total nonagriculture employment is 83.0% for female workers, but only 82.0% 
for male workers. In East and Southeast Asia, the percentage shares are roughly 
the same, 64.0% for women and 65.0% for men. In most countries, more 
men than women are in the workforce. As a result, men typically account for 
a larger percentage share of total informal employment than women (Vanek 
et al. 2014).
Status in employment. There is also gender segmentation within informal 
employment by status in employment. In general, women in informal 
employment are more likely to be self-employed than are men. The self-
employed can be further disaggregated into employers, own-account 
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operators, and unpaid contributing family workers.183 The proportion of women 
in own-account work tends to exceed that of men, following the same broad 
pattern as total self-employment. The exception to this is South Asia, in which 
the percentage share of male own-account workers in nonagriculture informal 
employment exceeds that of females because contributing family workers 
account for a particularly sizable share of women’s informal employment in 
South Asia. 
Contributing family workers account for the second-largest percentage 
share in self-employed informal employment after own-account workers. 
The percentage share of contributing family workers in total self-employed 
informal employment is about 12.0% in South Asia. For all contributing family 
workers taken together, the percentage of women is three times greater in the 
subregions of Asia.
Employers comprise only 2.0%–9.0% of nonagriculture informal employment. 
However, more men are employers than are women. In fact, very few women 
in informal employment are employers: 0% in South Asia, and 9.0% in East and 
Southeast Asia (Vanek et al. 2014).
Branch of economic activity. There is also gender segmentation within informal 
employment by branch of economic activity. Very few women work in informal 
construction and transport activities, the one modest exception being female 
construction workers in South Asia. In fact, informal construction and transport 
are clearly male-dominated. In contrast, manufacturing accounts for an equal 
or greater share of women’s informal employment than men’s in Asia. Services 
other than trade and transport (e.g., domestic work) account for a larger share 
of women’s employment than men’s across all regions (Vanek et al. 2014).
Place of work. Although available regional estimates do not include analysis by 
place of work, other recent statistical analyses have indicated that women are 
overrepresented in two forms of employment that take place in private homes: 
home-based work (in the home of the worker) and domestic work (in the 
home of the employer) (Chen and Raveendran 2014; Raveendran, Sudarshan, 
Vanek 2013). 
Recent statistical analyses have also indicated that women are less likely than 
men to be engaged in workshops or factories outside of the home. However, 
183 In some countries, members of producers’ cooperatives represent a fourth (but usually small) category 
of informal self-employment. Where relevant, data on members of informal producers’ cooperatives 
are included in the overall estimate of informal nonagriculture self-employment. However, separate 
regional estimates for this particular category of self-employment are not presented in Vanek et al. 
(2014).
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they are engaged alongside men in public spaces outside of the home, including, 
to varying degrees, construction, street trade, and waste picking, depending on 
the country concerned (Chen and Raveendran 2014, ILO and WIEGO 2013). 
Study Findings
This section summarizes the findings of the 2012 IEMS. The sources of data 
and information on which this study was based include a survey questionnaire 
and focus group discussions in Ahmedabad, India and Bangkok, Thailand. 
Sample Notes
In the 10 IEMS study cities, a stratified sample was drawn from the membership 
of a local organization of informal workers. In Ahmedabad and Bangkok, the 
sample was entirely female, as the membership of SEWA in Ahmedabad is 
all female, and the membership of HomeNet Thailand in Bangkok is mainly 
female. The sample is thus not representative of informal workers in the study 
cities, of the specific sectors surveyed, or even of female informal workers in 
these sectors. The findings are, nonetheless, indicative.
Demographic Profile
As noted earlier, the IEMS study sample included home-based workers plus 
street vendors in Ahmedabad, while the entire Bangkok sample comprised 
home-based workers.
The average age of the sample was 41 years in Ahmedabad and 46 years in 
Bangkok. The majority of individuals included in the sample were married. In 
Ahmedabad, 10.0% of the home-based workers and 4.0% of the street vendors 
were single or had never married. For the entirely home-based worker sample in 
Bangkok, 7.0% were single or had never married. 
The Bangkok sample had more years of schooling than the Ahmedabad 
sample. Only 5.0% in Bangkok had no education; the corresponding figure 
for Ahmedabad was 43.0%. Among those in Ahmedabad with no education, 
there was a notable difference by sector: 61.0% of the street vendors had no 
education, whereas this was true of only 25.0% of the home-based workers. 
Further, of the Ahmedabad sample, 18.0% of home-based workers had some 
secondary education or had completed secondary education, whereas the 
corresponding figure for street vendors was just 7.0%. In Bangkok, just over one-
third of the sample—all home-based workers—had some secondary education 
or had completed secondary education.
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All of the home-based workers in Ahmedabad were industrial outworkers (i.e., 
subcontracted to firms), whereas in Bangkok, 56.0% were industrial outworkers, 
22.0% were own-account workers, around 9.0% were employers, and a few 
were members of cooperatives or were casual day laborers (Chen 2014). 
Among the street vendors in Ahmedabad, 88.0% were own-account 
workers, while the remaining 12.0% were contributing family workers. This 
outcome presumably reflects the fact that street vending is often a hereditary, 
family-based occupation in India (Roever 2014). Women and men often work 
together when street vending is inherited. However, in household enterprises in 
India, men tend to be seen as the owner-operators, while women are seen as 
unpaid contributing family workers.
The IEMS survey asked respondents how long they had been working in their 
current main activity (Table 10.2). Many in the sample had been in their current 
main activity for a long time, an outcome that could, in part, be due to sampling 
bias. However, other studies have concluded that street vending is often a 
hereditary caste occupation in India, and that home-based workers tend to not 
change their work. 
Table 10.2: Years Working in Major Activity by City 
(%)
Years in Main Activity Ahmedabad Bangkok
0–1 0.3 3.6
2–5 12.2 33.3
6–10 18.2 24.8
10+ 69.3 38.3
Mean years 17.2 11.9
N 299 150
N = number of samples.
Sources: S. Roever. 2014. Street Vendor Sector Report: Informal Economy 
Monitoring Study. Cambridge, MA; Women in Informal Employment: 
Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO). Sally Roever analyzed the data in 
Roever (2014).
The mean number of years spent in the current main activity was 17 years 
in Ahmedabad and 12 years in Bangkok. A remarkably high percentage of the 
Ahmedabad sample—around 70.0%—had worked at their current main activity 
for 10 years or more. This contradicts the commonly held view that informal 
workers enter informality to cope with a crisis, and then exit when times 
improve. Informal work is what the informal workers included in this sample 
often do.
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Assets
Home ownership. A high percentage of IEMS survey respondents (over 60.0% 
in Ahmedabad and 86.0% in Bangkok) reported that they—meaning their 
family—own the homes in which they live. 
Source of start-up capital. In Ahmedabad, there were marked differences 
between street vendors and home-based workers in terms of their sources of 
start-up capital. For home-based workers, 17.0% did not need start-up capital, 
whereas this was true of only 6.6% of vendors. Many more vendors (20.4%) 
than home-based workers (2.7%) borrowed money from a private informal 
lender to finance the start-up of their business. Nearly one-quarter (23.8%) 
of home-based workers used household capital and borrowed from family to 
launch their businesses, as compared with half (51.6%) of the street vendors. 
Access to formal financial institutions. For the Bangkok sample, 90.0% had a 
formal bank account (or access to one), whereas this was true of three-quarters 
of the Ahmedabad sample. In Ahmedabad, all SEWA members are entitled to 
use SEWA Bank. However, for the study sample, a far higher percentage of 
home-based workers (82.0%) than street vendors (68.0%) had bank accounts. 
More than one-quarter (27.0%) of the Bangkok sample had credit cards. In 
contrast, this was true of very few in Ahmedabad. 
Health
The working poor in the informal economy are susceptible to the same 
health problems as the general population. However, like other members of 
low-income communities and households, they face greater exposure to these 
common health problems given their living conditions. Furthermore, they face 
additional occupational health hazards, because of what they do to earn a living 
as well as their status in employment, working conditions, and place of work.
General health. Limited data are available on the health status of informal 
workers in Asia.184 A notable exception is the research that SEWA has done 
on the health of its members. Among SEWA membership, as with the general 
population in India, communicable diseases such as diarrhea, malaria, respiratory 
infections, and tuberculosis are the most common. However, there has recently 
been a marked increase in the incidence of noncommunicable diseases such as 
heart and kidney disease (Chatterjee and Thomas 2014a). A similar trend was 
found in a recent health survey of Bangkok’s general population, with 25.0% 
184 Most demographic and health surveys do not include sufficient indicators on employment to 
disaggregate the data by formal and informal workers. Similarly, most labor force surveys do not include 
sufficient indicators on health to allow such disaggregation. 
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having noncommunicable diseases, the most common being diabetes, heart 
disease, hyperlipidemia, hypertension, and stroke (Tangworamongkon and 
Tulaphan 2014b).
While the IEMS study did not focus on health, survey respondents were asked 
a few questions regarding their health status. For instance, they were asked 
whether they had worked fewer hours than usual over the past week, and if 
so, the reason for this. Table 10.3 presents the reasons for working fewer hours 
Table 10.3: Reasons for Working Fewer Hours than Usual  
by Sector and Gender 
(full Informal Economy Monitoring Study sample in 10 cities in %)
Reason
Home-
Based 
Workers
Street Vendors Waste Pickers
TotalWomen Men Women Men
Work reduction 42.5 7.5 8.0 5.5 9.8 20.5
End of contract  
or season
0.5 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.4
Weather 1.1 8.4 8.0 5.5 18.0 6.2
Forced eviction 0.0 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4
Power outage 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
Holidays 6.1 1.9 0.0 4.6 13.1 5.4
Illness or accident 18.2 19.6 4.0 20.2 19.7 18.4
Child care 2.2 0 0.0 4.6 0.0 1.9
Care for elderly 1.1 0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.6
Care for sick 
person
3.3 5.6 0.0 2.8 0.0 3.1
Other personal 12.2 20.6 40.0 23.0 21.3 19.1
Maternity 0.6 0.9 0.0 1.8 0.0 0.8
Found other 
temporary work
0.6 2.8 4.0 1.8 0.0 1.5
Fewer materials 
available
2.2 0.9 0.0 8.3 4.9 3.5
Other 9.4 29.0 36.0 20.2 13.1 18.0
N 181 107 25 61 109 483
N = number of respondents.
Notes: 
1. The home-based worker sample is all women. 
2. The total indicates the percentage of the study sample for each sector in all cities.
3.  Data include only those respondents who said that they worked fewer hours than normal in the last 
week. As a result, the full sample is significantly larger than the values for N that appear in the final row.
Sources: S. Roever. 2014. Street Vendor Sector Report: Informal Economy Monitoring Study. Cambridge, 
MA: Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO). Sally Roever analyzed the 
data in Roever (2014).
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among 483 informal workers, out of the total sample of 1,949 workers across 
10 cities, who reported that they had worked fewer hours than usual during the 
last week. 
Two findings are striking. First, nearly one-fifth (18.4%) of all respondents 
reported working less due to an illness or accident. Second, no men in any sector 
had reduced their work hours to care for children, the sick, or elderly, whereas 
women in all sectors reported reducing work hours to care for these groups. It 
is important to note that women—more than men—have to take time off work 
to visit health services, both for themselves and for their younger, older, or ill 
family members.
Sanitation at home and at work. Whereas nearly all (97.0%) of the Bangkok 
sample had toilets inside of their homes, this was true of just under half of the 
Ahmedabad sample, which included both street vendors and home-based 
workers. Lack of toilets at workplaces is a multidimensional problem that 
is associated with great personal inconvenience and shame, especially for 
women. Lack of sanitation facilities clearly impacts personal health, the ability 
to trade hygienically, ability to attract customers, general public health, and 
self-esteem. The IEMS focus groups reported that the lack of home- and work-
based sanitation in Ahmedabad was associated with shame or embarrassment, 
and also a decrease in productive working time.
Position of migrants. One segment of the informal workforce—migrants—is 
especially vulnerable in general terms, and in terms of being able to gain access 
to health care. The precise ways in which migrants (internal and cross-border) 
are included or excluded from health services is a special focus of HomeNet 
Thailand’s work. 
Preliminary engagements with migrant female workers in Bangkok show that—
as a relatively young group—they do not cite health problems as a high priority. 
However, because they have very little knowledge about how the health system 
works, they are not aware of their entitlements. A major reason for this is that 
there is no public information about this in their own language. 
Occupational health. The working poor in the informal economy face health 
hazards or problems related directly and specifically to their work. Some of these 
hazards are associated with where they work (e.g., exposure to the elements 
if they work outside or exposure to petrol fumes if they work on the street). 
One of the most commonly reported problems across all sectors is lower-back 
problems, which results from working seated on the ground or at low, poorly 
designed tables or counters. Another commonly reported problem is joint or 
muscular pain due to repetitive physical movements (e.g., cleaning or scrubbing 
by domestic workers, rolling incense sticks, or using homemade cigarette 
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rollers). There are impacts also on family life and health as a consequence of 
small houses that double as workplaces. Both SEWA and HomeNet Thailand 
have dedicated initiatives that address the occupational health and safety 
problems faced by their members.
In sum, informal workers face specific occupational health risks that the formal 
workforce and the general public do not face, including (i) ergonomic risks 
relating to poor posture from sitting on the floor or at low tables (e.g., incense 
stick and cigarette rolling), making repetitive motions (e.g., incense stick 
and cigarette rolling and domestic tasks), carrying heavy loads (e.g., market 
porters and construction workers), and working long hours with limited rest 
time (all groups); and (ii) exposure risks to the elements and pollution (e.g., 
street vendors and construction workers) and to toxic substances (e.g., waste 
pickers, shoemakers, and metal workers). These risks are compounded when 
the place of work does not have shelter, water, sanitation, lighting, or ventilation 
(Chatterjee and Thomas 2014b). 
Access to Health Insurance
Across Asia, the share of female and male workers who are informally employed 
is roughly equal: around four-fifths in South Asia and two-thirds in Southeast 
Asia. All informal workers, both men and women, lack social protection through 
their work (i.e., contributions to health insurance, paid sick leave, or other forms 
of health care assistance from an employer). 
India and Thailand offer very different models of access to health insurance 
by informal workers. In Thailand, all citizens who are not in the civil service or 
military, or whose formal work status guarantees access to health insurance, 
have access to the Universal Coverage Scheme (UCS) (Namsomboon 
unpublished, Tangworamongkon and Tulaphan 2014a). 
Research has shown that female informal workers have reacted very favorably 
to the UCS (Namsomboon unpublished), drawing attention to their own 
improved productivity and their ability to use money saved from health 
expenditures to invest in better work equipment. However, later research with 
similar groups of female workers showed two barriers:
First, their informal terms of employment—[that is,] employment without a 
written contract, with workers having little awareness of existing protection 
laws—means that employers and contractors can arbitrarily impose long 
hours of work….There have been cases among domestic workers where 
employers deduct wages or dismiss them if they take sick leave. Second, 
travelling costs and complicated means of travelling can discourage them 
from using UCS services (Tangworamongkon and Tulaphan 2014a).
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India has a plethora of health insurance schemes (Jain 2012a). Recently, the 
federal government started a national health insurance scheme, the Rashtriya 
Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY) (Jain 2012b, Chatterjee and Thomas 2014a). It 
has successfully introduced identification cards, and use of RSBY services has 
spread rapidly. However, within the past 3 years, further expansion has been 
suspended, owing to a number of design problems. These include problems at 
the state level with identifying those living below the poverty line who should 
be exempt from premiums and probable increases in unnecessary surgery 
because of the payment system (Berman, Ajuha, Bhandari 2010; Chatterjee 
and Thomas 2014a). 
SEWA is well known internationally for VimoSEWA, health insurance for 
SEWA members that has been built over 30 years (Chatterjee and Ranson 
2003). Currently, VimoSEWA has slightly fewer than 100,000 members, which 
represents only a small fraction of SEWA’s 1.9 million members. However, 
VimoSEWA’s membership is vast in comparison to any other insurance scheme 
that has been built by informal worker organizations. In fact, VimoSEWA has 
shown that (i) it is possible for an organization of poor workers to build a health 
insurance scheme from the bottom up; (ii) it is possible to go to scale, as well as 
remain flexible and worker-managed; (iii) women are more reliable savers and 
insurers than men; and (iv) insurance claims can be contained. SEWA has also 
paid a great deal of attention to formulating insurance products that respond to 
female workers’ needs.
Another union of informal workers in India is Kagad Kach Patra Kashtakari 
Panchayat, a union of waste pickers in Pune, the majority of whose members 
are women. It created a cooperative called SWaCH, which then entered into 
a partnership with the municipality to form the Pune Municipal Corporation, 
which controls waste removal. In recognition of the contribution that the waste 
pickers make, the Pune Municipal Corporation pays their annual premium 
for basic health insurance. This is the only municipality in which the local 
government contributes to the health insurance of informal workers. 
Female informal workers are more likely than male informal workers to be in the 
lowest-earning segments of informal employment, as own-account workers, 
casual day laborers, subcontracted workers, or unpaid contributing family workers. 
All of these types of employment status lack recognized employers, who could 
be mandated to make contributions to health insurance and to provide paid sick 
leave and other health care assistance. Also, women are more likely than men 
to be engaged in private homes, making it more difficult to disseminate health 
information to them. In their own homes, female informal workers are more likely 
than male informal workers to assume responsibility for domestic chores and the 
care of children, the elderly, sick, and disabled. Thus, female informal workers 
have to work longer to earn the same income as male informal workers, and yet 
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they have less time to do so. These pressures restrict the time that women have 
available to seek health care for themselves, or for other family workers. 
Health Care in India and Thailand
India and Thailand are different in important respects. India has the second-
largest population in the world (about 1.3 billion), which compares with 
Thailand’s relatively small population of 68.2 million. In fact, the population of 
Gujarat State alone—where SEWA is headquartered and has a large share of 
its members—is roughly equal to the entire population of Thailand. India has 
a federal government system that is undergoing decentralization. In contrast, 
Thailand has a centralized governance system, with the center controlling 
Thailand’s provinces to a greater extent than India controls its various states.
Table 10.4 presents selected health indicators for both countries. Both have 
seen significant improvements across all indicators—for both men and 
women—from 2000 to 2013. 
Table 10.4: Selected Health Indicators for India and Thailand
Health Indicator
India Thailand
Men Women Men Women
Life expectancy at birth, 2000 (years) 57 58 66 72
Life expectancy at birth, 2013 (years) 64 68 71 79
Maternal mortality ratio, 2000 (per 
100,000 live births) 
682 449
Maternal mortality ratio, 2013 (per 
100,000 live births)
116 73
Under age 1 year infant mortality rate, 
2000 (per 1,000 live births) (no gender 
disaggregation)
92 23
Mortality rate for infants under 1 year old, 
2012 (per 1,000 live births) (no gender 
disaggregation)
56 13
Measles immunization coverage among  
1-year-olds, 2000 
59 74 94 98
DTP3 immunization, 2012 (no gender 
disaggregation)
72 99
DTP3 = diphtheria–tetanus–pertussis.
Source: World Health Organization. 2014. World Health Statistics. Geneva.
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Health System in Thailand
Thailand began its reforms with a solid network of primary health care facilities 
in both urban and rural areas. In 2001, the Government of Thailand began the 
30-Baht Scheme, with the public initially required to make a small payment of 
B30.00 (less than $1.00) per visit to access public health care, although the 
very poor were exempt from this fee. This was later transformed into the free 
universal coverage scheme (UCS), under which the B30 contribution became 
voluntary. In practice, while primary health centers tend not to ask for this 
voluntary contribution, hospitals do, often without informing the public that 
they are not required to pay. 
Those who are eligible for coverage, including the informal workforce, must 
register with a primary care unit. Hospitals and other health facilities, such as 
clinics, can register as UCS facilities, allowing a wide range of preventive and 
curative services to be obtained free of charge. 
Thailand’s UCS is not means-tested or insurance-based. Instead, it is financed 
from general revenues. However, it is not truly universal in the sense of one 
system for all, as the health care and health insurance systems for the civil 
service, armed forces, and the formal workforce continue to operate as separate 
systems.
Health System in India
India’s national health care system was designed as a three-tier system. Its 
vast network of government-funded primary health centers (at the local level) 
are, in principle, open to all persons with referral linkages to secondary-care 
facilities (at the district level) and tertiary care. However, it is difficult—if not 
impossible—given India’s size to run a centralized system that directly delivers 
health services. Given the sheer size of the population and the underresourcing 
of its health sector, there has never been a sufficient number of hospitals, 
doctors, medical staff, medicines, or ambulance services. As a result, the 
availability and quality of care have remained very poor. Many people thus use 
private health providers.
To address these deficiencies, the Government of India recently introduced 
several large-scale health reforms that have decentralized health service 
delivery. In particular, the government has issued policy directives and funds 
that allow state and local governments to deliver health care services. 
In 2005, the government launched the National Rural Health Mission to 
provide effective health care to rural people, particularly in 18 states that have 
poor public health indicators and/or weak infrastructure. However, this resulted 
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in all primary health care efforts being focused on rural areas, with little or no 
emphasis on the health of urban workers. As a result, in 2014, the government 
launched the National Urban Health Mission, the purpose of which is to address 
urban primary health care. Both missions are under the umbrella National 
Health Mission, which is funded by the central government. However, state 
governments and municipalities are expected to supplement the programs and 
services offered.
In 2008, as part of broader health reforms, the government launched a national 
health insurance scheme, the RSBY. Financed largely by the central government 
with contributions from state governments, the scheme covers hospitalization 
charges up to Rs30,000.00 ($450.00)185 for up to five members of families 
below the poverty line. It also covers transport costs up to Rs1,000.00 ($15.00) 
per year. Beneficiaries are required to pay only a small registration fee, and the 
scheme works through private insurance companies and enrolled hospitals, 
both private and public. 
Although coverage has risen rapidly, the scheme has encountered several 
systemic problems. Most notably, the RSBY has been accused of incentivizing 
unnecessary treatments, as there is limited regulation of treatments and 
no cap on provider payments (Jain 2012a, 2012b). Furthermore, the 
state-level data for below-poverty-line households are in disarray, causing 
great inconvenience and frustration to those applying for the RSBY insurance 
coverage. This appears to disadvantage women in particular, as applications 
have to be made by heads of household, and many male heads of households 
have migrated in search of work.
The government has also committed itself to universal health care in its 
Twelfth Five Year Plan, 2012–2017 and the landmark report of the High Level 
Expert Group on Universal Health Coverage. In particular, the policy calls for 
(i) universal health insurance with a strong emphasis on primary health care, 
(ii) integration of health insurance with primary and secondary care, (iii) free 
essential drugs, (iv) regulation of the health sector and adherence to standards, 
(v) community action for health, (vi) fullest attention to the social determinants 
of health, (vii) investment in human resources, and (viii) increasing investment 
in public health to at least double its current level of 1.1% of gross domestic 
product (GDP) to about 2.5% of GDP in the next few years.
The government has also placed a welcome emphasis on preventive and 
promotive health care, such as occupational health, yoga, mental health, 
women’s health, and care of the elderly. It has sought to integrate Ayurveda, 
185 At the rate of exchange in February 2016.
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Unani, Siddha, and homeopathy—all indigenous systems of medicine—as well 
as these practitioners, within the public health system. In addition, it has called 
for vertical integration of disease control programs with primary health care, 
and for emphasis on noncommunicable diseases along with communicable 
ones. Finally, the government has called for developing quality standards in 
both the public and private sectors, as well as a national debate on possible 
right-to-health legislation that will entitle all to basic levels of health care.
Today, the public and private sectors are the primary sources of health care for 
the majority of households in India, both in urban and rural areas. However, 
the public sector health system works better in certain states than others. 
For instance, Gujarat State has introduced its own health insurance scheme, 
MA Amrutam, which provides insurance coverage for catastrophic illness up 
to Rs200,000.00 (about $2,900.00) to persons from households below the 
poverty line. 
Comparison of the Health Systems of India and Thailand
A useful way to understand the differences between the health systems in 
India and Thailand is to examine the roles and responsibilities played by the 
government at various levels. In Thailand, the central state retains a firm hold on 
how the health system is structured, although administration is done through 
regions. In India, the central government is partly responsible for funding, and 
the individual states have more autonomy as to the amount of resources that 
they allocate to health, with the result that differences in health provision 
between states are stark. 
Both countries have a mix of public and private provision. The private health 
sector in Thailand is relatively well regulated; it is less so in India, where 
there is greater corruption and inefficiency in both the public and private 
health sectors. In both countries, aspects of the public–private mix provide 
incentives to doctors and nurses to shift from the public to the private sector. 
In both countries, informal workers, among others, use alternative—usually 
nonallopathic—health systems either routinely or when they cannot access 
services at formal hospitals or clinics. 
India and Thailand both have mechanisms for informal workers and their allies 
to engage in health policy reform, as well as in oversight of health service delivery. 
Thailand stands out for its decade-long inclusion of civil society organizations 
in an alliance for health reform, with HomeNet Thailand as one of the partners 
when the 30-Baht Scheme was first introduced (Namsomboon and Kusakabe 
2011, Alfers and Lund 2012). When the 30-Baht Scheme was replaced by the 
free UCS, an alliance of 11 civil society networks, including HomeNet Thailand, 
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were again involved in the design of the scheme, legislation, and thereafter in 
facilitating, monitoring, and evaluating implementation.
Mechanisms for civil society engagement in health policy reform and health 
service delivery also exist in India. SEWA has been involved at many levels in 
initiatives that promote inclusive health policy reforms and implementation. 
At the local level, it participates in local health committees. At the national 
level, it has been active in, among others, the National Advisory Committee, 
Commission on the Unorganised Sector, and High Level Expert Group on 
Universal Health Coverage. At the international level, Mirai Chatterjee of SEWA 
was a commissioner on the World Health Organization’s Commission on Social 
Determinants of Health and is a member of the National Health Commission’s 
Action Group on Community Action.
There are several reasons for the high quality of Thailand’s health care system. 
First, the medical profession enjoys a particularly high status in Thailand. 
Second, the 3-year compulsory rural service required of doctors trained 
in Thailand has exposed successive batches of doctors to the realities of 
both service delivery and rural life. Some doctors so trained have formed a 
professional association which, together with other professional associations 
in Thailand, has remained active in health reform and the public health sector. 
Third, the National Health Act of 2007 mandates that at least one National 
Health Assembly be organized each year to bring together all stakeholders—
government, civil society, and the private sector—to discuss health issues and 
to reach a consensus on specific health policies. Over several decades, the 
above factors have also helped coalesce a cross-sector movement in Thailand 
that supports health care reform, and which culminated in the introduction of 
the UCS.
Finally, it should be noted that as of 2014, both India and Thailand have allocated 
a limited percentage of their GDPs to health. In particular, India’s 1.0% and 
Thailand’s 2.0% were far less than the percentage share that the region’s other 
economies have allocated. For example, Singapore and the People’s Republic 
of China have both allocated 5.0%; Taipei,China, 7.0%; the Republic of Korea, 
8.0%; and Japan, 10.0% (Yip and Hsiao 2014). 
Barriers to Health Care Access for Informal Workers 
in Urban Health Systems
Three main variables determine health care risks and act as barriers to health 
care access for informal workers: (i) a worker’s status in employment, (ii) the 
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branch of economic activity in which a particular worker operates, and (iii) a 
worker’s place of work.
Status in Employment
Workers’ status in employment varies according to his or her degree of 
autonomy and control. All informal workers lack social protection through 
employment. However, there are differences relating to who is responsible for 
paying and who is able to pay health insurance premiums or health service user 
fees, and this is determined by the informal worker’s status in employment.
(i) Employers. They are owner-operators of informal enterprises who hire 
others. Informal employers are the only category of informal workers who, 
on average, are nonpoor. Some employers are, therefore, able to afford 
health insurance premiums or health services user fees. Few informal 
workers, and even fewer female informal workers, are employers.
(ii) Employees. They are nonformal employees with known employers 
in formal enterprises, informal enterprises, or households. In most 
countries, men are more likely than women to be informal employees. 
Their employers can be mandated to make contributions to health 
insurance, provide paid sick leave, or provide other forms of health care 
assistance. However, more employers (even formal employers) are 
hiring employees under informal contracts that exclude such benefits.
(iii) Own-account workers. These are self-employed persons who do not 
hire others. The self-employed are poor; therefore, they usually cannot 
afford health insurance premiums or health services user fees.
(iv) Casual day laborers. These are wage workers who perform work on a 
daily basis and thus often have a different employer each day. These 
workers are poor on average and cannot afford health insurance 
premiums or health service user fees.
(v) Subcontracted workers. They are workers who produce goods on a 
piece-rate basis under a subcontract from an outsourcing firm or a 
contractor of an outsourcing firm. These workers are also poor, and most 
cannot afford health insurance premiums or health services user fees.
(vi) Unpaid contributing family workers. These are unpaid family workers 
who work in a family firm or on a family farm. These workers remain 
dependent on the earnings and worker benefits of other household 
members. 
Status in employment also determines relative health risks. As noted, industrial 
outworkers and casual day laborers are more likely to suffer injuries than formal 
workers in their respective sectors. Further, industrial outworkers and casual 
day laborers often suffer mental stress due to their lack of control over when 
they will receive work orders or be hired.
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Branch of Economic Activity
The main branches of economic activity in which the urban informal workforce 
is engaged are manufacturing and a range of services that includes construction, 
personal services (notably domestic work), street vending and market trading, 
transport, and waste collection and recycling. The occupational health risks 
faced by informal workers—both women and men—differ by their branch of 
economic activity. For example, construction and transport workers are more 
exposed to serious work-related accidents than are informal workers in other 
branches of activity, while workers in other branches of activity are exposed to 
ergonomic stress or toxic substances. 
Place of Work
Most informal workers are engaged in places of work other than formal 
factories or firms, most notably, in private homes (home-based workers and 
domestic workers) and in public spaces such as construction sites, streets, 
dumps, or landfills. There are occupational health risks specific to each of these 
workplaces. Home-based workers in manufacturing, who often work sitting on 
the floor under poor lighting, are exposed to significant ergonomic stress and 
eyestrain—probably more than factory workers who are manufacturing the 
same products. 
Further, some places of work make it difficult to disseminate health information 
to informal workers, particularly home-based workers and domestic workers 
who are mainly women working in private homes. 
Demand- and Supply-Side Barriers
A summary follows of findings from research in Ahmedabad and Bangkok on 
both demand- and supply-side barriers to access to health services for the 
informal workforce, particularly women. The roles of the Ahmedabad Municipal 
Corporation and Bangkok Municipal Authority are specifically included in the 
discussion. 
Demand-Side Barriers 
The research in Ahmedabad and Bangkok confirms that informal workers 
tend to lack knowledge about preventive and curative health, which health 
services are available and where, and their health entitlements. The research 
also confirms that many informal workers—especially in India—have limited 
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confidence in public and primary services and overuse private and tertiary 
services. 
Other barriers to accessing health care include opportunity costs of time spent 
in transport (e.g., waiting in queues for services); time or timing constraints such 
as long work days and few days off; inability to negotiate complex registration and 
referral systems; distance requirements (e.g., distance of health services from 
the home, workplace, or facility where workers are registered to receive public 
care; lack of transport; and high transport costs); and lack of documentation 
required for registration.
Clearly, lack of knowledge about health constrains the health-seeking behaviors 
of informal workers. However, the inability to navigate the health system due 
to lack of documentation, time constraints, and direct or indirect costs may 
likewise be equally important barriers to access health services, as lack of 
knowledge may contribute to negative attitudes toward public and primary 
health systems. 
It is important to highlight that the opportunity cost of time spent in accessing 
health services is particularly high for informal workers, who must forfeit 
work time and related earnings to access health care services. Further, they 
are not compensated for medical expenses or sick leave. SEWA members 
reported that it took about half of a day on average, but often the whole day, to 
access health care services. A major concern is that they cannot earn income 
during the time that they are seeking care, either for themselves or for their 
family members, and there is no compensation or special allowance made 
for this. 
The same is true for transport costs. Half of the women in SEWA focus 
group discussions said that they have to take auto-rickshaws to hospitals or 
clinics. Approximately 40.0% said that they walked, and a few took public 
transport. In sum, accessing health services involves both foregone income and 
out-of-pocket expenses (Chatterjee and Thomas 2014b). 
Bangkok has the best-resourced health infrastructure in Thailand. However, 
informal workers who were relocated from the center to the periphery of the 
city in the 1980s and 1990s, as well as recent migrants to the city who also 
live on the periphery (except domestic workers who live in their workplaces), 
face difficulties in accessing health care. Migrants and those relocated must 
register as residents at the nearest government office. Registering as citizens 
is also necessary to become eligible for the UCS at the nearest primary health 
facility. Both processes require time and money. If their home is not registered, 
community leaders can certify that they live in the district in which they want 
to access the services. According to the health system rules, families or persons 
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are allowed to shift the facility at which they are entitled to services up to four 
times a year. However, community leaders are often not available or not willing 
to help them. 
Further, they may not be granted registration at their preferred facility, as 
each facility has a quota for patients. To use services once registered, informal 
workers often have to travel long distances, spending much time and money. 
In other words, disparities in health care access depend in part on where they 
live and work, and whether they are able to navigate health system registration 
rules that must be complied with if they are to be registered at their facility 
of choice. 
Supply-Side Barriers
A number of focus groups were held in Ahmedabad in 2014, and in Bangkok 
in 2011, to identify perceived barriers to accessing health services, and the 
relationship between access to health care and the ability to work. Also, in both 
cities, key informant interviews were held with health officials. Barriers to health 
care access as perceived by informal workers include the following:
(i) Inconvenient location and timing of services. Government health 
facilities are often too few and far between, and their operating times 
may not be convenient for informal workers, many of whom leave home 
before the facilities open and return home after they have closed.
(ii) Insufficient dissemination of health information. Thailand has a 
good public health service that devotes a fair amount of attention to 
distributing information. However, informal workers still often do not 
understand their entitlements, or even know that they exist. India has 
a weak public health system and invests less in public information, 
except during crises. The challenge is that health facilities are available, 
but there is little information about what sorts of services are available, 
where, and at what times.
(iii) Formal rules of exclusion. In Bangkok, to obtain access to the UCS, 
workers must be registered at a particular health facility. This is likely 
to be near where they live, not near the place where they work. Further, 
while they can change registration, this also takes time and money, 
and many do not know how to do it. In Ahmedabad, informal workers 
are excluded from the statutory health insurance scheme for formal 
workers, while the facilities covered by the scheme have the capacity 
and could easily take in informal workers. Also, in Ahmedabad, workers 
who live on the city periphery are excluded from rural facilities, but 
there are fewer urban facilities, and little attention is paid to urban 
health. 
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(iv) Lack of coordination between different facilities. With little or no 
linking through referral systems, informal workers easily get lost in the 
system, or fall through the cracks between facilities.
Once inside the health facility, other common barriers include time taken in 
queues (waiting for services or ending up the wrong queue is time away from 
work, with implications for lower productivity and reduced income); poor 
quality of clinical care, which is a disincentive to return to the service provider; 
and limited supply or high cost of medicines. 
As a case in point, the range and quality of services provided by urban health 
centers (UHCs) in Ahmedabad need expansion and improvement. Among 
the issues that SEWA members raised is the quality of care, lack of medicines 
that forces them to buy these on the open market, and the behavior of health 
staff both at the UHCs and in large municipal hospitals. In Ahmedabad, 
SEWA members reported that the bulk of expenditure, even in the public 
hospitals, were for medicines, followed by laboratory and other diagnostic 
tests (Chatterjee and Thomas 2014b). In fact, in India, 70.0% of out-of-pocket 
payments are for medicine, a much higher proportion than for hospitalization 
(Chatterjee and Thomas 2014a; Berman, Ajuha, and Bhandari 2010). 
Workers often resort to private care—which is expensive—because they do not 
get the services that they need at the quality that is required at public facilities. 
SEWA has been working with several UHC doctors over the past 2 years, and 
has developed a good rapport with them. They have found many public and 
private health providers who are open and willing to extend services to informal 
workers (Chatterjee and Thomas 2014b).
Government facilities tend to be much more crowded than private facilities. 
While the consultation and treatment are either free or low-cost, the 
opportunity cost of spending an entire day to get treatment is something most 
informal workers can ill afford. A street vendor said, “In a government hospital, 
it takes the whole day, as I have to stand in line everywhere” (Chatterjee and 
Thomas 2014b, Appendix 1, 21).
Often, if a test is required, and if the case is not an emergency, the patient is 
asked to come back a few days later. These repeated visits discourage informal 
workers from going to government facilities. They do not have the luxury of 
time, and a day at a government hospital means loss of an entire day’s income. 
The worker would rather go to a private hospital, get treated, pay the fee, go 
back to work, and earn at least half a day’s earnings. As one street vendor in 
Ahmedabad explained, “For us daily income earners, time is money. Who 
understands this? I spent the whole day recently in the Civil Hospital when I got 
sick. I had to stand in line for a long time” (Chatterjee and Thomas 2014b, 7).
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Another factor limiting the use of government facilities is distance. There is 
one UHC per ward (approximately 80,000 population), and these facilities are 
often located far from some locations. Some prefer to go to a nearby private 
clinic, as illustrated here: “I will have to pay the auto rickshaw Rs35.00–Rs40.00 
($0.57–$0.66)186 to go to the UHC. Plus the Rs5.00 fee there. Instead, I can 
go to a nearby private doctor and pay Rs50.00 for a consultation. It will cost 
me the same, and I will save so much time.” (Chatterjee and Thomas 2014b, 
Appendix 1, 21)
Hours of operation at government facilities, especially primary health centers, 
need to be changed to suit the working hours of informal workers. Private 
providers and large public, private, and charitable trust hospitals tend to remain 
open for longer. As one SEWA member put it, “I prefer to go to the private, 
charitable trust hospital because it is open all day and night and even on 
Sundays” (Chatterjee and Thomas 2014b, 7).
With regard to affordability, it is important to note that the costs of health care 
include fees for services and medicines, transport costs, transaction costs, and 
opportunity cost. Transaction costs include what is required to negotiate the 
registration and referral systems (e.g., necessary documentation and a long 
waiting time for documents to be approved), and what is required once inside a 
health facility (e.g., long queues and waiting time for services). The opportunity 
cost includes productive time and related earnings that are foregone due to the 
time involved in transport and transactions. 
With regard to eligibility, it is important to distinguish between de jure exclusion 
(e.g., the rules for registration) and de facto exclusion (e.g., the attitudes and 
practices of health service providers). Further, it is not always clear what an 
informal worker, especially a migrant informal worker, is entitled to under the 
health care system.
As part of the study on informal workers and health access, SEWA and 
HomeNet Thailand interviewed personnel from the health systems at both 
the city and national level at facilities in both the public and private sectors. 
Health personnel in Ahmedabad noticed how some of the health systems 
work to the disadvantage of informal workers, especially with regard to opening 
hours, long queues, disarray with below-poverty-line identification cards, and 
insensitivity and rudeness of some staff members. They recognized that many 
poorer workers choose to go to private facilities, despite the expense, because 
of the savings in time. The health personnel also pointed out how frustrating 
it was to work in a situation where there were far too many patients who had 
186 The exchange rate was derived from ADB (2015). On average, $1.00 was equivalent to Rs61.00 in 2014.
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to be seen each day, with the same questions about procedures being asked 
repeatedly. They also said that many people, including informal workers, do 
not follow the procedure of first going to a UHC and then being referred to a 
higher-level hospital. Other frustrating factors for the staff were the low levels 
of punctuality in keeping appointments and lack of medication adherence. In 
the key informant interviews in both Ahmedabad and Bangkok, interviewees 
said that moves are under way to increase the operating hours of facilities.
In focus groups and key informant interviews, switching between public and 
private health sectors by informal workers was evident. The results in Bangkok 
and Ahmedabad are strikingly similar to their findings from other countries. Basu 
et al. (2012) undertook a systematic review that compared the performance of 
private and public sector health services in middle- and low-income countries 
(one-third of the articles included were about countries in Southeast Asia). 
Private services were better in terms of timeliness and more positive attitudes 
of staff. The main limitations of the public services were inadequate equipment 
and scarcity of well-trained health workers. Contrary to popular stereotypes, 
private health care was less efficient than public health care, with poorer 
outcomes and more unnecessary diagnostic tests and procedures. However, 
the studies had too little emphasis on patients’ experiences (e.g., no patients 
were asked what they thought about waiting times).
Informal workers in India and Thailand both clearly experience more barriers 
to access, on the supply side. An overarching problem is that health systems 
are not designed with an adequate understanding of the realities of informal 
work (e.g., that informal workers may work far from their places of residence, 
that they work long hours, that time away from their work in accessing health 
services affects productivity and income, and that they face sector-specific 
occupational health and safety hazards). There is also a need for informal 
workers to have more information about preventive measures to improve their 
own health, as well as how to access health services. At the same time, there 
are systemic problems on the supply side, such as lack of coordination between 
facilities, inefficiencies within facilities, and formal and informal rules of 
exclusion of informal workers. Also, some keys to improved health are outside 
the control of the health system; much depends on the provision and quality 
of urban infrastructure (e.g., electricity, sanitation facilities, and water supply at 
both the home and workplace) as well as transport services between the home, 
place of work, and health care facilities. 
Addressing Barriers to Health Care Access for Informal Workers
Lifting the barriers that prevent access to health care will require local action with 
informal workers at their places of work or residence, as well as systemic reform 
in the health care system. This will, in turn, require efforts to bridge both the 
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on-the-ground reality of informal workers and the design and implementation 
of the health care system.
System-Wide Interventions
First, there is the need for improved data on the risks faced by informal workers, 
patterns of ill health that they experience, barriers to health care access that 
they face, and outcomes of their health-seeking behaviors. Second, informal 
workers must and can be included in health policy reforms and oversight of 
health service delivery. Informal workers know best the health risks that they 
face, the barriers to accessing health care that they encounter, and their health 
priorities. These workers should be represented (through elected or nominated 
leaders of their organizations) in negotiating health policy reforms, planning 
health services and related interventions, and monitoring health service delivery. 
Local Interventions
Interventions are needed where informal workers work and live that (i) educate 
them on preventive, promotive, and curative health; (ii) inform them about 
health care services; (iii) collect information on their health status; and 
(iv) monitor health conditions and disease outbreaks. Organizations of informal 
workers, where they exist, are well placed to engage in these local interventions 
in collaboration with health officials and health care providers in both the public 
and private sectors. The following ideas for interventions were derived from the 
experience of, and intensive research with, organizations working with informal 
workers in Ahmedabad and Bangkok. 
(i) Health information and advice centers. Health information and 
advice centers, located close to densely populated worksites and 
staffed by people who understand the conditions of informal workers, 
should be run and staffed by organizations of informal workers. 
Where female informal workers are better organized than men, these 
centers could be women-focused, safe places. They could be a venue 
for providing education on preventive and promotive health, as well 
as information on existing health services, including locations and 
operating hours of health facilities. They could also stock the forms 
required for registration and referral, and assist informal workers with 
filling in these forms and compiling other necessary documents. 
(ii) Digital technology. Use of digital technology, notably handheld tablets 
and mobile phones, should be used to promote preventive health 
education; provide information on health services and schemes; report 
health conditions to health care providers; and provide feedback on 
health services obtained, including their quality, from informal workers. 
This would be a direct attempt to address issues of lack of information 
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that exclude informal workers, and notably women who work in their 
own homes as home-based workers or in the homes of employers as 
domestic workers. This information should include the location of health 
facilities, services that they offer, and operating hours. Digital technology 
could also be used, as noted above, to facilitate the two-way flow of 
information between workers and health care providers in an attempt to 
secure better services, and to help in early detection and monitoring of 
epidemics.
(iii) Community health workers. Women consistently expressed the need 
for community health workers to staff information centers and engage 
with informal workers at their homes or workplaces. It was striking how 
many times in these cities, and in other areas where WIEGO works, 
poorer female workers expressed the need for people who can advise 
and support them in interpreting health messages and understanding 
how to navigate the health system. Community health workers could 
be provided with handheld tablets and mobile phones and trained in 
their use. 
(iv) Health screening. Health screening near workplaces or homes of 
informal workers, including mobile health diagnostic camps, would 
be ideal. This model of bringing health services to the people has 
been successful in many countries, with health personnel offering 
their services voluntarily. Diagnostic testing can be done for general 
diseases, occupation-specific health hazards, sight and hearing 
problems, and gynecological illnesses. 
(v) Low-cost pharmacies. Low-cost pharmacies that distribute free 
essential drugs, sell other medicines and surgical equipment at low 
cost, and help workers understand how to use drugs including the 
importance of completing prescribed dosages, are vital. Organizations 
of informal workers could be trained to run such facilities, learning 
from the model already developed by SEWA. As in the SEWA case, 
local governments could offer such organizations a no-cost loan to 
establish a round-the-clock pharmacy in or near public hospitals.
Linking Platforms
An overarching policy issue, which underpins successful implementation of 
these recommendations, is the need for engagement between informal workers 
and those in the health services as well as other departments that have control 
over working environments. Institutionalization of such platforms by the 
Government of Thailand in alliance with civil society, including organizations 
of informal workers such as HomeNet Thailand, was essential to the success of 
health care reforms there. 
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To promote health care for informal workers, there are different types of 
platforms that have been tested and are needed.
(i) Negotiating platforms. These assess barriers to health care access for 
informal workers and secure commitments for necessary health system 
reform. These should be enduring—ideally statutory—institutional 
spaces where informal workers can meet with health officials, health 
service providers, and city officials on an ongoing basis.
(ii) Planning platforms. These platforms are for planning and 
implementing appropriate health services; practical immediate 
solutions (e.g., fire extinguishers in crowded markets); and provision 
of urban infrastructure (e.g., water supply, sanitation services, garbage 
removal, street lighting, and emergency services at places where 
informal workers work and live).
(iii) Implementation platforms. These facilitate and monitor 
implementation of health service delivery (such as Thailand’s local 
health committees) and of urban infrastructure services (e.g., local 
residence and workplace committees). 
It is critical that representatives of organizations of informal workers be invited 
to participate in these platforms, be trained in negotiating skills, and be equipped 
with the necessary data and information to negotiate effectively. If this does not 
occur, such dialogues become one-off events that sometimes secure concrete 
commitments (e.g., the clearing of blocked drains in a market), but result in little 
follow-through or sustained action. 
Ideally, there should be permanent statutory platforms at the municipal level in 
which informal workers are represented in the same way that formal businesses 
have such platforms. Careful attention must be paid to representation of 
women, if the typical pattern is to be broken in which the overwhelming majority 
of members of informal workers organizations are women, but men occupy the 
leadership positions. 
There is a common logic behind the set of local interventions and linking 
platforms recommended above. First is an emphasis on health education 
for the workers themselves, using digital technology, including education on 
protection and prevention at the workplace (e.g., stressing the importance of 
posture). Second is recognition of the need to go beyond the simple “health 
education for workers themselves” model to one that promotes comprehensive 
health care and requires changes to health systems and policies. Third is a 
focus on preventive health services, not just curative health services, as a 
normal part of comprehensive health care. Fourth is emphasis on additional 
human contact (through health volunteers and community health workers) to 
reinforce health education messages, and to help facilitate access to services. 
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Fifth is bridge building through ongoing communication and negotiation 
among informal workers, health authorities, and other stakeholders. The 
logic underlying the solutions presented above also points to the need for 
system-wide institutional change.
System-Wide Institutional Change 
Both India and Thailand are in the process of health system reform. In India, it 
has been recognized that rapid urbanization has led to an underemphasis on 
urban health provision and to an increase in noncommunicable diseases. 
Thailand’s UCS has been widely acclaimed, including by informal workers. 
Occupational health is in the process of moving into public health, as in other 
countries. Reproductive health issues will continue to be covered because of 
the emphasis within public health on primary health care. However, HomeNet 
Thailand, SEWA, and WIEGO are concerned that such institutional migration 
will lead to a lack of focus on worker-related health provision, unless some public 
health personnel are trained in work-related health diagnosis and treatment. 
Recommendations
The reforms suggested below are normative principles, not operational 
recommendations. Concrete recommendations require analysis of the financial, 
institutional, and administrative capacity of the public and private sectors 
in each country or city, as well as analysis of the composition of the informal 
workforce in each country or city. More importantly, concrete recommendations 
should emerge out of consultative health policy reform processes that involve 
representatives of informal workers and their organizations, including SEWA 
and HomeNet Thailand.
It is important that the recommendations are for the benefit of all informal 
workers and their families, but all need to recognize and take into account 
women’s additional responsibilities for domestic and care work. 
From the evidence and experiences featured in this chapter, it is clear that an 
effective health care system for informal workers should include 
(i) Extensive health care infrastructure. This also necessitates adequate 
personnel, including women, especially at the primary health care level. 
As this chapter shows, the location and hours of operation of health 
services should meet the needs of those targeted for universal care, 
such as informal workers. 
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(ii) Health care workers who operate close to where informal workers 
live and work. SEWA in India has trained some female informal 
workers to be frontline health workers. In this way, they can both serve 
their communities and earn incomes doing so. Similarly, HomeNet 
Thailand is taking advantage of the system of local health volunteers 
(some of whom are HomeNet members) to introduce work-related 
health interventions. 
(iii) Efficient, appropriate, and user-friendly health registration and 
referral systems. If the target population does not receive information, 
or receives the wrong information, about services and has to stand in 
long queues for services, this creates a disincentive to take advantage 
of public services. In particular, the working poor, whether men or 
women, cannot afford the time to engage with a cumbersome and 
unfriendly system. Women are additionally disadvantaged by having 
to take family members to health services. 
(iv) Choice of registering at a health facility nearest a workplace or 
a residence, or ideally, both. In many countries, access to health 
services is governed by registration at a particular facility, which is 
usually the facility nearest to the worker’s home. For many, access 
would be improved if they could register near their place of work 
as well. A female worker needing to take her child to a clinic would 
probably prefer to go to the facility near home; if she needs to see to 
her own health problem, she may prefer to go to the clinic nearest her 
work, at a slow time during the day. Ideally, a portable “smart card”—
like the one used by the RSBY in India—would allow informal workers 
to avail of care from any facility. 
(v) A comprehensive package of services. These should be: preventive, 
promotive, and curative; primary, secondary, and tertiary; outpatient 
and inpatient. Universal health care without a focus on prevention 
makes no economic sense in terms of promoting health and well-
being, as well as productivity. 
(vi) Basic infrastructure services. These are needed to make the 
homes and workplaces of informal workers healthier, safer, and more 
productive. Similarly, more accessible, affordable transport services 
are needed between the homes and workplaces of informal workers 
and health facilities. This will require engagement with government 
departments other than health, especially at the local level. 
(vii) Reforms grounded in an understanding of the reality of work in 
the informal economy for women and men. This chapter presents 
a framework for understanding and addressing the health risks and 
barriers to health care access faced by different categories of informal 
workers (i.e., differentiated by status in employment, branch of 
economic activity, and place of work). 
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Universal health care is an achievable goal for countries at any income level. 
When Thailand achieved universal health care in 2002, the gross national 
income of the country was less than $2,000.00 per capita per year (Thai UHC 
Team 2011). Such an achievement requires a strong commitment—and a way 
of working together—on the part of politicians, technocrats, and civil society, 
including representatives of informal workers. 
Another key policy lesson is that increasing access to health care is key to 
reducing poverty and inequality. The Government of Thailand estimates that the 
UCS protected more than 75,000 households from medical impoverishment in 
2009 alone (Thai UHC Team 2011). 
This chapter highlights three important components of equitable health care 
systems: (i) regulation of services, costs, and service providers, including a 
cap on provider payments; (ii) equity in financial contributions and the use of 
health services; and (iii) affordable medicines, which is of critical importance to 
any equitable health system.
It is essential to promote a national consensus and agenda around health 
care reform by institutionalizing platforms for politicians, technocrats, and 
civil society to engage in an ongoing process of negotiating, planning, and 
implementing health reform. The importance of building bridges between the 
users and providers of health services and relevant policy makers cannot be 
overemphasized, nor can the importance of including those who have been 
excluded—notably informal workers—as key stakeholders.
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CHAPTER 11
Expanding Social Protection 
Coverage to Informal Workers: 
Implications for Policy
Sri Wening Handayani
This chapter highlights the findings and policy implications of expanding social protection for informal workers in Asia. Most literature focuses on social protection for the formal sector and does not cover the growing 
informal workforce. There is a knowledge gap on the design, financing, political 
economy, and governance of social protection coverage to this growing informal 
sector workers in Asia, particularly workers in micro, small, and medium-sized 
enterprises (MSMEs). Social protection for informal workers needs to be 
analyzed at the administrative, program, and policy levels, and various case 
studies examined to determine best practices for policy and practice. 
The case studies have shown that social protection improves the human 
development capacities of informal workers such as education, health, and 
economic well-being. While the previous chapters present policy solutions 
and recommendations that are applicable to various country conditions and 
institutional frameworks, there is still much room for further research and 
impact studies on how these social protection programs can be financially and 
institutionally sustainable in the long term. For instance, reform of national 
social protection systems can be analyzed through social budget analysis or 
actuarial valuations.
The weakening social ties and traditional forms of social protection, 
rural–urban migration, and demographic transition to a rapidly aging population 
have intensified efforts to strengthen social protection in the region. The 
informal economy workforce comprises 80.0% of the labor market in some 
countries in Asia (UNESCAP 2014). Globally, the informal economy is more 
than 90.0% of micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (ILO 2015a). 
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At the international level, high global incidence of informality and lack of social 
protection prompted 85 International Labour Organization (ILO) member 
states to adopt Recommendation No. 204, concerning the transition from the 
informal to the formal economy, at the 104th International Labour Conference 
(ILO 2015b). This calls for members to improve access to social protection 
coverage for informal sector workers, issue better infrastructure and services, 
and ensure decent work conditions. 
The succeeding sections will highlight benefits of expanding social protection 
coverage to informal workers and the components of building an effective 
social protection program. It will discuss (i) limited coverage and women in 
the informal labor market; (ii) challenges and constraints in expanding social 
protection coverage; (iii) kind and level of benefits, targeted versus universal 
provision, and benefit delivery; (iv) funding of social protection programs; 
(v) stages of social protection development, government commitment, 
and political economy; and (vi) role of donors in supporting effective social 
protection for informal workers. 
Benefits of Social Protection for Informal Workers
Social protection has benefits to offer informal sector workers. First, it helps 
reduce poverty and sustains livelihood development. Social protection such as 
unemployment benefits, work injury insurance, or health insurance provides 
better protection against income shocks and reduces vulnerabilities. For 
instance, ASKESOS or Social Welfare Insurance in Indonesia provides poor, 
informal workers with one-off cash benefits to members for illness, work-
related injuries, and death. The Philippines’ Social Security System, AlkanSSSya 
Program—a microsaving program encouraging informal workers to save—can 
enhance livelihood capabilities and supplement household needs.
Second, social protection provides economic growth and supports employability. 
Informal workers should be recognized as economic agents who buy goods 
from formal and informal suppliers, pay licenses and use of public space, even 
creating revenue for local government. These street vendors and home-based 
workers surveyed in the case studies are important components of the local and 
global value chain of production. Likewise, waste pickers sustain environmental 
sustainability, while domestic workers who perform care functions enable 
women to leave home and work in the formal sector.
Third, social protection is a human capital investment. Conditional cash 
transfers and child grants, for instance, allow children to invest in productive 
assets or skills. Health care insurance also helps labor productivity, such as 
Thailand’s Universal Health Care (UCS) that offers informal workers access 
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to health facilities, including preventive and curative services. Finally, the 
increased security and dignity that social protection provides helps families 
with disabilities and older people invest in their children and allow them a 
better future. 
Coverage and Women in the Informal Sector
Despite the progress of social protection coverage, there is still inadequate 
support and protection to informal economy workers. Existing social insurance 
schemes mainly support workers in the formal sector, and they do not cover 
the majority of informal workers in the region. Most informal workers have 
minimal protection against income insecurity caused by illness, disability, 
unemployment, or old age. Less than half of the population above statutory 
pensionable age is covered by old-age pensions, and only 34.0% of the labor 
force provides pension contributions in Asia and the Pacific (ILO 2014). 
Meanwhile, social assistance provides partial coverage with limited benefits. 
In Asia, women are more likely to be in informal employment than men (ADB 
and ILO 2011). The Social Protection Indicator in Asia and the Pacific found that 
women have less access and fewer benefits than men regarding social insurance, 
social assistance, and labor market programs (ADB 2016). The case studies 
also reveal that women are generally less employed in traditional formal sector 
work, have lower program participation rates, face greater health challenges, 
and receive lower wage rates than men. Women having lower earnings than 
men also lead them to face higher risks of poverty. Training opportunities 
should be expanded to female workers that can lead to higher pay and better 
job security. 
Women, especially those engaged in domestic work and care responsibilities, 
also have access to less information than men in the region and receive less 
social protection such as cash transfers. In social insurance programs, there 
is more difficulty in reaching women because of eligibility, participation, and 
types of risks (Holmes and Scott 2016). Eligibility is a constraint, with women 
highly represented in informal work (ILO and WEIGO 2013) and less likely to 
work in the formal sector (Floro and Meurs 2009). Thus, they are not covered 
by social insurance programs. Even when these programs are extended of the 
informal sector, women may not be able to participate because they receive 
irregular income and have casual jobs that pay lower wages. Women, due to life 
cycle risks, also have greater need for health services in reproductive health, but 
social insurance may not include these services in health insurance. In India, 
the launch of the national health insurance scheme, Rashtriya Swasthya Bima 
Yojana (RSBY), further disadvantaged women whose applications needed to 
be made by male heads of household, some of whom have migrated. 
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Some programs have built-in institutional arrangements that address these 
constraints and empower women such as India’s Self Employed Women’s 
Association (SEWA) and Bangladesh’s Rural Advancement Committee’s 
Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty Reduction-Targeting the Ultra Poor 
(CFPR-TUP) program, which includes women in the poorest households by 
providing them with productive assets such as livestock and a stipend. It also 
uses a monitoring and evaluation system that has data disaggregated by gender 
and indicators that empowers women (Holmes and Jones 2013). 
Those that are not covered by social protection receive informal support from 
families and other kinship ties. Families are the traditional providers of informal 
social protection in Asia, with children expected to care for older parents. The 
family also has a role in caring for other vulnerable members of society. While this 
is still prevalent, market expansion, urbanization, and migration has weakened 
this practice. However, some policy makers still promote this belief that the 
family and not the state is the main source of support. This has influenced the 
trajectory of social protection design, such as in Viet Nam, where older people 
can only receive a social pension if they do not have children to care for them 
(Kidd et al. 2015). There is, however, progress away from this thinking in some 
countries, such as Bangladesh, wherein the National Social Security Strategy 
used the weakening of traditional support systems to expand the country’s 
old-age allowance into a citizen’s pension (Government of Bangladesh, 
Planning Commission, General Economics Division 2015). 
Challenges and Constraints in Expanding  
Social Protection
There are many challenges in including the informal economy workforce in 
social protection programs. Lack of affordability and low awareness of program 
benefits and registration are some of the reasons for limited social protection 
coverage among informal sector workers. In Pakistan, for example, construction 
workers are unwilling to part with a portion of their income and are reluctant to 
register to the Employees Social Security Institution, as they prefer to spend 
on more immediate needs. In the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the high 
contribution rates and laws that require participation in all five social insurance 
programs simultaneously provide a disincentive to informal workers with low, 
irregular incomes. 
Inadequate administrative and financial capacity is another challenge 
to expanding social protection beyond the formal sector. There are high 
administrative and transaction costs such as registration of pension systems 
in remote, rural areas. There is also lack of coordination in social protection 
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programs for countries, such as Bangladesh where 13 ministries are involved in 
the delivery of social protection services. This lack of coordination constraints 
the development and implementation of these programs (Sharif 2009). 
Similarly, in Pakistan, involvement of various ministries and departments results 
in lack of consistency, weak beneficiary targeting, and unreliable benefit delivery 
(Malik and Pop 2013). 
Benefit portability of social protection programs is also a pressing policy 
objective in extending social protection to informal sector workers. Benefit 
portability minimizes the vulnerabilities that migrant workers face, thus 
protecting their basic human and social rights. In the PRC, for instance, migrant 
workers are registered in social insurance programs for residents in their hukou 
or place of participant’s birth and not eligible to participate in areas to which 
they have migrated. Similarly, in Viet Nam, temporary migrants are unable to 
access social protection benefits unless they return to their home country. 
Another critical challenge is the political economy factors involved in social 
protection design and implementation. The governing elites still prioritize 
formal sector workers and more prominent groups rather than the majority 
of informal sector workers, which makes social protection spending in Asia 
regressive (Claus, Martinez-Vazquez, and Vulovic 2012). Mongolia’s political 
party first proposed the Child Money Program as a platform for the 2004 
election, and, after its electoral success, was given fiscal space to make the 
program universal. There are universal pensions in Asia with low transfer values, 
such as the PRC, which only offers 1.0% of gross domestic product (GDP) per 
capita, or Viet Nam at 7.0% (Kidd and Damerau 2016).
Some innovations in the microinsurance sector have overcome these 
challenges by introducing flexible payment options and covering the cost of 
participation in insurance schemes. Other lessons in microfinance include 
elimination of fixed fees, facilitation of easy payments, and reduction of indirect 
costs (Holmes and Scott 2016). Allowing MSMEs to opt in and out of social 
insurance programs may also be favorable to employees with low, irregular 
incomes in the informal sector. 
A successful collaboration in India is the union of waste pickers in Pune who 
created a cooperative and entered into a partnership with the municipality to 
form Pune Municipal Corporation. The latter pays their annual premium for 
basic health insurance. It is the only municipality in which the government 
contributes to the health insurance of informal workers (Chen and Lund 2016). 
Extending social protection outside of contributory schemes to reach informal 
workers needs benefit eligibility to be disentangled from employment status. 
This means allowing the social protection program to be independent from 
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formal sector employment. Examples of these are voluntary contributory 
pensions, noncontributory health care, and microinsurance. These programs 
enhance the education, health care, housing, and well-being of beneficiaries. 
Benefit Determination, Targeting, and Delivery
Benefit determination denotes whether benefits should be provided in cash 
or in kind. Cash transfers give beneficiaries the choice to decide on how best 
to meet their individual needs, while in-kind transfers may be better suited for 
individuals in extreme poverty. Determination of benefit levels for the informal 
sector may be dependent on program funding or the financial capacity of local 
governments. They can benefit from asset transfers such as food, livestock, 
or land. 
A benefit level set too low lessens income insecurity and poverty reduction, 
while a benefit value that is set too high will limit the number of potential 
beneficiaries. Program funding issues are a challenge in the determination of 
an appropriate benefit level for informal workers, particularly since they do not 
make contributions to the tax-based social transfer programs.
Targeting social protection programs or ensuring universal provision is 
also a widely contested debate. The informal sector lacks documentation, 
heterogeneity, and stability of employment, and targeting informal sector 
workers may result in high administrative and financial costs despite the 
benefits of inclusion error reduction. 
The pattern of relative benefits presents a situation where nonpoor households 
receive no or relatively few benefits from social protection. They are called the 
“missing middle” of social protection systems—households that are neither in a 
position to benefit from social insurance because they are not employed in the 
formal sector (public or private sector firms) nor in a position to benefit from 
social assistance because they are not identified as poor (ADB 2013).
Some universal schemes offer higher benefits and help both low- and 
middle-income families, including those in the informal economy. For instance, 
the value of Nepal’s cash transfer program is one-third of the country’s 
social protection spending, and the Maldives’ new health insurance program, 
Aasandha, accounts for 45.0% of all social protection expenditures in the 
country (ADB 2016). Comparatively, targeted schemes in India and Bangladesh 
offer only 2.0% and 5.0% of GDP per capita, respectively. 
Program governance, design, and implementation arrangements also affect 
targeting effectiveness. Among those issues considered in the previous chapters 
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are lack of awareness and transparency of eligibility criteria, inconsistencies 
in scoring criteria, inadequate income and beneficiary verification, weak 
monitoring and oversight, and ineffective grievance redress. Indonesia’s 
temporary Bantuan Langsung Tunai (direct cash assistance) unconditional cash 
transfer program reveals weaknesses in program implementation, with poor 
targeting of households that were neither poor nor near-poor, receiving 30.0%-
40.0% of program benefits (World Bank 2012). Ultimately, targeting must be 
done on a case-to-case basis that considers potential administrative costs and 
possible exclusion errors. 
Meanwhile, benefit payment methods affect beneficiaries’ choice of program 
selection and participation. It also affects the cost and impact of the social 
protection program. It can increase the cost or diminish the impact of the 
program if delivery is inefficient. The supply side should be accessible, such as 
having health clinics and schools available locally.
Delivering social protection to informal workers is challenging since it is difficult 
to determine which individuals and households are part of this sector. The use 
of information and communication technology (ICT) in beneficiary enrollment 
through a single registry management information system (MIS) can ensure 
more equitable distribution and establish linkages that increase the efficiency 
of design and delivery. It also allows universal targeting, which minimizes 
inclusion errors and increases cost-effectiveness of social protection programs. 
Indonesia’s Basis Data Terpadu (Unified Database) national registry unifies 
informal workers across the country for beneficiary targeting. Tim Nasional 
Percepatan Penanggulangan Kemiskinan (TNP2K) manages the database to 
determine program eligibility. The Philippines also has a sophisticated national 
database under the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps). An MIS can 
further reduce costs and scale up affordable programs.
Other delivery methods used are direct deposit (e.g., in India’s Mahatma Gandhi 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act), smart card and mobile phone 
banking (e.g., in Pakistan’s Benazir Income Support Programme [BISP]), and 
home delivery (e.g., in Thailand’s Old-Age Allowance). India’s National Social 
Assistance Program, which included informal sector beneficiaries in 2008, 
allows beneficiaries to access benefits through commercial banks, post offices, 
and local government meetings in rural areas. 
Financing Social Protection
There is evidence in Asia that the establishment of an inclusive life cycle system 
of social protection is fiscally feasible. However, the only means to guarantee 
access to social protection for informal workers is through social transfers 
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financed by general taxation. While transitional cofinancing of benefits through 
donors is helpful, social protection systems should be financed through national 
budgets for long-term sustainability. 
Major gaps in social protection of informal sector workers can be closed with only 
about 2.0%–3.0% of GDP (Cichon and Cichon 2016). ADB’s Social Protection 
Index (SPI) (ADB 2013) highlights the Republic of Korea’s SPI as an attainable 
benchmark for at least middle-income countries in Asia and the Pacific. Its total 
social protection expenditures per intended beneficiary in 2009 was equivalent 
to 20.0% of poverty-line expenditures, or 5.0% of GDP per capita (as poverty-
line expenditures average one-quarter of GDP per capita). 
Financing additional social protection consists of finding new fiscal space from 
possible reallocation of existing expenditure or reprioritization of the current 
budget. Social protection financing can also be drawn from domestic sources 
and improved tax collection.
Increasing taxation is recommended only for countries with a revenue level of 
less than 25.0% of GDP, but improved tax collection or expenditure allocation 
is sufficient to finance closure of basic social protection gaps. Only a few 
countries cannot finance closure of basic social protection gaps because of 
extremely high poverty rates and may require transitional and external financial 
support, such as development assistance. 
Some Policy Implications 
Implementation of social protection programs with limited administrative 
requirements is possible. Monitoring and evaluation with an MIS can be simple 
initially and then expand progressively as program requirements evolve. A 
larger-scale social protection system can reform and adjust with political will 
for new social protection measures.
To finance these social protection programs for informal workers, governments 
should invest in tax and contribution collection. Political commitment to 
higher social spending and taxation, with policy makers placing value on social 
protection, is also needed as a beneficial component of the market economy 
that functions more effectively when a comprehensive system is in place. 
Governance, institutional framework, and labor law enforcement are indicators 
of government commitment that drive initiation and expansion of social 
protection coverage. For instance, India employs a top–down approach and 
leaves little room to adapt to local conditions, while other countries, such as 
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the PRC, are highly decentralized and allow autonomy in government decision 
making on beneficiary selection and level of benefits. The PRC’s Minimum 
Living Standard Guarantee (MLSG) scheme, the centerpiece of the country’s 
social welfare system, determines income transfers to households below a 
stated threshold locally. Local governments set MLSG eligibility thresholds, 
which reflect the government’s fiscal capacity more than the difference in costs 
of living. However, richer regions with more resources and fewer poor residents 
tend to set higher lines, and this restricts eligibility and adequacy of benefits to 
meet people’s needs in poorer areas (Babajanian 2016). 
The involvement of the central government in regulation and procedures while 
allowing for local adjustments to reflect local circumstances is a means to balance 
policy priorities. Moderate decentralization is key where central governments 
regulate program rules governing eligibility and benefit calculations but also 
allow for local autonomy to ensure inclusion and equity.
Structural reforms that inhibit further participation of informal workers in 
social protection programs are necessary in countries like Pakistan, where 
implementation of labor law is weak on the absence of unions in the informal 
sector, or in the PRC, which requires participation in all five social insurance 
programs at the same time. The MSME case studies of Bangladesh, the PRC, 
Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Philippines reveal that favorable work hours, 
awareness programs on work environments, access to health and safety 
equipment, and better enforcement of minimum wage can improve working 
conditions. The absence of contracts in countries such as Bangladesh 
exacerbates worker insecurity and provides a disincentive for employers to offer 
social protection programs. Informal workers should be included in the scope of 
labor laws to improve their employment arrangements and productivity.
Effective labor law enforcement is another indicator of good governance. 
About half (45.0%) of informal workers in the case studies are not registered 
with the social security system, and 68.0% are not covered by health insurance. 
There is weak compliance of labor requirements that informal workers must 
be covered by social protection. Further, countries such as Pakistan have labor 
laws that are subject to employment of 10 or more workers, and it becomes 
common practice for MSMEs and informal establishments to hire contractual 
laborers and not declare them as workers, effectively depriving them of their 
legal social protection coverage. Thus, informal workers need an organized 
voice that recognizes their rights as economic agents and empowers them 
through increased access to quality, relevant skills training. Improving labor laws 
and rights, and eligibility criteria of social protection programs, can promote fair 
treatment and decent work conditions.
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Governments can further capitalize on civil society organizations’ proximity to 
local populations and empower them to effectively mobilize social groups and 
encourage public participation. For example, HomeNet Thailand presented a 
health reform bill to the Parliament in Thailand, a move that helped support 
health care reform in the country and encourage the introduction of the UCS. 
India is also an example of the positive force of unions and organizations in 
pushing the social protection agenda. VimoSEWA, a health insurance for the 
Self Employed Women’s Association (SEWA), is organized and managed by 
poor workers. 
Social protection addresses the economic and social needs of informal 
workers—a sector often exposed to hazardous risks and poor working conditions 
without adequate social security, health insurance, or unemployment benefits. 
When contributory schemes for formal sector workers do not meet the needs 
of the growing informal workforce in Asia, voluntary contributory pensions, 
noncontributory health care, and microinsurance are some of the important 
policy alternatives. Another way to extend social insurance to informal workers 
is for governments to subsidize insurance premiums or contributions for low-
income groups. 
The effectiveness of social protection depends on the design and 
implementation arrangements, the effectiveness of benefit delivery and choice 
of eligibility criteria, financing, governance, and political will. Donor support from 
development agencies and nongovernment organizations are also important in 
the establishment, monitoring, and evaluation of social protection programs. 
It is necessary to manage donor support and tailor programs to a country’s 
social, political, and economic context to maximize the positive impact of social 
protection programs. Multilateral and bilateral donors also provide funding that 
supports good social and fiscal governance. 
Employers or owners of capital who currently evade responsibility for social 
provisions should be given incentives to contribute to informal workers’ 
social protection. A multistakeholder approach is needed wherein donors, 
governments, the corporate sector, trade unions, and member organizations of 
the informal sector can build empowerment among workers. This requires the 
informal workforce to be organized with sufficient voice and bargaining power 
to enter into national dialogues that help them shape policies that suit their 
local circumstances and livelihoods.
Last, social protection needs to be seen as a long-term investment that 
enhances productive capacities and addresses gender inequalities at the 
intrahousehold and societal level. Access to basic services contributes to 
economic growth during the life cycle, increases labor productivity in informal 
work, and strengthens societal relations among communities. A gradual 
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approach in expanding social protection to informal sector workers can achieve 
the broader development objectives of equity and social inclusion that remain 
one of the region’s major social policy challenges.
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